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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This dissertation investigates specific dimensions of social citizenship 
in China and the Nordic countries. The research aim is trifold. Firstly, 
the normative foundations of citizenship are uncovered, both from a 
normative-theoretical perspective and from an empirical perspective. 
Secondly, the degree to which the official Chinese goal of increasing 
universalism has been achieved is investigated across the three policy 
fields of unemployment protection, health care and pensions. Thirdly, 
comparative reform paths in China and the Nordic countries vis-à-vis 
universalism and social rights in the same three policy fields are 
uncovered.   
From a normative-theoretical perspective, social liberal or 
’egalitarian’ liberal citizenship is outlined on the basis of T.H. 
Marshall. ‘Confucianism’ is discussed as an approach to citizenship 
in comparison with traditional Western counterparts, including 
republicanism, communitarianism and liberalism. Conservatism is 
also included, and it is emphasized that Confucianism and social 
conservatism share some resemblances. Empirically, Chinese and 
Nordic citizens have distinct perceptions and normative orientations 
in terms of welfare and inequality, but this partly reflects that China is 
a strong outlier in the ISSP 2009 survey.  By the statistical method of 
latent class analysis, four qualitatively different types of citizens 
emerge within each country. One corresponds roughly to egalitarian 
liberalism, while the other to some extent resembles ‘Confucianism’. 
Potential theoretical explanations are discussed.   
As regards the second research question, it is concluded that China 
has taken significat leaps towards more universal welfare, although it 
is primarily insurance-based. This includes increased coverage of 
existing schemes as well as the extension of new schemes within all 
three policy fields. This trend is most pronounced in the field of 
health insurance. The hukou-based divide in social rights is less 
pronounced than before. On the other hand, inadequate and even 
declining adequacy for those covered is also a pronounced trend. Big 
challenges in terms of financing and fragmentation across hukou and 
geographical divides remain. This is most pronounced in the field of 
pensions.  
Finally, it is shown how certain historical paths towards more 
universal welfare are shared between China and the Nordic countries. 
The timescale is relatively ‘compressed’ in China, and the Chinese 
problems partly reflect the challenge of extending and restructuring 
the welfare system at the same time. The points of departure are very 
different, but both China and the Nordic countries have reformed 
their pension systems towards multitiered and multipillar pension 
systems. Declining generosity of unemployment protection is also a 
shared experience. The Nordic pension systems do not share the same 
inadequacies and future problems, however, and Nordic 
unemployment protection is relatively more universal. The policy 
field of health care is where Sino-Nordic differences are most 
pronounced, although some historical Nordic mechanisms of 
‘universalization’ resemble the current Chinese trends. It is also 
emphasized, however, that many of these common trends, whether 
historical or contemporary, are not exclusive to these five country 
cases. The Nordic development is to some extent general to other 
Western welfare states, just as some traits of Chinese social reforms 
resemble changes in other developing economies.  

VII 
DANSK RESUME 
Denne afhandling undersøger specifikke dimensioner af det sociale 
medborgerskab i Kina og de nordiske lande. Problemstillingen er 
grundlæggende tredelt. For det første afdækkes medborgerskabets 
normative grundlag, både fra et normativt-teoretisk perspektiv og fra 
et empirisk perspektiv. For det andet undersøges det i hvor høj grad 
det officielle kinesiske mål om mere universel velfærd er blevet 
opnået på policyområderne sundhed, pension og arbejdsløshed. For 
det tredje undersøges komparative reformveje i Kina og de nordiske 
lande i forhold til universalisme og sociale rettigheder inden for de 
samme tre policyområder.  
Fra et normativt-teoretisk perspektiv redegøres der for den 
socialliberale eller ’elagitært’ liberale medborgerskole med 
udgangspunkt i T.H. Marshall. ’Konfucianisme’ diskuteres som 
medborgerskabsperspektiv i sammenligning med traditionelle vestlige 
skoler som republikanisme, kommunitarisme og liberalisme. 
Konservatisme inddrages også, og det understreges at konfucianisme 
har meget tilfælles med socialkonservatisme. Empirisk har kinesere 
og nordboer i visse tilfælde ret forskellige virkelighedsopfattelser og 
normative holdninger til velfærd eftersom Kina i ISSP 2009-
undersøgelsen er en empirisk ’outlier’ på visse områder. Med den 
statistiske metode latent class analysis ser vi dog også hvordan fire 
kvalitativt forskellige medborgertyper fremkommer inden for hvert 
enkelt land, hvoraf den ene stemmer nogenlunde overens med 
’egalitært liberale’ idealer og den anden er mere ’konfuciansk’. 
Forskellige teoretiske forklaringer på de empiriske resultater 
diskuteres.       
Hvad angår det andet forskningsmål konkluderes det at Kina har taget 
store skridt henimod mere universel velfærd, om end det først og 
fremmest er forsikringsbaseret velfærd. Dette indbefatter både 
markant højere dækning af eksisterende ordninger og helt nye 
velfærdsordninger inden for alle tre policyområder. Dette er mest 
markant på sundhedsområdet. Skillelinjerne i sociale rettigheder 
baseret på hukou-systemet er samtidig mindre udtalte end før. På den 
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anden side er utilstrækkelig sikkerhed eller direkte forringet 
tilstrækkelighed af disse velfærdsordninger også et gennemgående 
særtræk. Der er store problemer forbundet med måden hvorpå disse 
ordninger er finansieret, ligesom stærkt fragmenteret velfærd på tværs 
af hukou og geografi stadig er en stor udfordring. Dette gælder især 
pensionsområdet.    
Endelig vises det hvordan visse historiske veje henimod mere 
universel velfærd er fælles mellem Kina og de nordiske lande. Den 
relative tidsskala er stærkt sammenpresset i Kina, og en del af den 
kinesiske udfordring består i at udvide velfærdssystemet samtidig 
med at det tilpasses moderne udfordringer. Udgangspunkterne er vidt 
forskellige, men både Kina og de nordiske lande har forsøgt at 
reformere deres pensionssystemer henimod mere komplekse 
’søjlebaserede’ systemer. Forringet arbejdsløshedsunderstøttelse er 
også et fællestræk. De nordiske pensionssystemer deler dog ikke de 
samme grundlæggende utilstrækkeligheder og fremtidsudfordringer, 
ligesom nordisk arbejdsløshedsunderstøttelse stadig er mere 
universel. Sundhedsområdet er det område hvor de kinesisk-nordiske 
forskelle er mest udtalte, om end visse historisk nordiske 
udviklingstræk henimod mere universel velfærd minder om de 
nuværende kinesiske. Det understreges dog også at mange af disse 
fællestræk, både historiske og samtidige, ikke er eksklusive for disse 
fem lande. Udviklingen i de nordiske lande har fællestræk med 
generelle reformtendenser i de vestlige lande, ligesom den kinesiske 
udvikling på visse områder minder om andre udviklingsøkonomier.  
IX 
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CHAPTER 1. SETTING SAIL TOWARDS 
THE UNCHARTERED TERRITORIES OF 
SINO-NORDIC CITIZENSHIP 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
After a tumultuous period of market reform followed by major social 
upheaval, China has in recent years been preoccupied with building a 
new welfare state on the rubble of the old welfare system of the 
planned economy. This entails social policymaking on a scale never 
seen before in human history. Literature investigating this daunting 
task has proliferated in recent years. As I will argue later, however, 
most policy-oriented studies of China do not engage the equally 
daunting task of making a comprehensive account of progress and 
challenges across several policy fields. The first aim of this 
dissertation is to do this in consideration of the official Chinese goals 
of making public welfare provision more universal. It will be shown 
how recent reforms in pensions, health and unemployment protection 
certainly has increased coverage of social protection, while big 
challenges remain in terms of  securing adequate protection for those 
covered and breaking down old inequalities and divides in a very 
fragmented welfare system.  
Furthermore, it will also be argued that comprehensive studies of 
China in a comparative perspective are much rarer still. Therefore, 
this becomes the second important aim of this dissertation. As we will 
elaborate below, the choice of a Sino-Nordic framework is not as 
hopeless as it may seem, especially given the official Chinese goal of 
achieving ‘moderate universalism’. Some similar policy dynamics 
can be identified when we adopt a wider historical perspective on the 
Nordic1 policy development. On the other hand, since we will be 
                                                          
1 The Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, but Iceland 
is not included in this dissertation. Furthermore, ‘Scandinavia’ will sometimes be used to 
refer to Denmark, Norway and Sweden.   
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making big comparative leaps with these very different country cases, 
a wider comparative context will also be established with help from 
the literature on East Asian and global social policy developments. 
This will help us understand that some of the Chinese social policy 
trends are not wholly unique to China. We will also see how China, in 
comparison with the Nordic countries, is experiencing something of a 
‘compressed’ timescale. Contemporary China is expanding its social 
policies while at the same time trying to adapt or recalibrate them to 
modern challenges. In the Nordic and other Western welfare states, 
these tendencies have been more neatly separated into different 
phases of welfare expansion and welfare adaption (some would argue 
for retrenchment) spanning several decades.  
Finally, we will also establish a normative context for these very 
different country cases. Here we will draw upon various schools of 
thought on the relationship between state and individual with a 
particular emphasis on egalitarian or social liberalism on the one hand 
and Confucianism on the other. The former is traditionally seen as a 
core feature of the Nordic ‘model’ welfare regime, while the latter is 
strongly associated with China and also features heavily in official 
discourse. They are very different visions of social citizenship, but it 
is too simplified simply to see the one as strongly egalitarian and the 
other as strongly inegalitarian.  
We will also investigate the empirical basis of normative social 
citizenship. This means that we will uncover different groups or 
typologies of citizens based on their attitudes towards welfare and 
investigate the social divides with which they are associated in each 
country case. We will se how Chinese and Nordic citizens certainly 
do seem to think differently in terms of the role of public welfare. 
Generally, the Chinese seem to be more accepting of inequality in 
welfare provision as long as the public provides basic welfare for 
everyone. On the other hand, some of the individual-level as well as 
country-level dynamics that we will uncover also question this simple 
interpretation. 
CHAPTER 1. SETTING SAIL TOWARDS THE UNCHARTERED TERRITORIES OF SINO-NORDIC CITIZENSHIP 
19 
Having sketched the aims of this dissertation and lifted the veil a little 
bit on some of the main conclusions, the motivations for this study 
can be fleshed out.  
It is a well-known story how China in the post-Maoist era charged 
full steam ahead into economic reform and consequently experienced 
very high economic growth and development. In the 32 years from 
1978 to 2012, Chinese GDP grew on average by 9.7% per year (Zhao 
2013). Economic reform did not only allow a small minority of 
Chinese citizens to “get rich first”, as Deng Xiaopeng purportedly 
phrased it. It also pulled more than 600 million Chinese out of 
extreme poverty when measured at the international standard of 1.25 
USD per day (adjusted for purchasing power). China by itself 
represents more than two thirds of the global decline in extreme 
poverty in most recent decades (The Economist 2013; Lu 2012). This 
is perhaps the single greatest step towards better welfare in recent 
human history. Yet, the rewards of economic growth by itself have 
limits, and that is also true in the arena of social development. After 
the initial successes following the early reform period, continued 
economic growth did not bring about continued social progress to the 
same extent. In the new millennium, reports from the World Bank on 
poverty and the United Nations Development Programme on health 
and education concluded that development seemed to be stalling 
(Zhao 2013). World Bank analysts Ravallion & Chen (2007:38) 
painted the picture that China had previously been reaping the “low-
lying fruits of efficiency enhancing pro-poor reforms”. With no more 
low-lying fruits, further social progress will require active social 
policymaking rather than just the removal of old obstacles for an 
efficient market economy. 
At the same time, the economic reforms also had some major side 
effects. Economic inequality skyrocketed alongside economic growth. 
Measured by the gini coefficient, it increased to just below 0.5 in the 
1990s, and has since stabilized at around 0.47 according to the 
estimates used by both official Chinese statistics and international 
organizations such as the World Bank (Herd 2013; World Bank 
2012). This would make modern China a society marked by a high 
degree of inequality, above American levels for example, yet not as 
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high as other major developing economies such as India and Brazil. 
Yet, some claim that the poorest have been underrepresented in these 
surveys. For example, a household survey in 2012 pegged the gini 
coefficient at 0.61 (The Economist 2012). Whatever the precise 
extent of economic inequality, the market reforms introduced into 
China the social risks associated with a market economy and 
privatized welfare provision. For example, it became commonplace to 
talk of the ‘three mountains’ that Chinese households had to climb by 
financing health, education and housing themselves (Ngok & Huang 
2014). These are just a few examples of the consequences of the 
dismantling of the old welfare system which was connected to 
employment within the old planned economy. Social upheaval at such 
a massive scale of course has great potential to threaten social 
stability. Thousands of protests involving millions of people became 
commonplace, and they increased in number in the new millennium 
(Zhao 2013; Chan 2010). There were for example 87.000 protests in 
2006 alone, which was somewhat of a peak at the time.   
In this context, Chinese policymakers quickly became preoccupied 
with introducing and extending new social protection schemes. In the 
middle and late 1990s, China took its first steps into the art of art of 
conducting social policy within a market economy. Health care, 
education, poverty alleviation, unemployment, pensions and housing 
are some of the most significant policy fields where major reforms 
have taken place (Ngok & Huang 2014; Ngok 2013; Herd 2013; 
CDRF 2012; Duckett & Carrillo 2011; Chan et. al. 2008). These 
social reforms were accompanied by a new political discourse in the 
new millennium. The aim of building a socialist ‘harmonious’ society 
was adopted by the Party Congress in 2006. Importantly, the term 
‘social policy’ was used for the first time in official documents in 
2006 as the vision of the harmonious society was spelled out. The 
goal of achieving a ‘moderate’ or ‘appropriate’ universal welfare 
state, first promoted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, was adopted by 
the government at the same time (Lei & Walker 2013; China.org.cn 
2012; Cook & Lam 2011). Earlier in the new millennium, the CCP 
had also promulgated the idea of the ‘scientific outlook on 
development’, which included a commitment to a much more 
balanced social development (Ngok 2013). Recent five-year plans 
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have repeatedly affirmed the goal of increasing coverage of existing 
schemes and also reducing their inherent divides in terms of social 
rights.   
Far away from China in more than just the geographical sense, the 
Nordic countries have for decades been perceived as mature welfare 
regimes characterized by universal social policymaking, at least to a 
higher degree than elsewhere. A distinct ‘Nordic model’ of social 
policy has been an international brand for these countries since the 
post-World War II-period (Petersen 2011). Traditionally, the ‘Nordic 
model’ has been associated with a high degree of social policy 
universalism in the form of comprehensive coverage, generous 
benefits and services and a high degree of redistribution, among other 
characteristics (Kautto 2010; Kildal & Kuhnle 2005; Eitrheim & 
Kuhnle 2000; Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen & Korpi 
1986; Titmuss 1974). The issue of whether and how the Nordic 
countries remain distinct has been the subject of much discussion in 
comparative welfare research (some recent extensive reports or 
anthologies focusing on the Nordic countries include for example 
Dølvik et. al. 2014; Kananen 2014; Valkonen & Vihriäla 2014; Kvist 
et. al. 2012; Hvinden & Johansson 2007; Kangas & Palme 2005; 
Kautto et. al. 2001). Arguably, the Nordic countries have been most 
distinct on a range of social outcome characteristics including (but not 
only) high income equality, high social trust, high social participation 
and support for the welfare state (Larsen 2013a; Kvist et. al. 2012; 
Fritzell et. al. 2012). From a comparative perspective, the Nordic 
countries have often seemed to embody a happy marriage between 
economic prosperity, equality and social cohesion. Therefore, the 
Nordic countries in many ways seem to be one of the most 
‘harmonious’ corners of the world.  
1.2 RESEARCH AIM: DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
As indicated by the above, the basic aim of this is thesis is to 
investigate social citizenship in China and the Nordic countries from 
a comparative perspective. This is a very general goal, but in this case 
it will be narrowed down to three main aims. Firstly, we will make 
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normative social citizenship an object of analysis. This will take the 
form of an enquiry into public welfare attitudes just as we will discuss 
various normative approaches to social citizenship, including 
Confucianism and social/egalitarian liberalism. Secondly, progress 
and challenges vis-à-vis the goal of universalism will be investigated 
with a focus on unemployment protection, health insurance and 
pensions in the Chinese case. Thirdly, a comparative Sino-Nordic 
perspective on social rights will be adopted. Here, the policy 
dynamics of the Chinese development will be compared with broader 
historical policy changes of the Nordic countries.  
If we frame these three aims as questions within the overall goal of 
exploring social citizenship, they could be phrased like this: 
 Firstly, what are the normative foundations of citizenship in 
China and the Nordic countries, both from a normative-
theoretical perspective and in terms of welfare attitudes 
among the citizenry? 
 Secondly, to what degree has the goal of achieving more 
universal welfare in China been achieved regarding health, 
unemployment and pensions, and what are the challenges in 
this regard? 
 Thirdly, what have been the comparative policy reform paths 
in China and the Nordic countries vis-à-vis universalism and 
social rights in the same three policy fields? 
Section 1.6 will further elaborate how this analysis and the rest of the 
dissertation will be structured. As I will further elaborate in chapter 2 
and 3, the three research questions will lead us to investigate some 
specific aspects or dimensions of social citizenship within the 
comparative framework of this thesis.   
Social citizenship is is a broad concept spanning not only policies and 
attitudes, but also a range of other social outcomes that are relevant 
for the practice of citizenship between citizens. While raising the 
general standard of living or combatting economic inequalities 
concern the classic material aspects of welfare outcomes, the social 
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outcomes of citizenship is concerned with how citizens perceive both 
themselves and others and how they act towards their fellow citizens.  
At the heart of it all is the basic question of how the principles on 
which welfare policies are based promote citizenship and alleviate 
inequalities or if they perhaps even exacerbate inequalities and 
undermine citizenship. Real-world social policymaking is usually 
gray rather than black and white, but such questions are at the heart of 
any welfare or citizenship regime.  
This thesis will not investigate social outcomes beyond those related 
to welfare attitudes (chiefly due to limitations in terms of comparative 
data), but is important to keep in mind and will be discussed 
conceptually later.  
Apart from this analytical conception, social citizenship can also be 
grounded normatively as a range of theoretical schools with 
prescriptions and ideals for policies and citizenship practices. Such 
ideals may in turn be reflected in the attitudes of the citizenry, even if 
citizens are not explicitly aware of the labels we may use to 
distinguish between different forms of normative citizenship.   
1.3 WHY CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES? 
The selection of cases is of course very much a design issue. 
Therefore, chapter 2 will deal with this question as a design issue. 
However, we may still ask ourselves what inspired this particular 
choice of countries. .  
I will be wary to claim that this thesis can further policy learning 
between China and the Nordic countries. Such a perspective easily 
evolves into a discussion on what developing China can learn from 
the developed Nordic welfare states. There is a strong research 
tradition emphasizing the role of policy learning as a process of 
international policy transfer or diffusion (see for example Benson & 
Jordan (2011) or Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) for reviews) and it has 
even expanded to the global level as we will see in chapter 11. Yet, 
this literature has long since moved beyond the notion that specific 
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policies can be copied across different national contexts. Furthermore, 
to the extent that direct policy transfer has been found to play a role, 
it has usually been across similar national contexts, for example in the 
way that policy transfer and the power of comparison certainly did 
play a role in the early development of the Nordic welfare states 
(Kettunen 2011; Petersen 2011). In official discourse, China has 
lauded the development experience of Singapore repeatedly since the 
time of Deng Xiaopeng (Zhao & Wong 2013).  
On the other hand, the Chinese reform experience is riddled with 
examples of active policy learning far beyond just the immediate 
neighbours of China. Examples are many. For example, the current 
multipillar set-up of the Chinese pension system as promulgated from 
1997 and onwards (see chapter 8) was inspired by World Bank 
recommendations at the time (Orenstein & Deacon 2014; Frazier 
2010; Salditt et. al. 2007). An official review of the unemployment 
insurance systems of more than 40 countries preceded the reform of 
the Chinese scheme in 1999 (Leung 2005). Public Employment 
Services Centers became national policy in the new millennium, 
inspired by ILO-recommendations (Xu 2012). In terms of managing 
the public sector, official Chinese discourse has looked to the West in 
terms of ‘good governance’, ‘new public management’ and more 
competitive public sector job allocation, although such inspirations 
have of course been translated into the Chinese context of the party-
state (Burns 2014). At the same time, some of the new Chinese policy 
discourse, such as the notion of moderate universalism mentioned 
above, might point to an increasing attention to the potentials of Sino-
Nordic policy learning. As a point in case, the Development Research 
Centre of the Chinese State Council, an official think-tank reporting 
directly to the Chinese Prime Minister, refers several times to various 
policies in Nordic countries in its report Constructing a Social 
Welfare System for All in China (CDRF 2012). The foundations for 
the report were laid during a study trip to Copenhagen.   
Comparative research can therefore by itself add to this potential 
policy dialogue. I hope that that this thesis will be able to further the 
Sino-Nordic research dialogue in the field of welfare research, or a 
more limited form of ‘research’ transfer, if you will. Chinese attention 
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to the Nordic countries has certainly been growing at the research 
level at the same time as scholarly interest in China has increased in 
the Nordic countries and the West in general.  
Chinese social policy research into the Nordic countries began 
already in the 1980s, but bloomed in the late 1990s (Zhang 2013a; 
Lin 2001). Sweden has dominated the Chinese literature since the 
beginning. At the same time as Chinese researchers have been 
lauding some of the accomplishments widely attributed to the Nordic 
welfare regimes, Chinese research has also been marked by 
ambivalence about the desirability of the Nordic path. The more 
negative perceptions stem from traditional critiques of the welfare 
state in terms of economic efficiency and sustainability (Lin 2001).  
For Nordic academics (and Western scholars in general), the research 
dialogue has greatly improved in most recent years with the very 
significant increase in research written in English. The wide body of 
literature cited in this thesis is a testament to this. Arguably, this 
dissertation would not have been possible had it begun just five years 
earlier. The number of scientific articles looking into various welfare 
issues in China are now almost beyond count. At the same time, there 
is still only a relatively limited number of really comprehensive 
works on China, although the literature has expanded in most recent 
years. Notable are Zhao (2013), Baehler & Besharov (2013), Li et. al. 
(2013), Duckett & Carillo (2011) and Zhao & Lim (2010). These are 
all anthologies, however, and Chan et. al. (2008) is still an essential 
piece of work with a both general and in-depth account of the Chinese 
case, although the significant reforms since 2008 are of course absent.  
If one is searching for comprehensive research with a comparative 
framework, a blind stroke of luck would very nearly be required. It is 
certainly possible to find recent comparative literature, but this 
typically comes in the form of broad cross-country anthologies where 
individual authors act as experts on one single country in each 
chapter. Yan (2014), Li (2013a) and Izuhara (2013) are a few recent 
examples. Walker & Wong (2005) also deserves mention, but this is 
once again not entirely up-to-date. 
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Comprehensive studies of China are therefore relatively limited, and 
those including China in a comparative framework are much rarer 
still.  In addition, almost nothing has been done from a Sino-Nordic 
comparative framework. Kuhnle (2011) called for a Nordic-East 
Asian welfare dialogue and reviewed some very basic features of 
these welfare regimes. I took up this call in Kongshøj (2013) with a 
small review of Sino-Nordic developments in income protection, 
which in many ways was a preliminary foundation for what later 
became chapter 10 in this dissertation. Kettunen et. al. (2014) edited 
the first Sino-Nordic welfare anthology, but only one of the 12 
individual chapters actually contains a Sino-Nordic comparative 
framework (in elderly care), and even here the Sino-Nordic bridge 
rests on rather fragile pillars. In addition, none of the questions raised 
here are treated in depth. It is interesting to note, however, that 
Kettunen et. al. (2014:27) also tentatively observed that “To some 
extent, one might say that recent reforms and agreed-upon plans in 
China point in a more ‘Nordic’ direction….”.  
However, since this dissertation will also examine attitudes towards 
welfare and equality in one chapter, we should note the anthology on 
political culture in East Asia and the Nordic countries edited by 
Helgesen (2006a). The empirical basis of this anthology is a survey 
conducted in 1999-2001, and while the focus is on political culture in 
a broader sense, some welfare attitudes were included in the survey 
and we will make relevant references to this in chapter 5  
Still, we must conclude that Sino-Nordic comparative research on 
social policy and aspects of social citizenship related to welfare is 
woefully limited. In short, the selection of cases here is motivated 
firstly by the lack of comprehensive comparative studies including 
China, and the nearly complete absence of Sino-Nordic work in this 
field. Therefore, there is ample space for furthering the Sino-Nordic, 
scholarly dialogue on welfare research.  
Besides these general arguments why Sino-Nordic comparative 
research merits interest, the choice of cases has naturally also been 
influenced by factors specific to this Ph.D.-project. Besides the 
Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies (CCWS) at Aalborg 
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University, the project is also anchored within (and partly funded by) 
the Sino-Danish Centre for Education and Research (SDC) in Beijing, 
which is engaged in Danish-Chinese research exchange. In this 
project, the scope has been broadened from Denmark to the Nordic 
countries because of the emerging Sino-Nordic research dialogue. In 
addition, the Nordic ‘brand’, which is also well-known in China, 
attracts more interest than the single Danish case in comparative 
welfare research. This also provides an argument for going in-depth 
with the very significant intra-Nordic diversities that exist at the 
policy level despite popular notions about the ‘Nordic model’.  
Finally, during the course of this project a longer research stay of 
more than three months in the fall of 2013 was spent at the Nordic 
Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai (plus shorter stays of a few 
weeks in 2012 and 2014) in addition to the shorter stays at SDC in 
Beijing. A short research stay of just a few weeks at the Nordic 
Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen also took place in 
the fall of 2014. I also enjoyed participating in a PhD-course on 
welfare research in China the Nordic countries in Shanghai, arranged 
by the Sino-Nordic Welfare Research Network (SNOW).  
1.4 WHY WOULD WE EXPECT SIMILAR REFORM PATHS? 
When considering the research aim outlined above, this comparative 
framework raises the question of whether we should expect any 
similarities at all as we uncover the trajectories of policy reforms. In 
order for the Sino-Nordic framework to be more interesting, it would 
help us if we did not simply see it as a given conclusion that China 
and the Nordic countries are very different places. Some arguments 
why we could expect at least some surprising similarities will be put 
forth here.  
Let it be noted first, however, that similar reform tendencies should 
not be confused with convergence (or divergence in case of dissimilar 
reform trajectories). For example, a common experience of moving 
towards multipillar pensions does not necessarily entail policy 
convergence to any significant extent. It may even include divergence 
of public pension benefits, for example, or at least ‘parallel trends, 
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persistent diversity’ as coined by Kautto & Kvist (2002). 
Convergence could even arise from dissimilar reform paths, just as 
similar reform paths could lead to divergence (see Hay & Wincott 
(2012) for an elaboration of convergence and divergence).       
Whether we would expect similar reform paths depends very much on 
our theoretical outlook on the drivers behind welfare regime change. 
A host of factors could be mentioned, such as economic change; 
changes in discourses, paradigms or ideas; changes in decision-
making institutions; actor-driven change or change in dominant 
actors; change driven by social classes and coalitions between them 
and new institutionalist explanations or institutional feedback-
oriented perspectives on change. As an example, Vis & Van 
Kersbergen (2014) can be recommended for a review of drivers 
behind welfare state change. They distinguish between four main 
‘rationales’ or ‘logics’, namely ‘socio-economic development and 
modernization’, ‘political integration and state-building’, ‘need-
satisfaction and risk-reapportioning’ and finally ‘class politics and 
redistribution’.  All of these factors behind welfare state change can 
of course be interlinked however they are defined or labelled.  
The interlinkages between these drivers of welfare change vary 
according to context and time. For example, as comparative welfare 
research has expanded beyond its traditional preoccupation with 
Western or developed welfare states, some thought has also been 
given to how social policies evolve and change for very different 
reasons in developing countries compared to the ‘old’ welfare states 
(Vetterlein 2013; Gough & Therborn 2010; Mares & Carnes 2009).  
Besides these broad drivers of change, which vary according to time 
and space, one could also introduce a form of welfare functionalism 
closely related to both economic and sociological conceptualizations 
of modernization theory (Blau 1989; Gough 1978), which is also 
partly reflected in Vis Kersbergen’s (2014) first logic of change 
above. This embodies what we might call the first generation of 
welfare state theory, which emphasized convergence between 
countries as societies progressed. Here, the construction of a welfare 
state is “interpreted as a functional requisite for the reproduction of 
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society and economy” (Esping-Andersen 1990:13) From an economic 
viewpoint, the modern market economy in tandem with developments 
in the production mode simply create a need for welfare state 
expansion. Economic growth following the introduction of a modern 
market economy can also quite simply create the room necessary for 
welfare state development (Wilensky 1975). Later economically-
oriented theories have added more nuances, for example that this 
‘need’ for state welfare might vary according to whether society is 
experiencing industrialization or de-industrialization (Iversen 2001). 
Linked with economic functionalism, functionalist sociological 
approaches emphasize the specialization and ever higher degree of 
complexity that characterizes modern social reations which by itself 
also creates a need for welfare provision at the societal level.  
The functionalist point of departure is implicitly evident in the classic 
definition of the welfare state provided by Asa Briggs (1961:228): “A 
welfare state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used 
(through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of 
market forces”. Similarly, Karl Polanyi (1944) described how the 
destruction of the old social order that followed the modern market 
economy also gave rise to the ‘double movement’, the corresponding 
demand for social protection, although he did perhaps not envisage 
the modern welfare state as such. In other words, from these 
perspectives the creation of a market economy simply demands some 
kind of effort to modify market outcomes. Indeed, most forms of 
social policy would be unimaginable without the market economy. 
It is on the basis of these functionalist accounts of social policy as 
something driven by the modernization of society that we would 
perhaps even expect some degree of convergence among our country 
cases. China has modernized rapidly in the past more than 30 years, 
and the introduction of a modern market economy has in time also 
demanded the introduction of modern social policymaking as implied 
to some extent in the introduction. While a richer China does not 
necessarily mean a correspondingly more modern China on all 
aspects of modernization, just as the old planned economy already 
had some traits of societal modernization, there is no doubt that China 
has modernized in both the economic and sociological sense. From 
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that point of view, the modernization gap between China and the 
Nordic countries has become less pronounced, which could lead us to 
question the extent of the Sino-Nordic disparity in terms of 
citizenship and perhaps increasingly similar policy changes.  
Other important arguments could be made as well. For example, and 
as mentioned in the introduction, a new discourse on social policy can 
be traced in China, especially in the new millennium. The goals of 
both the ‘harmonious society’ and the ‘scientific outlook on 
development’ are strongly associated with expanding or improving 
the embryonic Chinese welfare state, as is of course the idea of 
‘moderate’ universalism.  A whole range of new ideas in official 
discourse could be mentioned, such as ‘putting people first’, ‘a 
service-oriented government’, ‘equalization of basic public services’, 
‘improving people’s livelihood’ or ‘ensuring that all people enjoy 
their rights to education, employment, medical and old age care and 
housing’ (Ngok 2013). The social security system, which had been 
heavily skewed towards the urban population, was envisaged to be 
expanded particularly in rural China as part of the pro-rural policies 
under the heading of ‘giving more, taking less’ (Li et. al. 2013) This 
change of discourse within the Chinese Communist Party itself could 
lead to the expectation that citizenship in China might be edging 
closer to the Nordic countries. This perspective on welfare state 
reform in China echoes Vis & Van Kersbergen’s (2014) second logic 
of change, namely ‘political integration and state-building’.  
This  discoursive turn in China may be an echo of truly global norms 
and ideas about social policy as they have emerged in most recent 
decades as argued by ‘world society theory’ or the ‘world polity 
approach’ (chapter 11). As chapter 6 will also elaborate, the welfare 
regime literature has spent much time discussing a general East Asian 
welfare expansion, a trend that we may reasonably expect to apply to 
China as well.  
In short, it has been argued here that we could expect some 
similarities when we consider the basic functionalist argument 
coupled with the recent discousive turn in China and global social 
policy developments. Without going into any level of detail on the 
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remaining perspectives on welfare state development mentioned in 
the beginning, it can safely be said that we would expect marked and 
continued Sino-Nordic disparities through the perspective of most of 
them. Decision-making institutions and political actors are widely 
different, for example.  
The aim of this thesis is not to ‘test’ these theoretical perspectives. 
That will only be done very indirectly as we conclude on the 
comparative state and development of Sino-Nordic citizenship.  A 
proper conclusion in this regard would require a much deeper 
consideration of the perspectives mentioned here. Instead, the purpose 
of just briefly bringing in these perspectives here has been to anchor 
the main research question in a discussion that is both classic and 
topical in the research field, just as it shows how the basic research 
aim and the selection of cases are not quite as far-fetched as it may 
seem.  
1.5 WHY SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP? 
This dissertation is very inspired by the Scandinavian research 
tradition emphasizing social citizenship, although it has primarily 
been used for research into societal participation (see for instance 
Westholm et. al. 2007; Esaiasson & Westholm 2006; Goul Andersen 
& Hoff 2001; Goul Andersen et. al. 2000; Andersen et. al. 1993; 
Petersson et. al. 1989). Various Scandinavian studies into political 
political power and participation began in the early 1970s, although 
not always with explicit reference to citizenship (Micheletti 1984). 
Arguably, this tradition is grounded in a combination of social or 
‘egalitarian’ liberalism and ‘republican’ civicness (see chapter 4).  
However, we may ask ourselves why we would use social citizenship 
as an approach for analysis of social policy or related outcomes. 
Certainly, it could be possible to do that without explicit reference to 
social citizenship. In essence, we can speak of social citizenship both 
as a set of normative theories and principles for social policy and 
ideals for what constitutes good citizenship, but also as an approach 
for social policy analysis. The combination of these conceptual-
empirical and normative-theoretical approaches leads us to three basic 
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arguments for using social citizenship, all of which will be spelt out 
in chapter 3.   
Firstly, social citizenship will allow us to include both social rights 
(ie. the welfare state) as well as normative orientations about what 
social policy should and should not do. This means that we can 
include both principles of welfare at the policy level as well as 
normative attitudes towards welfare among the citizenry. It also 
means that we can spell out different normative schools of thought on 
social citizenship, where this thesis will discuss how exactly 
‘Confucianism’ relates to Western lines of thought on citizenship. 
This is a question often raised by much literature on welfare in East 
Asia, but it hardly ever answered beyond vague allusions to 
‘familalism’ or ‘collectivism’.  
Secondly, citizenship can help us narrow the empirical focus and 
identify what social outcomes to analyze instead of perhaps more 
vague allusions to ‘marginalization’ or ‘social exclusion’. This is a 
general argument for using the concept of social citizenship, even if 
this thesis will not investigate social outcomes in any depth.  Social 
citizenship can also contain some of the same policy outcomes that 
related concepts concern themselves with, but social citizenship can 
help us order the relationship between these outcomes and then 
narrow our focus.  
Thirdly and finally, when we cover all this ground in terms of both 
normative thinking as well as different empirical dimensions of 
citizenship (mainly social rights in this case), we actually analyze 
what the overall citizenship regime looks like. This is very much akin 
to welfare regimes, and it is possible to home in on some intersections 
between welfare regimes and citizenship regimes. For example, Rice 
(2013) suggests that the welfare regime literature touches upon three 
broad dimensions of welfare regimes, these being welfare institutions, 
welfare outcomes and welfare culture. These correspond largely to 
the dimensions of social citizenship discussed here, namely social 
rights and duties, citizenship outcomes and normative citizenship 
ideals.   
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Therefore, both welfare regimes and social citizenship have 
significant conceptual overlaps or commonalities, and this is also one 
reason why the idea of citizenship regimes has been suggested in the 
literature (Jenson 2013). In essence, a regime of citizenship includes 
not only rights, but also wider governance practices and the welfare 
mix as well as the identities that are created between citizens within a 
regime. Basically, citizenship can be conceptualized in broad and 
narrow terms. Citizenship in the broad sense is as much about 
relations between citizens as it is between the state and the individual, 
whereas the traditional narrow definition focuses solely on the state-
individual relationship in terms of rights and duties (Lister 2013; 
Andersen et. al. 1993).  
Related to this, it should in the context of this thesis at least be 
acknowledged that using social citizenship as a main concept raises 
the issue of an inherent Western (and perhaps especially Nordic) bias. 
Certainly, it is not a rarity to come across the argument that the notion 
of individual, social rights has very weak foundations in China or 
other Asian countries (Wong 2013a; Chan 2008a). On the other hand, 
some argue that the significant Chinese welfare reforms of the new 
millennium reflect that “….a conception of social citizenship has 
begun to emerge…” (Ngok & Huang 2014:156). Others argue for a 
similar trend at the global level (Leisering & Barrientos 2013; Davy 
2013). As regards the notion of citizenship regimes, Ong (1999) have 
used the concept to analyze citizenship regimes in Asian ‘tiger states’.   
We will return to these discussions later in their relevant chapters. 
The point here is that just as it does not make sense to say that a 
country has no welfare regime, there is always some form of social 
citizenship. This thesis is therefore very much in agreement with 
Clarke et. al. (2014:38) who argue that social citizenship is something 
that must be understood in its context: “So, ‘thick contextualization’ 
is also required when considering citizenship theoretizations as much 
as the forms and practices of citizenship itself. In saying that, we are 
not arguing for a relativistic or empiricist conception that would deny 
any attempt at conceptualizing citizenship. Rather, we are pushing a 
step further our contention that citizenship has no essence that is 
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immutable through time and space…”. This thesis is aimed at 
providing this thick contextualization for our country cases.  
In short, this thesis does not on the outset adopt a narrow definition of 
social citizenship as for example Petersson (1989) or even earlier 
Scandinavian studies did, namely a normatively grounded approach 
inspired by the work of T.H. Marshall (see chapter 4). The argument 
here is that social citizenship when utilized for analytical purposes is 
merely a methodological tool for uncovering comparative differences, 
firstly in terms of welfare states, and secondly in terms of normative 
thinking. Social citizenship is treated as an object of study which can 
take not ‘one true form’, but encompasses a range of different 
configurations of policies and social outcomes.   
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In the preceding sections, I have argued for the choice of the three 
aims or research questions stated in section 1.2. Uniting these three 
main questions is the very basic aim of chartering the hitherto 
unknown territory of Sino-Nordic citizenship. We will end this 
chapter by spelling out how we will proceed in engaging these 
research aims and how the dissertation will be structured.   
Before the research questions themselves will be engaged, the 
conceptual world of citizenship will be explained, as will issues 
relating to methods and design. Chapter 2 concerns method and 
design. The sections on design will concern themselves with what we 
can learn from selecting so diverse country cases as we do in this 
case. The methodological elaboration will explain how we will treat 
the enquiries into social rights and normative orientations empirically. 
Chapter 3 will elaborate upon various definitions of social citizenship, 
flesh out three main sub-dimensions for empirical research and finally 
elaborate more closely on the dimension of social rights since the 
policy level wil be so dominant in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 and 5 will engage the first research question on normative 
citizenship. Chapter 4 will establish the theoretical world of 
normative social citizenship with a particular emphasis on 
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Confucianism and ‘egalitarian’ or social liberalism. This chapter will 
discuss Conficianism in comparison with traditional Western schools 
of citizenship. As this chapter (and also chapter 6 on welfare regimes) 
will argue, Confucianism has in comparative welfare research often 
been mentioned in passing as expressing a set of deply rooted 
normative orientations in China and East Asia. This chapter will 
therefore bring in Confucianism as a mode of thought on citizenship 
comparable to relevant Western approaches.      
 
Chapter 5 will take an empirical perspective on normative citizenship 
and investigate welfare attitudes. Besides normative orientations, 
some measures of citizens’ perceptions of welfare and their own 
country context will also be included. Data will come mainly from the 
2009 module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). 
We are interested not only in aggregate country-level differences, but 
also in individual-level differences as they can be inferred to 
represent different typologies of citizens. We will also analyze what 
social divides these latent citizen typologies are associated with. We 
will also be interested in discussing the extent to which these different 
citizen orientations can be related to the normative schools of 
citizenship outlined in chapter 4 
 
Chapter 6 will serve as a comparative context for the policy-oriented 
research questions. By reviewing the relevant literature, the aim is to 
embed our country cases in a welfare regime context (since the 
regime literature is so voluminous and extensively discussed) and 
outline some main policy trends. In this way, we will have at least a 
rough perception of what is happening beyond our own country cases.   
 
Chapter 7, 8 and 9 engage the question of progress and challenges 
vis-à-vis universalism in the three selected policy fields in China. 
Recent reforms of social rights will be described in each field and 
each of the chapters will also aim to provide a deeper assessment of 
the consequences in terms of generosity and coverage of the schemes 
in question. Chapter 7, dealing with unemployment, will also describe 
the post-Mao market reforms since these reforms introduced into 
China the issue of unemployment as a widespread social risk.  
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Chapter 10 will provide the concluding analysis of the policy level by 
drawing comparisons between China and the Nordic countries in 
terms of the reform paths of all three policy fields. Naturally, this will 
draw upon the main findings regarding the Chinese case in chapters 7, 
8 and 9.  
 
Finally, chapter 11 will weave together the different threads of the 
preceding chapters into a coherent image of social citizenship in 
China and the Nordic countries.  The chapter will summarize our 
findings in three separate sections pertaining to the three main 
questions. The first will concern the normative foundations of 
citizenship in China and the Nordic countries (chapter 4 and 5), the 
second focuses on social rights in China (chapters 6, 7,8 and 9) and 
the third will discuss reform trajectories and mechanisms of 
‘universalization’ across all countries (chapter 6 and 10). In addition, 
chapter 11 will also take a more global outlook and discuss whether 
the policy trends we have uncovered are really unique to our five 
country cases.  
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CHAPTER 2. HOW SINO-NORDIC 
CITIZENSHIP IS INVESTIGATED 
It is clear that the classic comparative case study where individual 
countries constitute ‘cases’ is the cornerstone of this research design.  
The basic aim is to grasp the differences between countries regarding 
social citizenship. These countries can only be fully understood as a 
unique sui generis in each case. This form of case study does not 
necessarily exclude an explanatory aim, but any explanation or 
generalization that applies beyond the cases in question is usually not 
the focus of such studies. This fundamental difference between 
idiographic and nomothetic studies is often depicted as an old 
controversy in the comparative sciences (Wad 2000; Ragin 1991). 
Usually, it also includes the perceived battle or ‘paradigm war’ 
between context-oriented studies based on qualitative methods and 
variable-oriented studies based on quantitative methodology 
(Bergman 2008). 
Many researchers have moved out of the trenches of the paradigm 
wars. For instance, more nuanced discussions can be found in the 
very extensive debate on the mixed methods-approach and the 
various designs such an approach might use (Frederiksen 2013; 
Creswell & Plano-Clark 2011; Brewer & Hunter 2006). The intention 
of bridging the two worlds is not uncommon, but not as easy as it 
may seem. In this dissertation, such a challenge presents itself when 
tying the context-oriented policy analysis together with the 
quantitatively oriented and survey-based analysis of citizenship 
orientations and investigating the interdependence between policy 
and normative orientations. 
2.1 DESIGN: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM COMPARING 
APPLES AND ORANGES.  
The central question of any comparative case study is of course the 
choice of cases and how they matter for the central object of study, 
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which is social citizenship in our case. The comparative case study 
offers a few classic designs. While it should be clear that the Sino-
Nordic framework of this thesis is of course not a most-similar case 
study, it is not exactly a most-different case study either. In this 
thesis, the choice of cases has not been made with a particular 
citizenship outcome (of social rights) in mind and the research aim is 
not explanatory.   
Instead, this dissertation will generally follow John Stuart Mill’s 
‘method of concomitant variation’. J.S. Mill described a world of 
comparative strategies beyond the dichotomy of ‘most different’ or 
‘most similar’. He outlined five possible comparative designs, where 
the ‘method of agreement’ and the ‘method of difference’ are the 
most well-known. While these strategies were labeled ‘methods’ by 
J.S. Mill, they do very much concern design since it has consequences 
for the selection of cases or empirical data (and not only the method 
with which we treat these empirical observations). The ‘method of 
agreement’ corresponds to the most-different design and the ‘method 
of difference’ to most-similar design (Mills referred to the object of 
study in these labels, not to the explanations behind them) (Wad 
2000). However, along with the ‘joint method of agreement and 
difference’ and the ‘method of residues’, ‘the method of concomitant 
variation’ should not be forgotten. Here, the object of study remains 
the same across cases, but it varies concomitantly, as do the factors 
behind the research object.   
Translated into the vocabulary of this dissertation, we are not only 
interested in how welfare state policies are the result of different 
pathways of social rights, but also how we can outline broad lines of 
normative thought on social citizenship as they may be reflected in 
empirical welfare attitudes. This in turn constitutes the normative 
bedrock of our changing welfare states. Concomitant variation is 
more than anything what describes how we will go about 
investigating these specific country cases.  
By comparing this limited number of cases we will gain some 
understanding of how these different dimensions of citizenship are 
interconnected, at least in the case of the specific countries included 
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here. The inclusion of the Chinese case in the comparison should 
ideally enable us to gain a deeper understanding of the fundamentals 
of social citizenship, at least more so than we would have been able to 
if we had stayed comfortably in the Nordic or Western hemisphere or 
if we had focused solely on China.  
As Sartori (1991:246) writes: “Pears and apples are comparable as 
fruits, as things that can be eaten, as entities that grow on trees”. 
This is perhaps one of the logics behind a design based on 
concomitant variation. If I am comparing pears and apples here, I 
acknowledge that such a research design does not allow for much 
understanding of why pears are pears and why apples are apples, but 
hopefully we will gain some understanding of the commonalities of 
these fruits (or the common basics of social citizenship) at least. The 
purpose is to arrive at the mix of commonalities that draw our country 
cases together in terms of social citizenship, but also the specific 
flavors that makes each case a unique sui generis.   
2.2 THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ANALYSIS OF 
CITIZENSHIP 
Distinguishing between external and internal analysis in comparative 
science makes it easier to flesh out how the analysis will be tied 
together. This distinction is drawn from Janoski (1991) who 
emphasized that it could help achieve synthesis between the 
idiographic and nomothetic approaches in case studies. In cross-
country comparative science, internal analysis refers to the analysis of 
each single case by itself. External analysis concerns the actual 
comparison of countries, but internal analysis is of course a crucial 
necessity when we want to compare. Janoski (1991) emphasised that 
external analysis takes place both at the initial stage of conceiving 
and designing the study and then again at the final stage through more 
formal methods of comparison. The internal analysis takes place as 
the middle phase between these two where each country is 
investigated in detail before it is possible to procee to the final, 
comparative analysis.   
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The point here is that the interaction between external and internal 
analysis takes place at three stages: First, there is the standard, initial 
external analysis where the thesis is laid out in terms of research 
question, theory and the selection of cases (chapters 1, 2 and 3). Here 
we will also add a broader comparative context both in terms of social 
rights and normative ideals towards citizenship (chapter 4 and chapter 
6).  Second, we proceed to the internal analysis of both social rights 
and normative orientations, two strands of analysis which will be very 
different methodologically (chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9). Finally, we draw 
the comparative (external) conclusions, where will try to link the 
different dimensions of social citizenship (chapter 10 and 11).  
A few modifications to this ideal-typical design should be noted, 
however.  
Firstly, the internal analysis at the policy level focuses on China. At 
the policy level, the real added value of this dissertation lies in 
conducting an analysis of China and then including it in a 
comparative context. In the world of Nordic welfare regimes, much 
has already been written about the social policy development from a 
comparative perspective as noted in the introduction On the other 
hand, an updated, cross-Nordic assessment of the policy fields 
included here is difficult to to come across. The focus of the policy-
oriented part of the thesis will be to dig out the Chinese development 
(chapters 7,8 and 9) and then shed light on it in a Sino-Nordic 
comparative framework (chapter 10). Therefore, in the policy-
oriented chapters of the thesis, the Nordic countries are included only 
in the external analysis.   
Secondly, the empirical and quantitatively oriented analysis of 
citizenship orientations (chapter 5) will be far less extensive than the 
analysis of social rights, mostly due to data limitations. The World 
Value Survey and the International Social Survey Programme (2009 
module) do include China and they are obvious choices when the 
research object is social citizenship. However, data on normative 
orientations towards social policy (with the policy fields included 
here) are limited. It is also much more difficult to draw a sharp line 
between internal and external analysis here.  
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2.3. METHOD: CITIZENSHIP AT THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL 
RIGHTS   
As mentioned in chapter 1, the initial review of the literature on 
welfare state developments in China and the Nordic countries 
revealed that the most significant welfare reforms in China have taken 
place within old age pensions, health insurance and income protection 
for the working age population. Therefore, these three policy areas 
will be the particular focus of this thesis. 
The analysis of social rights in contemporary China will primarily be 
done by making an assessment of the developments within the social 
rights dimensions of benefit levels and coverage (which we will 
return to in section 3.4 as I conceptualize the connection between 
rights and socal citizenship). Benefit levels (usually measured as 
replacement rates) are, as Danforth and Stephens 2013: 1288) puts it: 
“…generally perceived as the most direct measure of benefit 
generosity. Moreover, there is a prevailing view that replacement 
rates are the most theoretically interesting aspects of social rights 
because, as Esping-Andersen (1990:50) has argued, they are 
‘absolutely decisive’ for people making decisions concerning welfare 
and work”. Furthermore, coverage of the population group towards 
which a welfare scheme is directed is of course another important 
measure in terms of how many actually enjoy the benefit or service in 
question. Together, these two dimensions of rights are the prime 
indicators of the ‘width and depth’ of a scheme.  
We will return to these dimensions of social rights in section 3.4 from 
a conceptual perspective. There I will further elaborate how 
eligibility, duration and financing are also very important, and all of 
these will also be considered if relevant. Coverage can partly be 
understood as an indicator of eligibility and duration, since the two 
latter very much determines how many are included in a scheme.  
These dimensions of social rights are classic to much welfare state 
research. Kangas & Palme (2005), for example, utilize data on 
coverage and generosity they track the historical development of 
social insurance schemes in the Nordic countries.  Esping-Andersens 
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(1990) analysis used data on benefit levels, eligibility, coverage, 
duration and waiting days in the construction of his de-
commodification index. Palme (1990), as another example, used 
coverage, benefit levels, eligibility and financing in his 1930-1985 
account of 18 OECD countries, focusing solely on pension schemes2.  
The point here is that there is at least some consensus as to what the 
relevant benefit dimensions are when we want to compare social 
rights across countries. All of these will to some extent be included, 
but the focus will be on benefit levels and coverage as the two most 
important dimensions. 
Lastly, I will make a few general points about how we gain 
knowledge about coverage, generosity and other relevant dimensions 
of social rights.  
While there are strong arguments for the novelty of the comparative 
framework and the scope and extensiveness of the enquiry into the 
three policy fields, the policy-related analysis will to a high degree be 
assembled from a large body of existing literature (if scattered vis-à-
vis our research aims).  
Another important discussion is the use of official Chinese statistics. 
These will sometimes be referred to when assessing coverage and 
generosity. It is well-known how some official statistics should 
definitely not be confused with the whole truth. Firstly, some 
                                                          
2 Esping-Andersens and Palme both utilized data from early versions of the Social 
Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP), which Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Walter 
Korpi began in 1981 in an effort to obtain comparable indicators of social rights. 
Scruggs and Allan (2006) tried to replicate the results of Esping-Andersens (1990) 
regime analysis with their benefit generosity-index using the same methodology 
and the same benefit dimensions, but instead using data from the Comparative 
Welfare States Dataset (CWED). The SCIP and CWED-datasets report widely 
different data for some countries due to differences in the way that they treat 
taxation and means-tested supplemental benefits or re-calculate benefit amounts to 
yearly net incomes, to name just a few issues (see Wenzelburger et. al. 2013 or 
Danforth & Stephens 2013 for comprehensive reviews) 
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statistics are simply unreliable due to bad data. Secondly, some 
statistics may be subject to outright manipulation if they concern 
sensitive issues or issues that are highly politicized. The first problem 
is not at all distinctly Chinese even if it often is very pronounced in 
China. The second problem is more unique to China (at least in a 
Sino-Nordic comparison). A classic example where both problems 
are strongly present is official unemployment statistics, but this will 
also be discussed later.  
On the other hand, official statistics should not necessarily be 
dismissed off-hand. It is important to note the potential issues on a 
case-by-case basis. In all three policy fields, we will also assess 
coverage and generosity with reference to other research or results 
from other household surveys. Particularly in terms of coverage and 
generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance we will 
note some issues. Coverage of pensions, however, will mostly come 
straight from the National Bureau of Statistics (2014, 2013) due to a 
seeming absence of better estimates in the literature.      
2.4: METHOD: ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP  
In chapter 5, we shift towards the exploration of ideals and 
perceptions of welfare and inequality. There is not exactly an 
abundance of data on social citizenship in China in an international 
context. Fortunately, some good measures can be found in both the 
World Value Survey and the 2009 module of the International Social 
Survey Programme. Based on these data, the chapter will follow two 
lines of analysis. 
Firstly, we will compare basic country-level differences regarding the 
different indicators of perceptions and normative orientations. Here I 
will compare not only our five main country cases with each other, 
but they will also be compared to the the wider context of available 
country cases. This initial analysis will be a straightforward 
comparison of descriptive differences, and it will be finished with 
principal component analysis (PCA) of a range of items on normative 
attitudes. This will enable us to reduce variable-level country 
differences to at least two main dimensions of normative ideals. This 
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makes it easier to gain a quick understanding of how different the 
citizens of the five countries are in relation to both each other and 
citizens of other countries. 
Secondly, we will enedavour to find distinct sub-groups or typologies 
of citizens within countries. This completes the effort to uncover 
empirical patterns of citizenship. The statistical method employed 
here will be latent class analysis (LCA). Since this will be the main 
method as we finish our analysis of welfare attitudes, the use of LCA 
will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUALIZING 
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
In section 1.5 we distinguished between citizenship as a normative 
ideal and as a concept for policy analysis. In this chapter, we will 
focus on the latter, while normative citizenship will be covered in 
chapter 4 as we investigate how we can understand ‘Confucianism’ as 
an ideal of citizenship.  
The chapter will elaborate how social citizenship as an analytical-
conceptual tool includes both the policy-level and the level of social 
outcomes. This is a fairly traditional approach in the literature, but I 
will try to elaborate a bit further how the subdimensions of 
citizenship can be defined and how they are interrelated.  
I will begin by briefly outlining three definitions of citizenship before 
I proceed with developing different interdependent dimensions of 
social citizenship which can be singled out in research. This 
dissertation will in later chapters only refer to those aspects of 
citizenship that concern social rights and welfare attitudes. Still, the 
overall conceptual framework is important to keep in mind and 
reminds us that social rights do not constitute an end in itself, but is a 
means to the end of improving social outcomes.  
3.1 THREE WAYS OF DEFINING SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
There are at least three ways of defining citizenship. Keith Faulks 
(1998) labels these as: 1) Legal definitions, which are often used 
interchangeably with nationality, but concerns not only legal status as 
a citizen in itself, but also the rights and duties which are bestowed 
upon the individual. Here we are referring to all legally defined 
elements of citizenship; 2) Socio-political definitions, which are 
concerned with power relations, the distribution of resources, and 
how socio-political changes affect citizenship; 3) Philosophical 
definitions, which is concerned with the appropriate role of the state 
in relation to citizens and what in turn can be expected from the 
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individual citizen. It is clear that the aforementioned normative 
theories of citizenship operate especially within this definition.  
By implication, social citizenship entails a more narrow focus than 
citizenship in itself. By deriving it from the three definitions above, 
we arrive at three corresponding ways of understanding what the 
‘social’ in social citizenship is. Firstly, social citizenship is often 
understood as those elements of citizenship that are relevant for social 
policy, in other words the welfare state itself. Secondly, social 
citizenship can allude to those dimensions of citizenship that are 
social, meaning relations between citizens (including attitudes) across 
a range of social outcomes (which may of course in turn be partly 
affected by the welfare state). Thirdly, social citizenship can also be 
defined as a range of normative citizenship traditions which 
emphasize the social needs of citizens much more than individual 
needs (Clarke et. al. 2014; Davy et. al. 2013).  
This thesis does not choose one definition over the other, but as stated 
in chapter 1, our enquiries will concern mainly social rights, but also 
normative aspects of citizenship. Social outcomes will not be 
included in an exhaustive manner.  Therefore, in this dissertation, the 
socio-political approach to citizenship is the main focus. However, 
we will also stray into the territory of philosophical approaches as we 
discuss Confucianism and normative citizenship in chapter 4 and 
chapter 5 as we investigate normative welfare orientations. The 
remainder of this chapter will be focused on elaborating a 
conceptualization of socio-political citizenship. 
3.2 THE MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
AND RELATED CONCEPTS  
As it follows from the socio-political definitions of citizenship, the 
analysis of social policy from the perspective of social citizenship is 
concerned with social outcomes. From this perspective, we are 
concerned with the extent to which the welfare state alleviates 
detrimental social outcomes in various arenas of life concerned with 
citizenship. In other words, policy analysis from the perspective of 
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social citizenship can fuse together the first and second definitions of 
social citizenship mentioned above.  
A host of concepts abound when we talk of inequalities and 
distribution of resources within social outcomes. The concepts of 
marginalization, social exclusion, deprivation or intersectionality 
present themselves as examples. We could ask ourselves why we 
should bother with the concept of citizenship when we are interested 
in inequalities which could also be analyzed with other concepts. The 
main argument here is that social citizenship allows us to specify 
more clearly what arenas of societal life we want to analyze, 
especially when we couple the notion of citizenship and welfare 
regimes as in the previous sections.    
It should be acknowledged that the literature on social exclusion 
encompasses some widely agreed dimensions of social exclusion, 
meaning that it can be clearly defined, even if it can be put in relation 
to nearly any arena of societal life. Marginalization, deprivation and 
intersectionality on the other hand, has no inherent theoretical 
framework but shares some similarities with the concept of social 
exclusion (Borchorst & Teigen 2010: Whelan et. al. 2002; Goul 
Andersen & Jensen 2001). These terms can signify a process rather 
than a static position of being marginalized, deprived or excluded, but 
the literature is not in agreement whether the individual concepts refer 
to processes or static conditions.  
All of these concepts emphasize that detrimental social outcomes can 
take place across a range of different arenas, which can all affect each 
other in a dynamic process (Nørup 2014; Vleminckz & Berghman 
2001; Goul Andersen & Jensen 2001). Looking at the range of 
research in the field, however, and the different dimensions that have 
been analyzed with reference to social exclusion, nearly all kinds of 
living conditions or general well-being have been covered 
(Vleminckx & Berghman 2001; Percy-Smith 2000).  
In the same vein, the social citizenship literature has with the 
reinvigoration of social citizenship in the past few decades often 
emphasized that social citizenship covers a range of different 
dimensions beyond rights and duties as will be explained below.  
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Does the multidimensionality of the concepts here then mean that loss 
of citizenship can be anything and everything? A very open-minded 
researcher might argue that only the imagination of the researcher 
places any limits on how many dimensions of inequality one can 
define. In order not to lose all sense of meaning and practical utility, 
however, one of course has to define these dimensions before 
proceeding any further, which will be done in the following. 
3.3. OUTCOME AND OUTPUT DIMENSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 
The main dimensions of social citizenship I will refer to here are the 
three dimensions of rights and duties, social participation and 
identity. This basic distinction is inspired by previous work such as 
Joppke (2007), Jensen & Pfau-Effinger (2005), Lister (1998) and 
Andersen et. al. (1993), all of which make use of the same 
dimensions beyond the classic rights-based approach. Kongshøj 
(2010) used the same distinction as a point of departure, but 
elaborated theoretically on citizenship identity and used different 
subdimensions of identity empirically. By contrast, as the focus in 
this thesis will mainly be on social rights, section 3.4 will 
conceptualize further on dimensions of rights. Social rights concern 
welfare state output, while identity and participation concern social 
outcomes. However, since rights affect outcome dimensions of social 
citizenship, and are indeed supposed to do so, we will also briefly 
outline the output dimensions.  
In addition to rights, identity and participation, one can add socio-
economic conditions in general (Goul-Andersen 2005), which is 
highly relevant for the outcomes of identity and participation. For 
example, material living conditions certainly affect one’s identity or 
participation as a citizen. Socio-economic conditions can be 
understood as a dimension that by itself does not express citizenship 
as such, since it does not directly encompass the relationship between 
state and individual or relations between citizens. However, socio-
economic conditions certainly affect social citizenship. We can for 
better or worse understand socio-economic conditions as a residual 
dimension covering all the remaining inequalities that are not at the 
same time included in the output dimensions of citizenship.   
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Below, we try to map the various dimensions of social citizenship and 
how they are related to each other:  
Figure 1: Dimensions of social citizenship                                            
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In figure 1, we find the whole socio-political continuum of a 
citizenship regime.  
The diagram illustrates how social citizenship encompasses the three 
main dimensions of rights and duties, participation and identity, 
where the latter two in policy analysis-terms are outcomes of social 
policy outputs (rights and duties). This underlines how citizenship in 
the narrow and more traditional sense concerns the relationship 
between the state and the individual (Lister 2013; Dwyer 2010).  
The way in which rights and duties affect the two outcome 
dimensions of social citizenship is mainly indirect because it is 
moderated by socio-economic conditions. From the perspective of 
social citizenship, the aim is to alleviate negative citizenship 
outcomes. The purpose of rights and duties is to affect general socio-
economic conditions, which is then supposed to shape the identity 
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and societal participation of each citizen for the better. This process 
can largely be understood as the way in which social policy is 
redistributional, with consequences for outcomes of social 
citizenship. Some direct effects between the output and outcome 
dimensions of citizenship can be imagined, however, for example in 
the very direct way rights determine whether one can participate 
politically in society. Mettler & Soss (2004) attempt to sum up the 
ways in which public policy affects citizenship. Very briefly, public 
policy affects citizenship by: Defining membership, forging 
communities and delineating groups, building or undermining civic 
capacities, framing policy agendas and problem perceptions, and 
finally structuring participation.    
3.3.1 RIGHTS AND DUTIES This concerns the formal and substantive 
rights and duties bestowed upon the individual. T.H. Marshall’s 
distinction between civil, political and social rights is classic and 
useful in understanding what the range of rights encompasses. They 
were defined as follows: “The civil element is composed of the rights 
necessary for individual freedom – liberty of person, freedom of 
speech, thought and faith, the right to own property, and the right to 
justice (…) By the political element I mean the right to participate in 
the exercise of power (…) By the social element I mean the whole 
range from right to modicum of economic welfare and security to the 
right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society” 
(Marshall 1950:8).   
One could probe whether this is really an exhaustive classification of 
citizenship rights. Marshall himself acknowledged this debate, and 
mentioned a set of residual rights, or a ‘secondary system of industrial 
rights’, to include rights defined by negotiation among non-
governmental parties as it is common in labor market corporatism 
(Janoski 1998). Janoski (1998:32) furthermore develops participation 
rights: “Just as political rights are public powers of action, 
participation rights are state-assured private powers of action. They 
refer to the individual and group rights to participate in private 
decision making through some measure of control over markets, 
organizations and capital.  
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The four types of rights also have their corresponding obligations or 
duties. A citizen may become subject to obligations after accepting 
any sort of right, and obligations by definition entail sanctions if a 
citizen fails to comply with them (Janoski 1998).  
3.3.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS This dimensioned has hitherto 
been residually defined as all living conditions that do not specifically 
concern the two output dimensions of social citizenship (identity and 
participation). Of course, this very broad definition can be broken 
down into subdimensions if needed. Percy-Smith (2000) makes a 
distinction between the dimensions of individual, neighborhood, 
political, social, economic, group and spatial social exclusion. These 
various dimensions have been deduced from a vast range of indicators 
of social exclusion that have been used in the research field.  
Although this is not a citizenship dimension as such, socio-economic 
conditions are important for the development of citizen identity and 
participation, and are generally the subject of social policy when the 
aim is to alleviate negative consequences of social risks. From a 
citizenship perspective improving socio-economic conditions is not 
solely an end in itself, but a means to improve the actual citizenship 
dimensions of identity and participation.  
3.3.3 PARTICIPATION Participatory citizenship is essentially what the 
popular notion of active citizenship is all about (Johansson & 
Hvinden 2007). Participation includes all kinds of societal 
participation, socially, economically and politically (Petersson 1989). 
If we take a point of departure in different societal spheres, the 
exercise of citizenship can take place with the public, private, state 
and market arenas (Janoski 1998). Alternatively, Gallie & Paugam 
(2000), for example, distinguish between primary (family), secondary 
(other social networks) and tertiary (formal participation in 
organizations and networks).  
As we will go on to see in chapter 4, many schools of citizenship 
especially concern themselves with participation (or active 
citizenship, citizenship as a practice, etc.). Other schools of 
citizenship such as egalitarian or social liberalism may be more 
attuned to social rights, but are so because the idea is  that particular 
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configurations of rights are conducive to the promotion of active 
citizenship. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the classic liberal 
school might not envisage an active governmental role in promoting 
participation through social policy, but it refrains to do so because 
only the negative civil and political rights are seen as conducive to 
participation. Promoting participation is an end goal for all citizenship 
thinkers, even if they might disagree on how to achieve it.   
3.3.4 IDENTITY This dimension of social citizenship concerns both 
orientations towards the self and towards others. Within the social 
pshychology literature, a distinction exists between social identity and 
personal identity (Kongshøj 2010; Luhtanen & Crocker 1992; Tajfel 
1981). Personal identity is concerned with identity towards the self, 
for example self-perception and self-esteem, while social identity 
concerns interpersonal relations towards others and also affinities and 
affiliations towards different social groups, for instance whether you 
identify yourself as belonging to a group of Catholics, left-wing 
activists, immigrants or unemployed. This distinction between outer 
and inner aspects of identity is classic, and can for example be found 
in Mead (1934), Goffman (1959) or Jenkins (2008), although these 
conceptions do  not always correspond directly to the social and 
personal aspects of identity as defined above.  
The subdimenson of social identity can be further divided into 
vertical social identity and horisontal social identity. Vertical social 
identity includes the relation towards authorities and the political 
system, as it is known from the classic political culture-approach 
(Almond & Verba 1963). Horisontal social identity includes the 
relations towards others, for instance on the form of social trust, 
perception of stigmatization in relation to others, etc.  
It is also possible to include normative orientations towards 
redistribution as another separate dimension of citizenship identity. 
Taylor-Gooby (2009), for example, includes values towards 
redistribution as an absolutely crucial aspect of citizenship since it 
determines the legitimacy of the redistributive welfare state. This is 
very important in the context of this dissertation.  
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In summary, conceptually we can distinguish between the dimensions 
and sub-dimensions of social citizenship listed below. As emphasized 
repeatedly, in this dissertation we will focus on social rights and the 
identity-related subdimension of normative orientations.  
Table 1: Indicators of social rights, participation and identity 
Social Rights Participation Identity 
Elaborated in section 3.4: 
 Generosity 
 Primary (family 
and kinship 
 Personal identity 
(self-perception) 
 Coverage 
 Eligibility 
 Financing 
 Duration 
 
 Secondary 
(other informal 
participation) 
  Horizontal social 
identity (social 
trust) 
 Vertical social 
identity (political 
trust) 
  Tertiary (formal 
participation) 
 Normative 
orientations 
towards both 
horizontal and 
vertical 
redistribution 
 
It should be noted that other conceptualizations of various dimensions 
of social citizenship have certainly been made. Leisering & 
Barrientos (2013) make use of the three dimensions of resources, 
recognition and participation. These correspond more or less to socio-
economic conditions, identity and participation, with recognition 
more narrowly concerning what has been dubbed personal identity 
here. Bothfeld & Betzelt (2011) develop quality, status and 
participation, which are perhaps best understood as those aspects of 
rights, identity and participation that concern individual autonomy 
and the capabilities necessary for self-determination (Nørup 2014). 
For example, quality should be measured by the degree to which 
social rights promote individual autonomy.  
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3.4 DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS: SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND 
UNIVERSALISM. TWINS OR CLOSE RELATIVES? 
Social rights will be the main focus of this thesis and warrant some 
further elaboration. In comparative welfare research, social rights 
have been analyzed using a range of empirical indicators. The usual 
suspects include eligibility criteria, generosity, coverage, duration, 
financing and also waiting days (Danforth & Stephens 2013; Scruggs 
& Allen 2006; Palme 1990; Esping-Andersen 1990).  
However, we need more specific criteria to assess whether ‘social 
rights’ are based on social citizenship. This will be derived from the 
literature on universalism where clear conceptualizations have been 
provided even if this concept is also often used somewhat loosely. 
Even if the universal welfare state is often seen as the embodiment of 
social citizenship, we will see how the two concept are not twins if 
not exactly distant relatives either.  
Universalism is a multi-faceted concept with a long historical 
background that stretches back to the period before the welfare state 
(Stefánsson 2012). In terms of social policy, universalism started to 
emerge in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries (Anttonen & Sipilä 
2012). Universal and compulsory education was the beginning. 
Universalism as a principle for social protection was developed later, 
particularly in Great Britain, where the famous 1942 Beveridge 
Report later became widely perceived as a cornerstone of 
universalism (ibid). The Beveridge Report proposed a fundamental 
reform of British social policy which would unify and integrate 
existing social policy, include all citizens and guarantee everyone a 
minimum standard of living. It is not a coincidence that this was also 
the home country of T.H. Marshall, who published his seminal 
Citizenship and Social Class just a few years later. Both Beveridge 
and T.H. Marshall were collegues at the London School of 
Economics (LSE). LSE was also home to Richard Titmuss, who 
around the same time founded social policy as an academic discipline 
(Benassi 2010). Richard Tittmuss became known as a champion of 
universalism: “One fundamental historical reason for the adoption of 
this principle [universalism] was the aim of making services 
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available and accessible to the whole population in such ways as 
would not involve users in any humiliating loss of status, dignity or 
self respect” (Tittmuss (1968) quoted in Anttonen & Sipilä 2012:24).  
Liberal welfare regimes such as Canada and Great Britain share with 
the Nordic countries a historical heritage of universalism (Beland et. 
al. 2014). This heritage is basically the citizenship-based approach to 
social rights. Often, selectivism/residualism and universalism are 
contrasted as opposing principles in welfare state research, but they 
might be said to have a rights-based approach in common (Overbye 
2012). This rights-based approach can be dinstinguished from 
insurance or contribution-based access to welfare provision. It should 
be noted, however, that the Beveridge report also envisaged small, 
flat-rate contributions.    
Inherent in the citizenship-ideal is a strong ambivalence between 
fully-fledged universalism and residualism where public welfare is 
targeted to the least well-off in order to bring them up to this 
minimum standard of living. In the citizenship-literature it is also 
evident in the difference between maximalist and minimalist 
interpretations of T.H. Marshall (see chapter 4). Even Richard 
Tittmuss acknowledged that the distinction between universalism and 
selectivism can become muddled since one can make a case for a 
universal and a needs-based approach on the basis of the same 
fundamental values (Overbye 2012). This ambivalence is apparent in 
public attitudes to welfare as well. People might support both 
residualism and universalism depending on the specificity of the 
question and the policy area towards which it is directed (Goul 
Andersen 2011a). This ambivalence in citizenship-based 
policymaking also became very visible at the regime-level some 
decades after Beverdige, Marshall and Tittmuss. Universalism 
became challenged in Britain, while the Nordic countries moved ever 
more close to universal ideal type (Anttonen & Sipilä 2012).  
All of the above point us toward the argument that citizenship-based 
social rights can be distinguished as something different from 
universalism. On the other hand, they do share some commonalities, 
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and universalism can be seen as a maximalist or more extensive 
version of citizenship-based social policy.  
Whether we label it as citizenship-based or embryonic universalism, 
the shared baseline is clearly that public welfare should be a clearly 
defined, legislated right that applies to all citizens. This is very close 
to what Cox (2004) calls ‘broad universalism’, while ‘narrow 
universalism’ is the more extensive and exclusive conceptualization 
of universalism that we find in the Nordic tradition. Narrow 
definitions of universalism have been specified as a set of dimensions 
by Overbye (2012) or more specific criteria by Goul Andersen (1999) 
and Anttonen (2002). Listed below is a fusion or amalgam of these: 
 
Table 2: Criteria for social rights based on social citizenship and 
universalism  
 Criteria for citizenship and 
universalism 
Three dimensions of 
universalism 
Citizenship based 
social rights: 
Minimalist and non-
universal (if 5,6 and 
7 are not included) 
1: Eligibility and entitlements 
are clearly defined rights 
2: Rules apply to all citizens 
3: Defined by legislation
b
 
Eligibility universalism 
4: Tax-financing -  
Citizenship based 
social  rights: 
Maximalist and 
universal (in 
combination with 
1,2,3 and 4) 
5: Benefits exclude nobody by 
means-testing*  
6: Benefits are adequate
a 
 
Measurement universalism 
7: High degree of coverage or 
inclusion
b
 
Risk-pool universalism 
Based on commonalities between Overbye 2012; Goul Andersen (1999) and 
Anttonen (2002). The seven specific criteria are based on Goul Andersens (2012) 
discussion of Goul Andersen (1999)  and Anttonen (2002), where: b = only present 
in Anttonen (2002) and a = only present in Goul Andersen (1999).  
* = Changed substantially from original wording which emphasized flat-rate 
benefits more, whereas this one leaves room for both flat-rate, earnings-related and 
positive-selective benefits. 
 
Table 2 describes how social citizenship as a principle for social 
rights is less exclusive than universalism, for example in the way that 
means-testing violates universalism, but not necessarily social 
citizenship. In other words, we might also say that citizenship is much 
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more concerned with eligibility, while universalism also includes a 
strong emphasis on entitlement criteria and coverage.   
These criteria are not beyond discussion. Particularly the fifth 
criterion concerning benefit entitlements has been subject to academic 
debate. The discussion of whether flate-rate or earnings-related 
benefits are most universal is a long-standing one (Goul Andersen 
2012; Overbye 2012). Flat-rate benefits might appear to be most 
universal because all citizens included in a scheme are basically 
granted the same benefit. The argument for earnings-related benefits 
is that they are better at securing adequate income protection for 
everyone, also for the higher incomes. This more effectively prevents 
the crowding-in of private welfare. The opposite of earnings-related 
benefits is positive-selective benefits, where the poorest may be 
granted additional supplements while everyone is still included (also 
dubbed as ‘targeting within universalism’). This once again illustrates 
the inherent tension between adequate income protection for everyone 
or raising everyone to a minimum level. However both positive-
selective, flat-rate or earnings-related benefits at least share the trait 
that no one is excluded, and therefore they can all be argued to be 
universal.  
By contrast, negative selectivism, whereby benefits are targeted only 
to the poor and higher incomes are excluded, has traditionally been 
seen as non-universal (Goul Andersen 2012; 1999). On the other 
hand, it clearly matters how strictly negative-selective schemes are. 
There is a substantial difference between targeting only the poorest or 
merely excluding the rich. The latter is much closer to universalism. 
However, Overbye (2012) for examples argues that this can also be 
seen as universal as long as criteria are based on clearly stated rights 
and criteria (such as classic income-testing). If benefit entitlements or 
eligibility are instead subject to high degree of discretion, it creates 
room for particularistic and unequal treatment, which violates the first 
and very basic criteria above. In this case, we would instead argue 
that this should instead be understood as a distinction between 
citizenship-based selectivism and particularistic selectivism.  
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As regards citizenship, many would argue that the fifth criterion 
should also be included as a citizenship-criterion and that negative 
selectivism violates citizenship-based social rights (Stephens 2010). 
This goes against the central argument of this section, namely that 
residualism and universalism do to some extent share an emphasis on 
citizenship, and that citizenship and universalism are substantially 
different even as they share the same baseline criteria. Here, we will 
once again point to the distinction between particularist selectivism 
and rights-based selectivism, with the latter being citizenship-based.  
Therefore, we also uphold that citizenship and universalism are 
substantially different when it comes to defining principles for social 
policy. Even as they are different, with citizenship being less 
exclusive, we emphasize that universalism comes closer to the 
maximalist interpretation of the citizenship ideal which emphasizes 
how the rights-based claim of individuals should not be dependent on 
‘the market value of the claimant’ (Marshall 1950: 28). This is entails 
de-commodification as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990), while the 
right to a modicum of welfare and a minimum standard of living 
defines the minimalist and non-universal approach to social 
citizenship.   
Finally, while the above criteria can clearly help us categorize and 
analyze policy changes vis-à-vis both universalism and citizenship, 
we should allow room for flexibility. The criteria above can be 
unduly exclusive in a world of complex welfare arrangements. It 
would be particularly difficult to find real-world social rights which 
are universal according to all seven criteria. We can envisage a 
continuum where policies can be more or less universal or more or 
less citizenship-based rather than either-or (Goul Andersen 2012; 
Overbye 2012). The difference is that the citizenship-continuum has a 
longer range than that of universalism, where more criteria will have 
to be taken into account. The judgments that wil be made of our 
analyses of social rights in chapters 6-10 will be based on this less 
exclusive conceptualization.   
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CHAPTER 4. IDEALS OF SOCIAL 
CITIZENSHIP AND CONFUCIAN 
CITIZENSHIP 
In this chapter, we are interested in social citizenship as a normative 
approach. This comprises several schools of thought emphasizing a 
range of different ideals about how citizens practices and what the 
relationship between state and individual should be. This is a very 
different approach to social citizenship compared to the analytical-
conceptual approach that was outlined in chapter 3.  
However, we are not solely interested in this as a scholastic exercise 
aimed at showcasing different approaches to social citizenship, but 
also because we want to discuss how we can understand 
Confucianism in relation to Western schools of thought. This will 
also enable us to understand much better what Confucianism means 
in relation to the welfare state, something that is rarely disussed in the 
literature on East Asian welfare states or welfare regimes despite 
abundant references to ‘Confucianism’ (see chapter 6). Furthermore, 
the discussion in this chapter will also be important when we 
investigate normative attitudes towards social citizenship in China 
and the Nordic countries later in chapter 5.  
We will begin this chapter by establishing the context in terms of the 
‘traditional’ normative schools of citizenship before delving into 
Confucianism and comparing it to its Western counterparts.   
4.1 SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AS A NORMATIVE YARDSTICK 
T.H. Marshall stated that citizenship can “…create an image of ideal 
of citizenship against which achievement can be measured and 
towards which aspiration can be directed” (Marshall 1950: 18), in 
other words, a normative yard-stick. This is the fundamental reason 
why social citizenship is also a useful tool to answer Harold 
Laswell’s (1951) viewpoint that social policy analysis should also be 
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
60
 
mindful of normative values and try to make them explicit. 
Normative values are difficult to avoid when assessments, evaluations 
or judgments about social policy are made.    
The normative underpinnings of the various ideas on social 
citizenship are the fundamental reason why these citizenship 
traditions are still relevant for the social sciences. Seminal and oft-
quoted as the work of T.H. Marshall might be, he was not the only 
one within this field, and therefore we turn to elaborating the main 
schools of thought regarding citizenship as an ideal.  Here I will focus 
on the main traditions of republicanism, liberalism, 
communitarianism, conservatism and egalitarian liberalism. They 
draw upon very old lines of thought, but have been constructed as 
normative traditions in the citizenship literature in recent decades.   
Others could be named, but here we are interested in the main 
traditions which cover the spectrum of positions on citizenship. Other 
positions usually relate themselves to, or are inspired by, these in 
some way. Another possible tradition could be Marxist approaches to 
citizenship, yet one could also argue that such a notion is pure 
nonsense since Marxism is concerned with eliminating the state-
individual relationship within market outcomes. Indeed, Marxist 
writings in this field usually take the shape of critiques of citizenship 
and any notions of developing social citizenship by social rights 
(Dwyer 2010).   
The classic Western ideals of citizenship are often traced back to the 
ancient Greek city states (Faulks 2000), but as it will also be argued 
later, Confucian citizenship ideals as they were developed in the East 
during the earliest Chinese dynasties and onwards cannot be ignored, 
especially when one wishes to include China in an analysis of social 
citizenship. Therefore, an additional aim in this chapter is to place 
Confucianism in relation to Western thinking on social citizenship.  
One of the very basic elements that distinguish the different 
normative schools of thought from each other is whether they are 
more concerned with either citizenship as a status or a practice 
(Lister 1997a; Andersen et. al. 1993). Citizenship as a practice 
concerns how citizens act in society, or how citizens live up to 
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various civic virtues. As we delve into each of the different normative 
traditions, it is clear the some, such as the liberal tradition, concern 
themselves more with citizenship as a status, while others, such as the 
republican or communitarian traditions are more concerned with 
practice (Lister 1997b). In other words, the classic liberal tradition is 
more focused on individual rights, while the other two traditions are 
more concerned with normative prescriptions for how citizens should 
be and act like. We might also describe this as ‘thick’ citizenship as 
opposed to ‘thin’ citizenship. Thin citizenship with its formal and 
substantive rights expresses subjecthood within a state-individual 
relationship, while thick citizenship is something more and adds 
agency of citizens to the cocktail (Faulks 2000; Andersen et. al. 
1993). Thick citizenship or citizenship practice is concerned with 
questions of achieving the good life and emphasizes interdependence 
between citizens, rather than just the independence of the citizen as 
expressed by citizenship as a status.   
4.2 CITIZENSHIP AS AN IDEAL OF THE WELFARE STATE: 
EGALITARIAN LIBERALISM 
We will begin by looking into egalitarian liberalism (perhaps more 
commonly described as social liberalism) (Dwyer 2010). This 
includes citizenship theorists who, from a liberal viewpoint of the free 
individual and concomitant individual rights, describe an ideal of 
quite comprehensive and encompassing social policy as necessary for 
realizing the citizenship of the individual. This normative approach 
would not be the first in a strictly chronological account of Western 
citizenship thinking (where we would most likely begin with classic 
Greek republicanism), but we will start out with egalitarian liberalism 
here because it relates very much to the modern welfare state. At the 
same time, most narrow definitions of social citizenship equate social 
citizenship with the egalitarian aim of creating free and equal citizens 
(Westholm et. al. 2007; Andersen et. al. 1993; Petersson 1989)  
The most famous account of egalitarian, liberal citizenship is that of 
T.H. Marshall in Citizenship and Social Class (1950) and subsequent 
works. Marshall is most famous for his tripartition of citizenship 
rights into the main types of social, political and civil rights (see 
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chapter 3). Social rights are of course the primary interest in the 
world of social policy and the reason why Marshall’s vision can be 
dubbed egalitarian. He defined social rights as “…the whole range 
from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the 
right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society” 
(Marshall 1950:8). Apparently, social rights covers the entire range 
from a ‘modicum’ of welfare to ‘living the life of a civilized being 
according to societal standards’, which is not exactly a narrow or 
exact vision of social rights. The use of this definitional range, where 
Marshall includes both encompassing and more minimalistic ways of 
defining social rights, makes him less easy to pigeonhole in 
ideological terms on a left-right scale regarding the role of the welfare 
state than one would conveniently prefer. On the other hand, it is 
clear that bestowing the individual with social rights is a means to the 
end of securing the full citizenship of the individual and alleviating 
market inequalities.  
Consequently it is possible to talk of both ‘maximalist’ and 
‘minimalist’ interpretations of T.H. Marshall (Dwyer 2010). The 
former is closer to a universal welfare state and the second a more 
residual type of welfare state where government is a last resort. These 
possible interpretations reflect that a social citizenship-based 
approach does not by itself tell us what welfare principle to apply, 
except that access to social right should be equal for all citizens, 
which does not discriminate between needs-based or residual welfare 
on the one hand and universal welfare on the other (as argued in 
section 3.4). Furthermore, Marshall himself did seem to be 
ambivalent on the issue when taking his entire of body of work into 
consideration. Rees (1995) and Janoski (1998) trace a development 
over time in Marshall’s work, where the younger Marshall with a 
more positive view of encompassing social rights gives way to a 
Marshall who is more open to critiques against universal welfare 
rights. Turning from rights to duties, Marshall (1964) lamented the 
proliferation of social rights at the cost of statutory duties and 
obligations in Class, Citizenship and Social Development, sounding at 
times somewhat like a modern neo-conservative or communitarian.  
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However, Marshall was always somewhat ambigious in his writings. 
Even when reading his famed Citizenship and Social Class it is not 
entirely clear whether he envisages an encompassing and universal 
welfare state. On the one hand, he several times reiterates that the 
antithesis to full citizenship is a society based on class divisons and 
inequality. Social citizenship is described as a system of equality, 
while “social class, on the other hand, is a system of inequality” 
(Marshall 1950:18). Similarly, he asserted that “…in the twentieth 
century, citizenship and the capitalst class system have been at war” 
(Marshall 1950:18). According to Marshall, social rights will not 
simply support capitalist class divides, but transform them. Marshall 
expresses this by a metaphor describing how social rights transform 
the market-based skyscraper into a more egalitarian bungalow (ibid.). 
A bit clumsy as this metaphor might sound, it also underlines how 
Marshall’s vision of citizenship was not completely open to any 
normative interpretation, but in fact was a vision of how social policy 
should change the foundations of capitalism to something 
qualitatively different. Marshall also spoke of a “…universal right to 
real income which is not proportional to the market value of the 
claimant” (1950:45). This is very easy to see as support towards the 
idea of a citizen’s basic income for all regardless of economic status 
(Loftager 2007). On the other hand, he stressed that inequalities and 
social class cannot be eliminated completely. After all, he was not a 
Marxist. However, “….the inequality of the social class system may 
be acceptable provided that the equality of citizenship is recognized” 
(Marshall 1950:70). The equality of citizenship ensures that everyone 
is free to realize their own citizenship potential by securing equality 
of opportunity and also some measure of equality of 
outcomes.“Status differences can receive the stamp of legitimacy in 
terms of democratic citizenship provided they do not cut to deep, but 
occur within a population united in a single civilization; and provided 
they are not an expression of hereditary privilege (Marshall 1950:44). 
Marshall’s overall vision of the egalitarian role of social policy 
resonates with many other theorists usually placed within a social 
democratic tradition. Here I have stuck with the term egalitarian 
liberalism, since it refers to egalitarian social policies within a liberal, 
rights-based society, but have refrained from speaking of social 
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democratic or reform socialist views on citizenship. One reason is 
that egalitarian liberalism can as mentioned before include both 
maximalist and minimalist definitions. Therefore, it would not be 
entirely correct or safe to equate this with a universal welfare state. 
Marshall (1950) did discuss different principles behind the 
distribution of state welfare, but in a quite ambigious way. For 
example, he argues that ’limited’ welfare rather than ‘total’ universal 
welfare may be better at achieving equality: “But a total scheme is 
less specificically class-abating in a purely economical sense than a 
limited one, and social insurance is less so than a means-test service. 
Flat-rate benefits do not reduce the gaps between different incomes” 
(Marshall 1950:33). Furthermore,“When a free service, as in the case 
of health, is extended from a limited income group to the whole 
population, the direct effect is in part to increase the inequality of 
disposable incomes, again subject to modification by the incidence of 
taxes”. On the other hand, he emphasized that particularly services, 
but also paid benefits, can create a shared experience rather than 
segregate different groups of citizens: “The extension of such services 
can have a profound effect on the qualitative aspects of social 
differentiation” (Marshall 1950:33), and “Equality of status is more 
important than equality of income” (Marshall 1950:33). 
Others, however, are easier to pigeonhole as championing universal 
and social democratic ideals of welfare. One such was Richard 
Titmuss, who gradually established his reputation around the same 
time as Marshall (Deacon 2002). Titmuss’ (1974) account of differing 
welfare principles also inspired the demarcation between universal, 
residual and insurance-based/meritocratic welfare state models that 
Esping-Andersen (1990) made famous. In the view of Titmuss, 
universal welfare was superior at promoting not just material equality, 
but also a sense of shared belonging and concern for others as 
emphasized by Marshall. In other words, social integration and social 
cohesion was best achieved through the principle of universal 
welfare. By contrast, residual welfare aimed only at the most needy 
would stigmatize the poor and single out the lower social classes as 
different from the rest of the citizenry and undermine a sense of 
shared identity. Hence the statement that is often ascribed to Titmuss: 
‘welfare for the poor is poor welfare’.  
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A number of critiques have been directed at the rights-based vision of 
egalitarian citizenship elaborated by T.H. Marshall and others has, 
most of which will not be explored in detail here.  It is especially easy 
to criticize his account as a theory of the development of rights (Mann 
1987). Marshall, writing from a decidedly British context, saw an 
almost evolutionary relationship in the way civil rights would lead to 
political rights and finally social rights. Taking countries such as the 
modern-day People’s Republic of China into account, it is easy to see 
how this does not hold true. This critique focuses on developing more 
bulletproof theories of citizenship development and putting various 
paths of development into system as attempted by for example Turner 
(1992). Other critiques include feminist critiques of an inhrerent 
blindness to gender issues, the idea of social ‘rights’ in itself, 
outdatedness, Anglocentrism and more (for an overview, see for 
example Dwyer (2010). The issue of Anglocentrism is of course 
something that we try to deal with here by including ‘Confucian’ 
citizenship. However, another very central critique shall also briefly 
be dealt with here since it has bearings on the very nature of this 
vision of citizenship as an ideal. 
Because egalitarian liberalism in the vein of T.H. Marshall is often 
associated with his conception of rights, a common critique against 
Marshall and those inspired by him is that they outline only a vision 
of rights without any emphasis on duties, obligations or virtues in 
connection with being a citizen. This is often criticized as being a 
vision of ‘passive’ citizenship (Kymlicka 1994), or, using the 
dichotomy described before, a vision of citizenship as a status without 
any elements of citizenship as a practice. Especially liberals (those 
concerned with negative rights of freedom) and some utilitarians 
(those who view utility as an individual issue and individuals as self-
interested) would argue that social rights are directly detrimental to 
citizenship (we will return to these visions of citizenship below).  
It should be noted, however, that T.H. Marshall did emphasize rights 
and duties and furthermore distinguished between vague and 
compulsory duties. As a compulsory duty he defined as an example 
the duty to work, while vague duties were “(…) the general 
obligation to live the life of a good citizen, giving such service as one 
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can to promote the welfare of the community” (Marshall 1950:45). 
Compulsory duties can be understood as the statutory duties that 
policymakers attach to social rights, such as for example the duty to 
seek work or participate in active labor market measures. Vague 
duties are more or less synonymous with the republican citizen 
virtues that we will elaborate below. Furthermore, T.H. Marshall also 
spoke of the ‘collective obligations’ that the state has towards society 
as a whole where policies must be conducted with the bigger picure in 
mind: “It follows that individual rights must be subordinated to 
national plans” (Marshall 1950:35).  The balance between individual 
and collective rights and duties can move back and forth, determined, 
for instance, by what the state can actually afford, something 
Marshall discussed with the education system as an example. 
Still, it should be acknowledged that the emphasis is on rights and 
that rights come before duties. Access to rights is seen as a necessary 
precondition for people to fulfill their citizen duties. In order to 
ensure that everyone can fulfill their vague or civic duties, it is first 
necessary to provide access to social rights. Otherwise, it would not 
be possible for some citizens to realize their full potential as good 
citizens.  
The critique against the so-called passive conceptions of social rights 
has been a prominent feature of the so-called new right critique, often 
from the standpoint of ‘new communitarianis’ (as it will be described 
in the next section). Recent decades have in Western welfare states 
seen a strengthened focus on ‘activating’ citizenship for people on 
social transfers (Jensen & Pfau-Effinger 2005; Clasen & Van 
Oorschot 2002). The actual policy changes have varied across welfare 
states, of course, since this aim can include quite different policy 
instruments of strengthening duties and responsibilities. Leaving 
aside these actual policy changes, we can say that ‘new 
communitarians’ and proponents of these policy developments argue 
that duties should come before social rights, that social rights is 
something that is earned once a citizen has fulfilled his or her duties. 
‘Duties before rights’ is then seen as a precondition for ensuring civic 
virtues (and values) among the citizenry.   
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The point is that egalitarian citizenship approaches are not inherently 
blind to citizenship duties and virtues, even if they are often accused 
of being so. Rather, the differences between the tradition of T.H. 
Marshall and its critics are differences in emphasis with regards to 
rights and duties, and which of these is a preconditions the other if the 
aim is to develop sound citizenship practices.  
Marshall himself explicitly stated that his vision of citizenship was 
one intended to let all citizens realize their potential of becoming 
‘gentlemen’, which was a vision he explicitly borrowed from the 
Alfred Marshall (Marshall 1950). The ‘gentlemen’ citizens of Alfred 
Marshall were essentially educated men, who care not only for 
themselves and material comforts, but for their fellow citizens and 
public duties as well. This concern with civicness echoes (Greek) 
republican ideals, which we will turn to below.  
4.3. OTHER CLASSIC NORMATIVE SCHOOLS OF 
CITIZENSHIP  
The discussion above on egalitarian liberalism illustrated how it 
certainly draws upon ideals of citizenship practices (despite being 
critized as an ideal of citizenship only as a status). It has similarities 
and differences to other normative approaches to citizenship. Placing 
egalitarian liberalism in relation to these is helpful in understanding 
general discussions on citizenship and the role of the welfare state. As 
we will also see later, placing Confucianism in a context of normative 
citizenship will also require deeper understanding of other lines of 
thinking. As we will see later, Confucianism has some strong 
resemblances to the normative citizenship approaches that we will 
discuss in this section.  
For these reasons, we will briefly outline other major schools of 
thought on citizenship here. Commonly, three or four normative 
approaches are dinstinguished in the literature. These are liberalism, 
republicanism, communitarianism and finally the egalitarian or social 
liberal tradition (sometimes also described as social democractic) 
(Westholm et. al. 2007; Goul Andersen & Hoff 2001; Andersen et. al. 
1993). I will add conservativism to the mix. This choice can be 
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discussed, but we will later see how it resonates strongly with 
Confucianism.   
Firstly, the ancient ideals of republicanism will be discussed. This 
will secondly be followed by communitarianism, which can be both a 
counterpart and a contrast to republicanism. Thirdly, conservativism 
will come next, and I will stress that both communitarianism and 
conservativism have different branches with very different attitudes 
towards encompassing social policy. In relation to this, I will briefly 
discuss the basic tenets of religiously founded conservativism 
(Cristian democraticism or Catholicism). Fourthly, I will include 
classic liberalism as a contrast to all of the above.   
The republican school of thought and its emphasis on participation in 
public (political) life (in other words on citizenship as practice), can 
be understood as emanating from the ancient Greek city state, which 
is often hailed as the cradle of democracy (Dwyer 2010). The word 
itself is inspired by the Greek word for people, demos. Here we can 
identify some of the classic notions of participatory citizenship as a 
way of moulding the good citizen. In this view, participation by itself 
is a way of educating a citizen to understand the world at large and 
making him (for he was considered to be male) internalize a 
commitment to work for the common good. These ideals are often 
ascribed to Aristotle, who certainly stressed the importance of a 
citizen committed to such virtues as the common good and political 
participation (George 2010). We might note that “…Aristotle 
famously expressed this idea in his argument that to take no part in 
the running of the community’s affairs is to be either a beast or a 
God!” (Faulks 2000:17). It should of course be remembered that 
formal citizenship was granted according to gender and socio-
economic status. Consequently, citizenship was possessed by only a 
small minority, such as for example an estimated 35.000-40.000 out 
of a total population of 200.000 to 300.0000 in Athens (ibid.) Even 
Aristotle himself did not possess formal citizenship. Nevertheless, it 
is from here that we draw the foundations of the civic virtues of 
republicanism (Kymlicka 1994). Many social citizenship theorists 
implicitly draw on republican ideals in their arguments for securing 
social citizenship via social policy (as T.H. Marshall arguably did).  
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It should be noted that republicanism as it is outlined here and 
elsewhere within citizenship theory is closer to what we may define 
as ‘Greek’ republicanism. Republicanism is a much more 
heterogenous school of thought, however. If we stay in ancient times, 
a ‘Roman’ republicanism can also be identified. Roman 
republicanism is more concerned with securing personal freedom and 
individual rights of liberty, while individual rights in Greek 
republicanism are often subordinate to civic virtues and its emphasis 
on educated citizens (Nelson 2006). For example, both Plato and 
Aristotle were extremely skeptical of individual property rights. In 
their view, this would inevitably lead to accumulation of wealth and 
widespread inequality, which would corrupt the wealthy and fail to 
educate the poor. By contrast, safeguarding individual property was at 
the heart of citizenship in Roman citizenship. This difference between 
the Greek polis and the Roman Empire is very much one of thick 
versus thin citizenship (Faulks 2000), or citizenship practice versus 
status.  In the Greek polis, citizenship was thick, but very exclusive 
and unequal. Citizenship status was certainly not for everyone. As the 
Roman Empire expanded, the concept of Citizenship became more 
and more inclusive, but lost its ties to political participation (Faulks 
2000). A more universal and legalistic concept of citizenship is handy 
if one wishes to achieve social control across an increasingly diverse 
empire. What we have defined here define as Roman republicanism is 
much closer to the liberal thoughts on citizenship, as it will be defined 
later, while Greek republicanism is somewhat closer to (but not 
synonymous with) communitarianism.  
The communitarian tradition shares with republicanism an emphasis 
on normative ideals for citizenship practices, but in essence it stresses 
the ideals of the common good even more by viewing the individual 
as embedded in a social context which moulds and  shapes the values 
and perceptions of the individual (Caney 1992). Driver & Martell 
(1997) refer to this as the first basic tenet of communitarianism, the 
sociological level. The second tenet is the ethical level, which 
basically views community as a good thing, as something essential to 
the end of promoting social and civic values. The ‘good’ community 
does not promote the individual above all else as in liberalism, but 
embeds the individual in a social context of common values. The 
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third and final level is the meta-ethical level, which is critical towards 
notions of universal doctrines and philosophies which disregard the 
social context. In the view of many communitarians, it does not make 
sense to speak of overarching or universal principles and rights 
regardless of the societal context. Communitarianism emerged as a 
critique of liberalism and its emphasis on individual rights. If a 
society only stresses the autonomy of the individual, communitarians 
perceive a danger of this leading to individualism without any sense 
of shared responsibility, values or community (Sørensen 1999)  
Beyond these basic tenets, a diverse range of perceptions can be 
found within the communitarian tradition (Driver & Martell 1997). 
Communitarianism spans nearly all possible normative positions on 
the welfare state beyond left and right. Even the basic emphasis on 
common values does not necessarily entail that all communitarians 
emphasize conformism or that a specific set of values should be 
shared by everyone (ibid.). Some communitarians strive more 
towards pluralism and the recognition of many diverse communities, 
towards heteregoneity rather than homogeneity.  
Commonly, communitarianism is perceived as very critical of any 
notion of a neutral state whose aim is only to facilitate individual 
pursuits of self-interest, and instead embraces policies intended to 
promote desirable common values and develop a sense of common 
good (Kymlicka 1990). Communitarians are sceptic of completely 
rights-based social policy without any emphasis on duty or 
obligations. For example, Deacon (2002) states that communitarian 
thinking on social policy is based on four core aims: First, access to 
welfare should be accompanied by obligations. Second, welfare 
reforms should be achieved through politics of popular persuasion. 
Third, social policy should seek to promote pre-defined values and 
moral standards. Fourth and final is the general aim of changing the 
citizenry for the better, in line with their view of the malleable 
individual embedded in a social context, as mentioned above, for 
“…communitarian welfare would not take people as it found them, 
but would try to change them. It would seek to shape their values and 
mould their characters” (Deacon 2002: 76).  
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However, as stated above, the communitarian tradition is diverse. It is 
certainly possible to advocate less conditionality and voluntarism 
rather than prescriptive policymaking, where citizens abide by values 
of their own choosing (Driver & Martell 1997). Whether the 
emphasis is on conditionality and obligations or rights and 
voluntarism, the above could imply a state or government relatively 
active in promoting communitarian values through social policy. This 
is particularly true of those communitarian traditions that emphasize 
community in the socio-economic sense rather than community in the 
moral sense (Byrne 1999; Driver & Martell 1997). Creating cohesive 
communities from a socio-economic rather than moral standpoint is 
all about redistribution and expanding or universalizing social rights.  
Community in the moral sense often entails a more conformist 
approach with emphasis on conservative rather than progressive 
values.  In recent decades, the so-called ‘new communitarianism’, 
perhaps somewhat related to conservativism, has been said to engage 
in a hostile battle against welfare or social rights, and does so from a 
very moralistic standpoint (Prideaux 2002). This has to a large degree 
become the modern face of communitarianism, even if the tradition is 
much more diverse. A common belief here is that individual rights, 
particular welfare rights, are harmful to developing a sense of duty 
and responsibility towards towards society. The perception is that 
social rights may promote a particular ‘culture of poverty’ or 
‘dependency culture’ in which the values of those dependent on 
welfare differ greatly from the rest of society in a very negative way. 
This view has been particularly prominent among US conservatives, 
and proponents such as Amitai Etzioni talk with longing of a 50s and 
60s America, where common values "…were relatively widely shared 
and strongly endorsed" and people "…had a strong sense of duty to 
their families, communities and society" (Etzioni 1997:61). 
Unsurprisingly, the emphasis on traditional values is appealing to 
conservatives, but in right-oriented conservatism it often becomes 
coupled with classic religious notion of moral decay among the poor 
as we might find in Calvinism, a branch of protestant thought where 
the poor were essentially seen as having earned their situation 
because it reflects their sinful and spiritually depraved state (Byrne 
1999). Etzioni and others are not entirely opposed to social policy, 
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but emphasize how only a minimal safety net should be publicly 
provided in order to leave room for the development of community 
welfare. This minimum of social rights should be coupled with strong 
obligations. For example, Etzioni envisaged ‘community jobs’ for 
people receiving welfare benefits (Dwyer 2010).  Such principles 
echo what many has often been described as a movement from 
welfare to ‘workfare’, which has been very prominent in many 
welfare reforms in recent decades across a range of very different 
countries, including East Asia (Ngok et. al. 2011; Chang 2011).   
Conservativism as a line of thought on citizenship, however, is much 
more than the ‘new right’-oriented ideological critique of the welfare 
state. Similar to communitarianism, conservativism also spans a wide 
range of attitudes to social policy. ‘New right’-oriented 
conservativism, as associated with Thatcherite or Reaganite thinking, 
does entail a high degree of welfare skepticism, but social 
conservativism has a long historical tradition. McKenzie & Silver 
(1969), for example, in old party literature dating back to the 1860s, 
traced the appeal of the British conservative party to the working 
classes by emphasizing two lines of appeal: Firstly, the emphasis on 
patriotism and traditional values, and secondly, the promise of 
including working class interests in government by easing their 
economic situation. The reference to ‘Angels in Marble…’ in the title 
of McKenzie and Silvers (1969) book is based on a 1883 piece on the 
late conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli in the newspaper 
The Times, which stated that: “In the inarticulate mass of the English 
populace, he discerned the Conservative Workingman as the sculptor 
perceives the angel prisoned in a block of marble”.  
The Economist Alfred Marshall was another prominent conservative 
(but quite progressive for his time) thinker of the 19
th
 century, who 
gave voice to similar thoughts (Dwyer 2010). He distinguished 
between ‘respectable’ and skilled sections of the working class and its 
more ‘rough’ elements, whose civic potential remained undeveloped. 
Marshall especially championed the basic right to education and the 
right not to grow up in ignorance. All had an inherent potential for 
being civic ‘gentlemen’: “The question is not whether all men will 
ultimately be equal – that they certainly will not – but whether 
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progress may go on steadily if slowly, till the official distinction 
between working man and gentlemen has passed away, till, by 
occupation at least every man is a gentleman. I hold that it may and 
that it will (Marshall, 1873, quoted in Dwyer (2010:33).  
While old conservatives such as Disraeli and Marshall did retain their 
aristocratic sense of entitlement in conducting political affairs on 
behalf of the commoners, they also saw the potential in bringing up 
the working class to a more educated world-view. During Disraelis 
government, public health, education and working-class housing was 
improved with political reforms. In the British context, this branch of 
conservatism has been styled ‘one-nation conservativism’ (Dorey 
2011). Generally, this line of thinking forms the foundation of social 
conservativism. Social conservativism views social policy as a tool 
with which the working classes could be educated to an awareness of 
citizenship based on civic ideals, and the basic tenet is a very organic 
view of society in which members of different social status have 
mutual obligations towards each other. For the upper classes, this 
entails a very paternalistic obligation towards the lower classes.  
Christian democratic movements or parties as they have influenced 
especially Continental European countries share with conservatism 
this organic view of society. The label of the ‘Christian democractic’ 
welfare regime has been a popular alternative to the ‘conservative’ 
welfare regime, but this religiously founded value set is distinct from 
conservativism (Van Kersbergen 1995). Christian democratic 
thinking is heavily influenced by Catholicism and stresses the vital 
role of the family and social organizations (particularly the church) 
and the subsidiary role of the state. The Catholic principle of 
subsidiarity is commonly described with reference to Pope Pius XI, 
who in 1931 formulated it in the following way: “…it is an injustice 
and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance to right order to 
transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be 
performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. 
Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a 
help to members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb 
them (quoted in Murray 1995:163). The principle of subsidiarity 
states that public social policy should only step in when other forms 
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of welfare provision break down. This is especially pronounced in the 
familial obligation to provide care as opposed to public care policies. 
The emphasis on a traditional and religious social order in Christian 
democraticism and Catholicism can be very different from the 
somewhat republican aspirations of social conservativism. On the 
other hand, religiously founded citizenship thinking may in some 
instances edge closer to social conservatism or even egalitarian 
liberalism (Van Kersbergen 1995), for example if we discuss social 
rights unrelated to care.  
 
In summary, the discussion above has emphasized that those branches 
of conservativism and communitarianism which feature more positive 
attitudes towards the potentials of social policy should not be 
forgotten amidst the new conservative and new communitarian 
welfare critique. Christian democracticism (or Catholicism) may 
resemble both ‘social’ and ‘new right’-oriented conservativism (or 
communitarianism) depending on the policy arena in question.  
The individualist liberal tradition favors basic individual rights and 
shuns normative prescriptions of how citizens should act or be like. 
Like some other normative citizenship approaches, there is a strong 
aversion to encompassing social rights. The fundamental difference 
between the ‘new communitarian’ or the ‘new conservative’ critique 
of the welfare state on the one hand and the liberal critique on the 
other is that the former two are not concerned with the way in which 
social policy might undermine individual liberty, but how it 
undermines a sense of community and civicness.  
In the liberal tradition, the ideal is the free individual who should be 
able to pursuit his or her own desires interests and values. Here the 
contrast to the socially embedded, communitarian citizen is obvious, 
or as John Rawls puts it in his description of the liberal view: “…the 
self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it” (Rawls 1971:560) 
The basic individual rights are understood to be the classic liberal and 
negative rights concerned with personal freedom (Kymlicka 1990). 
Particularly civil rights are prioritized and in the liberal view the 
different forms of rights often face trade-offs with each other, in 
which case civil rights should always be prioritized because they are 
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considered natural or pre-political rights (Faulks 2000). A classic 
critique of social rights from liberals is for example that social rights 
invade or limit civil rights. Political rights can also invade upon civil 
rights. For example, a liberal such as John Stuart Mill feared the 
‘tyranny of the majority’ whereby the masses would limit civil 
liberties. A Neo-liberal such as Friedrich Hayek was adamant in 
arguing that the market and its principles should be placed outside the 
reach of democratic decision-making. This branch of liberalism is 
built on several other trade-offs or dualisms, another one being the 
relationship between the community and the individual, in which case 
the sanctity of individual interest and the private sphere should again 
always be protected. While it is of course not inherently opposed to 
citizenship practices, it refrains from describing normative principles 
for practice.    
The historical backdrop of liberalism is the political philosophy of the 
enlightenment and its focus on individualism as opposed to the old 
feudal society where people were born unequal and their rights 
defined by status in the social hierarchy. In opposition to this, 
thinkers such as John Locke, writing around the late 17
th
 century, 
wrote of natural freedoms as a God-given right of every man, the core 
of which were the rights to personal liberty and property and that all 
should be equal before the law. These are the basic creeds as they also 
found their way to liberal political ideology, added with the notion 
that political interference in these freedoms is inherently bad (ibid.) 
These ideas are epitomized in Adam Smith’s classic the wealth of 
Nations from 1776, where it is generally argued that governmental 
involvement in the free market disturbs both the moral legitimacy 
(rooted in the natural freedoms) and the superior redistributive 
efficiency of the free market (Dwyer 2010). This is also the reason 
why civil rights for such liberals is often synonymous with market 
rights (Faulks 2000) It should be noted, however, that Adam Smith 
did at least consider some limited support for public schooling, for 
example.   
However, some branches of the liberal school do embrace social 
rights to welfare and do so from basic liberal perceptions of justice 
and human nature. John Rawls (1971) is famous for his A Theory of 
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Justice, in which he from a liberal viewpoint rejects the idea that 
market outcomes and distributions of resources are by definition the 
most just or that market principles preserve individual freedom better 
than any other method of distribution. This is for example evident in 
the second of his two principles of justice, which posits that a) 
inequalities are only just insofar as they are to the maximum benefit 
of the least privileged, and b) that inequalities are only just if they are 
connected to social positions which are possible for all to attain. In 
other words, social policy should be redistributive up to the point 
where the poorest are best off and social policy should seek to 
promote equality of opportunity so that the attainability of different 
positions of social status are not pre-determined by birth-given class 
divisions, for example. Rawls deduced that citizens would agree upon 
these two principles via his famed ‘veil of ignorance’ thought 
experiment, where imagined citizens decide upon principles of justice 
without knowing what social status or position they will occupy in 
society. We also see a clear relation to egalitarian liberalism in 
Rawls’ work, and often he is described as an important figure in 
social liberalism.  
A branch of liberal thought related the ideas of Rawls, which also can 
embrace the welfare state to a certain extent, is utilitarianism, even if 
it is not a tradition of citizenship per se.  This tradition is in essence 
concerned with the maximization of individual utility and the ideal of 
a society where an equilibrium of utility is achieved, which means 
that furthering the utility of one individual (or a group of individuals) 
cannot be done without harming the utility of one individual (or a 
group of individuals) even more (Malnes & Midgaard 2003). A 
utilitarian viewpoint can then justify an extensive or redistributive 
welfare state in the pursuit of maximizing aggregate utility. If we 
leave the liberal point of departure completely, there could in theory 
be no limit to how much you can harm the liberties of one or more 
individuals if only it benefits the utility of others even more, although 
few utilitarians would position themselves here.  
On the other hand, a utilitarian perception of human nature, rooted in 
the self-interested, pleasure-maximizing citizens of Jeremy Bantham 
could also lead to a very skeptical view of the welfare state. In this 
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view, generous social transfers would for example only lead to 
welfare-dependent free riders, since work is perceived as a sacrifice 
necessary for achieving the means of pursuing pleasure. In other 
words, rational (utilitarian) individuals will simply not work if 
transfers are too generous (Keeley 1981). These very different views 
of social rights reflect the fact that ‘utility’ is of course a contested 
subject of definition. It can be discussed whether utility should be 
defined as welfare-hedonism, mental states, subjective preference 
satisfaction or rational preference satisfaction (Kymlicka 1990). John 
Stuart Mill, a noted utilitarian, even held a peculiarly republican view 
of utility, in which developing utility was also a task of promoting 
citizenship virtues such as morality, empathy and interest in the 
public and political (Malnes & Midgaard 2003).  
In summary, the five main schools of normative citizenship we have 
covered here (egalitarian liberalism, republicanism, 
communitarianism, conservatism and liberalism) can in many ways 
be said to correspond to well-known branches of ideological thought. 
Republicanism may differ somewhat here since it emphasizes only 
societal participation as an ideal and does not offer many thoughts on 
the role of government, except of course that it should be conducive 
for participation. It should of be noted that differing views within 
each school of thought blur the picture, for example in the way that 
some communitarians are much more negative towards social rights 
than others. Janoski (1998) argues that these lines of thought 
correspond to the established regimes from comparative welfare 
research; The social democratic regime favors social rights and a 
measure of obligations, the conservative regime prioritizes 
obligations above social rights in its emphasis of traditional 
community values, and the liberal regime favors negative rights of 
freedom (civil and political) and shuns state-backed obligations 
towards the individual. Republican ideals may be found across these 
varying ideas about what the nature of the relationship between state 
and individual should be.  
The question of whether social rights are detrimental or conducive to 
realizing full citizenship is a very basic one as we can see and can be 
discussed within nearly any school of citizenship. As we shall see 
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below, the normative demarcation lines and ambiguities that have 
been drawn up here are also echoed in Confucian thinking of 
citizenship.  
4.4 A CONFUCIAN YARDSTICK OF CITIZENSHIP? 
When we seek to discuss whether Confucianism is useful as a more 
decidedly Chinese ideal of citizenship, we do so from the perception 
that Confucianism can help us understand what ideals of citizenship 
can be said to exist implicitly in contemporary Chinese policymaking. 
This aim of elaborating values sets (for example Confucianism) such 
as they make up the ideational foundation of societies is just what the 
welfare culture approach is all about (Van Oorschot et. al. 2008; Lin 
1999). Conceptions of culture abound, but by defininf culture as 
prevalent values, belifs and norms we capture at least one 
fundamental pillar of culture (Helgesen 2006b). In that sense, welfare 
culture is simply defined as prevalent values that concern welfare. 
From this point of view, Confucianism as a welfare culture defines a 
normative vision both for how citizens should be (citizenship 
outcomes), but also what kind of rights and duties a Confucian 
welfare state should bestow upon its citizens (citizenship output).  
From a welfare culture approach, such value sets or normative 
orientations may largely be implicit and culturally embedded, but 
uncovering them may help us understand very visible real-world 
differences that would otherwise be confounding. As Lin Ka 
(1999:10) notes in the beginning of his dissertation (written during a 
research stay in Finland) on Confucian welfare in East Asia: 
“Whereas I have been observing mainly Finns, I have also had the 
opportunity to be in the company of Danes and Swedes, noticing their 
deep trust in public officials (they often rely more on public officials 
than their neighbours), their prevailing feminism (for instance, the 
husband doing housework is regarded as ‘normal’ behavior), a weak 
hierarchical sense (beautiful women seem not to have a superior 
feeling towards those with less beauty), and a high sense of equality 
(a weak discriminative attitude of the ordinary people towards the 
disabled). Many of these phenomena where striking to me when I first 
arrived from China, but later on, with more understanding about 
CHAPTER 4. IDEALS OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND CONFUCIAN CITIZENSHIP 
79 
these norms, I have begun to comprehend their connection to the 
ideal of the Scandinavian welfare state” 
The notion that Confucianism reflects something distinct about 
Chinese (and East Asian) culture is nothing new. Early European 
enlightenment thinkers were very interested in Confucianism as 
substantial encounters between Eastern and Western political theory 
took place in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, particularly in French 
philosophy (Bell 2006; Helgesen 2006b). Debates on East Asian and 
‘Confucian’ statecraft engaged prominent thinkers such as Voltaire, 
Rosseau, Kant, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Montaigne and many 
more. Some of them, most notably Voltaire, lauded Confucianism as 
an inspirational political philosophy based on just rule and moral 
behavior. They pitted Confucianism against religious ways of 
thinking as they had dominated Europe. These idealized accounts of 
Confucian statecraft also reached the Nordic countries. In 1772, the 
Swedish State Councillor Fredrik Scheffer reported that “To the 
emberassment of the so-called cultured and well-mannered peoples of 
Europe we have to admit that in the course of all the changes of our 
Laws and Customs, which in themselves contained the causes of their 
impermancence, the Chinese people have lived under a System of 
Government which remained stable for several thousand years and 
which turned the Chinese realm into the mightiest, most populous and 
most affluent ever heard of or described (Lodén 2006:127). 
Later political or sociological thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and 
Max Weber took a quite different stand on the issue, and saw 
Confucian thinking as part of the explanation why China seemingly 
failed to follow modernity. On the other hand, we should also note 
that Weber did not critize the Chinese society for being incompatible 
with capitalism as harshly as has sometimes been depicted in the 
literature3 (Bell 2006; Helgesen 2006b). However, the example of the 
                                                          
3 For example, Weber wrote that “The Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, 
probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating capitalism which has technically 
been fully developed in the modern culture area. It is obviously not a question of deeming the 
Chinese “naturally ungifted” for the demands of capitalism. But compared to the Occident, 
the varied conditions which externally favored the origin of capitalism in China did not 
suffice to create it” (quoted in Helgesen 2006b:29) 
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early enlightenment thinkers illustrates how Western theorists could 
quickly become enamored with the exoticism of Confucianism. For 
example, within comparative welfare state research, the notion of an 
East-Asian ‘Confucian’ welfare regime is present in a large body of 
literature (Walker & Wong 2005; Lin 1999; Jones 1993). The 
Confucian label has been one widely used when it comes to 
describing what principles of welfare dominate this cluster of welfare 
regimes. In such instances, one could often raise the question of 
whether it has a tendency of becoming a ‘fuzzy’ concept for 
everything Chinese or East-Asian (Walker & Wong 2005; Makeham 
2003). Returning to welfare culture, one could for example raise the 
question of whether a reliance on the family in welfare provision is 
really something specifically Confucian, or just a common feature 
denominating a great number of countries both inside and outside of 
East Asia (Peng 2008). Nevertheless, a large number of contemporary 
so-called ‘New Confucian’ thinkers can be found, most of whom 
write with the aim of describing the relevance of Confucianism for 
modern developments (Makeham 2003). 
Before taking up the challenge of discussing how we can understand 
Confucianism as an ideal of citizenship, it is perhaps prudent to first 
deal with a very basic question. We should ask whether it makes any 
sense at all to understand Confucianism as a theory of citizenship in 
the same vein as the various schools of citizenship described 
previously.   
To answer that question we need know whether Confucianism 
contain any normative ideals of citizenship. Connected to this is the 
question of whether these ideals concern the aspects of both formal 
versus substantive citizenship and status versus practice as outlined in 
earlier. I will argue that it does, but that is of course not developed as 
a coherent theory of citizenship because Confucianism is not solely a 
political theory. However, the same could be said of some of the other 
Western schools of citizenship, especially the older or classic ones 
such as republicanism. Nevertheless, strong ideals can be found, some 
of them more implicit than others, but they do concern aspects of 
citizenship. Confucianism is especially strong within citizenship as a 
practice.  As Lin (2011:88) puts it: “We need to remember that these 
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[Confucian] narratives were constructed over 2,000 years ago and 
are steeped and bound in Chinese history and culture. They are not 
theoretical in the contemporary and scientific sense. Nevertheless, 
they provide typologies and identify elements of theories.” The fact 
that Confucianism is ‘steeped and bound’ in Chinese history and 
culture is of course also the reason why we are interested in it to 
begin with. While Confucianism originated in China it also spread to 
South Korea and Japan to emerge as a larger East Asian value set. 
The Confucian permeation of political practice and social relations 
took longer to evolve in Japan, where it fused with the existing 
practices of Shintoism. Lin (1999) argues that Japanese social 
relations were not ‘Confucianised’ until the 15th century.  
When Chan (2008a:127) states that “In Confucianism, there are no 
citizens, there are only subjects and rulers…” it might appear to be a 
missile straight to the hull of the ship we are trying to build here. 
However, we should remember that Confucianism contains specific 
ideals for both subjects and rulers about how to act. The quote might 
seem to imply a very authoritarian way of thinking, and that is 
certainly also how Confucianism is often perceived popularly. Still, 
while some branches of Confucianism for historical reasons stress the 
authority of rulers more than others, Confucianism is not an idea 
about how rulers rule and subjects obey (Yearley 2008). Instead, the 
core of Confucianism is a set of prescriptions about how people at 
different positions in society should act towards each other, or in 
other words ideals for benefactor-beneficiary relationships. As Chan 
(2008a) also acknowledges, we can say that Confucianism recognizes 
that one has a certain status in society, and from this status one expect 
certain opportunities but also duties or obligations that one is 
expected to perform in return. In short, Confucianism can hardly be 
described as a theory of equal citizenship status and rights, but instead 
citizenship that is contextually and relationally defined (just as 
conservativism and communitarianism). We shall delve into these 
issues later in a more thorough account of Confucianism in relation to 
social policy.  
It could be noted that modern citizenship theory has also engaged in a 
discussion of the merits of universal, individual rights. Universal 
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rights might be blinding to the structural, cultural or otherwise 
different contexts from which citizens interact, and therefore simply 
reproduce existing inequalities (Faulks 2000). Therefore citizenship 
writers such as Iris Young and Wil Kymlicka speak of adding ‘group 
rights’ (Young) or ‘self-government’, ‘polyethnic’ and 
‘representation’ rights (Kymlicka) to deal with existing inequalities 
and status differences for different societal groups.  
Confucianism is neither a coherent religion nor political theory, but 
essentially just a set of normative values or moral codes which has 
been written down, handed on and developed by different scholars 
throughout history. The normative element is apparent in the Chinese 
word for Confucianism, Ru Jia, which does not allude to Confucius 
(551-479 B.C.) himself, but instead means the ‘school of Ru’, Ru 
being “a type of man who is cultural, moral, and responsible for 
religious rites, and hence religious (Tang 1988: 362). Confucius saw 
himself as merely a person who transmitted old, but desirable values 
as they were already present in China, and not a thinker who created a 
new tradition (Chan 2008b). The allusion to religion in the above 
quote refers to an emphasis on tradition and rites, not a metaphysical 
explanation of the world. Confucianism is therefore rife with thoughts 
on the good life, the good society and ideal politics (Chan 2008a). 
This is the primary reason why it does make sense to compare 
Confucianism to other normative schools of citizenship (Nuyen 
2008).  
4.5. CONFUCIANISM IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLICY 
AND DISCOURSE 
Besides asking whether it makes sense to understand Confucianism as 
an ideal of citizenship, we might also question whether it has any 
relevance for contemporary Chinese policy. It is not difficult to argue 
that it does. The CCP has as mentioned before put the development of 
a welfare system ever higher on its list of priorities in the new 
millennium (CDRF 2012; Ye 2011; Cook 2011; Li & Sato 2006). At 
the same time, official Chinese policy discourse has become 
increasingly abundant with references to Confucian ideals such as it is 
for example evident in the goal of achieving a harmonious society. 
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Xiaokang, the harmonious society (or more precisely translated as 
‘well-off’ or ‘prosperous’ society) is a Confucian notion which has in 
recent years gained a large role. Already in 1979, Deng Xiaopeng 
began to rephrase to ideological goals of China, and made explicit 
references to Xiaokang as a goal where wealth and prosperity are 
available for all and where a harmonious society with fairness and 
justness is obtained (Lin 2011). In 2006, the Party Congress issued a 
decision to build a socialist harmonious society and this has 
subsequently been incorporated into the eleventh (2006-2010) and 
twelfth (2011-2015) five-year plans (Xu 2012).  
While Confucianism seems to play a large role in discourse, this by 
itself does not prove that Confucianism is part of the general culture 
or the cultural values influencing policymaking. In general, New 
Confucianism can be applied to modern literature on Confucianism as 
it has evolved in China since the 1970s (Makeham 2003). 
Confucianism has also witnessed a surge in popular interest, for 
example in increasing numbers of books written and sold. While the 
label of New Confucianism is an overall umbrella for many different 
branches of Confucianism that often argue heatedly with each other 
about the properties of Confucianism, one common denominator is 
that they see Confucianism (old and new) as expressing the main 
pillar of Chinese culture (Makeham 2003). New Confucians see 
themselves as inheritors and transmitters of the core values of 
Chinese culture. There is some ambivalence among New Confucian 
thinkers about whether they represent first and foremost a cultural or 
philosophical movement, but this perception of Confucianism as the 
embodiment of Chinese culture is nevertheless strong. Whether we 
can also confirm this perception if we look at the normative values of 
the Chinese people themselves is a question we shall return to in 
chapter 5. 
Confucianism not only plays an important role in policy discourse 
and discussions about culture and philosophy, but has also gained 
impetus within the sciences. In 1986, Confucianism was selected and 
financed as a key research area in the seventh five-year plan for the 
social sciences. Much effort has gone into not only re-discovering and 
re-defining Confucianism, but also into analyzing how China 
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progresses according to Confucian ideals. Here, the central issue is of 
course to develop it meaningfully so that it does not only become a 
label for general socio-economic development. For example, the 
National Bureau of Statics of China estimated that China was at a 
level of 74,6% of Xiaokang in 2008 based on 23 indicators of 
development (Xu 2009). Another such example is a report on regional 
development which concluded that average attainment of Xiaokang 
was 34,9% in 2006 (Yeoh et. al 2010). Some of the focus on solid and 
measurable indicators perhaps owes to the fact that Deng Xiaopeng 
himself began in 1979 by setting a goal of attaining a GDP per capita 
of 1.000 US Dollars as a vision of Xiaokang (Yeoh et. al. 2010). 
China passed the goal of 1.000 USD per capita long ago, but whether 
China has been in a blissful state of a harmonious and prosperous 
society since then is something that is up for discussion. Outside the 
world of domestic socio-economic development, a Confucian school 
of analysis of international relations (IR) is also perceived to have 
emerged alongside classic theoretical schools such as liberalism or 
realism (plus Marxism as the traditional IR dogma in China) (Wong 
& Pauly 2013). However, it does seem as if this line of IR thought is 
more normative than analytic, and it does perhaps not have as many 
explanatory notions about how to understand current international 
affairs like the traditional schools of analysis do.   
4.6. CONFUCIAN CITIZENSHIP IDEALS 
Having explained how Confucianism can be understood to contain 
normative values of citizenship, and also how it seems to play a role 
for contemporary Chinese policymaking (at least at the discourse), we 
can continue to elaborate Confucian citizenship ideals. If we start by 
examining ‘thin’ citizenship, or the formal relation between state and 
the individual, we would ask ourselves what the role of government 
should be and what kind of rights it should bestow upon its citizens.  
The primacy of familial care in welfare provision is one of the core 
Confucian values usually emphasized in the literature (Walker & 
Wong 2005; Goodman & Peng 1996). Consequently, government 
should only play a subsidiary role. This is an almost Asian echo of the 
Catholic principle of subsidiarity mentioned earlier (but note that this 
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is much older than its Catholic counterpart). The most well-elaborated 
thoughts on familial welfare and the subsidiary role of government in 
Confucianism can be found in the teachings of Mencius (379-298 
B.C.), who, alongside Xunxi (340-245 B.C), is one of the other two 
major classic Confucian philosophers besides Confucius himself 
(Chan 2008b; 2003).  In Mencius, a book devoted to his discussion 
with rulers of that time, Mencius emphasized the responsibility of the 
ruler for “Old men without wives, old women without husbands, old 
people without children, young children without fathers – these four 
types of people are the most destitute and have no one to turn to for 
help” (Chan 2003:238). In other words, governmental welfare should 
be reserved for those who have no familial relations to turn to.  
For Mencius, state-backed welfare was not only subsidiary to the 
family. If Mencius’ first tier of welfare and care was the family, his 
second tier was not the state, but a system of communal networks 
which should step in after the family. The state then becomes the 
third tier. The second tier as Mencius proposed it, the jing or ‘well-
field’ system, is based on a distribution of land divided into nine 
equal plots, eight of which goes to different families and the final one 
to the state. In this communal system, people should be expected to 
aid each other mutually. Only as a last resort after the family and the 
rest of the ‘well-field’ should we turn to the state for aid. Chan (2003) 
juxtaposes the idea of the well-field system with social networks and 
relations in general in his description of these three tiers of welfare. 
Interestingly, one could argue that welfare provision in China during 
the earliest decades of communist rule with planned economy was 
very much tiered in a Confucian order. Wong (1998) argues that 
welfare provision in this period was ordered by the tiers of family, the 
production unit, the neighborhood and finally the state, in descending 
order of importance. Only when neighborhood-run programmes failed 
would government step in with residual welfare.     
Naturally, one could point to the historical context of Mencius and 
other Confucians in explaining their emphasis on limited state 
welfare. They lived long before government had evolved the 
capability to conduct social policy. Yet, the role of the family also has 
very strong normative foundations in Confucianism. It is through 
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familial relations that an individual learns the core Confucian 
citizenship values present in ren and li (Nosco 2008; Chan 2003). Ren 
is mostly translated as benevolence, an essential virtue or human 
quality. Confucius himself said that ren is to “love your fellow men” 
(Chan 2008b:64). It could be argued that this Confucian ‘love’ is not 
a universal love towards all human beings, but rather a love restricted 
by the Confucian hierarchy of relations, which as noted begins first 
with the family (Lin 1999; Wong 1998). One cannot be expected to 
show love and benevolence towards strangers. On the other hand, we 
cannot ignore the influence of other popular Asian religions on how 
the virtues of love and benevolence have been construed. Particularly 
Buddhist notions of charity, compassion and a generally more 
universal love have had some importance for Chinese ethical thought 
(Wong 1998). An important trait in Buddhism is that good deeds 
motivated by these virtues influences one’s own life and are passed 
on as a form of moral credits to descendants and next lives. This 
encourages moral investment beyond family and immediate relations.   
Whatever the properties of Ren in Confucianism, it is learned through 
li, which is the Confucian system of rites, perhaps better understood 
as propriety or correct behavior (Hahm 2003). Many such rites could 
be mentioned, but the most important one are the five relationships as 
stated by Mencius: “…between father and son, there should be 
affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between 
husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old 
and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity” (Nuyen 
2001:64). These relationships are all benefactor-beneficiary 
relationships. These relationships place duties upon both the 
benefactor and the beneficiary. Both benefactor and beneficiary 
should practice ren, or be benevolent towards each other. In addition, 
the beneficiary should learn from and respect the leading role of the 
benefactor and the benefactor should guide and assume responsibility 
for the beneficiary. From three of these relations it is clear how 
Confucianism emphasizes the role of the family. It is here the 
individual is trained in citizenship and learns to love his fellow men 
(Nosco 2008). The two others (sovereign-minister and friend-friend) 
are even understood to be analogous to the father-son and older 
brother-younger brother relationships (Chan 2008b). The relational 
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duties in Confucianism is also expressed by the virtues of xiao, filial 
piety and the duty to take care of one’s parents, and ci, meaning the 
obligation to take good care of one’s children (Chan 2003). The virtue 
of brotherhood is expressed by ti (Chan 2008b).  In this regard, the 
family is not only viewed as an educational institution for children 
but also for adults (Bell 2006). This is a stark contrast to the ancient 
Greek schools of citizenship, whose inclinations certainly were much 
more individualistic (Bell 2006; Daun & Helgesen 2006). Aristotle, 
for instance, distinguished sharply between family and the public and 
preoccupied himself with thinking on rational and self-determining 
individuals. Bell (2006:269) argues that “Socrates neglected his 
children to concentrate on philosophizing and public service, and it 
was a short step from there to Plato’s proposal that the family should 
be abolished so that rulers could devote themselves wholly to the 
service of the community, unmoved by the distracting loyalties and 
affections of the family system” (Bell 2006:269). In both 
Confucianism and Greek philosophy, ‘private’ has negative 
connotations. In Greek, private alludes to ‘privation’ or to be deprived 
of something (Hahm 2006). In Confucianism, however, the family 
does not belong to the private or individual sphere, but constitutes an 
important arena of social learning.   
Feminist scholars have certainly also directed some harsh criticism 
towards Confucianism even if it does recognize the importance of 
family. The criticism of course stems from the gender division in one 
of the five relationships above. In addition, the so-called ‘Three 
Bonds-doctrine’ emphasizes how to wife should obey her husband, 
the son should obey his father and the minister obey his king (Nuyen 
2001). The concept of filial piety and deference to the father as family 
patriarch is usually understood to be very strong in Confucianism 
(Nuyen 2001). Against this can be argued that the Three Bonds-
doctrine was never part of canonical Confucianism, but was first 
mentioned in texts by the Legalist school of thought, one of the rivals 
of Confucianism. It later became incorporated in Confucian practice 
during the Han dynasty (ibid.). In addition, the five relationships 
could be perceived not as unequal relations, but rather as norms to 
govern interaction between people with different societal roles. Most 
importantly, it should of course be remembered that Confucianism 
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evolved in a context of patriarchal practices. Bell (2006) argues that, 
unlike Aristotle, thinkers such as Mencius and Confucius did not 
argue that women were biologically inferior to men. Most 
importantly, it is a core idea of Confucianism that all are born with an 
almost inborn moral instinct and inclination towards ren, and one of 
Confucius’ most famous principles is that education should be 
expanded to all (Chan 2008a). All human beings are born with ‘the 
four constants’ (benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom) 
as part of their nature, but not all are aware of them and so they must 
be cultivated (Hahm 2006). This means that everyone, women 
included, can develop their characters through education and become 
‘gentlemen’ of society.  
There is much to be said for the Confucian emphasis on the primacy 
of family in welfare provision. Indeed, the Confucian view holds that 
public obligations cannot overrule familial obligations. In imperial 
China, Confucian bureaucrats were even punished if they failed to 
retire for two years of mourning following the death of a parent (Bell 
2006). However, if one seeks to delimit what constitutes what 
constitutes ‘family’ things might not be so clear. The fact that societal 
relations are seen as analogous to familial relations opens op for the 
‘family’ as including relations beyond those defined by blood. 
Theoretically, the whole world can be argued to be the family (Chan 
2008b). The practice of ren and the observance of li do not end 
outside the home. In the Analects, Confucius states that “All within 
the four seas are one’s brother” and in Mencius it is stated that one 
should “Treat the aged of your family in a manner befitting their 
venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; 
Treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age and 
extend this to the young of other families” (Chan 2008b:65). Based on 
this conception of a more universal ‘family’, the Chinese historian 
Qian Mu (1895-1990) suggested that the virtue of filial piety, Xiao, 
encompasses all vertical relations in society, and that of brotherhood, 
ti, then is synonymous with all horizontal relations between equals.  
The implications of such a Confucian conception of family are very 
significant for social policymaking. If the familial relations concern a 
wider responsibility for other citizens, this opens up for social policy 
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playing a much larger role than merely a residual safety-net for those 
with no family or social relations to turn to. Bell (2006) also suggests 
that Confucian collectivism as opposed to Western individualism 
might change the way different sets of rights are prioritized. Where 
Western thinking emphasized the liberal and individual rights of 
freedom, embodied by civil and political rights, Confucianism might 
emphasize social rights much more, especially if the expansion of 
positive social rights is at odds with the negative rights of individual 
liberty. This might also be visible in the arena of international 
relations, where China is actively trying to construct itself as an actor 
emphasizing social and economic developmental rights at odds with a 
Western preoccupation with negative rights of freedom (Kilburn & 
Kozyrev 2012).   
It is therefore a subject of discussion exactly who the Confucian 
family is and to whom we should extend our Confucian benevolence. 
Mencius did state that benevolence should not be confused with equal 
concern for all (Chan 2003). Yet, even a more conservative 
conception of family might justify a rapid expansion of social rights if 
the family is subject to social changes that are limiting its capacities 
within welfare provision. The best example here might be the 
expansion of pension systems and care for the elderly in a context of 
demographic ageing and low fertility rates. In other words, new social 
risks rising from de-familialization from below might force the hand 
of public policy to act, which could be conceived to be completely in 
line with traditional Confucian familialism. 
Turning from the Confucian family, we now turn to another field of 
Confucian ambiguities. We will engage the discussion of whether 
Confucianism is opposed to equality, or what kind of equality a 
Confucian policymaker might favor. Traditionally, Confucianism is 
perceived as promoting social inequality, which follows from the 
Confucian emphasis on how we all have different functions or roles 
in society (Nuyen 2001). If we all have a role to play within a clear 
Confucian hierarchy, then it should follow that resulting inequalities 
are completely justified. As mentioned before, Confucianism has no 
true ‘citizens’ according to some, since people can never be of equal 
status. If T.H. Marshall envisages how we could all become 
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
90
 
gentleman given the right circumstances (and given a set of social 
rights), Confucius might have responded that hierarchy of merit is 
justified. All might be born equal in Confucianism, but our lives take 
us on paths towards different roles and achievements beyond that 
point. The result is that: “Those who attain a certain level of 
intellectual and moral development are gentlemen, and a certain level 
beyond that, sages. The gentlemen and the sages are the elites and the 
rest constitutes the masses” (Nuyen 2001: 62). It is only these few 
superior gentlemen who can abide by all virtues and rites and fully 
have the capacity to embrace ‘all in their love’ (Lin 1999). It is not a 
hierarchy imposed by human nature (since all are born with the 
aforementioned ‘four constants’ and all possess a potential to develop 
ren) but not everyone cultivates themselves fully (Hahm 2006).  
It would therefore seem that Confucianism is not compatible with any 
vision of social rights as a tool to transform class-based divisions in a 
Marshallian sense. However, it should not be forgotten that Mencius 
also emphasized poverty as a second circumstance (the first one being 
the absence of family and relations in the aforementioned well-field 
system) in which state intervention is necessary. In circumstances of 
poverty or starvation, where people can’t even work their own land, 
the just ruler should intervene. In the view of Mencius and Confucius, 
poverty is the result of misrule (Chan 2003). This does not serve as a 
justification for encompassing state welfare from cradle to grave, but 
rather that government is responsible for securing the conditions 
under which people can craft their own prosperous livelihoods. These 
principles of when to provide state-backed aid was put into practice in 
later dynasties, but they also had much earlier origins. The 
aforementioned well-field system with residual relief (often in the 
form of rice stores) for those in need developed as early as the early 
Zhou dynasty (1098-771 B.C.) (Lin 1999).  
Mencius also stressed that one of the most important hallmarks of a 
good ruler is that he realizes how fortunate he is in commanding great 
wealth and subsequently shares his wealth and possessions with his 
subjects (Nylan 2008). A little redistribution of wealth was not such 
an alien virtue to even the earliest of Confucians. Similarly, as 
mentioned in the discussion on gender equality, a basic Confucian 
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notion is that all are born equal and with equal moral potentials, 
which should be developed by observing propriety (not least the five 
relationships) and receiving education. This might imply social policy 
with the aim of developing potentials equally, if not necessarily a 
vision of equality in outcomes. Equality of opportunity might instead 
be said to be quite Confucian. This of course leads to the well-known 
discussion of exactly how extensive social policies should be in order 
to promote equality of opportunities. The limit for a Confucian might 
be where such policymaking violates the basic inequality stemming 
from differentiated societal roles and relationships. As emphasized in 
the Analects, people are “By nature close together, through practice 
set apart” (Nuyen 2002:132). This is also why some argue that the 
basic idea of equal rights for all does not go well with Confucianism 
(Nuyen 2000). Rather, rights can never be universal, but are always 
dependent on the context within which an individual is embedded, 
because Confucian citizenship is a vision of differentiated citizenship, 
as mentioned before.  There might be somewhat of a tension here 
between equality of opportunity and the respect for the different 
positions of citizens within the benefactor-beneficiary relationships. 
In short, latent in Confucianism we find a tension between equality 
and meritocracy, or between elitism and egalitarianism (Nosco 2008). 
This tension echoes our previous discussions of egalitarian liberalism, 
conservatism and communitarianism.  
It should be clear that this inherent tension between egalitarianism 
and elitism is not there because Confucians are torn between ideals of 
equality or meritocracy as ends in themselves. Rather, it stems from 
different views on how best to promote Confucian virtues. The end 
goal is to enhance the moral development of citizens and their 
potential for upholding the virtues of ren and li. This is very visible in 
the Confucian notion of min-pen, or treating people as trees by 
tending to their roots (Nuyen 2000). Min-pen can be traced back to 
the times before Confucius, and the idea is reiterated by Confucius, 
but it receives full treatment by its proper name by Mencius. The 
basic idea is that only under the right circumstances can people 
develop their potential to behave virtuously. Furthermore, it is the 
responsibility of the rule to make sure that social circumstances allow 
for the growth of Confucian citizenship virtues, hence the metaphor. 
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
92
 
Nuyen (2000) comments that min-pen can be said solve the 
Confucian ambivalence on equality and inequality in a manner 
similar to John Rawls and his famed principles of justice. Social 
policy should seek to promote equality of opportunity and inequality 
of outcomes should be alleviated to the point where it allows the 
lower echelons of society to also develop their potential as virtuous 
citizens. The starting and end point is still very much a society of both 
horizontal divisons (relations of brotherhood, ti) and vertical divisions 
(relations of filial piety, xiao). The big difference is of course that 
John Rawls wrote from the liberal tradition, and Rawls emphasized 
how “the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it”, as quoted 
before. In Confucianism, this in turned on its head, and the ends are 
prior to the individual. Likewise, while government in liberalism is 
supposed to only bring order in the chaos of atomistic individual 
interests, government in Confucianism is about overcoming self-
interest and promoting the common good (Nosco 2008).  
This means that political decision-makers have big moral 
responsibilities in Confucianism and that rulers are depicted as 
patriarchal figures (Helgesen 2003). A proper ruler should be well-
developed in his Confucian virtues, and much more so than you 
would expect from the common man. Mencius said that if a man’s 
heart is fully developed, “he can take under his protection the whole 
realm with the Four Seas, but if he fails to develop them [qualities of 
ren], he will not be able to even serve his parents” (Chan 2008b:74). 
This is also expressed in the often used quote from Confucius where 
he states that “The moral power of the gentleman is the wind, the 
moral power of the common man is grass. Under the wind, the grass 
must bend” (Chan 2008a:124). Usually, this quote and especially its 
final sentence is used the support the perception that Confucianism is 
authoritarian, but it might better be understood as a depiction of the 
moral responsibilities that should be placed upon rulers. The morals 
of the elite and its gentlemen cannot help but rub off on the morals of 
the rest of the people. The resemblance to social conservativism is 
strong here in this regard.   
Yet, it should be acknowledged that another in-built tension in 
Confucianism is that of authoritarianism versus democracy. Because 
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the vertical relationship between rulers and subjects is seen as an 
extension of filial piety and familial deference to your elders  or 
parents it might easily be construed as an authoritarian relationship. 
This family-centered perception of society is apparent in the way that 
a government representative at the county level was called a ‘father 
mother official’ (fu mu guan) in later imperial China (Rosemont 
2008) In the Analects, Confucius summarized filial piety with the 
words “never disobey” (Nosco 2008:31), and it is this interpretation 
that has been carried into more authoritarian practices of 
Confucianism. It is also easy to cast democracy as something born out 
of Western individualism, and therefore incompatible with Confucian 
collectivism.  
In reply to this it can be stressed that this relationship, as any 
Confucian benefactor-beneficiary relationship, has mutual 
responsibilities. In the Analects one can also read that “If a ruler sets 
himself straight, he will be followed without his command.  If he does 
not set himself straight, even his commands will not be obeyed” 
(Nosco 2008:30). Elsewhere in the Analects Confucius stresses that a 
state cannot survive without the confidence of its people. However, it 
is perhaps from Mencius that we can identify the strongest emphasis 
on benevolent rulership. He even formulated what has become known 
as a doctrine on the ‘right of revolution’. In a conversation with King 
Xuan of Qi, the king asked Mencius whether it would ever be proper 
for a minister to kill his king, to which Mencius replied that a king 
who fails to be righteous cannot be called a king, and murdering such 
a ruler is not unheard of. In other words, a king who fails to create the 
environment for moral growth according to Confucian virtues can 
very well be replaced through violence. Similarly, in Mencius he 
states that “One can never [truly] ‘gain’ the empire without the 
heart-felt admiration of the people in it” (Nylan 2008:93). In Korea 
during the Choson dynasty (1392-1910), different mechanisms of 
rectifying rulership towards benevolent rule were even 
institutionalized (Hahm 2003). This included the infamous Royal 
Lectures, the Censorate and Court Historians, whose advice and 
criticism of the ruler could be directed at any policy matter, also 
beyond merely ceremonial or judicial matters. In addition to this 
come the Confucian scholar bureaucrats in both Korea and China, 
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who were integrated into government until the very end of the 
respective dynasties in the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Their 
discourse on proper and benevolent leadership often became 
institutionalized perceptions of legitimate rule, and their official tasks 
included disciplining the rulers on such matters.   
This issue of authoritarianism versus democracy is not exclusive to 
Confucianism in relation to the other schools of thought. As 
mentioned, the primacy of civil rights in liberalism can lead to calls 
for strong limitations on political rights if political rights invade on 
civil rights, particularly those necessary for the free market. In the 
same vein, the primacy of political rights and the obligation to 
participate in republicanism can lead to arguments such as those of 
Rosseau, who spoke of the need to ‘be forced to be free’ or a 
republican theorist like Adrian Oldfied who stated that some should 
be “shamed, disciplined and sometimes terrorized into living civic 
virtue as an expression of his authentic self” (Faulks 2000:75). 
Ambivalence on such core issues of citizenship is not only a 
Confucian trait.  
4.7 PIGEONHOLING CONFUCIANISM AMONG WESTERN 
SCHOOLS OF CITIZENSHIP. 
While it certainly is possible to speak of Confucian ideals of 
citizenship, defining these ideals is, as we have learned from the 
above, perhaps not so easy. However, Confucianism does have some 
clear and strong ideals on how citizens should be and how they 
should act, namely by observing the virtues of benevolence and 
propriety. On the other hand, Confucianism does not spell out clearly 
what the role of government towards the individual should be.  
Turning to our former distinctions, we can say that Confucianism is 
strong and easier to define on ideals regarding citizenship practices. 
However, Confucianism is weaker and much more elusive on 
citizenship in the sense of formal and substantive rights as part of a 
state-individual relationship. As we have seen, a lot of ambiguities 
can be found in this aspect of citizenship.    
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A weak and residual government role in welfare provision can be 
emphasized, but it is also possible to argue for more encompassing 
governmental provision (depending particularly on the conception of 
‘family’). Meritocracy and status-maintenance can be emphasized as 
the main principle for social policy, but it is also possible to argue for 
a certain measure of equality. A patriarchal and somewhat 
authoritarian mode of government can be envisaged, but more 
inclusive and perhaps even democratic ideals of government can also 
be identified. On these three inherent fields of tension (welfare 
provision, welfare principles and form of government) traditional 
interpretations of Confucianism have perhaps had an inclination 
towards non-governmental welfare provision, meritocracy and more 
authoritarian rule, but such interpretations are not always clear-cut 
and not always founded in the actual Confucian canon.   
On the other hand, it should be very clear that the role of government 
should always be to promote the circumstances allowing for the moral 
growth of citizens in accordance with Confucian virtues. This is 
depicted in the aforementioned min-pen-doctrine, or seeing the people 
as a tree whose roots should be tended to by the ruler. Nuyen (2008) 
sees this as the first of three clear ideals of Confucian citizenship.   
The second ideal is the Confucian emphasis on harmony. According 
to this view, as outlined in the Doctrine of the Mean, one of the 
classic ‘four books’ of Confucianism (the others being Menciues, 
Analects and Great Learning), one should strive for balance in the 
often opposing forces of human life.  This is very much akin to the 
‘golden mean’ of Aristotle. Nuyen sees this as concept suited for 
solving the challenge of minorities in relation to citizenship “A 
society that practices harmony will enable different groups to blend 
harmoniously but at the same time retain their differences” (Nuyen 
2001:131). Harmony is also achieved by practicing the 
aforementioned Confucian virtues. Beyond that, it might be difficult 
to spell out clear guidelines on how to achieve harmony. Some see 
this pursuit of harmony as one of the core differences between the 
Confucian man and the Western man (Chen 2003). In (liberal) 
Western thought, man possesses a set of universal and individual 
rights, with which one is then free to go out in the world and act 
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according to individual preferences. For Confucians, this is a recipe 
for self-interested behavior and disharmonius conflict. A very clear 
expression of this is the Confucian practice of mediation, which 
emphasize mediation rather than litigation as a means for the settling 
of disputes (Ibid.). The ‘rule of law’ has historically been weaker in 
East Asian countries within dispute settlement, and this can perhaps 
be attributed to a Confucian heritage disfavoring statutory litigation.  
As the third and final ideal it can also be stressed that Confucian 
citizenship is a global form of citizenship (Nuyen 2001). A society 
characterized by Confucian citizenship virtues has the potential to 
make the whole world virtuous. The concept of tian xia (all under 
heaven) appeared as a concept referring to a political order reaching 
beyond individual states well before Confucius himself (Chan 
2008b). It should be remembered that thr idea originated in a context 
of conflict between individual Chinese states, where some might have 
longed for the clear imperial order under an emperor ruling by the 
‘mandate of heaven’ (tian ming), but it later became a more abstract 
idea referring to an ideal political and moral order which exceeded 
territorial boundaries.      
These three ideals express the ultimate society, where virtuous 
citizens (1) live in a harmonious society (2) exceeding territorial 
boundaries (3). This is the grand Confucian vision of da tong (the 
‘grand union’ or ‘great community’), which is described in the Book 
of Rites. The Book of Rites is one of the so-called ‘five classics’ (not 
to be confused with the aforementioned ‘four books’), which describe 
ancient rites and social practices. Here, da tong is described like this: 
“When the grand course was pursued, a public and common spirit 
ruled all under the sky, they chose men of talents, virtue and 
ability…Thus men did not love their parents only, nor treat as 
children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for 
the aged…They showed kindness and compassion to widows, 
orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so 
that they were all sufficiently maintained….[They accumulated] 
articles [of value] , disliking that they should be thrown away upon 
the ground, but not wishing to keep them for their own 
gratification…In this way [selfish] schemings were repressed and 
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found no development. Robbers, filchers and rebellious traitors did 
not show themselves, and hence the outer doors remained open, and 
were not shut. Thus was [the period of] when we call the Grand 
Union” (Chan 2008b:47). This very highest ideal of Confucianism 
sounds much closer to a society of more inclusive, and possibly even 
democratic, policy-making where the family refers to not only kinship 
by blood. Furthermore, norms of equality and public provision of 
welfare are also expressed.   
Finally, it should be acknowledged that all these ambiguities and 
inherent tensions in Confucianism more than anything reflect that 
Confucianism is an ancient tradition which has been continuously 
shaped and discussed by scholars and thinkers up to the present day. 
When Jesus was still an infant, Confucius had been dead for well over 
400 years, and Confucius considered himself merely a transmitter of 
even older values. Confucianism is of course not a religion in the 
metaphysical sense. However, the emphasis on personal and moral 
development, where one treads the human and moral path (ren dao) 
with the ultimate end of becoming a sage (sheng ren) does have some 
religious traits (Rosemont 2008). Confucianism is commonly 
classified into classic Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism and New 
Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism is traced back to the Song Dynasty 
philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200) (Makeham 2003). Neo-
Confucianism blended classical Confucianism with other influences, 
particularly Buddhism. New Confucianism denotes the revived 
modern interest and debate on Confucianism in later decades as 
mentioned before. While Neo-Confucianism was inspired by other 
Chinese or Asian schools of thought such as Buddhism, Taoism and 
Shintoism, New Confucianism has picked up on global counterparts 
and evolved into different branches with inspiration from such 
diverse elements as Marxism, Daoism or Kantian moral philosophy, 
to name just a few (Makeham 2003; Lin 1999). Some have suggested 
that the term post-New Confucianism would be appropriate to denote 
the current cocktail of Confucianism fused with modern inspirations.  
Much more could be said about the topics and contestations of the 
oftentimes heated New Confucian debates, but the gist in this context 
is that it is largely a futile effort to determine one true Confucianism. 
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Confucianism encompasses a broad set of desirable values and 
practices for the citizenry and some notions as to what a society 
should be, but it is not a coherent or consistent, ready-made 
framework.     
Nevertheless, the aim of this section has been to peg out some core 
Confucian ideals relevant for citizenship, and this has mainly been 
done by looking back on classical Confucianism through the eyes of 
New Confucian scholars and outlining their debates on classic virtues. 
Citing Joseph Chan’s summary of core Confucian ideals could 
perhaps be helpful here: “Most simply put, Confucianism holds that 
people should cultivate their minds and virtues through lifelong 
learning and participation in rituals; they should treat their family 
members according to the norms of filial piety and fatherly love, 
respect the superiors and rulers, and show a graded concern and 
care for all; learned intellectuals above all others should devote 
themselves in politics and education to promote the Way and help 
build the good society” (Chan 2008a:114). Similarly, Goodman & 
Peng (1996:193) describe the ‘common language of confucianism’ in 
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan as including: “respect for seniors, 
filial piety, paternal benevolence, the group before the individual, 
conflict avoidance, loyalty, dutifulness, lack of complacency, striving 
for learning, entrepreneurship and meritocracy”. 
From the discussions above, it is relatively easy to position 
Confucianism in relation the various schools of thought in Western 
literature on citizenship. At least it becomes easy when one looks at 
Confucian virtues as ideals of citizenship practices and ignores the 
elusive ambiguities regarding the role of government. However, 
ambiguities towards the role of government and social rights are also 
to be found in the other schools of thought whether it is liberalism, 
communitarianism, conservativism or egalitarian liberalism.  
As has been mentioned a few times, Confucianism constitutes a 
relatively stark contrast to liberalism with its universal rights of 
negative freedom de-coupled from any social context and its 
reluctance to elaborate any common value sets or prescriptions for 
citizen practice.  Confucianism has a lot in common with 
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communitarianism and conservativism on this account, which as 
noted before also encompasses quite diverse positions on social 
policy. The way in which conservativism and particularly Christian 
democratic thinking emphasize organic social relations and the role of 
the family in the socialization of values resonates strongly with 
Confucianism. With republicanism, Confucianism shares a concern 
for how citizens should act in society, but republicanism has 
traditionally focused on political participation as an arena where 
citizenship is learned, whereas Confucianism emphasizes the family 
as the central arena of citizenship learning. Confucianism stresses the 
moral obligations of decisionmakers like many democratically 
minded republicans. Tocqueville, for example, also emphasized the 
importance of ‘the habits of the heart’ (Helgesen 2006b). In 
Confucianism, however, it is not granted that all should strive towards 
political participation as this is best reserved for the most learned and 
morally cultivated in accordance with the Confucian view of 
differentiated social roles.  We may therefore identify a concern with 
republican civicness (not necessarily participation) and conservative 
values. This blend of conservativism and civicness echoes the 
thinking of the aforementioned social conservatives. A Confucian 
would certainly see the rough potential or the ‘angels in marble’ of 
the common citizenry.    
A Confucian might not be so fond of the most egalitarian thinkers in 
citizenship, such as the early writings of T.H. Marshall. On the other 
hand, when we critically discuss the inherent ambiguities in some 
Confucian concepts as they have evolved from to classical 
Confucianism to neo-Confucianism and new Confucianism we find 
some space for more encompassing social policymaking. 
Redistribution and a measure of outcome equality is justified so long 
as it is necessary to develop the moral and ethical potentials of the 
citizenry, but the line is drawn where social policy begins to violate 
those status differences that are justified in Confucianism. Equality of 
opportunity is certainly Confucian.  
This chapter will remain present in our minds for a while yet as we 
venture into normative social citizenship from an empirical 
perspective. The empirical citizen typologies we will proceed to 
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uncover will echo some of the discussions of this chapter. However, 
just as I have emphasized the nuances in this chapter, there is more to 
Sino-Nordic welfare attitudes than just a simple demarcation line 
between Confucius and T.H. Marshall.  
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CHAPTER 5. WELFARE ATTITUDES: 
TYPOLOGIZING SINO-NORDIC 
CITIZENS  
The aim of this chapter is to act as the empirical counterpart to the 
previous chapter. While we discussed different types of normative of 
citizenship from a normative-theoretical perspective in chapter 4, the 
end goal of this chapter will be to investigate normative orientations 
empirically. As mentioned in chapter 3, the attitudes of the citizenry 
are absolutely crucial in terms of social citizenship and the legitimacy 
of the welfare state. Such attitudes will be the focus of this chapter, 
but not only on the aggregate country-level. We will aim to uncover 
empirical typologies of citizens just as we discussed different forms 
of normative-theoretical citizenship in the previous chapter. How do 
citizens combine different normative orientations into coherent value 
sets, and what groups or types of citizens emerge within each of our 
country cases? What are the social divides associated with these 
different types of social citizenship?  
If we assume that normative attitudes in China and the Nordic 
countries follow stylized demarcation lines between different welfare 
cultures embodying ‘Confucianism’ and ‘egalitarian liberalism’, 
Nordic and Chinese welfare attitudes would be very different. 
However, as we will go on to see, this is not the case in all respects. 
In that sense, the empirical world is at least as ambigious as the 
normative-theoretical world of citizenship. Likely explanations for 
our results will be offered later in the chapter.   
The normative orientations we will include here are various measures 
of attitudes towards equality and the role of the state. However, some 
relevant measures of citizens’ perceptions of their own country 
context in terms welfare and equality will also be included in the 
initial descriptive sections of this chapter.  
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The chapter will begin by investigating descriptive country-level 
differences, not only between the five country cases, but also 
including a range of other countries. In this way, we will get a 
perspective on how unique or different our country cases are in a 
wider context. Firstly, we will take a very simple descriptive look at 
the individual variables that will be used later on. Secondly, we will 
also conduct a principal component analysis of these variables and 
see how all countries are placed on the two most important 
components in the ISSP 2009 survey. 
The chapter will proceed by investigating what groups or typologies 
of citizens dominate normative orientations within each of the 
country cases. This will be done by the method of latent class analysis 
(LCA), which divides citizens into mutually exsclusive classes or 
groups based on their attitudes. This will enable us to see how our 
country cases differ in terms of the dominating types or groups of 
citizens and we can furthermore use that to investigate the social 
divides that are associated with these different citizen types. The 
method of LCA will be explained further later.  
5.1 COUNTRY-LEVEL DIFFERENCES IN A BROADER 
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
The variables that will be used in this chapter are listed below in table 
3. Besides the 2009 module on ‘social inequality’ from the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the World Values 
Survey (WVS) also represents an international survey that is both 
relevant to our object of study and includes China. However, when 
the criterion is that the relevant variables should include both China 
and at least some Nordic countries, we are left with only four 
variables from the 2005-2009 wave in the WVS.  
A range of very relevant variables in terms of perceptions and 
normative orientations towards public welfare provision and social 
inequality is listed below. Still, the measures available to us do not 
necesseraily realize our ideal world. Since this thesis focuses on 
unemployment, health and pensions at the policy level, we would 
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want to investigate the corresponding dimensions of welfare at the 
level of attitudes.  
In the ISSP 2009, which will be centerpiece of the analysis later, we 
only have three measures that speak directly to the policy-level 
enquiries in later chapters. These are attitudes towards government 
responsibility for the living standards of the unemployed, attitudes 
towards benefits for the poor and finally tolerance of the rich being 
able to buy better health care provision.  
On the other hand, more measures regarding normative attitudes 
towards welfare provision would perhaps not make a very big 
difference in terms of country-level differences. Generally, there is  
very strong support for public welfare provision across countries for 
groups which are usually perceived as very deserving, such as the 
elderly and the sick, whereas there are larger variations in terms of 
attitudes towards the unemployed (Roosma et. al. 2012; Van 
Oorschot 2000). Still, interesting results could arise if we had 
measures regarding not necessarily the basic principle of support for 
the elderly and the sick, but orientations and perceptions towards 
different subdimensions of these policies or the willingness to 
prioritize between different forms of welfare provision.  
As regards the measures available to us, table 4 reveals the simple 
country-level differences on each of these variables. To keep the table 
itself limited to one page, we only show three countries (Germany, 
Japan and South Korea) beyond our main country cases. In this way, 
we will have two other East Asian countries and a major European 
country from one of the major worlds of welfare. We also also 
include the average for all countries in the survey in question. Later, 
we will show the wider country-context with all country cases in the 
ISSP 2009 survey by way of principal component analysis. In this 
table, results hare highlighted in bold if one of our five country cases 
is particularly distinct on the variable in question.  
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Table 3: Variables indicating normative ideals and perceptions in 
the ISSP and WVS surveys.  
No. Variable in 
table 4. 
Statement 
Survey: ISSP 2009 
1 Just pay 
diff. 
“How much do you think the chairman of a large national 
company should earn?” divided by “How much do you think 
an unskilled worker in a factory should earn?”. 
2 Perceived 
pay diff.  
“How much do you think the chairman of a large national 
company earns?” divided by “How much do you think an 
unskilled worker in a factory earns?” 
3 Inequality 
too high 
“Differences in income in <R’s country> are too large” 
 
4 Ineq. govt. 
responsib.  
“
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
differences in income between people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes” 
5 Unemp 
govt. res. 
“
The government should provide a decent standard of living 
for the unemployed” 
6 Poor less 
benefits 
“The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.” 
7 Progress. 
taxes 
“
Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger 
share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, 
the same share, or a smaller share?” 
8 High taxes 
on rich 
“
Generally, how would you describe taxes in <R's country> 
today for those with high incomes?”  
9 Just: Rich 
buy heal. 
“Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that people with higher 
incomes can buy better health care than people with lower 
incomes?”  
10 Just: Rich 
buy edu. 
“
Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that people with higher 
incomes can buy better education for their children than 
people with lower incomes?” 
11 
 
Conflict 
poor/rich 
“
In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts 
between different social groups. In your opinion, in <R's 
country> how much conflict is there between poor people and 
rich people?”  
12 Conflict 
work/mid 
“
In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts 
between different social groups. In your opinion, in <R's 
country> how much conflict is there between the working 
class and the middle class?”  
13 Ideal 
society 
“
These five diagrams show different types of society. What do 
you think <R's country> ought to be like - which would you 
prefer?” 
14 Perceived 
society 
“
These five diagrams show different types of society. Please 
read the descriptions and look at the diagrams and decide 
which you think best describes <R's country>.” 
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Survey: WVS 2005-2009 
15 Benefits 
humiliate 
“It is humiliating to receive money without working for it” 
 
16 No work 
lazy 
“People who don’t work become lazy” 
 
17 Demo. tax. 
rich 
“Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are 
essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each 
of the following things how essential you think it is as a 
characteristic of democracy: Government tax the rich and 
subsidize the poor” 
18 Demo. 
unemp.  
“Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are 
essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each 
of the following things how essential you think it is as a 
characteristic of democracy: People receive state aid for 
unemployment” 
 
Since we are only showing the percentage who agree with different 
statements, an index score has been constructed for each variable. 
These index scores can be seen in appendix B. The index score can be 
a useful supplement since table 4 in essence treats all variables as if 
they were dichotomous and thereby the results ignore degrees of 
agreement with the continuous variables. For this reason, highlighted 
results in bold are based on both table 4 and appendix B.  
 
Table 4 shows that the Chinese respondents are distinct from both the 
Nordic countries and the general survey in three ways. Firstly, the 
Chinese are in relatively high agreement with the statement that ‘the 
government should spend less on benefits for the poor’. Secondly, the 
Chinese to a high degree think it is justifiable if the rich can get 
access to better welfare provision. Thirdly, the Chinese perceive a 
relatively high degree of social conflict between the poor and the rich, 
but also between the working class and the middle class.  
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Table 4: Sino-Nordic perceptions and normative orientations 
Variable  Country Country 
averag.
1 
CN DK FI NO SE DE JP KR 
Per cent who agree with statement (except for just and perceived wages)
2 
Survey: ISSP 2009 
Just pay 
diff.
3 
5.0 
 
2.0 4.0 2.3 2.2 6.3 6 11.8 5.2 
Perceived  
pay diff.
3 
10.0 3.8 8.3 4.4 4.3 16.7 10 41.7 13.5 
Inequality 
too high
 
91 
 
62 
 
72 
 
61 
 
73 
 
90 
 
78 
 
90 
 
84 
 
Ineq. govt. 
responsib.  
81 
 
54 
 
75 
 
52 
 
58 
 
66 
 
54 
 
75 
 
72 
 
Unemp. 
govt. res.
 
87 
 
84 
 
81 
 
78 
 
78 
 
62 
 
70 
 
81 
 
73 
 
Poor less 
benefits
 
52 
 
9 
 
8 
 
7 
 
10 
 
8 
 
7 
 
10 
 
17 
 
Progress.  
Taxes
4 
74 
 
67 
 
84 
 
69 
 
72 
 
84 
 
88 
 
94 
 
76 
 
High taxes 
on rich
5 
13 
 
30 
 
13 
 
25 
 
23 
 
21 
 
17 
 
11 
 
21 
 
Just: Rich 
buy heal.
6 
64 
 
19 
 
21 
 
19 
 
14 
 
13 
 
31 
 
24 
 
23.0 
 
Just: Rich 
buy edu.
6 
69 
 
14 
 
14 
 
17 
 
13 
 
10 
 
36 
 
33 
 
24 
 
Conflict 
poor/rich
7 
66 
 
14 
 
34 
 
17 
 
36 
 
61 
 
36 
 
88 
 
44 
 
Conflict 
work/mid
7 
42 
 
5 
 
12 
 
6 
 
13 
 
21 
 
- 61 
 
23 
 
Ideal 
society
8 
77 
 
90 
 
88 
 
87 
 
84 
 
70 
 
73 
 
86 
 
79 
 
Perceived 
society
8 
14 
 
62 
 
37 
 
64 
 
40 
 
23 
 
24 
 
20 
 
22 
 
Survey: WVS 2005-2009 
Benefits 
humiliate 
70 
 
- 42 
 
54 
 
32 
 
42 
 
41 
 
59 
 
59 
 
No work 
lazy
 
82 
 
- 61 
 
54 
 
40 
 
49 
 
72 
 
89 
 
73 
 
Demo. tax 
rich
9 
81 
 
- 78 
 
68 
 
65 
 
75 
 
76 
 
77 
 
64 
 
Demo. 
unemp.
99
 
89 
 
- 85 
 
77 
 
74 
 
87 
 
81 
 
71 
 
75 
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1 
Country-level average of all countries in the survey (ISSP = 37-38 countries, WVS 
= 48-53 countries) 
2
 Most variables (exceptions noted below) have either 4 or 5 response categories 
ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The sum of “strongly agree” 
and “agree” at the country-level reported in these cases  
3
 Country-level median reported.  
4 “Much larger” and “larger” share reported 
5 “Much too high” and “Too high” reported 
6
  “Very just, definitely right” and “Somewhat just, right” reported 
7   “Very strong conflicts” and “strong conflicts” reported 
8  “
Type D: A society with most people in the middle” and “Type E: Many people 
near the top, and only a few near the bottom” reported 
9 “responses 6-10 on a 0-10 scale reported 
 
 
The Nordic countries are distinct in a number of ways depending on 
the specific countries in question. It is interesting to note that in the 
ISSP 2009 survey, Finland is generally not as distinct as the three 
Scandinavian countries. Citizens of the three Scandinavian countries 
desire wage inequalities to be relatively low, just as they also perceive 
wage inequalities to be low. The Scandinavian respondents also do 
not to the same extent as elsewhere agree with the statement that 
inequality is a government responsibility. Furthermore, especially 
Danes and Norwegians are very distinct in the way that they perceive 
their societies to be equal, middle-class societies dominated by 
relatively harmonious relations between both rich and poor as well as 
working class and middle class. It does not apply to Finland and 
Sweden to the same extent. In the World Values Survey, where 
Denmark is not included, we find that the Nordics to a lesser extent 
than elsewhere think that it is humiliating to receive benefits or that 
people without a job tend to become lazy.     
 
Some of these country-level response patterns are not difficult to 
understand, while others may seem very surprising. We will discuss 
this at the end of this section since we are not yet finished with 
aggregate country-level differences. At the same time, some of the 
most likely explanations will be suggested, even if the purpose of this 
chapter is not to explain these differences.  
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We will quickly go on to showcase the wider comparative context 
with all the countries in the ISSP 2009 where we will gain a wider 
comparative outlook than we were able to in table 4. The WVS will 
be left behind from here on because of the limited number of 
available variables. In table 5, principal component analysis of the 
seven measures that relate to normative ideals has been conducted. 
Those that directly relate to perceptions have been left out, but as we 
will also discuss by the end of this section, perceptions seem to have a 
way of creeping into the questions that should tap into normative 
ideals.  
 
Table 5: Principal component analysis of normative ideals in 
ISSP 2009 (all country samples included) 
Components Component 1  
 
Component 2 
 
Component 3 
 
Pct. explained 
variance 
31.7 17.8 14.4 
Interpretation of 
components 
Justification of 
better private 
welfare for the 
rich 
Government 
responsibility 
Ideal society and 
perceptions of the 
poor 
Variables
1 
Factor loadings 
Govt. responsible 
for inequality 
-0.254 0.772 -0.074 
Govt. responsible 
for unemployed 
-0.109 0.763 -0.243 
Progressive tax 
system as ideal 
-0.208 0.607 -0.013 
Just that rich can 
buy better health 
care 
0.937 -0.255 0.142 
Just that rich can 
buy better 
education 
0.938 -0.237 0.140 
Equal society as 
ideal 
0.020 0.011 0.893 
Less benefits for 
the poor 
0.276 -0.292 0.484 
Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy = 0.602; Bartletts test of 
sphericity significant at 0.000 
Oblique rotation of components 
1 
Respectively, variables number 4,5,7,9,10,13 and 6 in table 3.  
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The first component is dominated by the two variables that concern 
the justifiability of better private welfare for the rich. The second 
component concerns two measures of government responsibility for 
the unemployed and general inequality as well as support for a 
progressive tax system. The third component is dominated by the 
degree to which a relatively equal society is an ideal, but also the item 
on support for benefits for the poor.  
Figure 2 shows how the countries place themselves in relation to each 
other on the two most important components. The closer a country is 
to the center of the table, the more the response patterns resemble the 
general survey sample on these two dimensions of normative 
attitudes. The upper right corner consists of countries where the 
average citizen does not want or expect a lot from government in 
terms of welfare, while they at the same time think that better welfare 
for the welfare for the rich is justifiable. By definition, the lower left 
corner represents the opposite. In the upper left corner of figure 2, 
citizens that do not necessarily demand a lot from government but 
oppose inequality in welfare provision are overrepresented. Again, 
the opposite is the case in the lower right corner.  
China is a visible outlier on the first axis. The Chinese respondents 
are not at all typical in the way that they think it is justifiable that the 
rich can buy better welfare solutions. China and the Nordic countries 
resemble each other much more in terms of attitudes towards the role 
of government in welfare. Here, they are also very close to the survey 
average. The Nordic countries are generally not very distinct on either 
of these two dimensions, except perhaps that the Finns seem to want 
more government involvement in terms of welfare and equality. The 
Norwegians are least enthusiastic (or perhaps just least unsatisfied) in 
this regard.  
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Figure 2: Country positions on the two components of 
”Justification of better private welfare for the rich” and 
”Government responsibility” 
 
 
 
In terms of support for public welfare provision, it should be noted 
that our findings are generally in line with the findings of Thomsen 
(2006), who reported on the major results from a 1999-2001 survey 
on political culture in seven Nordic and East Asian countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden, China, Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwain). Despite the main focus on political culture, some items on 
welfare attitudes were included. Generally, both East Asian and 
Nordic citizens showed high support for public welfare in terms of 
equal education for all, social security for the elderly, unemployment 
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benefits as well as support for a ‘high level of social welfare’. 
Interestingly, Nordic and Chinese citizens appeared more welfare 
enthusiastic than respondents from the three other East Asian 
countries. However, when forced to prioritize between welfare and 
other issues (in this case, environmental protection and fighting 
crime), East Asian respondents, including Chinese, did not rank equal 
education and social security for the elderly as high as Danes and 
Swedes did (Finnish respondents were not asked to rank priorities). 
Support for the unemployed was more prioritized in East Asia, 
however. Unfortunately, in our case, the ISSP 2009 survey does not 
ask respondents to prioritize between issues.  
 
The findings of Thomsen (2006) cannot be used to confirm another 
main finding here, namely that the Chinese appear highly tolerant of 
inequalities in acces to welfare beyond what should be to all provided 
by the public. However, in Myth of the Social Volcano, Whyte (2010) 
utilizes the first systematic, nationwide Chinese survey on attitudes 
towards inequality and justice (from 2004) and makes the general 
conclusion that the Chinese are relatively tolerant of existing 
inequalities (some measures could be compared with 10 other 
countries, including some Eastern European countries, but also 
United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany and Japan). 
Another general conclusion was that the Chinese generally wanted 
stronger public involvement in securing equal opportunity and 
securing minimum standards of living, but also favored clear space 
for merit-based social outcomes to evolve. This echoes our country-
level results here. We could describe this as general support for 
‘Confucian’ social citizenship. Interestingly, however, Whyte (2010) 
also found that those most critical of social inequality was the new, 
well-educated and urban middle-class.    
 
5.2 A CAVEAT ON THE CHINESE SAMPLE AND OTHER 
LIKELY EXPLANATIONS  
Some of the most like explanations for the at times seemingly 
surprising results will be discussed here.  
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
112
 
As we just saw in figure 2, China is a strong outlier (along with South 
Africa and the Philippines) in terms of attitudes towards better 
welfare for the rich. One interpretation could be that the Chinese 
simply think that such a state of affairs is justifiable, but it may also 
to some extent reflect a propensity to simply just agree with different 
statements. This questions the validity of the Chinese data, especially 
on those measures where China was very distinct compared to other 
countries.  
Indeed, if we take a look at the statements with which respondents 
can agree or disagree in the ISSP 2009 (eight variables in total
4
), we 
will find a strong Chinese tendency to agree. Across these eight 
statements, 22% of Chinese respondents agree with seven or eight of 
them (the survey average is 7%; Not shown here). 44% agree with six 
or more (survey average 20%). Chinese respondents on average agree 
with 5.2 of the eight statements (the survey average is 4.1; Not shown 
here). However, a range of countries resemble China in this regard. 
These are, for example, Turkey (5.1 statements on average), Bulgaria 
(4.9), Russia (4.9), Ukraine (4.9), South Africa (4.8), South Korea 
(4.8), Argentina (4.7), Croatia (4.6) and Hungary (4.6). It is not given 
that this should be interpreted as a strong ‘agreement bias’ in this 
regard. Since many of these statements measure perceptions of 
procedural injustice and economic inequality, it makes sense that 
China and other Asian or Eastern European countries range near the 
top.  
                                                          
4 1)“Differences in income in <R’s country> are too large” 
2)
“
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes” 
3)
“
The government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed” 
4)
“The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.” 
5)“To get all the way in <R’s country> today, you have to be corrupt 
6) “In <R’s country>, only students from the best secondary education have a good 
chance to obtain a university education” 
7) “In <R’s country>, only the rich can afford the costs of attending university”  
8) “In <R’s country>, people have the same chances to enter university, regardless 
of their gender, ethnicity and social background”.  
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It makes more sense to talk of a possible ‘agreement bias’ if we 
investigate the combination of two specific statements, namely that 
“…only the rich can afford the costs of attending university” and that 
“…people have the same chances to enter university, regardless of 
their gender, ethnicity and social background”. This is shown for all 
countries below. It is clear that China and the Nordic countries are at 
opposite ends of this spectrum of potential ‘agreement bias’. 
Table 6: Potential ‘agreement bias’ by country 
Per cent agree with ‘only the rich can afford university’ and ‘people have the same 
chance to enter university’ 
Country Agree 
with 
both 
Agree 
with 
one 
Agree 
with 
none 
Country Agree 
with 
both 
Agree 
with 
one 
Agree 
with 
none 
China 39 48 13 Cyprus 14 59 27 
South Afr.  32 56 12 Argentina 14 68 18 
Taiwan 32 61 7 Slovakia 14 66 19 
South Kor. 31 53 16 Australia 14 69 17 
Latvia 30 58 13 Israel 14 58 28 
Bulgaria 29 60 10 Chile 12 58 30 
Turkey 27 48 25 Germany 11 58 32 
Russia 23 56 21 UK 10 63 27 
Hungary 23 49 28 Belgium 9 63 28 
Estonia 21 62 18 New Zeal. 7 73 20 
Czech Rep. 20 59 21 Spain 7 65 29 
France 19 64 18 Switzerland 7 67 26 
Ukraine 18 59 23 Iceland 6 72 22 
Croatia 18 58 23 Austria 5 65 29 
Slovenia 18 67 15 Denmark 4 69 27 
Poland 17 59 23 Sweden 4 67 29 
Phillippines 17 59 23 Norway 2 78 19 
Japan 17 65 19 Finland 1 73 26 
USA 15 61 24 Total 18 61 21 
Portugal 15 50 36     
However, the question is whether we have consctructed such a clear-
cut measure of agreement bias. A combination of the two statements 
may simply indicate that respondents indicate that yes, formally, 
access to university education is equal, but in reality, the rich have 
much better chances. Undoubtedly, some agreement bias is present, 
but it may be mixed with response patterns that actually have a 
coherent logic in the way these two statements are perceived by at 
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least some of the respondents. This interpretation makes sense if we 
consider that many countries at the top of the scale also have a high 
economic inequality, while the Nordic countries are at the bottom. It 
does not necessarily mean that Nordic respondents are simply much 
better than their European neighbours at answering questionnaires. 
Another argument why these two statements should not be seen as 
mutually contradictory presents itself when we consider that many 
combine disagreement with both statements. In the Nordic countries, 
for example, a sizeable number of respondents disagree with both 
statements.  
In short, it is difficult to make an easy conclusion regarding the 
measure in 6. An argument why we should not choose the most 
radical solution and simply exclude the respondents exhibiting 
possible agreement bias is that it would actually not make much of a 
difference. If we exclude the above 39% of the Chinese respondents, 
49% of the remaining respondents (compared with 52% in table 4) 
would still agree that the government should spend less on benefits 
for the poor (not shown here). Respectively, 60% and 65% would still 
agree that it is acceptable that the rich can buy better health care or 
better education (64% and 69% in table 4). The coordinates (X;Y) of 
China in figure 2 would change from (-0.997; -0.052) to (-0.916; -
0.052). China’s status as an outlier on the x-axis would only change 
marginally.   
It is clear that the Chinese tendency to agree with or chose the first 
response category in the seven variables chosen in figure 2 does not 
simply reflect a lack of competence or efficacy. The Chinese 
tendency to agree with the seven variables is not related to 
educational level (not shown here). The same applies to South Korea 
and Japan, while the tendency to agree is (negatively) correlated with 
educational level in the Nordic countries. Thomsen (2006) found the 
same in the 1999-2001 survey on political culture in East Asia and the 
Nordic countries. While the Chinese responses do not appear to 
reflect a lack of competency, it may still reflect some degree of 
response bias in the form of a general East Asian tendency to agree.  
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In terms of the measure of potential agreement bias in table 6, 
education level is not associated with the tendency to agree with both 
statements in any of these Nordic or East Asian cases (not shown 
here). If this is actually a good measure of agreement bias, it does not 
seem to reflect a lack of education.  
To summarize the lengthy discussion on possible agreement bias in 
China, we have not found a smoking gun. The Chinese tendency to 
agree does not reflect a lack of education, and it is not clear-cut that 
the two statements discussed in table 6 are actually mutually 
contradictory. Furthermore, excluding the respondents agreeing with 
the two seemingly contradictory statements would hardly make any 
difference regarding the Chinese position on our measures of 
normative orientations.  
For these reasons, we will continue with the data as they are. On the 
other hand, the measure of potential agreement bias should reflect a 
bias for at least some (but not all) respondents agreeing with both 
statements. Therefore, we will also check if excluding these 
respondents makes a difference for the latent class analyses in the 
next section.   
From a theoretical perspective, some of the results for both China and 
the Nordic countries do make sense. I will briefly outline some of the 
most likely theoretical explanations. Generally, individual-level 
explanations (such as self-interest or ideological values) would not be 
the main focus, although compositional factors are always a potential 
issue. In terms of macro-level explanations, three potential types of 
explanations can be emphasized.  
1) Attitudes are influenced by perceptions: In case of variables that 
should ideally be measures of normative orientations, we need to 
remember that respondents express these attitudes within different 
policy contexts and have different perceptions. This point is perhaps 
banal, yet it makes it notoriously difficult to compare basic values 
across country contexts. As John R. Zaller (1992:6) noted in his 
seminal work on mass opinion: “Every opinion is a marriage of 
information and predispositions…”. We may wish to measure these 
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basic values or predispositions, yet when they are expressed they are 
contingent upon perceptions or ‘information’.  
In terms of attitudes towards the role of government in welfare, the 
fact the Nordic citizens do not necessarily express strong opinions on 
the role of government in welfare provision can be explained by a 
form of ‘policy saturation’ effect. As for instance Roosma et. al. 
(2012) have found with the European Social Survey, unsatisfied 
‘demand’ in the form of negative perceptions of present welfare 
outcomes can lead people to express stronger support for the role of 
government. This is the reason why many Southern and Eastern 
European countries seemingly express stronger public welfare 
support than Nordic Europe. As we can also see in figure 2, this 
group of countries dominates in the lower half of the y-axis. This may 
also help explain why Finland finds itself somewhat separated from 
the Scandinavian countries in figure 2. As we will go on to see in 
chapter 10, the Finnish welfare state is not as universal as its three 
Scandinavian counterparts. We have also seen how Swedes differ 
from Norwegians and Danes in the way that they do not to the same 
extent perceive that social conflicts are neglible or that they live in a 
relatively equal middle-class society. One explanation emphasizing 
perceptions, as for example put forth by Svallfors (2004), is that class 
differences are are much more articulated in public discourse. The 
perception and public articulation of class cleavages is simply 
stronger in Sweden.  
In the Chinese case, tolerance of inequality is arguably strongly 
influenced by a ‘tunnel effect’ (Larsen 2013b). This means that in the 
ISSP 2009 survey the perception that ‘income differences are too 
high’ (see also table 4) is influenced by the perception that both 
oneself and society in general is better off than previously. This 
increases tolerance of perceived inequality, and this ‘tunnel effect’ is 
very strong in China. Whyte (2010) found indications of the same 
effect with the aforementioned 2004-survey. Several decades of very 
high economic growth is of course the straightforward explanation for 
this tunnel-effect in China, but perceptions are of course also 
dependant on how China’s economic progress (or lack thereoff) is 
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discoursivated. Regardless, this illustrates how social stability in 
China is dependent on perceived progress.  
On the other hand, Larsen (2013b) also shows that the Chinese 
tolerance of inequality is adversely affected by a strong perception of 
procedural injustice in China, in this case measured as the belief that 
bribes, personal connections and coming from the right family is 
important for getting ahead in society. While the Chinese scored 
extremely high on the ‘tunnel effect’, they scored extremely low in 
terms of the belief in just instiutions. In the Nordic countries we see 
the opposite, meaning that a general perception of strong procedural 
justice ceteris paribus increases tolerance of inequality in these 
countries.          
2) Attitudes are influenced by policy institutions: Country-level 
differences in welfare attitudes are to some extent influenced by the 
institutional set-up of the welfare state. A number of theories exist on 
this level, but they are generally related to the ‘new instutionalist’ 
school of thought. Some are rational choice-oriented. The argument is 
that encompassing welfare states create strong interests for welfare, as 
argued by Pierson (1993). Others emphasize historical institutionalist 
explanations. Here the argument is that universel welfare states 
helped further class coalitions as also argued by Esping-Andersen 
(1990). Some favor sociological dynamics where institutions further 
certain basic values. Mau (2004), for example, elaborate upon the 
‘moral economies’ of different types of welfare state. Finally, others 
such as Larsen (2013a, 2006) and Rothstein (1998) emphasize how 
the welfare state influences our perceptions of both our fellow 
citizens and the welfare state itself. The core argument is that residual 
or targeted welfare opens up for discussions about the actual 
‘deservingness’ of welfare recipients and that policies based on these 
principles further the perception that the welfare state is unjust and 
inefficient.  
These theories emphasize very different dynamics behind attitude 
formation, but they converge in emphasizing that the universal 
welfare state should create high public support for welfare, whereas 
the opposite should happen in residual or targeted welfare states. This 
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fits very well with the position of the Anglo-Saxon and more residual 
welfare states in figure 2 (United States, United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and Australia). ‘Policy saturation’ could certainly not be the 
explanation, at least not in the sense that welfare policy has met 
demands and desired outcomes, but rather that negative perceptions 
of public welfare (and distrust in government) are pervasive.  
In the Chinese case, I have argued elsewhere that the seemingly 
negative perceptions of the poor goes well with an institutional 
explanation that takes the combination of the hukou system and the 
present social assistance-schemes into account (Kongshøj 2014a). 
This institutional effect may have contributed in disassociating 
unemployment and poverty in the minds of many Chinese, something 
which could be very harmful for the perceived deservingness of the 
poor. As we will se in chapter 7, the Chinese Minimum Standard of 
Living Scheme (MSLS) is, despite increased coverage, often becomes 
very stigmatizing in implementation.  
3) Attitudes may to some extent validate existing real-world 
differences. This is related to the first explanation on perceptions, but 
the argument here is that people to some degree have a tendency to 
validate the perceived context as just (Hadler 2005). This is perhaps 
due to an inherent cognitive need to believe in the fairness of existing 
reality, or perhaps just because value-based evalutations tend to take 
perceived reality as the starting point of what is considered to be 
‘normal’. Regardless of the specific cognitive dynamics, the result is 
that people who perceive high wage gaps (to take an example) may 
want lower wage inequalities, but the desired wage gap will still be 
higher than that of people who perceive a reality of low wage 
inquality (Kjærsgård 2014). This might also matter in the Chinese 
case as regards the high tolerance of the rich being able to purchase 
better welfare. At least, as we will see in chapter 9, this has very 
much been the reality in the Chinese health care system. It does not 
necessarily mean that the Chinese do not want better and more equal 
provision of public education and health.        
The three general types of country-level explanatations offered above 
are not exhaustive and have served here as potential explanations for 
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some of the more surprising results. Without further investigation 
these explanatory factors are very difficult to disentangle, especially 
because they may pull in different directions at the same time. For 
example, the fact that the Nordic countries occupy the middle of 
figure 2 may be the result of a strong ‘policy saturation’ effect pulling 
these countries upwards on the y-axis and a strong ‘new 
institutionalist’ effect pulling them downwards at the same time. 
Explaining such ‘vector dynamics’ on different dimensions of welfare 
attitudes is not our purpose here, however.   
5.3 CITIZEN TYPOLOGIES AND CORRESPONDING SOCIAL 
DIVIDES 
Finally, we will turn to the task of uncovering empirical typologies of 
attitudes within our country cases. We may reasonably expect some 
Nordic citizens to be more ‘Confucian’ than ‘Marshallian’, just as 
some Chinese would be in strong agreement with T. H. Marshall.  
In this section, we will include only those measures which to some 
extent should tap into normative ideals of the welfare state. As 
discussed before, however, they are always to some extent influenced 
by perceptions of reality. Some of these variables are strongly 
dependendent upon perceptions, but they will still be included as long 
as they are somewhat based on normative evalutations.  
In total, nine variables are selected, and these are: 1) Inequality is too 
high, 2) the government should be responsible for alleviating 
economic inequality, 3) the government should ensure a decent living 
standard for the unemployed, 4) the government should spend less on 
benefits for the poor, 5) the tax system should be progressive, 6) taxes 
on high incomes are too low, 7) it is just or acceptable that the rich 
can get better health care, 8) it is just or acceptable that the rich can 
get better education, and finally 9) a society with relatively high 
equality as an ideal (see table 3 again for the specific question 
formulations as they have been directed at respondents).  
In this section, latent class analysis (LCA) will dominate as the main 
tool to help us uncover empirical typologies of citizens. Therefore, we 
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will begin by discussing and arguing for the use of LCA from a 
methodological viewpoint.   
LCA is a statistical method that has been widely employed in 
different social and health sciences such as psychology or sociology. 
(See Collins & Lanza (2010) or Lanza et. al. (2007) for more 
extensive reviews). Oser & Hooghe (2013) is a study which has 
directly inspired this chapter since the method was utilized to 
investigate different citizenship norms among Scandinavian 
adolescents.   
LCA is related to dimension reduction techniques such as principal 
component analysis (PCA), but as Oser & Hooghe (2013) argue, there 
is at least one important reason why LCA is preferable to PCA in the 
study of value-based citizenship. In our case, we are interested in how 
respondents combine different attitudes into coherent sets of citizen 
norms, not how a set of variables can be reduced to a limited number 
of dimensions. Methods such as PCA identify latent variables, 
whereas we are interested in latent groups of individuals. Therefore, 
PCA does not identify mutually exclusive groups of individuals based 
on their combinations of attitudes as LCA does. 
In this specific case, an empirical argument for LCA as opposed to 
PCA can also be made. PCA was conducted with the nine variables in 
each of the five countries (not shown here). The components that 
emerged were somewhat different by country, but Denmark and 
Sweden were nearly identical. Therefore, the indicators of social 
background that we will later use for LCA were regressed with the 
two principal components of Denmark-Sweden and China with the 
method of multiple classification analysis (MCA)
5
. Generally, the 
social background variables were only weakly correlated with the 
four dominant components (two in Denmark-Sweden and two in 
China). Only the first component for Denmark-Sweden (largely 
similar to ‘government responsibility in figure 2) had several 
                                                          
5 MCA has some advantages over standard linear regression. Most importantly, it is better 
suited for ordinal-scale variables, binary and multivariate regression coffiecients are provided 
at the same time, just as adjusted and unadjusted dependent variable means are provided for 
each category of the independent variables (Lolle (2007) 
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significant correlations with the social background variables, and it 
was also the only component where more than 3-5% of the variance 
could be explained (23%). Therefore, the empirical argument for 
investigating social divides in latent classes rather than latent 
variables is also strong.  
In technical terms, two sets of parameters are estimated with LCA; 
Class membership probabilities and item-response probabilities with 
each of the classes (Lanza et. al. 2007). Parameters are estimated by 
maxium likelihood. The standard procedure is to produce different 
baseline models with different numbers of classes. The baseline 
model that produces the best model of fit while also making sense in 
terms of the interpretation of classes is selected. This baseline model 
can then be extended to include subgroups (in our case, country 
samples) with different classes if the subgrouped LCA produces a 
better model fit. Finally, we can introduce covariates to see which 
factors increase or decrease the probability of belonging to different 
classes with a specific class as reference. In other words, covariates 
are estimated by logistic regression since the set of classes essentially 
constitute a categorical variable.    
In our case, we use the LCA Plugin for Stata (2014) from the 
Methodology Center at Penn State (version 1.1) with the user’s guide 
by Lanza et. al. (2014).   
As regards the nine variables, they have all been re-coded to 
categorical variables (as demanded by the method) in such a way that 
equality- or welfare-oriented reponses have the value of 1 and other 
responses the value of 2
6
.  
                                                          
6
 Value 1 equals the following responses: 
“Strongly agree” or “agree” with “Differences in icome…are too large…”  
“Strongly agree” or “agree” with “…reduce differences in income…”. 
“Strongly agree” or “agree” with “…a decent living standard for the unemployed…” 
“Disagree” or “strongly disagree” with “…less on benefits for the poor” 
“Much larger” or “larger” in “…people with hich incomes should pay a larger share….” 
“Too low” or “much too low” in “…taxes…for those with high incomes?” 
“Somewhat unjust/wrong” or “very unjust/definitely wrong” in “…higher incomes can buy 
better health care…”  
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Having discusssed the method, table 7 below presents the results from 
different possible baseline models when we only include the Sino-
Nordic country samples. The solution with four different latent 
classes is highlighted in bold because it will be chosen for further 
analysis. 
Table 7: Comparison of baseline models for latent class analysis 
of the Sino-Nordic country samples 
No. of classes G
2 Akaike’s 
Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
Bayesian 
Information 
Criterion (BIC) 
Degrees of 
freedom 
2 5338 5509 5528 492 
3 2088 2146 2349 482 
4 1356 1434 1706 472 
5 1171 1269 1611 462 
6 968 1086 1498 452 
7 880 1018 1500 442 
8 739 897 1449 432 
9 679 857 1479 422 
10 636 834 1526 412 
 
We can se how the likelihood ratio G
2 
test statistic drops significantly 
with each step from two to four classes, indicating a very significant 
improvement of model fit. However, the likelihood ratio G
2 
continues 
to drop until around eight classes. Akaike’s Information Criterion also 
continues to drop, as does the Bayesian Information Criterion. This 
indicates that, from a purely technical viewpoint, the trade-off 
between model fit and parsimony should allow us to go up to at least 
eight classes. However, model interpretability should also be 
considered (Lanza et. al. 2007). Looking at item-response 
probabilities for baseline models beyond four classes (not shown 
here) makes it extremely difficult to make very meaningful 
interpretations of these classes (and we only have nine different 
items). Furthermore, some classes run the risk of becoming very 
small. Therefore, the baseline model with four classes will be chosen.   
                                                                                                                                       
“Somewhat unjust/wrong” or “very unjust/definitely wrong” in “…higher incomes can buy 
better education…”  
“Type D” and “Type E” in “What do you think <R’s country> ought to be like…” 
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We will go on to conduct latent class analysis for each of our five 
country-sample populations separately, but first we could raise the 
question of whether this is actually a better solution than just using 
the same four classes with the same parameter estimates across all 
countries. In other words, does a model with different estimates for 
each country produce a better fitted model than one where we do not 
distinguish between countries? The short answer is that, yes, it does.  
The way to check this assumption is to compare a baseline model 
with measurement invariance across groups (countries in this case) 
with a model without measurement invariance (meaning that 
estimated parameters are allowed to vary across countries) (Lanza et. 
al. 2007). The results are that a model with measurement invariance 
across countries has a likelihood ratio G
2 
of 5065.6 (df =2508), while 
a model without measurement invariance has a likelihood ratio G
2 
of 
2974.8 (df = 2364). The difference in G
2 
between the two models 
(equal to the difference in -2*log-likelihood) is (5065.6 – 2974.8 =) 
2090 at (2508 - 2364=) 144 degrees of freedom, which is statistically 
significant. In other words, the model is improved significantly if we 
allow parameters to vary between countries.  
Results for the latent class analysis are presented below with five 
tables, one for each country. In each table, the size of each class (as a 
percentage of the population) is reported along with item-response 
probabilities for the four classes. The classes have also been given a 
label based on an interpretation of the item-response probabilities. 
The same labels are applied across countries, even if there are some 
important differences, which we will continue to discuss below.    
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Table 8: Latent class analysis, China 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3  Class 4 
Interpretation of 
class 
Egalitarian Ambigious Pro-public 
welfare, 
but tolerate 
inequalities 
in welfare 
mix 
Inegalitarian 
Size of class 15% 39% 35% 11% 
 Response probabilities 
Inequality is too high 0.95 0.93 0.98 0.55 
Govt. responsible for 
inequality 
0.87 0.84 0.92 0.21 
Govt. responsible for 
unemployed 
0.92 0.88 0.97 0.38 
Govt. should not 
spend less on poor.  
0.39 0.29 0.44 0.29 
Progressive tax 
system as ideal 
(0.72) 0.53 0.94 0.44 
Taxes on high 
incomes too low 
(0.70) 0.24 0.83 0.42 
Not just that rich can 
buy better health 
care 
0.94 0.04 0.09 0.23 
Not just that rich can 
buy better education 
0.86 0.04 0.07 0.22 
Equal society as 
ideal 
0.79 0.74 0.86 (0.68) 
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Table 9: Latent class analysis, Denmark 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3  Class 4 
Interpretation of 
class 
Egalitarian Ambigious Pro-public 
welfare, 
but tolerate 
inequalities 
in welfare 
mix 
Inegalitarian 
Size of class 42% 25% 12% 21% 
 Response probabilities 
Inequality is too high 0.95 0.35 (0.74) 0.12 
Govt. responsible for 
inequality 
0.88 0.24 (0.63) 0.03 
Govt. responsible for 
unemployed 
0.95 0.76 0.86 (0.62) 
Govt. should not 
spend less on poor.  
0.90 0.78 0.75 (0.61) 
Progressive tax 
system as ideal 
0.88 0.54 (0.72) 0.27 
Taxes on high 
incomes too low 
0.58 0.26 0.34 0.06 
Not just that rich can 
buy better health 
care 
0.90 0.83 0.04 0.01 
Not just that rich can 
buy better education 
0.95 0.83 0.21 0.30 
Equal society as 
ideal 
0.91 0.91 0.95 0.87 
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Table 10: Latent class analysis, Finland 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3  Class 4 
Interpretation of 
class 
Egalitarian Ambigious Pro-public 
welfare, 
but tolerate 
inequalities 
welfare 
mix 
Inegalitarian 
Size of class 46% 17% 23% 14% 
 Response probabilities 
Inequality is too high .95 .27 0.80 0.17 
Govt. responsible for 
inequality 
0.98 0.21 0.90 0.16 
Govt. responsible for 
unemployed 
0.94 0.57 0.82 0.49 
Govt. should not 
spend less on poor.  
0.89 0.71 0.75 0.46 
Progressive tax 
system as ideal 
0.94 0.59 0.88 0.47 
Taxes on high 
incomes too low 
0.89 0.33 (0.62) 0.09 
Not just that rich can 
buy better health 
care 
0.93 (0.74) 0.08 0.01 
Not just that rich can 
buy better education 
0.92 0.78 0.29 0.08 
Equal society as 
ideal 
0.92 0.88 0.91 0.75 
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Table 11: Latent class analysis, Norway 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3  Class 4 
Interpretation of 
class 
Egalitarian Ambigious Pro-public 
welfare, 
but tolerate 
inequalities 
welfare 
mix 
Inegalitarian 
Size of class 37% 18% 21% 24% 
 Response probabilities 
Inequality is too high 0.90 0.29 (0.74) 0.16 
Govt. responsible for 
inequality 
0.88 0.18 0.56 0.11 
Govt. responsible for 
unemployed 
0.92 (0.62) 0.84 0.52 
Govt. should not 
spend less on poor.  
0.88 0.75 0.79 (0.61) 
Progressive tax 
system as ideal 
0.91 0.59 (0.70) 0.33 
Taxes on high 
incomes too low 
(0.73) 0.35 0.42 0.09 
Not just that rich can 
buy better health 
care 
0.95 0.98 0.22 0.15 
Not just that rich can 
buy better education 
0.98 1.00 0.31 0.14 
Equal society as 
ideal 
0.89 0.90 0.90 0.85 
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Table 12: Latent class analysis, Sweden 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3  Class 4 
Interpretation of 
class 
Egalitarian Ambigious Pro-public 
welfare, 
but tolerate 
inequalities 
welfare 
mix 
Inegalitarian 
Size of class 44% 28% 14% 14% 
 Response probabilities 
Inequality is too high 0.95 0.55 0.82 0.19 
Govt. responsible for 
inequality 
0.83 0.35 0.56 0.06 
Govt. responsible for 
unemployed 
0.92 (0.62) 0.82 0.41 
Govt. should not 
spend less on poor.  
0.83 (0.70) (0.68) 0.47 
Progressive tax 
system as ideal 
0.95 0.47 (0.74) 0.37 
Taxes on high 
incomes too low 
0.83 0.30 0.42 0.05 
Not just that rich can 
buy better health 
care 
0.96 0.90 0.04 0.09 
Not just that rich can 
buy better education 
0.97 0.92 0.03 0.07 
Equal society as 
ideal 
0.86 0.87 0.88 0.77 
 
Generally, in all countries we can identify a main demarcation line 
between those who very often choose equality- or public welfare-
oriented responses on all (or nearly all) questions, and those who do 
not (except for the measure on ideal society). These two classes have 
been labelled ‘egalitarian’ and ‘inegalitarian’. This egalitarian citizen 
is strongly dominant in the Nordic countries (37-46% of the 
population samples), but not in China (15%). ‘Inegalitarian’ citizens 
have a stronger presence in Denmark and Norway (21% and 24%) 
than in the other countries (11-14%).  
The citizen type that seemingly dominates in China is the citizen who 
generally favors public responsibility for welfare provision but also 
CHAPTER 5. WELFARE ATTITUDES: TYPOLOGIZING SINO-NORDIC CITIZENS 
129 
accepts some inequality in welfare provision in the sense that the rich 
can afford better welfare (35% of the Chinese respondents). This 
echoes the aforementioned main conclusion of Whyte (2010), namely 
that the Chinese generally favor basic welfare provision, but also 
accept a certain space for ‘meritocratic’ welfare outcomes. This lends 
support to the prevalence of a ‘Confucian’ social citizenship in China, 
but as speculated previously (and later), more mundane explanations 
could also matter. This type of normative citizenship also constitutes 
a sizeable share of the citizenry in Norway and Finland (21% and 
23%) but less so in Denmark and Sweden (12% and 14%).  
The remaining class of citizens has simply been given the easy label 
of ‘ambigious’, since it is not very clear how we should interpret this 
class. Furthermore, this is also where response probabilities vary the 
most between countries. We cannot really compare the ‘ambigious’ 
citizens of China with the ‘ambigious’ citizens of Denmark, for 
example.  
The remaining differences across countries in terms of response 
probabilities generally echo previously reported country-level 
characteristics. For example, even among the egalitarian citizens of 
China negative perceptions of the poor seem to be widespread, and 
the egalitarian citizens of Denmark do not necessarily think that taxes 
on high incomes should be higher.  
It should be noted that the potential agreement bias discussed earlier 
makes no noticeable difference for the LCA of China. Again, if we 
use the most radical solution and simply exclude 39% of the Chinese 
respondents (those who agree with both statements in table 6), the 
results hardly change. The ‘egalitarian’, ‘ambigious’, ‘pro-public with 
tolerance of inequalities in welfare provision’ and ‘inegalitarian’ 
classes would respectively constitute 14%, 39%, 36% and 11% of the 
Chinese sample (not shown here). In other words, there is no 
noticeable change. Even if the measure that we constructed earlier 
really captures some degree of ‘agreement bias’, it has no bearings on 
the relation between different latent classes. 
Finally, we turn to the issue of social background and latent class 
membership. Below we will examine whether sex, age, income, 
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education, employment, subjective class or self-assessed urban-rural 
living environment are associated with the probability of belonging to 
the different latent classes.  
Our dependent variable is essentially a categorical variable (four 
qualitatively different latent classes), and therefore the socio-
economic covariates are estimated by logistic regression in LCA. 
Logitistic tegression coefficients have been transformed into the 
intuitively more understandable odds-ratios, and the significance of 
each individual estimate is tested with a Wald test. Since the odds-
ratio expresses how class membership probability increases (or 
decreases) when the independent variable increases by 1, it should be 
remembered that the level of the odds-ratios are not directly 
comparable because the independent variables span a different 
number of categories (as indicated in the table). Furthermore, we 
should be very cautious of interpreting logistic regression coefficients 
or odds ratios as simple effect estimates, since the estimates are 
affected not only by the strength or size of a particular correlation, but 
also by unobserved heterogeneity in the sample (Mood 2009). This 
means that we should be cautious of making simple comparisons of 
the size of odds ratios across countries. All odds ratios are controlled 
for the effect of the other independent variables.  
We will summarize the results variable by variable below. In terms of 
interpretation, it is important to emphasize that all odds ratios and 
signifigance levels are with the ‘inegalitarian’ class as reference. For 
example, this means that when women in some countries have a 
higher chance of being ‘pro-rich’, it does not mean that women 
generally have a higher chance of being ‘pro-rich’. It means that 
women have a higher chance of being ‘pro-rich’ rather than 
‘inegalitarian’. The difference in interpretation is fundamental.   
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Table 13: Latent classes and social background  
Logistic regression coefficients translated into odds-ratios with ‘inegalitarian’ 
class as reference. Significance levels indicated below odds ratios (Wald test) 
 Variables (number of categories in parenthesis) 
Class Sex
1 
 
 
(2) 
Age
2 
 
 
(6) 
Income
3 
 
 
(7) 
Edu-
cation
4 
 
(6) 
Employ- 
Ment
5 
 
(2) 
Percei-
ved 
class 
6 
(10) 
Urban- 
Rural
7 
 
(5) 
China 
Egalitarian 1.19 
ns 
1.22 
** 
1.13 
* 
1.10 
ns 
0.80 
ns 
0.79 
*** 
1.01 
ns 
Pro-rich  1.02 
ns 
1.18 
** 
1.08 
ns 
1.25 
** 
0.85 
ns 
0.81 
*** 
0.89 
ns 
Ambigious 1.03 
ns 
0.97 
ns 
1.16 
** 
1.11 
ns 
1.03 
ns 
1.01 
ns 
1.00 
ns 
Denmark 
Egalitarian 2.56 
*** 
1.34 
** 
0.53 
*** 
0.98 
ns 
0.42 
** 
0.67 
*** 
0.94 
ns 
Pro-rich  1.61 
ns 
1.04 
ns 
0.63 
** 
0.76 
* 
0.61 
ns 
0.84 
ns 
1.05 
ns 
Ambigious 1.76 
* 
1.02 
ns 
0.56 
*** 
0.83 
ns 
0.93 
ns 
0.90 
ns 
0.93 
ns 
Finland 
Egalitarian 2.00 
* 
1.26 
ns 
0.64 
** 
0.56 
** 
0.64 
ns 
0.54 
*** 
1.04 
ns 
Pro-rich  2.41 
* 
1.17 
ns 
0.63 
** 
0.65 
* 
0.60 
ns 
0.67 
* 
0.95 
ns 
Ambigious 1.62 
ns 
0.82 
ns 
0.75 
ns 
0.60 
* 
1.33 
ns 
0.84 
ns 
0.83 
ns 
Norway 
Egalitarian 2.45 
*** 
1.29 
** 
0.48 
*** 
0.65 
*** 
0.42 
** 
0.65 
*** 
1.05 
ns 
Pro-rich  1.87 
* 
1.04 
ns 
0.67 
*** 
0.68 
*** 
0.53 
* 
0.85 
ns 
0.90 
ns 
Ambigious 1.39 
ns 
0.92 
ns 
0.65 
*** 
0.59 
*** 
0.51 
* 
1.08 
ns 
0.98 
ns 
Sweden 
Egalitarian 2.56 
** 
1.95 
*** 
0.44 
*** 
0.72 
** 
0.18 
** 
0.57 
*** 
1.13 
ns 
Pro-rich  2.98 
*** 
1.58 
*** 
0.47 
*** 
0.76 
* 
0.19 
*** 
0.71 
** 
1.00 
ns 
Ambigious 2.56 
*** 
1.30 
* 
0.48 
*** 
0.92 
ns 
0.27 
*** 
0.75 
* 
1.06 
ns 
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ns = not significant; * = significant at the 0,05-level; ** = significant at the 0,01-
level; *** = significant below the 0,01-level 
1:
 1= man, 2 = woman 
2
 Age in 6 categories from 18-29 (1) to 70+ years (6) 
3
Income in 7 categories from 0-0.25 times the country median income (1) to to 
more than 3 times the median (7) 
4Highest completed education level in 6 categories from ‘no formal education’ (0) 
to ‘university degree completed’ (5) 
5 
1 = employed, 2 = not employed (including helping family member, unemployed, 
student/school/vocational training, retired, housewife/-man, disabled, other/not in 
labor force).  
6 
Subjective self-placement in 10 categories from bottom/lowest (1) to top/highest 
(10).  
7
 Self-assessed living environment in 5 categories from ‘urban/ a big city’ (1) to 
‘farm or home in the country’ (5).  
 
Gender has no significant correlation with class membership in 
China, while females in all the Nordic countries have a much higher 
probability of being ‘egalitarian’ rather than ‘inegalitarian’. In 
Norway, Sweden and Finland, women also have a higher probability 
of being the type of citizen that accepts better welfare for the rich 
(rather than ‘inegalitarian’). In addition, women are more ‘ambigious’ 
than ‘inegalitarian’ in Denmark and Sweden.  
Older age groups have a higher probability of being ‘egalitarian’ or 
‘pro-rich’ in China. In Denmark and Norway, age increases the 
probability of being ‘egalitarian’, while higher age is associated with 
increased likelihood of belonging to any of the three non-
‘inegalitarian’ classes in Sweden7.  
Income is associated with very different citizen dynamics in China 
and the Nordic countries. In all the Nordic countries, higher income 
                                                          
7 ‘Age’ is a variable where it would have been relevant to examine whether we are 
really witnessing linear relationships, or perhaps just the result of a few deviant age 
cohorts. Unfortunately, the LCA-plugin for Stata is not designed in way that makes 
it possible to examine individual categories in the independent variables. It would 
of course be possible to dummy-code the variable, but this variable itself it not so 
important for the conclusions that will be drawn below.      
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increases the probability of belonging to the ‘inegalitarian’ class 
(compared with any other class), while it increases the probabily of 
being either ‘egalitarian’ or ‘ambigious’ in China.  
In China, increasing education level increases the probability of being 
the type of citizen that simoultaneosuly want public welfare provision 
but also accepts that the rich can buy better welfare. Again, the 
dynamic is somewhat different in the Nordic countries. In Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, education increases the probability of being 
‘inegalitarian’. In Denmark, the highly educated are less ‘pro-rich’ 
than ‘inegalitarian’.  
Whether you are employed or not does not seem to make much of a 
difference in China or Finland, whereas not being in employment 
increases the probability of being ‘inegelitarian’ in Sweden and 
Norway (in reference to any other class). In Denmark, this dynamic 
only works between the ‘inegalitarian’ and ‘egalitarian’ classes.  
Higher perceived social status generally increases the probability of 
being ‘inegalitarian’ in all countries, but the specific classes with 
which this tendency is significant varies between countries. In China, 
you have a smaller probability of being ‘egalitarian’ or ‘pro-rich’ if 
you perceive yourself as belonging to the top of society. In Sweden, 
the probability of being ‘inegalitarian’ increases with higher social 
status compared to any of the three other classes.  
The variable on self-assessed urban-rural environment makes no 
difference anywhere. This may seem surprising in the case of China 
(but unfortunately we have no indication of hukou status). Some 
reservations towards this variable can be discussed, however8.  
                                                          
8 It should be noted that none of the Chinese respondents have responded with 
‘farm, or home in the country’ (but a large group of 35% have indicated ‘country 
village, or other type of community’; Not shown here). The question is whether this 
means that rural citizens are simply missing. It may be the case that rural citizens 
for reasons specific to China choose ‘country village, or other type of community’. 
Rural Chinese are still somewhat underrepresented in the survey if this is the case 
(unless rural Chinese would also indicate ‘town or small city’). Regardless, it does 
seem that the variable is a somewhat valid measure of urban-rural residence. At 
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In conclusion, many of these associations between social background 
and latent citizen types (in terms of normative attitudes) in the Nordic 
countries support what one would expect from the perspective of self-
interest. The higher educated, those with higher incomes and those 
who perceive themselves as having high social status generally tend 
to have a higher probability of being ‘inegalitarian’. It varies 
somewhat between the countries exactly where this tendency is 
noticeable and significant. It should be remembered, however, that we 
found that the tendency to agree with various statements in the Nordic 
countries (not only with the measures used in this LCA analysis) 
decreased with education level, for example. The results may to some 
extent reflect this since a respondent would have a higher probability 
of being classified as ‘egalitarian’ or ‘pro-rich’ rather than 
‘inegalitarian’ if agreement bias is present. 
The picture is somewhat different in China. Generally, high incomes 
and to some extent the highly educated (but not those who perceive a 
high social status) tend to have a smaller chance of being 
‘inegalitarian’. As noted earlier, Whyte (2010) made the same general 
conclusion with the 2004-survey (even if the statistical method was 
different). This may seem puzzling. However, it generally supports 
the assumption that those who expect or demand the most from 
government in an emerging economy is the new middle class or those 
who have benefited the most from market reform. Economic 
development leads to increasing expectations. If the Chinese are 
indeed strongly affected by a ‘tunnel’-effect as found by Larsen 
(2013b), we could speculate whether our results would have been 
even stronger had this effect not been present (if we assume that high 
incomes or the higher educated are those most strongly affected by 
this ‘tunnel’-effect, and that the tunnel effect also affects welfare 
demand, not only tolerance of inequality).  
                                                                                                                                       
least, and as expected, income and education correlate highly with this variable in 
the Chinese sample (not shown here). It may simply be that there is no independent 
effect from urban-rural living environment once we control for other background 
variables as we do in this case.      
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This main finding also supports welfare reform as it has actually 
unfolded in China. As we will see in the coming chapters, urban 
workers generally have the by far most generous welfare schemes and 
the welfare reform of the past 10-15 years also began here. We may 
speculate on the direction of causality between welfare attitudes and 
social policies, but at least it seems clear with these individual-level 
dynamics that there is a long way to go before we reach any kind of 
‘welfare saturation’. Furthermore, it also emphasizes how we should 
be careful with static assumptions about the pervasiveness of a 
‘Confucian’ type of normative citizenship.  
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CHAPTER 6. SINO-NORDIC SOCIAL 
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: WELFARE 
REGIMES, EAST ASIA AND THE 
CHINESE BACKSTORY 
The purpose of this chapter is to anchor the Chinese and Nordic cases 
in a context. This thesis will make big comparative leaps with the 
unlikely companions of China and the Nordic countries. While the 
Sino-Nordic framework has both merit and interest, with the very 
different country cases we will be drawing conclusions far removed 
from the wider context in which the country cases are embedded.  
Therefore, a broader comparative context beyond China and the 
Nordic countries will be introduced, but not at the same level of 
policy-detail. The classic Western welfare regimes will largely be 
assumed to be well-known for the reader, but we will bring East 
Asian welfare regimes into the traditional framework. This will also 
enable us to understand whether and how the Chinese development is 
typical to East Asia by including discussions on changes in East Asia 
in the regime literature.  
Finally this chapter will end with a brief backstory on the 
characteristics of the old Chinese welfare system of the planned 
economy. The motivation behind this is also one of providing context, 
this time regarding the longer historical trajectory of public welfare 
provision in China. This has of course informed the trends and 
challenges of the contemporary welfare system investigated in later 
chapters (as we would assume from a ‘path dependency’-
perspective).    
6.1 STYLIZED WELFARE REGIMES IN EAST AND WEST 
In this section, East Asia will be contrasted with the classic, three 
Western welfare regimes, but without the same attention to detail 
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since this ‘old world’ of welfare is quite well-established and well-
described (if still contested). Neither the heated discussion on the 
actual number of welfare regimes nor their real-world empirical 
applicability will be engaged here (otherwise, see for example Vis & 
Van Kersbergen (2014), Hay & Wincott (2012), Powell & Barrientos 
(2011) or Arts & Gelissen (2010, 2002). The same kind of research 
debate has also bloomed in the case of East Asia. Here, the discussion 
is arguably still somewhat inconclusive. The debate has not only 
revolved around whether there is one or more East Asian regimes, but 
also whether the concept has an inherent Western bias and is lacking 
concepts to capture the distinctness of East Asian welfare (Powell & 
Kim 2014).  
Some of the latter points will be discussed here (what the ‘Western’ 
regime literature might be missing). We will begin by discussing two 
fundamental traits to be found in the literature on East Asia, namely 
familialism and productivism, before arriving at stylized conception 
of East Asian welfare regimes in comparison with Western welfare 
regimes. Later, we will add details on recent East Asian 
developments.    
One dominant theme in the literature on East Asia is that social policy 
is often perceived to be completely subordinate to the market, the 
family or both. A host of labels has been proposed in the literature, 
such as ‘developmental’, ‘productivist’, ‘Confucian’, ‘conservative-
liberal hybrid’, ‘informal security’ or ‘oikonomic’ welfare regimes 
(Abrahamson 2011), but most of them agree on this point. Some 
emphasize the market more than the family and vice-versa. For 
example, the labels of developmentalism and productivism both 
emphasize how social policy is completely subordinate to economic 
goals such as high growth in emerging economies.  The label of 
‘Confucianism’, however, has a tacit, but quite strong, emphasis on a 
particular East Asian welfare culture dominated by familialism.  
This is almost an echo of one of the classic criticisms of the classic 
welfare regime typology, namely that Southern or Mediterranean 
Europe does not merely constitute an under-developed subgroup of 
the corporatist welfare regime (Minas et. al. 2014; Bonoli 1997; 
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Ferrera 1996).  The argument is that they form a distinct regime 
characterized by familialism and a general Catholic principle of 
subsidiarity (it should be noted that these traits were also 
acknowledged by Esping-Andersen (1997) himself). This trait is also 
prominent in Jones (1993), something of a standard reference in the 
literature on Confucian regimes, in which this welfare regime is 
summarized thusly: ”…so it seems appropriate in this case to add 
another composite category: that of the Confucian welfare state: 
Conservative corporatism without (Western-style) worker 
participation; subsidiarity without the Church, solidarity without 
equality; laissez-faire without libertarianism: an alternative 
expression for all this might be ‘household economy’ welfare states – 
run in the style of a would-be traditional, Confucian, extended 
family” (Jones 1993:214). Similarly, Goodman & Peng (1996:5) 
emphasized the ‘common language of Confucianism’ in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan by listing a core set of Confucian values as 
elaborated in chapter 4. From this perspective, Confucian value 
systems to a large degree explain the distinctness of these welfare 
regimes.  
A strong tradition of familial welfare provision is evident in the way 
that East Asian countries have tended to inscribe familial welfare 
provision in the law. For example, in China the Family Law required 
that family itself takes care of those in need, such as those without 
work, the Elderly Law in 1996 further reiterated that the family was 
to been seen as the primary carer of the elderly (Chau & Yu 2005; 
Leung 2005). The biggest contrast to this is the Nordic countries, 
where the most distinct feature of these welfare regimes has been 
relatively universal state provision of both services and care (Stoy 
2014; Kvist et. al. 2012). On the other hand, China is in these years 
witnessing local experiments with elderly care provision beyond the 
traditionally strongly residual care institutions for the most 
disadvantaged elderly, and the central government has recently begun 
financing local experiments (Lei & Walker 2013). A stronger 
governmental role in elderly care is part of the lofty welfare goals of 
the 12
th
 Five Year-Plan (2011-2015). This underlines how the cultural 
underpinnings of welfare regimes should not be conceived too 
statically. Hong (2014) argues that East Asian familialism with 
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reference to ‘Confucian’ values should be perceived more as political 
rhetoric in order justify residual welfare than an actual East Asian 
regime-characteristic.  
That the welfare state is merely an appendix in East Asia is also a 
core trait in the ‘developmental’ and ‘productivist’ labels, but here 
social policy is subordinate to market forces and economic goals 
rather than the family or broader value systems. Developmentalism as 
a label is less easy to pin down than productivism, however, since it 
could imply many kinds of developmentalism besides the primacy of 
economic goals (Wong 2013b; Choi 2012)
9
. To avoid some of the 
confusion of the developmental label, we will stick to productivism 
here.  
Holliday (2005:148) notes on productivism that: “In the productivist 
type, social policy is an extension of economic policy, and is 
subordinated to and defined by economic objectives. In such a state, 
in consequence, social policy looks very different from the form it 
takes in welfare states (…) whereas Esping-Andersen’s three worlds 
all allow social policy some autonomy and thereby enable it to 
become one of the shaping forces of the social order, the productivist 
world does not permit this”. Developmentalism is largely defined in 
the same way in the literature.  
Ong’s (1999) analysis of citizenship regimes in East Asian ‘tiger 
states’ stresses that these traits are promoted by East Asian states as a  
general ‘style of reasoning’, or as she also writes: “…the post-
developmental strategy of middle-range Asian economies seeks to 
produce technically proficient and socially unified citizens attractive 
for capital” (Ong 1999:65). The argument for this constituting a 
                                                          
9 Developmentalism as a concept might also entail government capacity to promote 
development, developmental ideology or different economic paradigms in 
developing countries (Lee & Ku 2007). Developmentalism also implies a somewhat 
functionalistic perception of policymaking in the sense that the economy and the 
welfare state will progress to ever higher levels of development. It has been argued 
that a developmental welfare state does not belong to a particular welfare regime as 
such, but is more of a transitory phenomenon of an emerging economy (Wong 
2013b; Ringen & Ngok 2013). 
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particular regime of citizenship is that it would also be embedded as a 
way of thinking among the citizenry, even if it is very state-led.  
This fundamental trait gives East Asian welfare regimes a somewhat 
amorphous face, since the goals of economic policy are subject to 
change, particularly in emerging economies. An economy evolving 
from demand for cheap labor to more skill-intensive labor markets 
with higher productivity might demand more extensive social rights, 
for example.   
However, this assumingly very fundamental East Asian trait is also 
easy to question as something particularly East Asian. The 
instrumental use of social policy to support goals of economic growth 
is of course nothing new. Kwon (2005) himself notes that the social 
reforms of Bismarck, often perceived as one of the defining moments 
in welfare history, were merely means to the end of furthering 
industrialization through social insurance programs while curbing 
support for the socialist movement at the same time. Richard Titmuss, 
widely hailed as one of the grandfathers of social policy research, 
denoted this as ‘welfare statism’, the very basic approach common to 
nearly all industrialized societies: “…the generalized welfare 
commitment is nevertheless viewed as the dominant political fact of 
modern Western societies. Governments of the liberal right and the 
liberal left may come and go; the commitment to welfare, economic 
growth, and full employment will remain with minor rather than 
major changes in scope and objectives” (Titmuss 1987: 116). Even 
the Scandinavian welfare states are no strangers to productivism, 
despite what Holliday (or others) might say of the autonomy of social 
policy in ideal-typical, Western welfare regimes. Esping-Andersen 
(1999:80) even wrote that “Scandinavian welfare and employment 
policy has always been couched in terms of ‘productivism’, that is 
maximizing the productive potential of the citizenry”. Generally, 
productivism and economic competitiveness have long been very 
strong in the Nordic countries.    
The increasing attention in all developed welfare states to reform 
social policies from a ‘social investment’-perspective (Morel et. al. 
2012), where economically productive aspects of social policy is 
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emphasized, is a good example of a general reform trend that most 
certainly is not particularly East Asian. Indeed, the notion of ‘social 
investment’ has oftentimes been represented as a very Nordic or 
Scandinavian approach (Nolan 2013).  
Social investment as a concept is quite ambigious, which accounts for 
its popularity, but productivism is perhaps more narrow. Jessop 
(1994) argued that a ‘productivist re-ordering of social policy’ could 
be observed as a global paradigmatic shift as states increasingly 
emphasized international competitiveness rather than equality or full 
employment. In Denmark, for example, the notion of the competition 
state has been part of public discourse in most recent years, fed by a 
book of the same name (in Danish) from Ove K. Pedersen (2011) 
This is clearly something different than basic welfare statism. The 
notion of the competetition state is nothing new, however, and 
emerged already in the 1990s to describe the perceived effects of 
globalization (Cerny 1997).   
In short, productivism is not necessarily something particularly East 
Asian, but it also depends on how narrowly or broadly the concept is 
defined. This point is increasingly acknowledged in the literature 
(Hudson et. al. 2014; Choi 2013; Hudson & Hwang 2013; Izuhara 
2013). A more accurate way to put it might be that while trying to 
achieve politics ‘for markets’ rather than ‘against markets’ is 
something you can find in any modern welfare regime, the degree to 
which social policy alters the way market forces work is the most 
marginal in a productivist regime. The instrumental use of social 
policy to achieve growth or other economic ends is less defining of a 
particular welfare regime than is the way in which social policy 
shapes market processes and outcomes. This fundamental 
developmental or productivist trait means that de-commodification is 
very low while welfare stratification is high in such a welfare regime 
if we recall the two dimensions upon which The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism was based.     
There are some commonalities with the ‘classic’ welfare regimes 
here. In an ideal-typical corporatist regime, we might say that welfare 
stratification is high, since the welfare state maintains existing 
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market-based stratifications via the principle of merit, often through 
social insurance schemes. The merit-based allocation of welfare is 
arguably rooted in the very first social insurance reforms of 
Bismarck, at least in the German case, with the aims of preserving 
status and social order. This is not too far from the aims of 
‘Confucian’ authoritarian social reform (Lin 1999). In an ideal-typical 
corporatist regime, however, de-commodification is not necessarily 
low since people included in these schemes are not very dependent on 
their market status in terms of securing an adequate level of living10. 
Therefore, both de-commodification and welfare stratification is 
lower in a residual welfare regime relative to a corporatist regime.  
This means that productivist social policymaking, subordinate to 
market forces, combines the high welfare stratification of the ideal-
typical corporatist regime with the low level of de-commodification 
in the residual welfare regime. In other words, this is where we see 
how the stylized East Asian regime can also be understood as a 
hybrid between these two regimes such as Esping-Andersen (1997) 
preferred to label it. Productivism shares with corporatism the 
insurance-based principle of merit, but combines this with the 
minimal extent of residual citizenship-based social rights (Holliday 
2005). This means that the goal for productivist welfare schemes is 
merely to secure a certain minimum standard of living, not to 
guarantee the previous standard of living, even if access to these 
schemes is based on insurance and merit.  
                                                          
10 Once again, we are operating in the ideal-typical world here. For example, the 
point has often been made that Germany has long had quasi-universal welfare 
arrangements in the sense that contributory schemes are combined with citizenship-
based social minima in pensions or healthcare, for example (Bode 2013). This 
quasi-universal balance has changed, however. Generally, benefits have been 
lowered and the actuarial principle of insurance strengthened at the same time as 
coverage of insurance has decreased (Palier 2012). The result is greater dualization 
or insider-outsider divides, or a step back towards the more ideal-typical welfare 
stratification of a corporatist welfare regime.  
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Finally, we have the question of welfare culture in East Asia. Here, 
we find the notion of the Confucian welfare culture, which is a mirror 
to Western welfare cultures in this field of literature. As noted in 
section 4, ‘welfare culture’ can basically be defined as the ideational 
bedrock upon which welfare regimes are based.  
It is somewhat of a standard explanation in this literature to trace 
modern-day welfare regimes back to much older religious 
transformations. For example, the divide between 
Scandinavian/universal and Anglo-Saxon/residual welfare regimes on 
the one hand and Continental European/corporatist on the other is 
traced back to the divide between Catholicism and Protestantism. The 
former is based on a view of society as an organic entity that heavily 
differentiates between the roles of different societal classes (Rice 
2013). The Catholic principle of subsidiarity, the idea that the state 
should only step in if familial or community-based welfare provision 
is absent, is often seen as particularly strong in Southern Europe. In 
contrast, Northern Europe gradually based itself on a on a secular 
tradition heavily influenced by individualism and the idea of equal 
rights. From here, the Nordic countries departed onwards to modern-
day universal welfare regimes by the road of a strong marriage 
between state and church, which was conducive to idea of a strong 
state enmeshed in social affairs (Rice 2013; Stråth 2005). While 
Confucianism is not a religion as such, since metaphysical 
explanations and divine entities are quite absent, it is in a sense 
largely correspondent to classic, Western religious value systems 
such as those of Protestantism and Catholicism.   
If we summarize this discussion on stylized welfare regimes in East 
and West, we arrive at the regime traits sketched in the table below. 
The first three rows cover welfare state institutions, while the next 
three cover welfare outcomes and socio-structural effects, including 
the welfare mix 
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Table 14: Ideal-typical welfare regime characteristics in East and 
West 
 Productivist Residual Corporatist Universal 
Social policy aims Subordinate 
to economic 
aims 
Alleviate 
poverty 
Security Promote 
well-being 
Main principle of 
state welfare 
Productive 
reciprocity 
Need Reciprocity Equality 
Social rights Minimal, 
linked to 
productive 
activity 
Minimal, 
linked to  
citizenshi
p 
Extensive, 
linked to 
productive 
activity 
Extensive, 
linked to 
citizenship 
Degree of 
decommodificatio
n 
Lowest Low Medium Highest 
Degree of welfare 
stratification 
Highest Medium High Lowest 
Welfare mix: 
Emphasis on: 
Civil society 
Family 
Market 
State 
 
 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
Weak 
 
 
Strong 
Moderate 
Strong 
Weak 
 
 
Moderate 
Strong 
Weak 
Strong 
 
 
Weak 
Weak 
Weak 
Strong 
Welfare culture Confucianism  Anglo-
Saxon 
Protestanti
sm 
 Catholicism  Nordic 
Protestantis
m 
Based on Kongshøj (2013) and modified with inspiration from Hong (2014), Rice 
(2013), Anttonen et. al. (2012), Aspalter (2011), Lee & Ku (2007), Arts & Gelissen 
(2002), Clasen & Van Oorschot (2002), Holliday (2000); Kuhnle & Alestalo 
(2000). 
 
The first three rows are largely facets of the same general trait. 
Productivist regimes more than any other have subordinated social 
policy to pre-existing market imperatives. Once again, we note that 
trying to make social policy work with market forces is not 
necessarily regime-specific, but the degree to which social policy 
alters market forces is. While East Asian productivist regimes are 
closest to the corporatist regime in many ways, this particular feature 
of East Asian social policy makes the corporatist reciprocity much 
more ‘productive’ or minimal in terms of social rights. As opposed to 
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ideal-typical corporatism, even the insiders favored by reciprocal 
social insurance can hardly expect generous welfare in this regime.  
This makes the ideal-typical East Asian welfare regime a curious 
blend of elements from both the residual and the corporatist regime. 
The result is something resembling a polar opposite of the universal 
welfare regime. This is also evident in the outcome measures of de-
commodification and stratification, where de-commodification is 
lowest among these four ideal-types and welfare stratification highest. 
Finally, we have the welfare mix, and here we once again witness the 
ideal-typical opposite to universalism resulting from the 
residual/corporatist blend of the welfare mix.  An active and vibrant 
civil society has not been something strongly associated with East 
Asian governance structures, and it is not important for welfare 
provision either. On the other hand, NGOs or charitable organizations 
have in some cases, particularly in Hong Kong, been almost 
institutionalized within welfare provision (Aspalter 2006). The 
market and particularly the family, however, have undoubtedly been 
very important. Another way of putting it is that in East Asian welfare 
regimes the state chiefly regulates while financing as well as 
provision is shouldered by non-state actors (Wong 1998). Finally, as 
the last welfare regime dimension we have added welfare culture. 
Confucianism does have a lot in common with the religiously 
founded welfare conservatism and the overall principle of subsidiarity 
within Catholicism as discussed in chapter 4.  
6.2 ADDING FINER BRUSHES TO THE STYLIZED EAST-
ASIAN IMAGE 
The previous section was very much a sketch of the East Asian 
welfare regime seen through the prism of the traditional dimensions 
of western Welfare regimes. The finer brushes to be added here come 
in the form of criticisms against the traditional regime perspective as 
missing important and distinct traits of the East Asian cases. Firstly, 
there is the argument that many East Asian countries have achieved 
relatively good welfare outcomes despite the absence of 
comprehensive and inclusive welfare states. For example, White & 
Goodman (1998:3) remark that “East Asia has the most dynamic 
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economies in the world. They have managed to combine this 
dynamism with social cohesion, an apparent “health miracle” and 
very low crime rates, while keeping their welfare expenditures low”.  
The same point is very much evident in the notion of ‘informal 
security’ regimes (Sharkh & Gough 2006). The East Asian cases 
achieve relatively good welfare outcomes without needing a welfare 
state, it might almost seem. On the other hand, it should be noted that 
these informally achieved welfare outcomes largely only included 
health (life expectancy and immunization rates) and education (school 
enrollment and illiteracy). Traditional welfare regime analysis have 
relied on other indicators on order to be able to distinguish between 
welfare regimes. We might also say that this is just a natural result of 
the fact that many East Asian welfare states actually do have quite 
comprehensive policies regarding health and education (Wong 1998; 
Aspalter 2006), while other policy areas have received less attention. 
The core East Asian trait of very limited state provision and financing 
is not as marked as previously, particularly not in the Japanese and 
South Korean cases. This is illustrated below by trailing the 
development in public social expenditure and coupling it with some 
of the most important social reforms in the East Asian cases.  
The table below is not in any way a detailed account of welfare 
reforms in these countries, but it serves as a rough sketch of the major 
reforms mentioned in some of the literature. A major discussion since 
the turn of the millennium has been whether some East Asian 
countries, particularly Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, have 
abandoned the developmental or productivist welfare principles in 
favor of more inclusive or universal regime characteristics (Hudson 
et. al. 2014; Hong 2014; Choi 2012; Kwon 2005; Holliday 2000).  
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Table 15: East Asian welfare expansion? A rough account of 
major trends  
Pensions and elderly care: 
Japan 
 1954: Pension system 
 1989: Gold Plan: National goals for extent of elderly care.,  
 1995: New Gold Plan: Extended goals for elderly care) 
 1997-1999: National Long Term Care Insurance Plan  
 1985, 1994, 1999 and 2004: Retrenchment of pension generosity 
Taiwan 
2002: National, universal old age allowances 
South Korea 
 1988: National pension insurance, universal coverage in 1999 
(replacement rates cut) 
 2007: Basic old age allowance 
 2008: Long Term Care Insurance 
 
Family policy: 
Japan 
 1994: Angel Plan (some public child care and maternity allowance) 
 1999: New Angel Plan (new efforts the meet the goals of the 1994-
plan) 
 2010-2012: Universal child allowance 
Taiwan 
 2000s’s: Parental leave, later turned into paid leave. Child care less 
means-tested. 
South Korea 
 2000’s: Maternity and parental leave 
 2008: National child care insurance 
Unemployment insurance: 
Japan 
 2001: Expansion of UI coverage and duration in 2001 
Taiwan 
 1999: UI scheme. Coverage subsequently expanded 
South Korea 
 1995: UI scheme. Coverage greatly expanded after the 1997-crisis 
 
Health: 
Japan 
 1948: Health insurance 
 2002: ban on private health lifted 
Taiwan 
 1994: National health insurance  
South Korea 
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 1977: National health insurance 
 1988-1989: Universalizing coverage 
Central Provident Funds: 
Singapore: 
 1953: Central Provident Fund 
 1968: Housing scheme added to the CPF 
 1984: Medisave account added to the CPF 
 1987: Minimum Sum Scheme for old age added 
Hong Kong 
 2000: CPF (before then, government-funded NGO’s was the chief provider 
of welfare) 
Based on Zhao & Wong (2013), Wong (2013b), Choi (2012); Goishi (2011); Park 
& Jung (2011); Kuhnle (2011); Leung (2011); Chang (2011); Takegawa (2011); 
Kwon & Lee (2011); Aspalter (2011; 2006); Hill & Hwang (2005); Kwon (2005); 
Holliday (2000) 
 
For example, Japan significantly expanded childcare services and 
benefits for families. The increased effort of the 1990s was an attempt 
to battle the shock of plummeting fertility rates. Taiwan and South 
Korea engaged in similar efforts later. Both countries also expanded 
coverage of health care and income protection for the unemployed via 
new unemployment insurance schemes. The latter was at least partly 
a response to the very significant East Asian economic crisis in 1997 
which made unemployment a real problem. South Korea also 
introduced a more generous social assistance in the form of the 
Minimum Living Standard Guarantee. Singapore has slowly been 
expanding the scope of the general mandatory savings fund for the 
employed, the Central Provident Fund, to finance first housing 
(besides the general public housing programme) and later added 
accounts for health care as well. Hong Kong introduced a similar 
provident fund in 2000 as a way to deal with the issue of increasing 
numbers of elderly without sufficient means of living. Hong Kong 
has been characterized by a general lack of transfer benefits besides 
the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance, while social rights for 
education and health care were basic and limited, but universal.  It is 
not given that these trends by themselves signal an end to traditional, 
productivist welfare. For example, the new Long-Term Care 
Insurance in Japan was partly a cost containing measure with regard 
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to existing care schemes, and the generosity of public pensions was 
also cut significantly several times.  
It could be argued that these trends reflect how productive social 
policy shifts to deal with shifting economic demands. For instance, 
Kwon (2005:483) writes how the developmental welfare regimes of 
South Korea and Taiwan have changed: “I will argue that the shift in 
the overall goal of economic policy from extensive growth based on 
cheap labour to economic competitiveness based on high 
productivity, which was hastened by the Asian economic crisis, 
brought about new definitions of developmental social policy in 
Korea and Taiwan, and created enough room to accommodate 
political demands for greater social rights”. Particularly South Korea 
is perhaps the most significant example of a more inclusive 
productivist regime, which has universalized coverage of a significant 
number of schemes such as health, pensions and unemployment 
insurance. This has arguably been accompanied by an ideational shift 
in the perception of welfare policies, where “…the political debate on 
welfare has been transformed from ‘pro-welfare versus anti-welfare’ 
into ‘universal versus selective welfare’ (Choi 2012:281).  
This increasing role of the state is evident in rising public social 
expenditures. Despite the old truth that social expenditures by 
themselves do not tell anything about welfare regimes, they do reflect 
the general trend in the East Asian case, as evident in the graph 
below. The graph illustrates the available time series for the East 
Asian cases of China, Japan and South Korea.  
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Figure 3: Social expenditures in East Asia and the OECD, % of 
GDP 
 
Sources: OECD (2013a), OECD (2013b) 
 
Japan was the first East Asian country to significantly expand state 
financing of welfare already in the beginning of the 1990s. Social 
expenditure has been rising steadily since then and it doubled from 
11% to 22% of GDP between 1990 and 2009. In terms of the 
denominator it should be noted that GDP growth has also been 
stagnant. Social expenditure started taking off in South Korea a few 
years later, and expanded from 3.7% in 1997 to 9.7% in 2012. The 
shift happened even later in China, but expenditure rose dramatically 
later in the new millennium. Welfare expenditures including 
education increased to consume 35% of government expenditures in 
2010, whereas it had been only 13% in 1978 when welfare was 
provided by work units (Zhang 2013b). The result was that public 
social expenditure represented some 8.5% of GDP in 2011, up from 
6% in 2007. Taiwan is not included above, but ILO(2014) reports that 
social expenditure stood at 10% of GDP by 2010, a slight increase 
from around 9% in the 1990s. In Hong (2014), the estimates for 
Taiwan are lower, however.  
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In the literature it is often pointed out that while social expenditure 
data reflects spending on protective measures, it misses spending on 
productive measures such as education which is very highly 
prioritized in East Asia. This is an argument against the notion of East 
Asian welfare ‘underdevelopment’ (Kim 2010). Total expenditure on 
education in Korea and Japan amounted to 8% and 5% respectively in 
2009, while the OECD average was 6% (OECD 2012). However, the 
private share amounted to about 3% and 1.3% of GDP in South Korea 
and Japan, and the countries look rather like the United States in the 
way that private expenditure is highly prevalent in tertiary education, 
while constituting a small share of primary and secondary education 
expenditure. In China, public education spending has also increased 
from 2.4% in 1995 to 3.9% in 2011 according to official figures 
(Xinhua 2013; Mok & Wong 2011). In addition to this comes the 
very significant role of private expenditure, which made up about 1.6-
1.7% of GDP in most of the years in this century (OECD 2012). 
Overall, the generally very limited role of the state in terms of welfare 
financing and direct welfare provision places much responsibility on 
non-state institutions as emphasized by the notion of ‘informal 
security’ regimes. This does not only mean that the distinction 
between welfare state and welfare regime is particularly important in 
East Asia. It also has distinct consequences for relations between 
societal sectors in the institutional responsibility matrix (Lei 2012). 
Specifically, informal security regimes can be argued to enforce 
unequal power relations and exacerbating them because of ‘negative 
permeability’, meaning that distinct power relations within each 
sector spills over into the others. These are outlined below: 
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Table 16: Negative permeability within the responsibility matrix 
in informal security regimes 
Sector Characteristics of unequal power relations 
State Erratic intervention without formal-legal backing, 
personalized patronage relations  
Market Rent seeking, monopolies and oligopolies skewing market 
practices and evading formal regulations  
Family A patriarchal rather than an altruistic unit  
Civil Society Patron-client relations stratifying social capital 
Source: Lei (2012) based on Wood (2000:4) 
 
Wood (2004) also describes the outcome as one dominated by 
imperfect markets, clientilist communities, patriarchal households and 
a state that is negatively permeated as being both marketized, 
patriarchal and clientilist. The overall result is a welfare regime 
characterized by a high degree of clientilism, such as…”beggars 
asking police for protection, peasants paying brokers for urban 
employment, migrant workers bribing post offices for successfully 
sending remittance, rural households relying on lineages or even 
warlords, poor people borrowing money from informal moneylenders 
or bonding to influential families by marriage” (Lei 2012:28). In 
short, an East Asian productivist or developmental welfare regime 
places very much emphasis on interpersonal relations in terms of 
welfare provision (‘informal’ welfare regime), but these relations are 
very much characterized by asymmetrical power relations. Wood & 
Gough (2006) therefore add de-clientalization as term signifying a 
highly relevant policy outcome to strive for besides the classic one of 
de-commodification. Thus, statutory rights are not only as means to 
free the less fortunate from market outcomes, but also to mitigate 
informal relations dominated by clientilism.    
6.3 THE CHINESE BACKSTORY: COMMUNIST 
OCCUPATIONAL WELFARE 
Armed with a basic understanding of the trends regarding social 
rights in East Asia, we can begin to uncover the corresponding 
development in China more closely.  
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Before we begin this journey in the following chapters, this chapter 
will be closed with a brief backstory on welfare provision in China 
before the market reforms. A basic understanding the old Chinese 
welfare system will enable us to appreciate how some of the most 
important traits of the old system have shaped present welfare 
institutions. The general traits of the old system of welfare was in 
many ways similar to what could be observed in other communist 
planned economies, namely a relatively comprehensive system of 
welfare, at least compared to countries at similar levels of economic 
development (Leung 2005; Wong 1998). However, these welfare 
systems were also based upon occupational ties. The egalitarian intent 
of these policies were often subordinate to goals of development and 
quick industrialization, and therefore urban,  industrial workers  and 
especially bureaucrats and leaders within the respective one-party 
systems often received strongly preferential treatment. Consequently, 
Szeleneyi (1978) argued that social policy in East European states at 
the time was marred by very inegalitarian effects. This was arguably 
also a trait of the Chinese case (Wang et. al. 2013; Wong 1998). On 
the other hand, it should be acknowledged that social problems such 
as illiteracy, health and unemployment were greatly reduced and life 
expectancy improved from 39 to 69 years (Rutten 2010; Leung 2005). 
China fared much better than other countries at similar levels of 
economic development on such indicators of social development.    
In the Chinese case, welfare in urban areas was known as the ‘Iron 
rice bowl’ from which the entire urban populace was nourished 
(Duckett & Carillo 2011). Communist occupational welfare in the 
Chinese case was based on the work-unit (or danwei) and provided 
pensions, housing, education and health care. Extensive social 
protection was a prerequisite for low wages which just barely met the 
daily consumption need. This in turn facilitated capital accumulation 
and industrialization (Liu 2011). In rural areas, welfare provision was 
more scant and based on the communes (collectives based on a 
number of villages) or the production brigade (often equivalent to the 
village-level) and did for example not include housing or pensions. 
The rural co-operatives were the basis of the rural system, and rural 
farmers were forced into these from 1958 after experiments with co-
operatives had begun in earnest in 1951.   
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‘The iron rice bowl’ was not as encompassing and generous as it 
might appear to be in a historical retrospect. The more generous urban 
system had expanded to cover 78% of urban workers in the late 
1970s, yet this made up only 19% of the total Chinese population 
(Rutten 2010). The rural communes had big problems meeting their 
formal requirements of welfare provision, not least because financing 
was scarce. This was a result of the so-called ‘price scissors’ policy, 
whereby government controlled agricultural prices a level lower than 
prices of industrial output, which secured industrial capital 
accumulation and lubricated the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(Jieh-min & Selden 2011; Knight & Li 2006). As early as in the First 
Five Year-Plan (1953-1957), China transferred 80-90% of the rural 
surplus above basic subsistence to urban China. In the years 1958-
1980 only about 1,5% of communal revenues went to the collective 
welfare funds (Liu 2011). Even within the more generous urban 
system, inegalitarian divisions were prevalent. For example, welfare 
expenditure on workers in SOEs was twice as high as that of workers 
in collective enterprises, and governmental civil servants received 
even stronger preferential treatment as they still do today (Liu 2011).  
In the urban areas, residual and non-occupational welfare was mainly 
available for people afflicted by the ‘three no’s’ (no work, no family 
and no means of living). In the rural areas, the communes gave some 
minimal, residual support to households in absolute poverty, also 
known as the so-called ‘five guarantees’ (originally food, fuel, 
clothing education and burial, but later also expanded to some 
housing and basic medical care) (Lu 2012; Duckett & Carillo 2011; 
Chau & Yu 2005; Wong 1998). The beneficiaries of the five 
guarantees were mainly restricted to the elderly, disabled, widowers, 
widows and orphans who had no other means of living. The family 
played a large role in welfare provision, especially for those in need. 
Historically, under the Family Law, the family was required to take of 
those in need such as those without work or taking care of elder 
family members (Chau & Yu 2005). This residual, governmental 
relief system was overseen by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) 
at the national level, and by Civil Affairs Departments (CADs) at the 
local level. Wong (1998) describes welfare provision during the 
planned economy as chiefly a familial responsibility, and then came 
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in order of importance the production unit, the neighborhood and 
finally the state.  
However, while the ‘three no’s’ and the ‘five guarantees’ were the 
most important forms of residual government welfare, they were not 
the only ones. In urban areas, relief could be granted to poverty-
stricken households and also aged and frail workers who had been 
laid-off during the crisis years of 1961-1965 and were in reality 
unemployed. One of the earliest forms of social relief was the 
preferential treatment of military personnel and their dependants. It 
emerged already during the 1930s, long before the founding of the 
PRC, as the welfare of the families of the predominantly peasant 
fighters became a problem during Red Army campaigns. In rural 
areas during the period of the rural communes (1959-1983) this form 
of relief mainly consisted of granting work points to dependants of 
military personnel (Wong 1998). After the work point system itself 
was disbanded, army households were instead compensated with cash 
grants. Social welfare homes or institutions were also to be found in 
the period. The local CADs ran three types of institutions; The first 
had a mixed clientel of elderly, disabled and orphans, while the 
second aimed more exclusively at orphans and abandoned or disabled 
children. Mental hospitals were also to be found. Finally, social 
welfare production enterprises provided employment for the disabled 
with some ability to work. As in the case of the residual welfare 
programmes mentioned above, the coverage of these programmes 
was not as rosy as it might seem. Civil affairs agencies claimed they 
were serving roughly one-fifth of the population each year, but a look 
at actual records and statistics suggests only a few million recipients 
(ibid.). For example, the aforementioned five guarantees only 
benefited two to three million people in the years 1978-1980, or less 
than 0,5% of the total rural population. Similarly, residual urban relief 
can be assessed to have benefited less than 2% of the urban 
population in the years 1962-1963 (Liu 2011). Formal welfare 
provision was for the majority of the population something to be 
secured via the rural or urban work units. 
Lastly, it should be remembered that all the basic foundations of a 
functioning labor market were absent. Job allocation was controlled 
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by labor bureaus at all levels which allocated jobs to both state-owned 
and collective enterprises (Xu 2012). Furthermore, wages were 
strictly controlled. Wage levels were determined according to wage 
calculation tables issued by the central government. Variables which 
influenced wage levels were position, seniority, education and skill 
level, plus variations in local costs of living (Li & Zhao 2006). 
However, it was also a wide-spread practice to pay workers in-kind in 
commodities besides the standard wages as a way of evading 
restrictions of wage bills. Such commodities could be anything from 
food items to appliances. In the late 1980s after the onset of the 
market reforms, it made up no more than a few percent of total 
earnings, and has since declined further. In agricultural China, a 
work-point system determined what each peasant would get beyond 
the basic rations for all peasants. The work point system was a 
complicated array of systems whereby the profits of production were 
granted to peasants according to performance, and emerged after the 
more idealistic and collectivistic production modes had failed 
(Crémer 1982). 
6.6 THE EMERGING CHINESE SOCIAL INSURANCE MODEL   
In subsequent chapters, we will uncover social rights within our three 
selected policy fields. Here, we will instead tie the knot with the 
previous very general observations on welfare state developments in 
East Asia by taking a brief birds-eye view at the welfare system in 
modern China.  
Unemployment, health and pensions are the major schemes within the 
emerging Chinese social insurance model, which also includes 
maternity and work injury insurance. The previous section briefly 
mentioned residual government welfare for those outside the system 
of urban employment-based welfare, but the schemes for those within 
the urban workers’ system were very much forerunners of the 
modern-day insurance schemes. The main social insurance schemes 
were laid out already in 1951 with the Labor Insurance Regulation of 
the People’s Republic in China, which established schemes for 
retirement, health care, work injury, sick leave and maternity leave 
(Lin 2009). Only unemployment was not included at the time as a 
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reflection of the planned market. Unemployment is indeed one of the 
new social risks in China.  
At the time, financing came solely from the urban workplaces, 
whereas the system today resembles a traditional insurance set-up 
financed both by employees and employers. In the reform era with its 
emerging non-state sector, financing was initially placed solely upon 
the shoulders of the employers, but it increasingly became the 
perception that burdens were too heavy (Lei & Walker 2013; Wong 
1998). The otherwise flourishing new market seemed to be unduly 
bogged down by contributions, for example in the way that 
expenditure on labor insurance leapt from 14% of wages in 1978 to 
about 33% in 1991 (Lin 2009). Today, the insurance system in urban 
China looks like indicated below with respect to financing 
Table 17: Financing of the five insurance pillars for urban 
workers 
 Unemplo
yment 
Pensions Health Maternity  Work 
injury 
Total 
Employers, 
pct. of wage 
sum 
2 11-20 6-8 0,8 1 
(avg.) 
21-32 
Employees, 
pct. of 
individual 
wage 
1 8-11 2 0 0 11-14 
Source: Modified from CDRF (2012: 256) with Wu (2013) and Barber & Yao 
(2011).  
As indicated by the table above, it is mainly health and pensions that 
dominate the new social insurance system in terms of contributions. 
Once again, the table above is specific to the urban schemes only, but 
in the sections below on health and pensions we will track the 
developments in both rural and urban China.  
Naturally, these five insurance schemes do not constitute everything 
of significance for Chinese social policy. Of importance is also 
particularly education and housing, but these will be excluded from 
here on since we will be focusing on the most significant insurance 
schemes where important reforms have taken place as steps towards 
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more citizenship based rights. However, it should be acknowledged 
that government has also stepped up financing of education in recent 
years, measured not only in % of GDP (from 2.4% to 3.9% in 2011 as 
mentioned before), but also as a share of total education expenditure. 
Housing as a social policy to make living space available for lower 
incomes has of course been important ever since an actual housing 
market began to develop in 1994 with commodity housing (Li 2013b; 
OECD 2013a). The previous tie between employment and housing 
was completely severed in 1998 when SOEs were forbidden to 
provide housing for employees and were also forced to sell their 
existing housing stock. Current policy measures include subsidized 
pricing (lowering prices below market levels), rent-subsidized public 
housing, and housing cash subsidies, the latter being the least 
developed and in the pilot stage in some localities (Li 2013b).  
These developments have of course been important drivers for 
increasing public expenditure on welfare. Total governmental welfare 
expenditure, if we include education, increased from 2.8% of GDP in 
1996 to 12.3% in 2011 (OECD 2013a; Wang & Long 2013). Social 
expenditure according to the standard definition (excluding 
education) stood at 8.4% of GDP in 2011 and was later reported to be 
around 9% in 2012 (OECD 2013a; OECD 2013c). OECD-estimates 
of the development in disaggregated social expenditures are 
illuminated below.  We can view this as a rough guide on the trends 
in protective social rights in China.  
Total social spending as a share of GDP rose by 42% in the few short 
years from 2007 to 2011 (table 18). Of course, GDP itself also 
increased substantially in this period.  Social spending in nominal 
terms rose by more than 24% on overage per year in 2007-2011 
(OECD 2013a). All four main components outlined above have seen 
significant increases, but spending as a share of GDP on health and 
particularly housing has expanded by 80% and 355% respectively. 
Housing is still a relatively minor spending component, but it was 
boosted significantly with the stimulus package from 2008, which in 
total amounted to four trillion (Cook & Lam 2011).  
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Table 18: Disaggregated social expenditure in China in per cent 
of GDP (2007-2011) 
 Social 
security 
Social safety 
net 
Health  Housing Total 
2007 2.97 2.05 0.75 0.18 5.9 
2008 3.16 2.17 0.88 0.19 6.4 
2009 3.61 2.23 1.17 0.21 7.2 
2010 3.70 2.28 1.20 0.59 7.8 
2011 3.83 2.36 1.35 0.81 8.4 
Increase 2011-
2007, % 
29.1 15.4 80.4 355.1 42.3 
Increase 2011-
2007, % of GDP 
0.86 0.32 0.6 0.63 2.5 
Source: OECD (2013a:19) 
 
In short, the expansion of social rights that will be laid out in 
unemployment, health and pensions later has also been accompanied 
by the state increasingly stepping in and driving the development in 
terms of financing. For example, the dramatic increase in coverage of 
health insurance, which we will investigate further in chapter 9, is 
also reflected by the sharp increase in health expenditures.  
Before we continue, a few words about what policies will be 
‘missing’ is appropriate. As stated previosuly, the three policy fields 
have been selected because they constitute the dominant pillars in 
modern Chinese social policy and because they have also been 
subject to extensive reform in the last 10-15 years. The corresponding 
policy fields in the Nordic countries will then included in a 
comparative analysis of reform paths in chapter 10. This means that 
we will be missing not only the aforementioned housing and 
education (if we include the latter within the welfare state), but also a 
large range of possible benefits and services such as family benefits, 
disability benefits, student benefits, child care and elder care.  
Most importantly, the selection of policy fields means that we 
compare China and the Nordic countries where they are more easily 
comparable since these are some of the most developed policies in 
China. Indeed, in most of the remaining policy areas it would be very 
difficult and sometimes impossible to paint a meaningful picture of 
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China at the national level. Naturally, this will also have bearings on 
the conclusions that will be drawn. Our country cases would appear 
even more different if areas such as family and care policy had been 
included instead. Arguably, and as mentioned previously, family and 
care policy are the areas where the Nordic countries are most distinct 
when compared to non-Nordic countries. At the same, these areas 
have only just begun to receive national-level attention in China. 
Therefore, it is important to be mindful that we have limited ourselves 
to certain corners of the welfare state.     
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CHAPTER 7. UNEMPLOYMENT: 
COMMODIFYING AND DE-
COMMODIFYING CHINESE LABOR  
This is the first chapter in which we turn to social rights in one of our 
three select policy fields. Thus begins the second of the research 
questions posed in section 1.2., namely the question regarding the 
development of social rights vis-avis the goal of increasing 
universalism.  To facilitate the comparative analysis of social rights in 
China and the Nordic countries, we will in the later sections of the 
chapter turn to the new protective schemes directed at poverty and 
unemployment. The final sections of the chapter will go in-depth with 
coverage and generosity of these schemes, which I singled out as the 
main aspects of social rights in chapter 2.   
One of the fundamental reform trends in contemporary China is that 
we now find a labor market where before there was none. This policy 
field is a textbook example of how the introduction of a market 
economy gives birth to unemployment as a social risk, which in turn 
requires a social policy response.  
It is difficult to understand the trends in social rights in China without 
understanding the reform development that presupposed the 
introduction of social policymaking within a market economy. 
Therefore, we will begin this chapter by delving into the market 
reforms that gradually commodified Chinese labor.  
7.1 THE POST-MAO MARKET REFORMS  
The market reforms began almost immediately with the death of Mao 
Zedong in 1976 and the subsequent return to power of Deng 
Xiaopeng, never as president, general secretary or premier (the first 
two posts were abolished for years after Mao’s death, and there were 
no acting general secretary from 1943), but nevertheless as the most 
important leader regardless of the various offices he held.  
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Thus began the process of incremental and experimental reform 
towards a market-based economy, or “crossing the river by groping 
for stones” as Deng Xiaopeng phrased it (Chan et. al. 2008:27). Other 
prominent examples of the discoursive change is the 1984-document 
Decisions on the Reform of the Economic System from the CPC 
Central Committee, which stressed that a commodity-based economy 
could work under socialism with the development of a ‘socialist 
society with Chinese characteristics’ and explained how “…the policy 
of encouraging some sections of the people to get rich first is the 
necessary road of bringing the whole society to prosperity (Chan et. 
al. 2008:30). The same document also acknowledged that 
redistribution and social relief would be necessary for those groups in 
society “…who have not become rich yet” (Lei 2012:130). In 1978, 
under the new leadership China adopted the goal of the ‘four 
modernizations’, which called for reforms and modernization of 
agriculture, industry, national defence and science.     
The reforms were spearheaded by the ‘special economic zones’ 
(SEZs), which in typical Chinese fashion where areas where 
dismantling of the planned economy could first be safely observed as 
local experiments and then made nation-wide at a later point in time.  
Xiamen, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou (the latter three all in the 
southern Guangdong province and the first in Fujian province) were 
the first in 1980 (Eesley 2009; Webber & Zhu 2007). Here, the effects 
of preferential treatment such as lower tax rates and the opening up 
for foreign investments below a certain limit could be observed. 
Enterprises in SEZs also had relatively high autonomy in terms labor 
management. The first reforms abolishing life-long employment and 
governmental job allocation were not introduced nation-wide before 
1986.  A further 14 cities were opened op for foreign investment in 
1984, and in 1992 special treatment was extended to most cities along 
the Yangtze River. Even cities that were not classified as SEZs often 
created ‘development zones’, and did not always bother to obtain 
formal approval from the central government.  
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Table 19: Important reform steps towards a Chinese labor 
market 
Year Reform 
1978  Deng Xiaopeng’s ’four modernizations’ 
 Adoption of the ‘household responsibility system’ 
1979  Rural communes and production brigades allowed to set up 
non-agricultural enterprises 
 Dual pricing system 
1980  The first ‘special economic zones’ 
1981  Legalization of individual businesses (less than 8 employees) 
 First administrative reforms of the public sector 
1985   First experiments with non-central wage setting 
 Ceiling on market prices in dual-pricing abolished 
1986  The ’four temporary regulations’ 
- Gradual abolishment of life-long tenure, new work-
contract system 
- Open job offers 
- Firing certain workers 
- “Job-waiting” insurance 
1992  Adoption of a “socialist market economy” 
 First wave of privatizations 
 Dual price system abolished for almost all goods 
1994  Unemployment officially recognized 
 The Labor Law 
1995  First management reforms of state-owned enterprises 
1997  “Grasping the large and letting go of the small”: Second wave 
of privatization 
2005  Labor Contract Law 
2008  Employment Promotion Law 
 
In tandem with these local experiments, nationwide reforms were 
introduced. In rural China, 1978 was a watershed because it 
introduced the so-called ‘household responsibility system’, whereby 
peasants could keep their own production surplus once the agreed 
quota was met (Wong 1998). The reform was not a central 
government initiative, but spread from Sichuan and Anhui was 
widespread nationally by the end of 1983 (Chan et. al. 2008). 
Beginning in 1979, the SOEs were allowed to sell any output above 
their quotas at higher or floating prices in the so-called dual pricing 
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system (Li 1999). In the beginning these prices could not exceed 
planned prices by more than 20%, but this limit was lifted in 1985.  
In terms of the commodification and free movement of labor, 1984 
was important since peasants with rural household registration or 
rural hukou were allowed to move to cities to look for work (Wong 
1998). The groundwork for gradual industrialization and tertiarization 
of rural China was laid in 1979 when communes and production 
brigades were allowed to set up non-agricultural enterprises to a much 
greater extent (Eesley 2009). The forerunners of what would become 
known as township and village enterprises (TVEs) in 1984 were 
previously restricted to limited areas such as iron, steel, chemical 
fertilizer and agricultural machinery and tools. While TVEs in 
principle were owned cooperatively or collectively, some were de 
facto operating as private enterprises (Eesley 2009; Webber & Zhu 
2007).  Over time, reforms of TVEs as well as communes and 
brigades ushered in a clear trend of liberalization.  
In urban China, one of the first important steps was the official 
legalization of the so-called individual businesses in 1981 (less than 8 
employees). Private businesses (8 or more employees) became 
allowed later in 1988 (Eesley 2009). The urban equivalent to the 
household responsibility system was the ‘contract management 
responsibility system’ (CMRS) which was widely implemented by 
1987. Experimentation had begun already in 1979 (Webber & Zhu 
2007; Li & Zhao 2006). Wage controls were gradually relaxed and 
firms were allowed to use their profits to pay bonuses up to a certain 
limit. Later, the ceiling on bonuses was abandoned altogether. The 
old system of central formulae for determining base wages was 
relaxed in 1985 when experimentation began with tying total wage 
bills to economic performance indicators. Taxation of enterprises also 
began to replace transfer of profits to the government around this 
time. The overall autonomy of the SOEs was greatly improved in 
terms of financing, procurement, strategy, organization and 
marketing.     
However, the reform that more than anything else laid the 
groundwork for the commodification of urban labor was the 
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introduction of the ‘four temporary regulations’ in 1986 (Xu 2012; 
Chan et. al. 2008; Wong 1998). These new regulations dealt a death-
blow to the old system of planned employment where local labor 
bureaus assigned job quotas to each work unit and people were 
assigned to jobs based on these quotas. The first of these new 
‘regulations’ was the abolishment of life-long tenure for workers and 
the establishment of a new labor contract system. Anybody hired after 
1986 was to be employed on a contract, while older employees 
continued to work under pre-reform conditions. From 1986 to 1997, 
the share of SOE-workers employed on short-term contracts increased 
from 7% to 52% (Chan et. al. 2008). Thus began the erosion of the 
old ‘iron rice bowl’ where life-long tenure and access to welfare were 
interwoven. The second temporary regulation introduced open job-
offers where recruitment and hiring of workers was subject to 
competitive selection. This effectively ended planned job allocation 
and made labor a commodity based on supply and. The third 
regulation made it possible to fire workers who repeatedly disobeyed 
orders, engaged in criminal activities, or were simply not able to 
fulfill the requirements of production. Finally, the last regulation 
established ‘job-waiting’ insurance for workers in SOEs. This we will 
return to later in our account of unemployment insurance in China.  
Subsequent reforms of labor market regulation can mostly be 
described as attempts to further implement the spirit of the 1986-
reform or to fill the holes left by this reform in terms of labor market 
relations between employers and employees (Xu 2012). The Labor 
Law of 1994 adopted some of the earlier temporary regulations as 
legal articles and developed the relationship between employers and 
employees as independent actors within a labor market. While it 
regulated issues such as working hours, vacation and minimum 
wages, it also stipulated that labor and capital were independent and 
free on both sides to engage in a contract relationship. Many 
employers regarded this as a loophole to not sign contracts as all with 
their employees. While the law is significant in the way that it defined 
employees as actors who can resort to law if their rights are violated 
with warnings and fines provided as enforcement tools, big problems 
in implementation persisted.    
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The Labor Contract Law, drafted in 2005 and effective from 2008, 
tried to deal with this since it once again stressed the requirement of 
work contracts (Cui et. al. 2013; Xu 2012). Three types of contracts 
were laid out in the Law: The fixed-term contract, the non-fixed term 
contract and an open-ended contract. The Law demands that a labor 
contract should be signed after one month. Furthermore, any work 
relation where no formal contract has been signed after one year shall 
according to the law be regarded as standard work contract without a 
fixed period. The law has by itself not resolved the issue, however. 
Most surveys in the new millennium consistently placed coverage of 
work contracts for migrant workers below 50% (Wong 2013a; Xu 
2012). Progress has perhaps been seen, however. Official reports 
from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security stated that 
work contract coverage had increased by 77% to cover 114 million 
workers in 2007-2010 (Cui et. al. 2013). A 2010-survey from the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACTFU) placed coverage of work 
contracts at 85%, although this picture is perhaps also too rosy. A 
majority of the contracts surveyed did not even even specify wages 
just as many did not provide work position or name of the employer. 
Some were even completely blank (Cui et. al. 2013; Wong 2013a).  
The Law also contained a range of other stipulations besides work 
contracts, such as 30 days of notice for employees being fired or that 
no more than 10% of employees can be fired except in case of 
bankruptcy. In terms of other possible effects of the law, Cui et. al. 
(2013) find that wage growth increased beyond the historical trend in 
2009, just as wage elasticity dropped. This was most noticeable in 
SOEs, large firms and sectors with high unionization. 
In the context of labor market regulation, the Employment Promotion 
Law from 2008 right also deserves mention, even if it is largely a 
collection of good intentions with hardly any concrete targets, 
resources or enforcement. The basic intention of the law is to sum up 
existing policies on employment promotion and to stress the 
responsibility of local governments in financing employment 
promotion via instruments such as job subsidies, vocational training, 
public welfare jobs, etc. Furthermore the law is supposed to further 
the ‘equal citizenship’ of rural migrants with equal right to a work 
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contract, public employment services, vocational education, 
employment assistance and self-employment.  
As mentioned, implementation of the Labor Law or the Labor 
Contract Law is still a big issue. A number of reasons can mentioned 
(Xu 2012). Firstly, enforcement is usually left to local labor bureaus, 
but the business-friendly orientation of many local governments de-
couples law and practice. Second, the hitherto ample supply of labor 
might give employers the upper hand. Finally, companies often find a 
way of getting around requirements.  
While particularly the 1986-reform laid the groundwork, the 
development towards commodified labor remained sluggish in the 
beginning of the 1990s. Deng Xiaopeng once again paved the way at 
the rhetorical level with his famous ‘southern tour’ of 1992 where he 
inspected the most successful local market experiments in Southern 
China. Here, Deng announced the goal of a ‘socialist market 
economy’ and encouraged the acceleration of economic reform. The 
CCP officially redefined China as a ‘socialist market economy’ in 
1992. In 1992, the government decided to privatize small and 
medium-sized SOEs and keep the larger and more strategically 
important SOEs. This was followed by a nationwide campaign in 
1997 to ‘grasp the large and let go of the small’ (Dong et. al. 2007). 
This privatization program was initiated by an official directive from 
the 15
th
 CCP Congress in that same year to reduce the labor force in 
order to enhance efficiency. Large scale privatization went hand-in-
hand with bankruptcies, something that had been formally possible 
since 1986 with the first Bankruptcy Law. However, many of the 
remaining ‘large’ SOEs, especially those designated as ‘strategic’, 
have arguably increased in importance and size or taken over private 
enterprises (Oi & Zhang 2014).    
Nevertheless, the number of SOEs fell from 118.000 in 1995 to 
53.000 in 2001 and employment in SOEs decreased from 113 to 72 
million. Employment in collectively owned units fell from 31 to 11 
million (Liu & Wu 2006). The cumulative effects of these reforms 
were most visible from the mid-1990s and onwards. The economic 
hardship of the SOEs was only aggravated by the gradual erosion of 
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the aforementioned ‘price-scissors’ policy (section 6.2). Furthermore, 
SOEs were not only shedding surplus labor, declaring bankruptcy or 
being entirely privatized, but also experienced transformations in 
terms of public ownership and management. In 1993, the CPC 
Central Committee envisioned a freer and more mixed management 
of SOEs, and the government started to change the governance of 
pilot firms in 1995 (Chan et. al. 2008). Since then, SOEs have been 
transformed into three main types; 1) Shareholder partner companies, 
which allow individuals to purchase and manage them 2) Shareholder 
corporations owned by external or internal shareholders and 3) State-
owned limited liability corporations (Webber & Zhu 2007). The state 
itself plays only a small role in the first type, while the second type is 
subject to a variety of regulations. Finally, the third type, often 
consisting of very large enterprises deemed to have strategic 
importance, is subject to government strategies and policies. A 
development very similar to this can be traced in the TVEs of rural 
China. Finally, reforms of the general public sector at all 
administrative levels have also shed jobs, devolved or abolished state 
responsibility and transformed former public sector service units 
(Brødsgaard 2014; Brødsgaard & Chen 2014). These reforms began 
in 1981 in earnest and have continued into the new millennium.   
Figure 4: Urban employment patterns (1990-2011)* 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013) 
* The percentages do not add up to 100. A large but declining share of the urban 
employed (27% in 2011) are not reported in NBS statistics.  
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**Cooperative units, joint ownership units, limited liability companies, 
shareholding enterprises, private enterprises, enterprises with funds from Hong 
Kong or Macao, foreign funded enterprises, self-employed.  
 
7.2 THE RISE OF UNEMPLOYMENT: A MESSY ISSUE IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
The reforms above all else introduced unemployment as a serious 
social risk. The reforms in the 1980s, particularly the ‘four temporary 
regulations’, laid the formal groundwork, while dramatic increases in 
unemployment and labor flexibility did not occur before the 
transformations and privatizations of SOEs, TVEs and collective 
units in the 1990s. In the the planned economy with central job 
allocation, unemployment did not officially exist. Recognizing 
unemployment as a social risk is not easy in a political system that 
still formally abides by communism. Unemployment was actually not 
acknowledged officially before 1994, but later it has officially been 
deemed one of the most serious threats for social stability (Xu 2012).   
Nevertheless, China did have some experiences with unemployment 
in the pre-reform ‘iron rice bowl’ despite its central job allocation and 
planned economy. One important peak in actual unemployment was 
the return of young Chinese to urban China after having been 
dispatched to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. 
Similarly, young entrants into the labor market waiting to be assigned 
a job were of course de facto unemployed. In general, inadequate job 
supply in the cities was the reason behind the phenomenon of ‘young 
urban residents waiting for work’. Later, the term was expanded to 
include all ‘urban residents waiting for work’. It was officially 
perceived to be merely a transient phenomenon, a formality to be 
dealt with in short order once bureaucratic efficiency was resumed 
(Hong & Ip 2007). The discourse of ‘waiting for work’ would later be 
reflected in the adoption of ’job-waiting’ insurance (rather than 
unemployment insurance) in 1986. Official discourse aside, 
unemployment was a persistent phenomenon even before the reform 
era, particularly while the new planned economy was gradually 
implemented in the 1950s and again in the 1970s when youth 
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unemployment rose due to the above reasons. For example, according 
to official statistics, this form of unemployment stood at 5,9% in 1957 
and 5,3% in 1978 (Lei 2012).  
In contemporary China, unemployment is a very messy issue to put it 
bluntly. This mess reflects various circumstances rooted in the reform 
period, which will return to below. Registered unemployment in 
urban China has long been relatively stable around 4%, but real 
unemployment is several times higher and has witnessed major 
fluctuations. A number of studies have estimated unemployment in 
China, but below the difference between the most optimistic data 
(official data on registered unemployment) and one the most negative 
studies based on the same data is illustrated (Han & Zhang 2010). 
Using the same data from the Urban Household Survey (UHS) as the 
National Bureau of Statistics uses, Han & Zhang (2010) estimated 
real unemployment in urban China to be just below 10% in 2005, 
while the official unemployment figure was only 4,3%. 
Unemployment rose drastically around 1997 from some 3% to 11% 
just after the turn of the millennium. This reflects the large scale 
privatization and transformation of SOEs under the banner of 
‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’ as described before. 
Giles et. al. (2006), based on a 2001-survey in five cities, found 
unemployment to be an even higher 12,5%.  
Figure 5: Unemployment rates according to official statistics and 
the Urban Household Survey (1990-2005)   
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Source: Han & Zhang (2010)  
 
It is difficult to find updated assesments of unemployment rates 
beyond 2005 (besides official figures). The time lag when 
independent researchers have to utilize household surveys can be 
considerable. Both Wang & Sun (2014) and Deng & Gustaffson 
(2013) report figures from 2007, for example. They report as different 
figures as 13.4% and 7.9% respectively, the primary reason being that 
Wang & Sun (2014) cannot sort out those who are not actively 
looking for work (as it is done in the standard ILO-definition). They 
assess that the unemployment rate would have been 8.6% in that case.  
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) estimated that 
unemployment rose again in 2009 to 9.4% (Cook & Lam 2011; Ru et. 
al. 2009). China was also affected by the financial crisis of 2008, 
most visibly by a contraction of 29% in exports. One senior 
government official stated that China lost 6.7 million jobs by the end 
of 2008 alone.    
Numerous other attempts at assessing unemployment have been made 
(for example OECD 2010; Hu & Sheng 2007; Dong et. al. 2007; Xue 
& Zhong 2006). Chen (2004) even argued that one should also 
include ‘disguised unemployment’, meaning employed whose 
marginal productivity is lower than their wage renumeration. This 
yielded an estimated unemployment rate of 25% for urban China, but 
this was of course also (and even more so) an issue in pre-reform 
China. Regardless, the general result is always the same: Real 
unemployment defined according to international standards is several 
times higher than official figures.  
There are some main reasons for registered unemployment in urban 
China being a poor indicator. The most important is that large groups 
of jobless people looking for jobs are not able to register, firstly 
because some of them for historical reasons were not considered 
unemployed, secondly because others simply live outside the system 
of formal urban employment and work contracts (Wang &  Sun 2014; 
Duckett & Hussain 2008; Webber & Zhu 2007; Solinger 2001).  
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The so-called laid-off (xiagang) workers are a group of the first kind. 
This category arose from the restructuring of urban work units and 
SOEs, and while they were formally still tied to the work place, they 
were in essence unemployed (Li & Sato 2006).  The number of de 
facto unemployed xiagang workers peaked at 10-11 million in 1997 
(Chan et. al. 2008; Hu & Sheng 2007). Formally, they are now 
eligible to register as unemployed, but many still do not. However, 
even adding together officially registered unemployed and xiagang 
workers would hardly cover all jobless people looking for a job. We 
can appreciate this by minding the official definition of the two 
categories; xiagang applied only to those who began working before 
the onset of work contracts in 1986, but had been laid-off while still 
retaining a relation with the former work place. This only covered 
workers coming from the state sector, excluding workers losing their 
jobs in urban collectives. The officially unemployed, on the other 
hand, were those urban citizens whose firm had gone bankrupt with 
no possibility of retaining the connection to the old firm (Solinger 
2001).    
Jobless rural migrant workers (citizens in urban areas with rural 
hukou) constitute another major group of de-facto unemployed not 
covered by the above definitions. In late 2008, official surveys 
assessed the number of unemployed migrants to be 20 million (Wong 
2011). While the Employment Promotion Law from 2008 formally 
recognizes their right to register as unemployed and get 
unemployment benefits, local governments still have their own 
practices of differential schemes for local urban workers and migrants 
(Xu 2012; Jieh-min & Selden 2011). Even where it might be possible 
to register, exercising this formal right is more than difficult for this 
group. One problem is producing documentation of previous work in 
the form of work contracts, which they as mentioned previously often 
do not have in spite of statutory requirements that employers must 
sign contracts. Other groups who could be counted as unemployed are 
people who have retired early from their previous work unit but are 
still looking for a job; people on extended leave, people who have 
kept their jobs but receive no wages and people who have simply lost 
contact with their employers (Wong & Ngok 2006; Xue & Zhong 
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2006). Some of these unemployed simply lack an incentive to register 
and others refrain from doing so.  
Another group of people excluded from official unemployment 
statistics are people above the age of 50 for men and 45 for women, 
regardless of whether they have urban hukou, former work contracts 
and are considered formally unemployed and receiving 
unemployment benefits (Liu 2011). Official unemployment statistics 
do simply not take the employment and unemployment patterns of 
this age group into consideration even if the formal retirement age is 
60 for men and 55/50 for women.  
Furthermore, incomplete knowledge among the unemployed 
contributes to the problem. A basic lack of awareness of social rights 
seems to be an issue. For example, Wang & Sun (2014) find that 
awareness of and participation in labor training programs positively 
affects the likelihood of being registered, as do participation in local 
community activities.  
Finally, it is also well known that party officials ‘cook the books’ in 
in order to meet government-set standards of ‘appropriate’ levels of 
unemployment. As an example, it is not surprising that when Premier 
Wen Jiabao in 2010 stated that unemployment should be at a low and 
manageable 4-4.6%, local officials keen to maintain and develop their 
own careers make sure that local unemployment rates somehow never 
ends up straying too far from this target. The common expression that 
“numbers make officials, and officials make numbers” is fitting (Xu 
2012:63). Official targets from the government in 2014 set the goal of 
a figure below 5% (Wang & Sun 2014).  
In short, official unemployment rates are greatly underestimated 
because the laid-off or xiagang workers are often not included and the 
same applies to jobless migrants with rural hukou and other groups. In 
addition to this comes outright manipulation with numbers.  
However, simply adding the different categories together might on 
the other hand also overestimate real unemployment. For example, it 
is well-known that some laid-off workers were actually working part- 
or fulltime in other jobs or may no longer be looking for work. Giles 
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et. al. (2006) in their analysis of survey data from 2001 found that 
17,4% of xiagang workers were also working at the same time. 
Therefore, these should not be considered unemployed according to 
the standard, international ILO-standards (unemployed and looking 
for a job). Some 10% were even receiving either unemployment 
benefits or receiving unemployment and xiagang benefits at the same 
time. A survey in 2000 in eight provinces found that as many as 50% 
of the laid-off workers hid that they had some form of employment 
while being registered as xiagang (Wong & Ngok 2006). Yet, this 
perhaps more than anything reflects that laid-off workers were forced 
to find some other form of subsistence in the face of low or absent 
benefits. 
The different results of the studies referenced above illustrate how 
unemployment can be defined in a number of ways if we look at the 
table below. 
As can be seen below, the variations in estimated unemployment are 
quite large. Hu & Sheng (2007) include the groups mentioned above 
and arrive at 8% in 2003. OECD arrives at the same figure, but by 
calculating the difference between labor force participation and 
employment. Han & Zhang (2010) arrive at 11% when excluding all 
rural migrants and including all without a job whether they are 
looking for one or not. Dong et. al. (2007) find 9% to be unemployed 
when including all people who are working less than 4 hours a month.    
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Table 20: Defining unemployment in China (2003) 
 National 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
Han & 
Zhang 
(2010) 
OECD 
(2010a) 
Hu & Sheng 
(2007) 
Dong et. 
al.  (2007) 
Unem-
ployment 
rate 
4% 11% 8% 8% 9% 
Defined 
as unem-
ployed 
Registered 
unemployed 
All 
without a 
job, except 
rural 
migrants 
and 
foreign 
workers 
Difference 
between 
official 
statistics on 
labor market 
participation 
and 
employment, 
excluding 
urban 
citizens 
engaged in 
agriculture 
Registered 
unemployed 
+ laid-off 
workers  + 
jobless rural 
migrants + 
jobless 
students 
All 
persons 
looking 
for a job 
and 
working 
less than 4 
hours a 
month 
Data Urban 
Household 
Survey 
Urban 
Household 
Survey 
Urban 
Household 
Survey 
Urban 
Household 
Survey 
Urban 
Household 
Survey 
 
Some traits of this phenomenon are not entirely unique to China. As 
an example, in Denmark, register based unemployment (those 
receiving unemployment benefits) was at 6,2% in 2012, while 
surveys based on the ILO-standards (those without a job, but 
searching and readily available for one) placed unemployment at 
8,2% (Statistics Denmark 2012a; Statistics Denmark 2012b). Official 
net unemployment (registered unemployed readily available for work, 
ie. unemployed participating in active labor market measures not 
included) was at 4,3%. Here, the main explanation just as in the 
Chinese case is that many unemployed on the lookout for jobs are not 
registered, while others are not registered because they are students or 
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pensioners (and  therefore registered as being on other allowances) 
(Statistics Denmark 2009). Unemployed who have been discouraged 
from job search is also an issue. The difference between Denmark and 
China is of course that the match between registered and survey-
based unemployment is much poorer in China, primarily because of 
the exclusion of rural migrants or laid-off workers.  
Finally, it should be stressed that only the issue of urban 
unemployment has been considered so far here. Once again we need 
to turn the historical Chinese context since rural unemployment has at 
best been considered another form of ‘hidden unemployment’. Rural 
residents formally have access to collective land and are therefore 
considered able to obtain an independent livelihood (Murphy & Tao 
2007). In reality, increasing numbers of rural Chinese have become 
visibly unemployed with no independent means of livelihood. 
Different forces behind rural unemployment exist,  such as 
restructuring of the aforementioned township and village enterprises 
(TVEs), land requisitions by local government for urbanization or 
other forms of transformations of the rural landscape and the labor-
shedding of local governments (ibid.). Millions of rural Chinese are 
affected by land requisitions alone every year at which point they are 
often given some form of one-off compensation.  
As it will be stressed later, no formal unemployment policies exist in 
rural China, except for some national labor training programmes and 
scattered local policy initiatives. Here, unemployment is even more 
difficult to assess than in urban areas. In the 1990s it was generally 
estimated that somewhere between 100 and 200 million rural citizens 
should be considered surplus labor (Chan et. al. 2008; Murphy & Tao 
2007). This number includes employed rural laborers with low 
productivity. The share of the rural workforce looking for a job and 
being out of employment is not as high as these figures might 
suggest. Zhang (2003) placed this as low as 1.2% in 2000.   
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7.3 SOCIAL RIGHTS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED IN CHINA: 
FROM 1 TO 3 TIERS - AND BACK TO 2 
Having considered the development towards a labor market with 
Chinese characteristics, including the messy issue of unemployment, 
we will now turn to income compensation schemes for the 
unemployed in China. This is mainly a story of how an embryonic 
unemployment insurance system was first set up in 1986 and then 
accompanied by a social assistance scheme nationally from 2007 
(having had some local precursors since 1992). From 1998 a separate 
scheme with some important elements of active labor market policy 
was also set-up for the increasing number of laid-off workers, but this 
has been gradually phased out since 2001. This means that China 
today has two income compensation schemes for the unemployed in 
the form of unemployment insurance and social assistance. While we 
will begin by tracking these historical trajectories, the main focus of 
this chapter will be the analysis of social rights in contemporary 
China. This will be done by considering the dimensions of generosity 
and coverage as the most important dimensions of social rights as 
explained before in chapter 2. However, duration, financing, 
eligibility and obligations will also be considered.  
As mentioned previously, 1986 was a watershed year with its four 
regulations which in various ways laid the foundations for the 
development towards a modern labor market. One of these 
regulations was the new ‘job-waiting’ insurance. In the beginning 
only workers in the state-sector could join the scheme and four kind 
of workers were eligible for the scheme: 1) Workers from bankrupt 
enterprises; 2) Workers from enterprises being reorganized after 
having received an official notice of bankruptcy; 3) Contract workers 
having experienced an expiration of the new fixed-term contracts and 
4) Workers dismissed by enterprises (Chan et. al. 2008; Duckett & 
Hussain 2008; Vodopivec & Tong 2008). Considering that hardly all 
the unemployed could fulfill these criteria, it is understandable that 
coverage was limited. Contributions were set at 1% of the basic wage 
payroll from enterprises with no direct contributions from workers 
themselves. This yielded a benefit of 50-75% of the basic wage for a 
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maximum of two years depending on previous employment and 
contributions.  
Table 21: Unemployment insurance in urban China  
Year 1986 1993 1999 
Generosity 50-75% of basic 
wage 
120-150% of local 
social relief 
threshold (changed 
to 70-80% of local 
minimum wage in 
1995) 
Above local 
threshold for 
Minimum Living 
Standard Scheme, 
but below local 
minimum wage 
level (usually 80% 
of local minimum 
wage) 
Duration Maximum 24 
months, depending 
on contribution 
period 
Maximum 24 
months, depending 
on contribution 
period  
Maximum 24 
months, depending 
on contribution 
period.  
Less than 5 years = 
1 year duration, 
more than 10 years 
= 2 year duration. 
Eligibility 4 categories of 
workers in state-
wwned Enterprises 
(see text) 
7 categories of 
workers in state-
owned enterprises 
(see text) 
All urban workers 
(except civil 
servants) registered 
as unemployed. 
Contribution 
requirement: 1 
year 
Financing 1% of basic wage 
payroll from 
employer + 
government 
subsidies  
0,6% of payroll 
from employer + 
government 
subsidies  
2% of payroll from 
employer, 1% of 
wage from 
employee. 
Government 
subsidies covers 
any shortfall 
Source: Vodopivec & Tong (2008); Chan et. al. (2008); Duckett & Hussain (2008) 
 
The new job-waiting insurance was changed in 1993 with enterprise 
contributions changed to 0,6% of the payroll (including bonuses and 
other payments) instead of just the basic wage (Chan et. al. 2008). At 
the same time, the benefit level was tied to local social relief 
thresholds at 120-150% of the local social relief threshold 
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(Vodopivec & Tong 2008). In addition, eligibility was expanded to 
cover three more categories of workers in SOEs. As the new Labor 
Law from 1994 required a minimum wage, the benefit level instead 
became tied to this at 70-80% of the local minimum wage.   
Finally, after a 1999-reform, the scheme assumed its present day 
shape. Notably, the earnings-related element of the scheme was 
removed and now it was stipulated the benefit level had to be above 
the local social assistance thresholds but below the local minimum 
wage. In most cities, it is simply placed at 80% of the local minimum 
wage (Wang & Sun 2014). Problems in financing of the old scheme 
also meant that workers themselves now had to contribute 1% of their 
wages while employer-contributions were raised to 2% of the payroll. 
Duration was set at a maximum of 24 months, but dependent on the 
individual workers contribution time. Importantly, eligibility was now 
expanded to cover all workers registered as unemployed regardless of 
sector. Since then subsidies for health insurance (alongside interest 
subsidies for business loans) have been introduced and expanded 
following a pilot program to expand unemployment insurance from 
2006 (Li et. al., 2013; Ringen & Ngok 2013). Although migrant 
workers as mentioned before now have been formally recognized as 
part of the urban labor force, they are still not treated as such if 
enrolled in the unemployment insurance scheme. Enrolled migrant 
workers are not required to pay personal contributions but their 
employers are, and they are paid a lump sum rather than a monthly 
benefit (Chen & Gallagher 2013). Furthermore, enrollment is very 
low, with coverage being around 9-10% of migrant workers, which 
we will return to below.  
For a brief period in 1998-2001 there was a third tier in Chinese 
unemployment policy specifically minded for the laid-off or xiagang 
workers and it was also known as one of the ‘three lines of 
protection” (CRDF 2012; Chan et. al. 2008). Because the scheme was 
only gradually phased out from 2001 it continued to play a significant 
role in the following years. It emerged as the 1990s began to see a 
dramatic increase in the number of laid-off workers. As a response, 
the central government first launched to so-called ‘re-employment 
project’ nationwide in 1995. Initially, the policy was more like a 
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catalogue of ideas in the form of general and piecemeal principles to 
be adopted locally, such as preferential tax policies, calling for strong 
SOEs to hire more workers, developing service industries, home 
leaves and such. During implementation of the re-employment 
project, Shanghai innovated the so-called re-employment service 
centers (RSCs), where the laid-off workers were required to register 
in order to receive their basic living allowances (Wong & Ngok 
2006).  When signing a contract with the RSC, the laid-off worker 
agreed to look actively for work and to accept jobs referred by the 
center with the penalty being a complete termination of the benefit 
(Xu 2012). This was also a way of relieving the enterprises of the 
burdens of supporting their laid-off workers (as well as the benefits 
and social insurance premiums for the laid-off). The goal of the RSCs 
was basically to create training and job-referral programmes. In other 
words they, had clear traits of some embryonic form of active labor 
market policy (ALMP) and the later public employment service 
(PES) centers. Subsequently, the State Council encouraged other local 
governments to follow the example of Shanghai in 1997, and in 1998 
the CCP Central Committee and the State Council jointly made the 
RSC-centers national policy. The centres were financed in equal 
shares by the local government, enterprises and social insurance 
funds.  
 From 2001, it was decided to curtail the xiagang-policy and citizens 
could no longer enter the separate benefit or the re-employment 
center. Gradually, the group of laid-off workers was to be transferred 
either to unemployment insurance or the new minimum living 
allowance (Hammond 2011; Hong & Ip 2007). For this reason, there 
has been a gradual decline of the number of laid-off workers. Around 
the turn of the millennium, there were 10 million xiagang workers, 
but this had declined to around 4 million already in 2003 (Hu & 
Sheng 2007). By the end of 2003, there were 2.6 million laid-off 
workers, of which 1.9 were connected to RSCs according to official 
statistics (Wong & Ngok 2006). Because the RSCs and the separate 
benefit have been phased out, we will not dwell on this ‘line of 
protection’ in our subsequent analyses. However, we can make a 
short review of some of the main conclusions of research into this 
short-lived policy.  
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The laid-off workers registered at a RSC enjoyed a benefit that was in 
most cases significantly higher than unemployment insurance, yet not 
always sufficient in terms of securing a basic level of living. The 
level of the benefit was also a local decision. Some received less than 
60% of their previous income and in some cases it was not that far 
from the hardly sufficient unemployment insurance (Chan 2010). Just 
as in the case of unemployment insurance, the level of the benefit is 
also very dependent of the ability (or willingness) of local enterprises 
to pay their contributions. This created divides between workers who 
came from economically sound SOEs and those who came from 
enterprises who could not make ends meet (Solinger 2005). Many 
experienced long delays in receiving their allowances or getting their 
insurance premiums paid. In some cases, the laid-off workers 
received no allowance at all. For example, in 1998 Chinese Labor 
Statistics showed that 32% of the laid-off received not benefit at all. 
(Chan 2010). Local economic resources also determined the quality 
of actual training and guidance. The training programmes varied 
widely from cooking and cleaning to marketing and public relations, 
but according to an official release from the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security in 2004, 5.3 million xiagang participated in these 
training programmes (Lee & Warner 2007). This was hardly 
sufficient considering the vast number of workers laid-off in the years 
around the turn of the millennium. A national survey in 1998 found 
that only 10% of laid-off workers held a certificate of registration at a 
RSC (Liu 2011) According to official statistics, 26 million people 
were laid off from 1998 to mid-2002 (ibid.). Of these, 17 million 
supposedly re-entered employment, yet as suggested by the nature of 
the courses mentioned above, many re-entered in the low-skilled end 
of the labor market.  
The new ‘minimum standard of living scheme’ (MSLS) for urban 
citizens evolved in the beginning of the 1990s. The scheme was 
spearheaded by Shanghai in 1993 and then adopted as national policy 
in 1999 (Yan 2014; Guan & Xu 2011; Chan et. al. 2008). Before then, 
social relief in urban China was mainly available through the 
aforementioned ‘three no’s’-programme. With the onset of economic 
reform it became apparent that increasing numbers of jobless people 
with extremely poor (if any) means of subsistence was one of the 
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biggest social problems in urban China. Poverty as a result of being 
inflicted by one of the ‘three no’s had previously constituted a 
majority of the urban poor, but new urban poverty following the 
market reforms now made up some 70-90% of the urban poor (Lin 
2007). The problem was not limited to the unemployed. For example, 
a study by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions showed that 10 
million did not receive their wages on time, and 1.5 million retirees 
faced reduced or even suspended pensions. Jiang Zemin, president at 
the time, urged social reforms that would support the ongoing 
economic transformation while securing stability and the Chinese 
government began regarding the plight of jobless urban workers as 
the biggest threat to social stability.  
While Shanghai pioneered the scheme in 1993, it was soon followed 
by other provinces with the support of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. 
After the State Council called for remaining cities to adopt the 
scheme in 1997, it was emphasized that the MSLS targeted not only 
recipients of social relief via the ‘three no’s’, but also unemployed 
and poor households in general. As always in the wake of both fiscal 
and policymaking devolution the level or income threshold of the 
assistance was to be a local matter. With so much leeway in defining 
the benefit, this meant that local governments reluctant to spend 
significantly on the benefit often presided over a scheme with very 
low coverage and generosity. To secure a more homogenous 
development, the State Council in 1999 issued a set of compulsory 
regulations. Most importantly, it was made clear that financial 
responsibility was a local responsibility to be shared by municipal and 
district level governments. This of course only exacerbated the 
general trend of very strict entitlement criteria and low benefits (Guan 
& Xu 2011). For example, while the number of beneficiaries 
increased from around four to 12 million up until 2001, it was 
estimated by researchers that the actual number of urban poor was 
around 30 million. Many of the excluded were people laid-off from 
the SOEs since local government did not want to finance a scheme for 
enterprises from which they had no power to collect taxes (Zhang 
2012).    
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For these reasons, and probably also as a response to increasing social 
unrest, the central government decided to step in with significant 
financing. From 1999 to 2001, the central government increased its 
share of total financing from 5% to 54% and even went beyond 60% 
later in the new millennium (Solinger 2014; Xu 2007). Central 
government financing is even higher in many poor areas (and 
correspondingly lower in wealthy cities). In 2001, the State Council 
called for local governments to extend the scheme to all urban poor 
and also increase financing (Zhang 2012). Subsequently, the number 
of MSLS-beneficiaries increased to 21 million in 2002, and that 
number has since remained quite stable with a slight increase of a few 
million. Still, public expenditure on the MSLS has hovered around 
0.5-0.6 % of total public expenditure or just above 0.2% of GDP 
(Solinger 2014; Wong et. al. 2014).  
Around the same time as central government financing was increased, 
an increasing array of supplementary support was added to the 
scheme besides the cash-benefit itself. This usually included 
supplementary assistance for housing, education or medical care, to 
name some examples (Lei 2012). In 2007, the State Council 
announced that 2010 would be set as a goal of providing all urban 
MSLS-recipients with low-rent apartments or housing subsidies. 
Once again, the actual design and implementation of these 
supplementary forms of support is left to local governments, so 
geographical variations across China are considerable. The cash 
benefit itself is therefore only part of the overall benefit package.   
The aforementioned changes in the official perception and discourse 
on poverty can perhaps be gauged from the urban MSLS-scheme, but 
it is at least quite evident in the new rural MSLS-scheme. This was 
adopted as national-level policy in 2007, but already in 2003 the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs started promoting the idea that a rural MSLS 
should be developed in order to guarantee a more integrated system 
of social assistance nationwide (Zhang 2012). While the MCA and 
the top-level leadership in the State Council had been in agreement on 
the expansion of the urban scheme, the Ministry encountered 
resistance about a more comprehensive rural scheme. The State 
Council made it clear that while an expanded rural MSLS might be 
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desirable, it was still a local matter and existing relief systems (such 
as the rural ‘five guarantees’) would still have to suffice. As 
mentioned before, coverage of the ‘five guarantees’ was extremely 
low, however, and continues to reach only around 1% of the rural 
population (Wu 2013).  Eventually top-level and Ministry-level 
leadership converged on the new discourse of integrating rural and 
urban social assistance. From 2005, the State Council and CPC 
Central Committee repeatedly stressed that local governments in rural 
areas should explore the feasibility of establishing rural MSLS-
schemes. In 2007, it was finally adopted formally as nationwide 
policy. Once again, central government financing was the most 
important factor behind the expansion of coverage from 2007.  
While this development represents a big step in terms of coverage, it 
does not mean that social assistance can actually be said to be a 
universal, social right in China. Importantly, the MSLS is still not 
available for people without local hukou (Wong 2013a). This means 
that rural-urban migrants are excluded from the scheme. The 
widespread perception among city officials seems to be that migrant 
access is simply unaffordable and that it would open a floodgate of 
poor migrants (ibid.).  
7.4 COVERAGE AND GENEROSITY: LAGGING BEHIND THE RISKS 
OF POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT.  
The coverage of the rural and urban MSLS-schemes has seen two 
major increases in coverage as Figure 6 reveals. This reflects the 
national adaption of the urban MSLS-scheme in 1999 and the rural 
counterpart in 2007. From 1999 to 2001, the number of urban 
recipients increased from just a few million to more than twenty 
million. The increase of urban coverage of course also reflects that 
the central government increased its share of financing as explained 
earlier. The number of rural recipients had already begun to increase 
before national adaption in 2007 and then increased sharply to more 
than 50 million.  
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Figure 6: Coverage of the Minimum Standard of Living Scheme 
(1999-2011) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013) 
 
Official statistics on the number of recipients do by themselves not 
tell the whole story regarding coverage of the scheme. The number of 
recipients above correspond to 3.2% of the urban population and 
7.8% of the rural population in 2012 (Wong. et. al. 2014), but a 
proper coverage rate needs to take into account the number of 
Chinese below the local MSLS-thresholds. Using data from the 2002 
China Household Income Project, Gao et. al. (2009) found that only 
half of formally eligible households actually received the benefit. 
Work on 2003-2004 data on urban households by Chen et. al. 2006 
found that 7.7% of urban citizens had incomes below the local 
MSLS-lines, but once again, only about half received the benefit.  
This reflects what can only be described as limited coverage. This is 
where we see the effect of the aforementioned local and usually very 
informal eligibility criteria (Solinger 2014; Yan 2014), but we will 
elaborate further on this below. There is an issue regarding the 
reliability of official recipiency statistics such as those just above. For 
example, Luo & Sicular (2013) note that only 2.5% of rural 
households in the China Households Income Project (CHIP) survey 
were recipients in 2007, while the official data corresponded to 4.9%, 
but this may also reflect inadequacies in the sampling of poor 
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households in surveys such as the CHIP, which is a common 
problem. In these 2007-data, only 5-7% of poor individuals 
(depending on whether poverty is measured by the official poverty 
line, the 1.25 USD/day poverty-line or the relative poverty lines of 
50% or 60% of median income) were MSLS-recipients in rural China 
(Luo & Sicular 2013). At the same time, 1-2% of the nonpoor were 
MSLS-recipients. However, these seemingly very low coverage rates 
also reflect that local benefit thresholds are usually set below these 
poverty lines (see below).     
Figure 7: Generosity of the urban MSLS (1999-2011)  
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013); MCA (2013); Lei (2012) 
Note: The MSLS-threshold is not equal to benefits granted since the MSLS is a top-
up scheme where any other income in the household is deducted from the threshold. 
Numbers apply to an individual recipient, but note that the benefit is granted on a 
household basis (where income is calculated as average income per member in the 
household. The difference between average income and the threshold is then 
multiplied by the number of household members and the total sum is granted to the 
household as the benefit).  
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Figure 8: Generosity of the rural MSLS (2006-2012) 
 
Source: Umapathi et. al. (2013);  
 
Figures 7 and 8 tell one important story: The average urban and rural 
MSLS-income threshold has increased significantly, but in relative 
terms it is far less impressive when the general Chinese income 
development is taken into consideration. Since the turn of the 
millennium, Chinese urban wages have on average increased by 14-
15% every year (National Bureau of Statistics 2013), and this has left 
urban MSLS-recipients relatively poorer than before. The average 
urban threshold has dropped from 31% to 15% of the average, 
disposable per capita household income in urban China from 1999 to 
2007.  The yearly increases in local thresholds has since then kept the 
pace with the general income level. In most places, the level of the 
MSLS was raised significantly in 2008 and 2009 as part of the four 
trillion stimulus package from the government (Cook & Lam 2011). 
In rural China, the MSLS has even increased to 26.1% of average 
disposable income from the bottom level of 20.3% in 2007. In 2011, 
the central government raised the official rural poverty line to 2300 
yuan/year (or about 1 USD per day at the time). This was a 92% raise 
compared to the 2009-line (Wall Street Journal 2011). This may play 
a role for the even steeper increase in local rural MSLS-thresholds 
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that happened that same year, but it should also be noted that the 
average threshold is still below this line.  
Furthermore, one should bear in mind that the threshold does not 
correspond to actual benefits granted since the MSLS is a top-up 
benefit where other income is deducted. If this adequacy rate had 
been re-calculated according to average, disposable wage, the benefit 
would appear lower still. However, these estimates may also 
underestimate the Chinese benefit for a number of reasons. One 
important thing to note is that the benefit is granted on a household 
basis where average income in the household is taken into 
consideration. This means that in a one-earner household with two 
adults, one income is divided by two in order to calculate the cash 
benefit. This difference (threshold-income) is then multiplied by two 
in order to calculate the benefit (on average, there are two recipients 
in a MSLS-household according to the MCA (2013).  This also means 
that the threshold is not as harsh as it seems for households with more 
recipients than independent incomes.  
Finally, as mentioned before, the cash benefit is not the only support 
available for most MSLS-recipients. It should therefore be noted that 
supplementary support such as housing, education or medical support 
is usually available according to need as mentioned before. Here, 
local variations are very considerable. Using Guangzhou in 2010 as 
an example, Lei (2012) tracks how recipients there were entitled to 
significant benefit increases in the form of extra subsidies for 
education, housing, elderly couples or health insurance. Other 
available and more specific forms of support were for example 
complete exemption for education costs, free access to medical 
insurance, vouchers for daily necessities and more (Lei 2012). 
Guangzhou is widely perceived as a city with a particularly advanced 
welfare system, so while the scheme can be relatively generous for 
recipients with certain welfare needs there, it is most certainly not a 
typical case.  
As noted just above, any exact development in coverage over time of 
the MSLS is very difficult to find or calculate. A way to assess the 
combined effect of coverage and generosity of the scheme is to 
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consider that no Chinese households would be below the MSLS-
thresholds if everyone was included. In contrast, Wang (2007) found 
that the poverty-rate only dropped from 13,6% to 12,1% of urban 
households if one defines poverty as income below the local MSLS-
thresholds (based on a 2004-survey among 6700 households in 14 
cities).  
However, this is not only a result of low coverage, but also of ‘benefit 
gaps’ for those included in the scheme. Many households are simply 
not getting the top-up allowance they are formally entitled to (up to 
the local minimum income line), even if they are covered. It is well-
documented how the local ‘street offices’ and ‘community 
committees’ charged with registering and administering the 
individual recipients include very strict, local and particularistic 
eligibility criteria (such as ownership of electrical appliances or other 
‘luxury goods’ barring potential recipients from the benefit) (Yan 
2014; Lei 2012; Solinger 2008). There is a strong concern with 
avoiding ‘dependency’ or ‘raising lazy people’ both among the 
general public and the street offices who implement the benefit (Yan 
2014; Lei 2012). Particularly poorer cities and local areas tend to 
exclude the registered unemployed, but at the same time they include 
people in flexible or informal work to a larger extent than wealthier 
areas (Solinger 2014). Such dynamics are important factors behind 
the benefit gaps.   
Gao et. al. (2009) found a benefit gap of an astonishing 73% in urban 
China with their 2002-data. It is therefore not surprising when 
Gustafsson & Deng (2011), also using the same 2002-data, find that 
the benefit itself only made up 10% of the household income among 
recipients. They also find that only 16-40% of households are actually 
moved out of poverty, using various consumption-based poverty 
levels. Gao (2013), based on a 2009-2010 survey, finds that the 
MSLS decreases the poverty rate from 30% to 16%, with a poverty-
level set at the consumption requirement for minimum food intake. 
However, this most recent study is only based on one district in 
Shanghai.  
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If we instead turn to relative poverty levels and utilize the standard 
50% of median income as the poverty line, Wang (2007) found that 
pre- and post-transfer poverty rates were 21,1 and 20,3%, 
respectively. Gao et. al. (2009) find similarly weak effects on relative 
poverty using the same 50%-level.  
These data are of course all from the beginning of the millennium. 
Umapathi et. al. (2013) calculate from official statistics on benefits 
paid that MSLS-transfers on average increased from 30% to 73% of 
the average MSLS-threshold in 2002-2012 (urban MSLS) and from 
49% to 60% in 2006-2012 (rural MSLS) This may either indicate 
smaller ‘benefit gaps’ or increasing needs among the very poorest.  
According to Gao (2013), one Chinese study has found that the ability 
of the MSLS to combat absolute poverty rates increased only slightly 
between 2001 and 2005. This is perhaps not surprising given that 
benefit levels have certainly increased, even if they have declined 
relative to the general income development in that same period..  
Figure 9 reveals coverage of unemployment insurance, but is 
important to note that this coverage rate is only calculated by the 
numbers on official and registered unemployed. As section 7.2 
explained, real unemployment is much higher. Nevertheless, the 
recipiency rate at least tells us the coverage of unemployment 
insurance as a percentage of potential recipients who have the right to 
participate (as the unregistered unemployed cannot gain access to the 
scheme) 
Since the registered unemployment rate has remained very stable, it 
would appear that the coverage rate has declined to around or below  
30% of the registered unemployed in most recent years, but this is 
also very uncertain since the official unemployment rate in particular 
is such a ‘politically sensitive’ statistic as explained previously.  
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Figure 9: Coverage of unemployment insurance (1994-2012)* 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2014); CDRF 2012; Vodopivec & 
Tong (2008); Warner & Lee (2007)  
*) 1999-2006 coverage data are based on year-end recipients and come from CDRF 
(2012) and Vodopivec & Tong (2008). Million recipients indicate beneficiaries 
during the year.  
 
The reasons for the apparent decline in coverage and recipiency are 
not entirely clear, but perhaps it might reflect that some groups with 
more marginal and less secure labor market relations have joined the 
ranks of the unemployed. These could be the former laid-off or 
xiagang workers who have gradually been channeled into official 
unemployment or even some migrant workers in most recent years. 
Both groups have a distinct status as labor market outsiders for 
different reasons, and therefore might have problems finding their 
way into unemployment insurance.  
The rural-urban migrants are predominantly not included in registered 
unemployment and face a big coverage gap compared to urban 
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workers. Surveys of migrant workers conducted in 2005, 2010 and 
2012, for example, concluded that only 8-10% of migrant workers 
were enrolled in unemployment insurance, a share that did not appear 
to be increasing (Wang & Wan 2014; Wong 2013a). Despite the fact 
that they are now formally acknowledged as part of the urban labor 
force, they still have big problems enrolling in unemployment 
insurance. One explanation is the problem with extending work 
contracts to these workers as mentioned previously.  
Figure 10 below reveals a story about generosity which is very 
similar to the one for the urban MSLS, namely that significant benefit 
increases have been outpaced by even more significant income 
increases among the population in general. However, the benefit 
increases since 2007 have at least kept the pace to a much higher 
degree. As in the case of the MSLS, unemployment benefits were 
also raised significantly from 2008 following the four trillion stimulus 
package (Cook &  Lam 2011).  Again, we should note that the exact 
estimates are uncertain (as explained below).  
 Figure 10: Generosity of unemployment insurance (2001-2012) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2014); Proceedurallaw.cn (2013); 
CDRF 2012; Vodopivec & Tong (2008); Warner & Lee (2007) 
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Note: 1) Average benefit is based on total benefits paid during the year and 
beneficiaries at year-end (in essence it is therefore assumed that the number of 
recipients at year-end is representative of the situation during the year).  
2) Replacement rates have been calculated by re-calculating average per capita 
disposable income (excluding transfers) to cover only wage earners, based on the 
number of dependents in the average household (in 2011). The numerator in the 
estimated net replacement rate is simply the average benefit amount (left hand axis) 
since the benefit is not taxable.  
 
Just as the MSLS is low if compared to social assistance counterparts 
in developed welfare states, so the Chinese unemployment insurance 
is very low. A net replacement rate of around or below 25% is not 
much compared to most OECD countries, where the net replacement 
usually is well above 50% for an average workers except in a few 
instances such as the United Kingdom (OECD 2014a). However, just 
as in the case of the MSLS, it should be noted that the disposable 
income statistics does not include informal employment, generally at 
lower wage levels, which makes the replacement rate appear lower 
than it actually is for significant groups in the actual workforce. On 
the other hand, this group is of course not eligible for the benefit.  
To summarize our lengthy enquiry into unemployment protection, the 
extension and increased coverage of social protection (social 
assistance in this case) is marred by inadequate or even declining 
benefit generosity. Unemployment insurance has not witnessed 
significant reforms. This general conclusion in terms of generosity 
and coverage will become a familiar refrain during the course of the 
next two chapters. The final conclusions regarding this policy field 
will be the focus of chapter 11 (and rather implicitly also in the Sino-
Nordic comparison of chapter 10) as we compare all three policy 
fields at the same time.  
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CHAPTER 8. PENSIONS: A NEW 
MULTIPILLAR SYSTEM IN TROUBLE 
This chapter will focus on the development of the Chinese pension 
system, beginning with the broad reform path and then focusing in 
later sections on generosity and coverage (and the big problems that 
plague the system in this regard). As argued in chapter 1-3, these 
dimensions of rights are crucial for our enquiry into the social policy 
developments vis-à-vis the goal of ‘moderate universalism’ and also 
for social citizenship.  
 
The reader should be familiar with standard pension literature-jargon 
before reading this chapter (and chapter 10). I will be making use of 
the terms of defined benefit (DB), defined contribution (DC), pension 
tiers, pension pillars,‘pay-as-you-go’ (PAYG) and funded.  
 
The first two refer to benefit entitlements. DB-based entitlements 
guarantee a pre-defined benefit level, which could for example be 
based on years of service or as a share of the salary. DC, on the other 
hand, simply means that benefits are based on contributions (and 
yields from investments of those contributions).  
 
Pillars and tiers refer to the institutional ensemble of the overall 
pension system. The trifold distinction between the pension pillars of 
state, occupational and private is common. This means that the total 
pension income of any individual may come from any of these three 
sources at the same time. Tiers usually refer to whether benefits are 
‘basic security’, earnings-related or supplements. Pillars and tiers may 
be very similar, for example, with the state pillar guaranteeing basic 
benefits while occupational solutions are earnings-related, but this is 
not always the case. As we shall see, it is also very common that the 
state pillar features both basic security and earnings-related benefits, 
for example.    
 
PAYG and funded refer to the financing of benefits. PAYG means 
that the current working age-population pays for current retirees, 
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which may be both through general taxes or special contributions. In 
a funded system, however, pension contributions are saved and 
people pay for their own pension benefits during work life.  
 
Having elaborated on the terms, we can turn to our investigation of 
the Chinese pension system. In general, pension reform in 
contemporary China has been a rocky road towards a mulitipillar 
pension system whose very basic institutional features might 
resemble what you could find in almost any modern welfare regime, 
but with some very specific Chinese characteristics as well.  
 
Overall, the current Chinese pension system can be divided into at 
least four major benefit systems, namely one directed towards 
employees in urban enterprises, one aimed at urban residents outside 
employment, one for the rural population in general and finally one 
directed at civil servants and government employees (Wu 2013; Xu & 
Zhang 2012).  
8.1 THE LONG HAUL TOWARDS A MODERN PENSION 
SYSTEM 
The urban pension system traces back to the aforementioned 1951-
Labour Insurance Law which covered all urban work units 
nationwide. It is remarkable that it did not cover the big majority of 
the population namely the rural poplation. The separate scheme for 
civil servants was enacted in 1955, but merged again with the other 
scheme just three years later, before once again branching out as a 
separate tier in 1978 (Xu & Zhang 2012). Both schemes were 
operated on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis with the pension 
allowance being defined benefit (DB). Contributions from urban 
enterprises were collected and administered by the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions through the individual trade unions (Shi 
& Mok 2012). Generosity of the DB-benefit varied, but the 
replacement rate was typically 50-70% and even higher for civil 
servants (Wu 2013; Salditt et. al. 2007). Pension age was set at 60 
years for men and 55 or 50 years for women, just as it is today. This 
is also quite remarkable, since average life expectancy in the 1955-
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1960 period was 43,1 years for men and 46,2 years for women, while 
it has increased to 73 years in 2011 (Salditt et. al. 2007; World Bank 
2013). The scheme ceased to function during the cultural revolution 
as trade unions were abolished and the ACTFU-administered system 
could no longer operate. Instead, the individual enterprises largely 
became responsible for their own employees.  
 
The system as it looks today is very much a child of the reform era. 
As mentioned before, the impetus for the current contribution-based 
system was a result of increasing financial burdens on urban 
enterprises within an increasingly market-based and competitive 
environment. The practice of giving full responsibility for pensions to 
the workplaces as it developed during the Cultural Revolution was 
formalized in 1978.  The principle of ‘socialization’ in pensions and 
elsewhere meant that burdens were shifted from the state to 
enterprises and individuals (ibid.). The number of workers per retiree 
decreased from 30 to six in ten years from 1978 to 1988 (Salditt et. al. 
2007). Pension benefits declined markedly, but most for the poor and 
less so for the better off in well-performing enterprises (Friedman 
2013).  
 
Local experiments with pooling of funds in combination with 
individual accounts based on personal contributions began taking 
place in early 1980s (Xu & Zhang 2012; Ye 2011). As could be 
expected, these local solutions varied widely in design and 
implementation, just as it varied whether they applied to the county or 
provincial level.  In 1986, the central government stepped in and now 
for the first time required that employees should take part in financing 
pensions. A national contribution rate was set at 3% of the wage and 
15% of the pre-tax wage bill for employers and the funds were now to 
be managed by local social insurance agencies (Friedman 2013; Xu & 
Zhang 2012). This shifted some of the burden away from urban 
workplaces.  
 
In 1991, the State Council stepped in and called for provincially 
pooled pension funds to cover all types of non-governmental urban 
workers (Xu & Zhang 2012). This applied only for urban, state-
owned enterprises, while collective enterprises and private companies 
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could join voluntarily (Chan et. al. 2008). The envisioned scheme 
consisted of the basic pension for all retirees, where the financial 
responsibility was to be shared among the three parties of employers, 
employees and the state (Salditt. et. al. 2007). As the new Chinese 
pension system was to be increasingly financed by employers and 
employees, the government would not shoulder a bigger financial 
responsibility when the scheme was to be extended. Pensions 
declined from 8% to 5-6% of government budgets in the middle of 
the 1990s (Shou 2013). In the 1991-system, employers’ contributions 
were to be decided locally, while employees would pay a contribution 
at 3% of their wage. In addition, there could be a supplementary 
scheme financed by the enterprise and a private account financed by 
the individual workers themselves (payable as a lump sum upon 
retirement). Taken together, this is what we may otherwise also 
understand as the basics of a multipillar pension system. Financing 
and contributions were now to be administered by the local pension 
board. Still, the basic pension remained very dominant, and it 
operated purely on a PAYG-basis (Ye 2011).   
  
The State Council acted once again in 1995 with a new plan which in 
earnest outlined the basics of the pension system as it is defined 
today. Specifically, it turned the public pension tier from being purely 
PAYG-based to one based on a combination of social pooling and 
(formally) funded personal accounts with benefits determined by the 
principle of defined contribution (Xu & Zhang 2012). Still, the 1995-
decision gave local governments much leeway in defining the exact 
balance between personal accounts and social pooling as well as the 
exact contribution rates. It also offered two different ways in which 
social pooling could be combined with individual accounts which did 
not exactly further a more unified system either (Friedman 2013; 
Chan et. al. 2008).  
 
8.2 THE NEW PENSION SYSTEM EMERGES 
The ambition of a more unified system was finally fulfilled to some 
measure in 1997 with the Decision to Establish a Unified Basic Old-
age Insurance System for Enterprise Workers from the State Council. 
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It was set in stone that the first tier of the public pension scheme 
would consist of the PAYG-based and defined benefit-calculated tier, 
while the second, defined contribution-tier would be the individual 
account based on individual contributions (CDRF 2012).  
 
In terms of the unification of contribution rates and benefits, the new 
regulation stipulated that enterprises would contribute up to 20% of 
the total wage sum while individuals would pay 8% of their wages (as 
it is also the case today) (Chen & Gallagher 2013; Wu 2013; Xu & 
Zhang 2012). The exact employer contribution rate is decided by each 
province or autonomous region, but it cannot exceed 20%, and some 
self-employed or employees with flexible employment pay more than 
8% (Chen & Gallagher 2013).  Therefore, variations remain, but 
contribution rates typically fluctuate between 11-20% for employers 
and 8-11% for employees (Wu 2013).  
 
The individual account consists of the individual contributions plus 
3% from the enterprise contribution (corresponding to 11% of the 
wage in total in case of ‘normal’ contribution rates). In terms of 
pension payments, the basic, defined-benefit tier should correspond to 
20% of the local average wage prior to retirement, topped up by the 
personal account divided by 120 a month (making it last for ten 
years). This set-up was outlined on the basis of recommendations 
from the World Bank (Safarti & Ghellab 2012).   The new set-up was 
not implemented until 2000, where it was established first in Liaoning 
province, and then slowly expanded to other provinces in the years 
after.  
 
In 2000, the central government also promulgated the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) in an effort to alleviate some of the biggest 
problems stemming from a very fragmented system (Shi & Mok 
2012). Risk pooling was very limited with very local, sub-provincial 
level funds marked by disparities in financial sustainability. This 
naturally created conflicts of interests in cases where more affluent 
funds did not want to merge with the less fortunate ones. On top of 
this funds were divided according to whether they applied to SOEs, 
urban collectives or foreign-invested enterprises (Frazier 2010). By 
the mid-1990s, there were 3.423 pools for SOEs at the city or county 
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level, plus 2.219 for urban collectives and 764 for foreign enterprises. 
This is a number that can only be considered to be vastly bloated, 
even in a country like China. In many cases, lack of resources meant 
that the personal accounts were directed to finance current retirees, 
creating a system that was de facto still purely PAYG-based in many 
cases. The NSSF was meant to strengthen pooling at the provincial 
level and ensure financing by letting it act as a reserve of last resort 
(Salditt et. al. 2007). Revenue from the privatization of SOEs among 
other things were transferred to the NSSF in order to build it up as a 
long-term, strategic reserve in order to cover the the pension 
liabilities of local governments in the future as demographic 
transition kicks in. However, problems with ensuring personal 
accounts and risk pooling still persist.  
 
Table 22: Important pension reforms.  
Sources: Herd (2013); Shi & Mok (2012); Xu & Zhang (2012); Salditt et. al. (2007) 
 
 
Year Reform 
1978 ‘Socialization’ of pension responsibilities to urban work units 
1986 Employee contributions added at 3% of wage; Employer 
contribution set at 15% of wage bill.  
1991 Provincial-level funding system administered by pension boards 
Multipillar system as it is today (except that pillar 1 was purely 
PAYG and defined benefit) 
1995 From purely PAYG public pension to mix between social pooling 
and personal accounts (two tiers) 
1997 Basic old age insurance system for enterprise employees. National 
harmonization of contribution rates and benefit formula for tier I 
and tier II.  
2000 National Social Security Fund set up to strengthen provincial 
pooling and ensure contributions in individual accounts with NSSF 
as a reserve of last resort.   
 
Changes in contributions and benefit formula: Decrease in funds to 
personal account, increase in the basic, defined-benefit tier.    
2006 Changes to benefit formula. 
2009 New rural pension system.  
2011 Urban residents’ pension system 
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In 2000, the balance between contributions to the personal accounts 
and the basic, defined-benefit tier was also changed (Xu & Zhang 
2012). Specifically, it was decided that only the employee-
contribution of 8% of the wage would go the personal account, 
whereas the 3% of the wage-bill from employers that were previously 
used to fund personal accounts now would go to the basic tier. The 
extra financing for the basic, defined benefit-tier were used to make 
this more generous for individuals with long contribution histories, so 
that people who had contributed more than 15 years to the pension 
system would get benefits above the previous level of 20% of the 
average local wage, but with a maximum of 30%. This was changed 
again in 2006, so that benefits from the individual account would be 
equal to 1/139 (rather than 1/120) of the accumulated funds, which 
reflected life expectancy at age 60) with even bigger divisors for 
women as indicated in table 23 beceause they retire earlier. 
Furthermore, the basic tier was changed to reflect wage differences so 
that each year of contributions would qualify for 1% of the local 
average wage indexed by the individual wage prior to retirement. The 
target is a replacement rate of nearly 60% for a contribution period of 
35 years (35% from the first tier and 25% from the personal account) 
 
In the new millennium, the central government also tried to facilitate 
the development of second-tier, purely employment-based pensions 
by providing the regulatory framework on how these funds were to be 
managed as well as providing them with tax concessions (Shi & Mok 
2012). By the end of 2010, more than 33.000 companies covering 56 
million workers had established such schemes.  
 
By far the biggest pension reforms since the gradual set-up of the 
urban multipillar pension are the new pension schemes for citizens 
with rural hokou in 2009 and for urban citizens outside the workers’ 
system in 2011. Both schemes had been running as local trials in 
select provinces a few years before nationwide adaption. These two 
new schemes are very similar in their set-up. While the schemes are 
in essence relatively cheap (low contributions) and therefore not very 
generous, they do nonetheless represent significant steps in terms of 
securing pension benefits as a basic social right. These new schemes 
were also to consist of a mix between a basic, defined-benefit tier and 
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a defined contribution-tier with a personal account (Chen & Turner 
2014; Herd 2013). The first tier is a flat-rate benefit financed entirely 
by central and local government, set at the minimum level of 55 
yuan/month (corresponding to 7,3% of average disposable income of 
rural workers in 2011
11
) (National Bureau of Statistics 2013). Local 
governments can raise the level of this very low non-contributory, 
minimum benefit according to their financial ability. The second tier, 
the personal account, is funded by a contribution at a level decided by 
the individual, but within a certain range with fixed steps (for 
example five contribution levels from 100-500 yuan/month for the 
rural scheme).  
 
The new rural scheme was to be a nationwide solution in place of the 
much diversified local solutions that were available to some rural 
Chinese with gradual implementation expected to last until 2020. The 
new rural scheme had been in experimentation in some localities 
since 2007 following a decision in 2002 by the Central Committee of 
the CPC that urged wealthier provinces to explore the establishment 
of rural pensions (as well as medical insurance and a rural minimum 
living allowance) (Xu & Zhang 2012). Rural pensions had been an 
issue since the communes were disbanded in the early 1980s, which 
meant the effective break-down of any coherent coverage of pensions. 
Local solutions were later to be found in a very patchy manner, but 
the Ministry of Civil affairs in 1992 tried to promote a more unified 
rural pension system with some success, but coverage never increased 
above 75 million. Crucially, the central government never contributed 
more to this scheme beyond tax concessions, and many less-
developed regions disbanded the scheme when they started to 
experience financial difficulties.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Estimation based on a re-calculation of average per capita disposable income (excluding 
transfers) to cover only wage earners (multiplying per capita disposable income by average 
number of dependents in each household. The numerator in this replacement rate is of course 
the flat rate benefit of 55 yuan/month (660/year).  
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Table 23: Set-up of the three new pension schemes 
 Urban workers Urban residents Rural residents 
Year 1997 2011 2009 
Target population Formally employed 
urban workers 
Urban residents 
outside the formal 
labor market 
All rural residents 
Coverage 60.3% of urban 
employees (2011) 
NA 49.7% of rural 
population (2011) 
Pillar 1 Tier I: Social 
pooling 
Tier II: Personal 
account  
 
Tier I: Flat-rate 
benefit 
Tier II: Personal 
account  
 
Tier I: Flat-rate 
benefit  
Tier II: Personal 
account  
 
Pillar 2 Other employer-
based pensions 
 NA NA 
Pillar 3 Individual pension NA NA 
Financing Tier I: Employer-
financed (20% of 
wage sum). 
Tier II: Employee-
financed (8% of 
wage) 
Tier I: Central and 
local government 
Tier II: Personal 
contribution of 
own choice (five 
possible levels 
from 100-500 
yuan in 2011) 
Tier I: Central 
and local 
government 
Tier II: Personal 
contribution of 
own choice (ten 
possible levels 
from 100-1000 
yuan in 2011) 
Benefit formula Tier I: Defined 
benefit.1% of local 
average wage per 
year of contribution 
indexed by personal 
wage at retirement 
Tier II: Defined 
contribution. 
Payment at 1/139 of 
savings in personal 
account per month 
(1/195 for a woman 
retiring at age 50; 
1/170 at age 55).  
Tier I: 55 
yuan/month in 
2011 
Tier II: Defined 
Contribution. 
Payment at 1/139 
of savings in 
personal account 
per month. 
Tier I: 55 
yuan/month in 
2011 
Tier II: Defined 
Contribution. 
Payment at 1/139 
of savings in 
personal account 
per month. 
Intended 
replacement rate 
60% of pre-
retirement wage for 
35 years of 
contributions (35% 
NA 35% of average 
per capita 
household 
income (Flat-rate 
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for tier I + 25% for 
tier II) 
benefit equivalent 
to 25% + 
contributory 
benefit equivalent 
to 10% of 
household 
income)  
Generosity 45% of average 
wage for both tiers 
(2011)  
Tier I: 3% of 
urban disposable 
per capita income 
(2011) 
Tier I: 9.4% of 
rural disposable 
per capita income 
(2011) 
Sources: Wang et. al. (2014a; 2014b); Chen & Turner 2014; Herd 2013; Xu & 
Zhang 2012; Chan et. al. 2008 
 
 
 
The new urban residents’ scheme from 2011 is basically built on the 
same template as the rural scheme from 2009, but with personal 
contributions instead divided into ten possible levels (from 100 to 
1000 yuan/month in 2011) (Xu & Zhang 2012). The flat-rate tier of 
55 Yuan/month corresponds to just 2,11% of the wage of the average 
urban worker. In both schemes, the level of central government 
subsidy is geographically defined. Central government finances 100% 
in middle and Western provinces, and only 50% in Eastern provinces.  
 
In addition to these three main schemes, we should remember that the 
basic PAYG-based pension scheme for civil servants without 
personal contributions is still in place. We will return to this (still) 
much more generous scheme below. In addition, we could single out 
a new scheme for employees at public institutions. Following a State 
Council decision in 2008, experiments with singling out a new 
separate scheme for these workers were undertaken in three provinces 
as well as Shanghai and Chongqing (Wang et. al. 2014a; Brødsgaard 
& Chen 2014). However, it is not yet adopted nationally and just as 
the two schemes for urban and rural residents are very similar, the 
set-up of this scheme resembles the urban workers’ scheme as 
depicted in table 23.  
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8.3 COVERAGE AND GENEROSITY: THE CHALLENGES OF 
AN UNSUSTAINABLE AND FRAGMENTED SYSTEM 
It is clear beyond doubt that the aforementioned pension reforms are 
extremely significant in terms of expanding access to pension 
schemes for the whole population, both rural and urban. These 
pensions are insurance-based, but nevertheless with a new, in-built 
minimum pension benefit as a basic right for those covered since 
2009 in rural China and since 2011 in urban China. Everybody over 
age 60 can receive this new minimum benefit even if they have not 
contributed to these new schemes (provided that their children are 
enrolled) (Chen & Turner 2014). Truly universal basic pensions have 
even been formally adopted at the local level in many cities (Lei & 
Walker 2013). In Guangzhou, for example, elderly above the age of 
70 are granted a universal allowance which increases with age.  
 
These reforms are also reflected in the coverage of the various 
pension schemes outlined below. In this case, only the urban 
employees’ scheme is depicted along with the new rural pension 
scheme. A time series for the new urban resident’s pension from 2011 
would be very short, but in 2012 2.35 million retirees received 
pensions from this scheme according to official statistics (Wang et. al. 
2014a, see also figure 12 below). In total, 125 millon retirees were 
reported to receive pensions in 2011, corresponding to a coverage rate 
of 60% (Wang et. al. 2014b). By the end of 2014, Vice Premier Ma 
Kai delivered a report to the National People Congress which stated 
that coverage stood at 80% of all workers and retirees (China Daily 
2014).   
 
What we have to keep in mind in that the figure below is of course 
that the data are in absolute numbers, which do not reflect increasing 
urbanization. The official urbanization rate has expanded from 17% 
in 1978 to 36.2% in 2000 and 53% in 2011 (OECD 2013a; Webber & 
Zhu 2007). Therefore, while the number of urban workers covered by 
the pension scheme doubled from 2000 to 2011, the share of the 
population living in urban China also increased by nearly 50%. About 
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60% of urban workers were covered in 2011, while the figure was 
around 45% in 2000 (CDRF 2012:13).  
 
Figure 11: Coverage of urban workers’ pension scheme (1997-
2012), millions 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2014) 
 
Conversely, the expansion of rural pensions becomes even more 
impressive when we take into account that the rural population is 
shrinking. The table below mainly indicates a dramatic increase in 
2011 in the number of rural Chinese covered, but also a noticeable 
development from 2009 following the adaption of the new scheme in 
that year.  
 
It should be emphasized that, unlike unemployment protection 
previously and health insurance in the next chapter, our numbers for 
coverage numbers come straight from official statistics without any 
discussion or references to other estimates.  
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Figure 12: Coverage of rural pensions (2006-2011), millions.  
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2013).  
Note: Data for 2012 not shown since the statistics for the rural residents’ scheme 
have become merged with the urban residents’ scheme. In 2012, 484 million people 
were reported to be included in both schemes, of which 134 million were elderly 
recipients.  
 
 
Figure 13: Generosity of pension schemes (2011) 
 
Source: Wang et. al. (2014a) 
Replacement rates calculated according to the estimates of average wages for the 
different segments of the population in Wang et. al. (2014a).  
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In the urban workers’ system, average replacement rates have 
dropped from more than 75% in the late 1990’s to around 45% in 
2011 (Herd 2013). Benefits vary according to geographical location 
of course, but not as much as general income differences, which 
means that scheme is especially inadequate in wealthier regions. For 
instance, when the average replacement rate for urban pension 
insurance in 2003 was 56%, it ranged between 40-80% in different 
provinces, with the lowest figures in Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin 
(Chan et. al. 2008). Projections of the average replacement rate places 
it at around 30% in 2050 despite the official target of 60% mentioned 
previously (Herd 2013).Civil servants have not witnessed the same 
drift of replacement rates just as they have the advantage of not 
paying personal contributions. Civil servants pensions are today 
based on the two components of ‘rank wage’ and ‘duty wage’ which 
formally should yield replacement rates of 80-90% for 35 years of 
employment (Wu 2013). In terms of the new urban and rural 
residents’ pensions, benefits are at this point paid mostly at the low 
basic level of 55 yuan/month since the contributory tier is still 
maturing.  
 
The issue of benefits is of course closely linked to the financing of the 
scheme. Firstly, the accumulated funds and their returns quite simply 
cannot keep up with the dramatic increase in Chinese incomes. This is 
has so far not been fully countered by the set-up of the National 
Social Security Fund (NSSF) mentioned earlier, even if the decline in 
generosity has been curbed somewhat in later years. A study from the 
Global Pension Fund Research Center of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences estimated that the average rate of return for China’s pension 
funds had been less than 2% in 1997-2010, even lower than the 
increase of the consumer price index (Chen & Turner 2014; Hu 
2014). The problem is a result of a quite restricted and still immature 
Chinese financial market (Chen & Turner 2014; Hu 2014; Shi & Mok 
2012). For the pension funds, a specific problem is that they are 
restricted to deposit funds in national banks or invest in government 
bonds by the current regulations. The aforementioned NSSF has more 
leeway, but is also subject to regulations on how large a share of 
funds can be invested in shares, for example. Local governments have 
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
208
 
been allowed to entrust the NSSF with investing contributions from 
individual accounts since 2007 and pilot projects allowing a small 
number of local governments to use a larger array of investment 
options were undertaken from 2012 (Chen & Turner 2014).  
 
Additionally, a personally funded account lasting for only 139 months 
(or less than 12 years, but longer for employed females as noted 
before) means that funds are increasingly inadequate as life 
expectancy increases. The retirement age has not been changed at all 
since before the reform era when the retirement age was higher than 
average life expectancy. The average retirement age was 56.1 in 
2011, which means that contributions for individual accounts did not 
even last to age 70 at a time when average life expectancy was 74.8 
years (Wang et. al. 2014b). Since the benefit level is guaranteed as an 
annuity even if the the 139 months are exceeded, the government is 
financially liable for the DC-based benefits beyond this point. This 
problem will become worse as the dependency ratio increases. It is 
projected to increase from 0.11 in 2009 to 0.5 in 2038 (Hu & Yang 
2012) 
 
It could be argued that the combination of these two issues 
(inadequate funding in both individual accounts and socially pooled 
contributions) does not really pose a problem as long as the 
government can continue subsidizing pensions since the government 
is required to make up for any shortfall. The shortfall will increase 
without reform. Wang et. al. (2014b) estimate that it will increase 
from 135 billion yuan/year in 2013 to 444 billion in 2020. Up until 
2050, Wang et. al. (2014b) estimate that the funding gap can be offset 
by an annual increase in government financing of 6.2%, which would 
certainly be a very big feat.   
 
Furthermore, there is still the problem of the vast number of sub-
provincial pension funds which leads to very limited risk pooling. 
Despite the goal of at least achieving provincially unified funds, intra-
provincial disparities and local funds continue to characterize the 
system (Shi & Mok 2012). In four cases provincial-level funding has 
been adapted, including the provincial-level cities of Beijing and 
Shanghai (Chen & Turner 2014; Huang 2013). The number of 
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pension funds has become smaller than the one provided earlier for 
the mid-1990s, but Chen & Turner (2014:5056) state the number is 
still ‘more than 2000’. One important roadblock is that the system of 
local funds administered by local social insurance agencies (SIAs) 
has created its own vested interests. City and county governments are 
charged with the task of staffing and operating the SIAs whose 
primary purpose is to collect contributions. These local money bins 
are an especially strong temptation for local governments under 
financial strain (Frazier 2010). It is therefore easy to understand how 
the effort to create pooling at higher levels has been met by strong 
resistance by local SIAs.  The standardization of contribution rates 
may have curbed these tendencies to some extent, but nevertheless 
the pooling system itself is still quite fragmented.  
 
Finally, as in other areas of the Chinese welfare state, there is the 
issue of rural-urban migrants. Coverage of pension insurance 
continues to be very low among migrants. In 2011, a report from the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions placed pension coverage at 
21% (Wong 2013a). In 2012, The National Bureau of Statistics 
estimated pension coverage to be only 14% (Wang & Wan 2014). 
This revealed that progress in this regard was non-existent when 
compared to eariler surveys in the new millennium. In 1999, national-
level regulations were for the first time made regarding the inclusion 
of migrant workers in urban pension insurance (Ringen & Ngok 
2013; Xu & Zhang 2012), but it seems that insurance-coverage 
continues to elude them. The issue of non-compliance from 
employers is especially prevalent for this group of workers, but rural-
migrant workers themselves may opt out due to the traditionally 
limited portability of contributions. Local urban insurance schemes 
for migrants usually include lower contributions (12% from 
employers, 4-8% from employees), but urban employers also 
negotiate with migrant workers to enroll them in the rural scheme of 
their home area (Wu 2013; Xu & Zhang 2012)  
 
In short, the pension system is still marred by inadequate and 
declining replacement rates as well as fragmented risk pooling. In 
addition to this comes the lack of financial sustainability, leading to 
the still widespread practice of using funding in individual accounts 
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to pay for current retirees. For instance, Hu & Yang (2012:197) are 
quick to dismiss the current ‘multipillar’ setup of urban pensions by 
stating that “….the consistent removal of IA [Individual Account] 
funds to pay for the benefits of the retirees renders the entire system a 
PAYG system”. A less harsh judgment would perhaps be that the 
urban workers’ pension system is a de facto notional defined 
contribution (NDC) scheme. Efforts are being made to make the 
individual accounts funded, however (Chen & Turner 2014). Three 
provinces started to partially fund the individual account in 2001 
(with big government subsidies), a number that had increased to 
around 10 provinces by 2006 (still only partially funded) where it has 
since stagnated.     
 
The exact mix of all these problems vary according to the different 
pension schemes as indicated above, but altogether these issues make 
pension reform one of the biggest and most urgent challenges 
looming over the current Chinese welfare system. From the 
perspective of social rights, the steps toward greater coverage have 
been taken mostly by adopting highly inadequate new schemes with 
big inherent divides in terms of occupation and rural-urban hukou.  
In 2014, the State Council issued a decision to integrate the two new 
schemes for urban and rural residents (which as emphasized are 
already nearly identical) (Wang & Beland 2014). By the end of 2014, 
Vice Premier Ma Kai stated that the preferential schemes for civil 
servants and public employees would be integrated with the urban 
workers’ scheme (and reiterated the goal of achieving around 95% 
coverage for all of China by 2020) (China Daily 2014). Even if this is 
achieved, the huge disparities between the more generous 
occupational schemes on the one hand and the schemes for urban and 
rural residents on the other will remain.  
 
In this chapter we have seen how significantly increasing coverage of 
pensions has been largely achieved by (so far) relatively ‘cheap’ and 
inadequate schemes. On the other hand, these new schemes may be 
the first significant step forward, and the integration of a very 
fragmented system seems to be next challenge that wil be taken up. 
This assessment will also ring true in case of the health insurance 
system in the next chapter. As I also stated by the end of chapter 7, 
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the final conclusion and assessment of social citizenship and social 
rights in this policy field will be the focus of chapter 11 (and to some 
extent also chapter 10).    
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CHAPTER 9. HEALTH INSURANCE: 
FROM CLUBS FOR THE RICH TO 
SHELTERS FOR THE POOR 
This chapter will focus on health insurance within the health care 
system, but care and provision will also be touched upon. Focusing 
on health insurance will also allow us to investigate the dimensions of 
generosity and coverage in a manner comparable to pensions and 
unemployment protection. I will begin first by outlining the reforms 
that led to the present health insurance system as I have done in the 
previous chapters. Then we will turn to assessing the consequences in 
terms of coverage and generosity in the final sections of this chapter. 
The final conclusions on this and the other three policy fields will be 
part of the last chapter.    
Any appraisal of significant social policy developments in China 
would be sorely incomplete without consideration of health care. 
Besides pensions, this is undoubtedly the other major policy field 
where reforms have transformed the landscape of social citizenship in 
China in terms of social rights.  
Arguably, the changes here are even more significant since reform-
era China witnessed a nearly complete breakdown of public 
healthcare only to be countered by something approaching a nearly 
universal expansion of health insurance coverage in a few short years. 
Nevertheless, this new insurance system still faces a myriad of issues 
and inadequacies. This another reaon why the focus will be on health 
insurance.  
9.1 THE BREAKDOWN OF THE OLD HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
In the planned economy, China set up a system of health care which 
received wide acclaim for being very well-developed when taking the 
general level of economic development into account. From 1949 to 
1981, the number of hospital beds increased from 100.000 to 1,2 
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million while life expectancy increased from 35 years to 68 years and 
infant mortality dropped  400 to 48 per 1.000 infants (Chan et. al. 
2008). UN estimates placed the Physical Quality of Life index in 
China 68
th
 in the world while it ranked only 107
th
 in terms of 
economic development for the period 1970-1975 (Leung 2005).  
In urban China, the Labor Insurance System for urban workers and 
their dependents was set up in 1951 while the Government Insurance 
System followed in 1952 for government staff, university students 
and disabled veterans. In rural china, the Rural Cooperative Medical 
Scheme (RCMS) was expanded throughout the 1950s (Nundy 2014; 
Gao & Meng 2013; Barber & Yao 2011). By 1975, it was estimated 
that coverage was nearly universal in urban China while the RCMS 
covered about 85% of the population (Lora-Wainwright 2011; Chan 
et. al. 2008). However, some have raised the question of whether 
particularly rural coverage has been inflated in most accounts  
For those covered, the schemes did provide relatively generous and 
mostly free treatment, particularly for urban residents. Out-of-pocket 
payments were relatively minimal except for minor charges for some 
medicines and remedies subject to price caps (Barber & Yao 2011). 
Healthcare was provided in a three-tier system in both urban and rural 
China. In urban areas, street and workplace clinics provided primary 
care, while they could refer people to the second tier of district 
hospitals. Finally, city hospitals would deal with specialized or 
complicated treatments. Government work units with more than 100 
employees operated independent workplace clinics just as large SOEs 
also ran their own clinics (and in some cases even hospitals too). In 
rural China, primary care was delivered at village medical stations 
staffed by the famous ‘barefoot doctors’ that could provide 
rudimentary treatment while often working part-time as farmers 
themselves. The second and third tiers consisted of township and 
county hospitals.     
The rosy image that has sometimes been painted in hindsight is 
marred by the inequalities that did exist between those covered by the 
schemes and then we may raise the question of actual coverage. 
While the Government Insurance system was financed from the 
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central government, government funds also partly subsidized 
treatment beyond the first tier in the remaining two schemes, but 
urban health care benefited disproportionately. On top of that came 
the inequalities resulting from the primary sources of financing, 
namely the urban work units and the rural production brigades. Some 
medical subsidies were available in rural areas for the poor and 
households covered by the ‘five guarantees’, but allegedly it rarely 
met actual needs. White (1998) describes the rural reality in terms of 
health provision as one where self-reliance was the ‘mantra’.  
Although the level of service was low in rural areas, the provision of 
basic health care still played a large role in improving the health of 
rural Chinese.  
This health system broke down with the market reforms outlined 
earlier. Coverage of health insurance dwindled and marketization of 
health providers meant escalating private costs for health care. The 
privatization of SOEs and the abolishment of workplace 
responsibility for welfare provision in urban areas alongside the 
abolishment of collective communes in rural China resulted in a 
dramatic decrease in coverage. The National Health Services Surveys 
indicated that insurance coverage had decreased to 12% in urban 
China and 9% in rural China by 1998 (Liu et. al. 2012). Many health 
facilities closed down and the barefoot doctors disappeared or became 
private practitioners with the abolishment of rural communes and 
work collectives (Nundy 2014; Phua & He 2013).  
The surviving health facilities at all levels gained increased autonomy 
in finding alternative sources of revenue. This drove up treatment fees 
and costs of health supplies and lowered the quality of care. 
Especially the newly privatized pharmaceutical industry became an 
important life support-mechanism for health providers. Chinese 
doctors overprescribed pharmaceuticals at a level far beyond most 
other countries (Li et. al. 2012). Sales of drugs and services accounted 
for 87% of hospital revenue in 2000 (Chan et. al. 2008). Hospitals 
were also allowed to over-charge for advanced treatment. Public 
hospitals could not cope with the changes. Just getting a consultation 
became exceedingly difficult. People often slept on the street just to 
get a consultation ticket and a black market around consultation 
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tickets evolved. The ever increasing financial burden for individuals 
and tendencies towards overprescription of drugs or treatment due to 
badly financed hospitals led to decreased public trust in doctors or 
physicians. Patients would refer to doctors as ‘white wolves’ and 
some local hospitals even had to ask for police to be stationed in 
hospitals because of poor relations with patients (Wong 2013b).   
The central government did not step in to mitigate the development 
but instead retracted further from its role. From 1978 to 1999, the 
central government share of total health expenditures decreased from 
32% to 15% and private out-of-pocket expenditure climbed to 60% of 
total expenditure (Li et. al. 2012; Barber & Yao 2011). The 
government actively pushed hospitals to be autonomous and profit-
making as it implemented something akin to the ‘household 
responsibility system’ for hospitals where surplus income could be 
retained for the hospital itself (Chan et. al. 2008). Outright hospital 
privatization was also encouraged with new ownership forms 
appearing. With rapidly increasing private costs and declining 
insurance coverage, most people were effectively barred from seeking 
anything beyond rudimentary treatment. For example, a typical 
inpatient treatment was estimated to cost on overage two-thirds of 
average household expenditure in urban areas around the turn of the 
millennium (Barber & Yao 2011).  A 2005-report from the 
Development Research Center under the State Council simply 
described the situation as one where “…China’s health care reforms 
have turned hospitals into clubs for the rich” (quoted in Frazier 2010: 
4). While China had presided over an increase in life expectancy of 
23.5 years between 1960 and 1980, far outstripping the general trend 
in both developed and developing countries, the situation reversed in 
the next two decades. The development in Chinese life expectancy 
was much slower (a more modest increase of 4.8 years) than most 
other countries (Li et. al. 2012). In 2000, The Chinese health system 
was ranked as number 144 of 191 around the world by the WHO 
(Manning 2011).  
With responsibility of health care schemes delegated to the local 
governments, health insurance coverage was not only low but very 
fragmented across provinces. Some raised contributions for existing 
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schemes, some paid lump sums to workers annually for outpatient 
treatments, some set a fixed rate or share for private expenses of 
medical costs and so on. 
 
9.2 UNIVERSALIZING COVERAGE OF NEW HEALTH 
INSURANCE SCHEMES 
It was not until 1994 when the State Development and Reform 
Commission published its Views on Reforms of the Medical Care 
System for Enterprise Workers that a new reform wave towards a 
more unified and more comprehensive insurance system gained 
impetus (Kong et. al. 2012). The report envisioned a scheme based on 
both social pooling and individual ‘medical savings accounts’ 
(MSAs) for urban workers. The State Council decided to begin local 
trials in two cities in Jiangsu and Jiangxi province, also known as the 
‘Two-River Pilots’, which was further extended in 1996.  
Finally, in 1998, the State Council promulgated the Decision on the 
Establishment of the Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban 
Workers with the new insurance scheme (BMIUW) as a nationwide 
policy (Kong et. al. 2012; Chan et. al. 2008).  Employers would 
contribute 6% of the wage bill while workers would contribute 2% of 
their wage. Nearly a third of the employer contribution would 
together with the personal contribution go to the individual MSA to 
be used for outpatient treatment while the rest of the employer 
contribution would go to the social pooling fund to pay for inpatient 
treatment. In some cases, the MSA covers both in- and outpatient 
treatment below a locally defined threshold, while the pooled funds 
cover a share of expenses above the threshold. As in the pension 
system, civil servants enjoy insurance without paying personal 
contributions and generally have much lower copayments of around 
5-10% of both inpatient and outpatient care (Nundy 2014; Zhang & 
Navarro 2014).   
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Table 24: Important reforms in the construction of a new health 
care system  
1994 “Views on Reforms of the Medical Care System for Enterprise 
Workers”  
“Two-River Pilots” 
1998 The urban Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban Workers 
(BMIUW) 
2003 The rural New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) 
2006 Rural Medical Financial Assistance (MFA) fund 
2008 Urban Medical Financial Assistance (MFA) fund 
2009 Reform of insurance financing (increased government contributions) 
and health care delivery (hospital reform, including “National 
Essential Medicines Catalog”) 
2009-2010 Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) 
Sources: Li et. al. (2012), Liu et. al. (2012), Yip et. al. (2012), Barber & Yao 
(2011), Chan et. al. (2008) 
. 
Later, in 2003, it was time to take on the issue of rural health care 
when the ‘new cooperative medical scheme’ (NCMS) was 
introduced. The 1990s had seen an effort into extending a Rural 
Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) but the policy design was not 
effective and coverage never increased beyond 10% of the rural 
population (Nundy 2014: Gao & Meng 2013). The NCMS was to be 
organized at the county level and enrollment would take place at the 
household level (rather than the individual worker as in the case of 
the BMIUW). Contributions would come from households, local 
government and the central government (Liang et. al. 2012; Chan et. 
al. 2008).  
The exact benefit packages in the NCMS vary greatly since it is 
decided by the local county level governments and subject to 
variations in local resources. Because the primary goal of the NCMS 
is to reduce poverty due to serious illness, the scheme has had a much 
stronger emphasis on inpatient treatment (Wang et. al. 2012). For 
example, in 2011 only 4% of counties had harmonized reimbursement 
rates for both inpatient and outpatient treatment, while nearly half 
covered outpatient treatment only with the much more limited funds 
in the household MSA (Barber & Yao 2011). Initially in 2003, the 
three contributing parties (the household, the county government and 
the central government) would each contribute 10 yuan/year, but 
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contributions have since been raised substantially. Total contributions 
from local and central government were in 2008 set at the level of 
some 120 yuan annually, with households contributing 20-50 yuan, 
depending on the individual province. This government contribution 
was again increased to 300 yuan in 2011. The central government 
covered half of this in the poorer, Western provinces, while county 
governments shoulders most of the responsibility in Eastern provinces 
(Yip et. al. 2012; Liu et al. 2012; Barber & Yao 2011). The 
government pledged to raise this to 320 yuan in 2014 (Lam 2014).  
As mentioned previously, the old Labor Insurance System applied to 
both urban workers and their dependents, while the new BMIUW 
scheme from 1998 covers only the individual worker. Consequently, 
urban residents without formal employment (such as students, 
children, unemployed, elderly or the disabled) were completely left 
out of health insurance in general except for a few provinces who had 
experimented with their own schemes for residents outside the 
BMIUW.  
In 2007, the new ‘urban residents basic medical insurance’ (URBMI) 
was piloted in 79 cities, followed by 229 more in 2008 before being 
extended nationwide in 2009-2010 (Liu et. al. 2012; Barber & Yao 
2011; Chan et. al. 2008). Like the NCMS it is based on voluntary 
household enrollment and targeted mainly at serious treatment needs 
(inpatient treatment). Contribution levels were higher than the NCMS 
to begin with. The average total contribution was at 245 yuan/year in 
2008 (when the total of the NCMS was around 150 yuan), the main 
difference being that the URBMI has much higher individual 
contributions. The scheme has the same three sources of financing 
and, similarly to the NCMS, higher central government contributions 
subsidize lower local government contributions in the poorer Western 
provinces. Government contributions also increased sharply in 2011 
to 300 yuan as in the NCMS. Unlike the NCMS, the disabled and the 
poor receive extra subsidies from the central government (60 yuan in 
2008), and MSAs are in general not a part of the set-up except for 
some cities. The mainly pooled funds are directed at inpatient 
treatment and outpatient treatment for some key diseases, but the 
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URBMI also varies widely in terms of the reimbursement rates and 
the overall benefit package (Yip et. al. 2012).  
Table 25: Set-up of the three new health insurance schemes 
 BMIUW URBMI NCMS 
Target population Formally 
employed urban 
residents 
Urban residents 
outside the formal 
labor market 
All rural residents 
Year 1998 2009 2003 
Coverage rate 
(2010) 
92%  93%  97%  
Participation Mandatory at 
individual level 
Voluntary at 
household level 
Voluntary at 
household level 
Financing (2011) Employee: 2-3% 
of wage; 
Employer: 6-8% 
of wage sum 
Individual 
contribution: 20-
250 yuan/year 
(highest in Eastern 
provinces); 
Government 
contribution: 300 
yuan/year 
Individual 
contribution: 20-
50 yuan/year 
(highest in Eastern 
provinces); 
Government 
contribution: 300 
yuan/year 
Benefit models 
(varies locally): 
1) Inpatient care 
based on formula 
(predefined re-
imbursement rate 
between 
deductible floor 
and ceiling, 
outpatient care 
paid through 
Medical Savings 
account (MSA) 
2) Same as in 1 
but no MSA for 
outpatient care. 
Outpatient covered 
with pooled funds  
 
Reimbursement 
ceiling at six times 
average wage of 
local workers 
Not all cities have 
yet established 
MSA’s. Pooled 
funds directed at 
both outpatient 
and inpatient care.  
 
Reimbursement 
ceiling at six times 
disposable per 
capita income of 
local residents.  
1) Outpatient 
reimbursed by 
MSA until spent, 
while pooled funds 
cover inpatient 
care 
2) MSA covers 
both outpatient 
and inpatient 
beneath a 
deductible floor, 
while pooled funds 
cover a fixed 
percentage of 
expenses above 
the deductible.  
 
Reimbursement 
ceiling at six times 
disposable per 
capita income of 
local residents. 
Average inpatient 
reimbursement 
68% 48% 44% 
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rates (2010) 
% of cities or 
counties covering 
(2010): 
-General 
outpatient  
-Outpatient for 
major and 
chronic diseases 
 
(MSA and social 
pool covering both 
according to 
benefit models) 
 
 
58% 
83% 
 
 
44% 
79% 
Sources: Yip et. al. 2012; Meng et. al. 2012; Barber & Yao 2011. 
 
The new millennium also witnessed the setup and expansion of a so-
called ‘medical financial assistance’-scheme that subsidizes the 
medical expenses of the poor covered by rural and urban social 
assistance (the MSLS-schemes) as well as their contributions for the 
two rural and urban basic medical insurance schemes. The rural and 
urban MFA-schemes were pioneered in 2003 and 2005, respectively, 
and then made nationwide in 2006 and 2008 (Nundy 2014; Barber & 
Yao 2011). The scope of the scheme gradually expanded from only 
catastrophic illnesses to a wider range of ailments while also 
becoming integrated with NCMS and URBMI insurance schemes. 
The subsidies for people enrolled in the NCMS and URBMI cover 
their contributions as well as expenses beyond the normal ceiling for 
reimbursements in the various local insurance schemes. By the end of 
2009, the scheme covered 93 million residents, two-thirds of which 
were rural residents. In that year, 16 million accessed the MFA funds 
for subsidies. The financing for the programme had increased by 
nearly six times to 13.1 billion yuan, most of which reflected an 
increasing central government share of financing from 27% to 62%.  
The aforementioned increases in government contributions and the 
new URBMI scheme were both a result of a decision from the central 
government in 2006 to undertake and investigate options for an 
overhaul of the health care system. This later resulted in a 2009-
reform package endowed with substantial government financing with 
the aim of increasing insurance coverage and quality of health care 
delivery. In 2006, the ‘Inter-Ministerial Coordination Group for 
Healthcare Reform’ was established across 16 ministries and headed 
by the Vice Premier (Li et. al. 2012; Barber & Yao 2011). The Group 
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began the task of outlining the coming reform in a deliberation 
process which lasted for three years during which the URBMI was 
both initiated as a pilot reform and then made national policy. In 
2008, the Group also gained input from six international and Chinese 
organizations and a wider public input before the final, joint decision 
in 2009 from the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. The 
international input came from actors such as the WHO and 
consultants from McKinsey & Company. The total reform package 
had a price tag of 850 billion yuan (124 billion USD) of which 46% 
were dedicated to improving coverage and rasing government 
contributions for the insurance schemes (Gao & Meng 2013; Barber 
& Yao 2011). The health care reform was one of the major pillars of 
the stimulus (which amounted to four trillion yuan in total) to 
mitigate the international economic crisis (Cook & Lam 2011).   
Beyond the financing allocated to increase coverage and government 
contributions for the three insurance schemes, the rest of reform was 
in essence meant to strengthen the quality of health care delivery via 
reform of the public hospitals and clinics (Phua & He 2013; Yip et. 
al. 2012). As mentioned previously, government subsidies accounted 
only for a very small share of hospital financing. Revenues from 
drugs and medical service fees accounted for the vast majority of 
income at all levels of specialized care (Brixi et. al. 2011). In 2008, 
for example government subsidies accounted for 9% of hospital 
financing while the rest came from drugs and patient fees (ibid). The 
2009-reform package included increased financing for staff training 
as well as an increase in the government subsidy for primary health 
care providers.  
The implementation of the reform package among other things 
included a shift in monitoring from volume or output-based measures 
to input-based proxies such as enrolment, training sessions and 
buildings. In total, the reform wave of the new millennium gave birth 
to the construction of 33.000 new clinics, mostly in the poorer 
Western regions (Li et. al. 2012). Between 2000 and 2010, the 
number of general and specialist hospitals increased by 30% (Meng 
et. al. 2012). The 2009-reform also had a strong emphasis on 
improving hospital governance, although the tools utilized vary 
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significantly across cities and counties. This broad heading includes 
everything from limiting the power of hospital directors and setting 
up hospital boards as well as creating new management agencies to 
limit the power of local health departments, separating managerial 
control over hospitals and pharmacies, setting standards for referrals 
and strengthening the gatekeeper-function of physicians (Phua & He 
2013; Yip et. al. 2012). It can be probably expected that the results of 
these management reforms have also varied widely.  Efforts have also 
included openly privatizing some public hospitals to create 
competition and generally opening up the market to private hospitals 
(Phua & He 2013). Public hospitals still dominate strongly, but the 
number of private hospitals is growing fast. The goal is to increase 
the number of private beds and other services to 20% of the total 
(Zhang & Navarro 2014).  
To finish off the 2009-reform, it most importantly included an effort 
to limit the tendency towards overprescription of pharmaceuticals. 
The remedy offered was the new so-called ‘National Essential 
Medicines Catalog’. Before this reform, hospitals typically received a 
15% mark-up on pre-scriped medicines while doctors themselves 
would often earn around 30% in additional, under-the-table kickbacks 
(Li et. al. 2012). The new Catalog includes 307 basic medicines, 
supplemented by other medicines decided at the provincial level 
according to local needs. These must be sold at market price with 
zero mark-up or extra commissions. In addition to this a new 
competitive market or price-bidding system was set-up where clinics 
and hospitals could purchase these medicines. The combination of 
this price-bidding system and the Catalog lowered the average cost by 
around 30% while also removing the incentive for prescribing 
pharmaceuticals at volumes beyond what is required (Li et. al. 2012; 
Yip et. al. 2012).  
However, completely eliminating the issue of overprescription is of 
course difficult. Drugs deemed too ineffective for the national-level 
Catalog have often found their way back to the provincial 
supplements for the list, just as marked differences between bidding 
and retail prices have been reported, raising the question of corruption 
(Yip et. al. 2012). Importantly, it should also be noted that the new 
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Catalog so far only applies to the primary health care level, and 
therefore has no effect in rural or urban hospitals. Public hospitals 
therefore remain very dependent of revenue from prescriptions. In 
2010, prescription revenues on average accounted for 62% of hospital 
revenues (Yip et. al. 2012; Li et. al. 2012).  Therefore, the problem of 
chronically underfinanced public hospitals, where hospitals 
continuously search for other revenue sources, remains.    
9.3 COVERAGE AND GENEROSITY: A SHINY NEW HEALTH 
INSURANCE SYSTEM WITH SOME MAJOR STAINS 
The impact of the reforms described above has been very significant. 
This will be shown here mostly with results from the National Health 
Services Survey (NHSS). The reforms have resulted in a rapid 
increase of health insurance coverage. In urban China, the new 
BMIUW from 1998, being mandatory for workers in formal 
employment, had pushed coverage well above 50% of the urban 
population by 2003 (figure 14, below). However, not only the 
dependants of these workers but basically everyone outside the labor 
market were still left out until the gradual introduction of the URBMI, 
which was finally made available nationwide in 2009-2010. The 
scheme is voluntary at the household level, yet it still pushed total 
urban coverage to 91% by 2011. The rural predecessor of the URBMI 
was the NCMS, which shares many features with its urban 
counterpart. Implemented nationwide from 2003 it had pushed rural 
insurance coverage above 90% already by 2008 and included 97% by 
2011.    
The coverage of these insurance schemes has also become notably 
more equal across income strata. Total insurance coverage had by 
2011 become almost totally ignorant of income differences. In 2003, 
the richest quartile beat the poorest quartile by a factor 1.6 in terms of 
insurance coverage, while the difference is now almost non-existant 
(Meng et. al. 2012). This first and firemost is a result of the 
introduction of the NCMS. The NCMS has higher coverage among 
the poorest income deciles while the urban BMIUW is still strongly 
‘pro-rich’ (Liu et. al. 2012). The URBMI has an almost completely 
neutral income-profile.  
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Figure 14: Health insurance coverage (1998-2011), % of the 
population 
 
Sources: Herd (2013), Meng et. al. (2012), Liu et. al. (2012), Li et. al. (2012), Tang 
et. al. (2012).  
Note: Quite disparate coverage rates can be found in the literature up until around 
the turn of the millennium. Therefore, the coverage rates for 1998 and 2003 stated 
here are somewhat uncertain.  
 
To finish off coverage, we should note that even if coverage is by 
now nearly universal, it does not mean that health insurance is the 
first example of a policy field where the discrimination against rural-
urban migrant workers has been abolished. Migrant workers with 
health insurance are usually included in the NCMS-scheme of their 
home county, yet receiving reimbursements from the NCMS in urban 
areas is not problem-free. Some local governments have tried to 
increase portability of funds with ‘nationwide roaming’ or ‘continual 
transfer’-solutions (Li et al 2012; Yip et. al. 2012) Furthermore, 
getting reimbursed when using providers outside the home county 
usually includes significantly higher co-payments. Depending on the 
city, migrant workers may also have the option to enroll in either the 
BMIUW or the URBMI. More than a third of migrant workers are 
assessed to be included in the BMIUW, yet they often do so with 
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significantly lower contributions (such as a total of 3% + 1% 
contribution rather than the usual 6% + 2%) in order to keep their 
labor cheap (Li et. al. 2012; Barber & Yao 2011. It is of course even 
cheaper for employers if migrants are only included in the URBMI or 
the NCMS.      
One of the ways of assessing the impact of the overall expansion of 
coverage is to take a look at who pays for total health expenditures. 
This measure says a lot about whether health care has is privatized in 
the sense that people have to pay for it themselves or whether it is 
perhaps more socialized (whether from government coffers or 
financed by contributions from insurance schemes). The three labels 
in figure 15 below express these three main sources of financing.  
 
Figure 15: Financing of health expenditure (1986-2010), % of 
total expenditure.  
 
Sources: Tang et. al. (2012), Li et. al. (2012) 
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In terms of financing, the new millennium heralded a decline in 
private expenditure. The situation only began to turn as new 
nationwide policies began to replace a public insurance system where 
gaping holes had become much larger than the body of the system 
itself. Private financing peaked at 59% of total expenditure in 2000 
and had dropped to 35% in 2010. In the beginning, it was mainly an 
effect of social financing via the new and expanding insurance 
schemes, but the government share also increased sharply from 18% 
in 2006 to 29% in 2010. This is not surprising given the increasing 
government contributions in the URBMI and NCMS-schemes in most 
recent years as well as the injection of financing meant for improving 
health care delivery as in the aforementioned 2009-reform. This 
turnaround in health financing is even more impressive when we take 
into consideration that 100% does not indicate the same sum of 
money in two different years.  In the short span of years from 2000 to 
2011, total health expenditure per capita increased 5.9 times from 
around 319 yuan to just below 1.888 (Long et. al. 2013).  
A way to assess the actual generosity of the insurance schemes from 
the point of view of the individual insurance holders is the extent to 
which they get reimbursed for their health expenses. A very 
significant share of treatment costs is still borne by the Chinese 
people themselves. The average reimbursement rate for inpatient care 
stood at 47% in 2011 which is of course a marked improvement over 
the 14% in 2003. The State Council Healthcare Reform Office in 
2012 declared that the reimbursement rate was 70% for those covered 
by the schemes (Li et. al. 2012). Partly as a result of increasing 
coverage, but also because of increasing government contributions 
within the NCMS, the ratio of rural to urban reimbursement rates was 
only 0.8 in 2011 where before it was 0.17. The remaining difference 
is mostly due to the more generous BMIUW where the average 
inpatient reimbursement rate is quite a bit higher. These 
reimbursement rate have also become nearly blind to income 
inequalities, at least when comparing income quartiles.  
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Table 26: Indicators of the adequacy of health care 
 Adequacy Rural/urban 
divide 
Income divide: 
Quartile 1/ Q4 
2003 2011 2003 2011 2003 2011 
Insurance 
coverage, pct. 
of population 
All 29.7  95.7  0.38**
* 
1.07**
* 
0.63**
* 
0.98**
* Rural  21.0  97.4 
Urba
n 
55.2 90.9 
N 19368
9 
5983
5 
Inpatient 
reimbursemen
t rate 
All 14.4 46.9 0.17**
* 
0.80**
* 
0.37**
* 
0.97ns 
Rural  5.8 43.7 
Urba
n 
34.5 54.6 
N 6018 4011 
Use of 
outpatient 
care, pct. of 
population 
All 13.4 14.8 1.18**
* 
1.12** 0.86**
* 
0.98ns 
Rural  13.9 15.3 
Urba
n 
11.8 13.7 
N 19368
9 
5983
5 
Catastrophic 
expenses, pct. 
of households  
All 12.6 12.9 1.51**
* 
1.27**
* 
1.85**
* 
2.04**
* Rural  13.6 13.8 
Urba
n 
9.0 10.9 
N 56894 1880
0 
Self-discharge 
for financial 
reasons, pct. 
of 
hospitalized 
All 63.6 28.0  
 
 
 
 
 
Not available 
Rural  67.0 28.3 
Urba
n 
52.9 27.0 
N 1643 353 
Hospital 
admissions, 
pct. of 
population 
All 3.6 8.8 
Rural  3.4 8.4 
Urba
n 
4.2 10.1 
N 19368
9 
5983
5 
Health 
spending as a 
share of total 
household 
expenditures 
All 11.3 12.9 
Rural  12.1 13.3 
Urba
n 
9.3 11.9 
N 56362 1979
4 
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*** = significant the 0,001-level; * = significant at the 0,05-level, ns = not 
significant 
Source: Meng et. al. (2012), based on the National Health Services Survey 
 
In terms of outpatient treatment, the schemes generally appear even 
less generous, but improvements can be tracked here as well. As 
explained before, particularly the NCMS and URBMI were directed 
at the generally more serious inpatient treatments. Usually, the 
personal medical savings accounts (MSAs) in the NCMS and 
BMIUW are directed at outpatient needs, but the MSAs for most 
NCMS-enrollees are very limited and quickly depleted. On the other 
hand, around 80% of counties offered outpatient reimbursement as 
part of the benefit package in 2010, which represents a marked 
increase in availability of outpatient reimbursement (table 25). Still, 
the utilization of outpatient care has not seen any real improvement in 
the new millennium. Only 15% and 14% of urban and rural 
respondents in the NHSS indicate that they had utilized outpatient 
treatment in 2011. The opposite is the case within inpatient treatment, 
for example when looking at the number of hospital admissions 
which had more than doubled in 2003-2011 to cover nearly 9% of the 
Chinese population by 2011. The combined effect of a more publicly 
and socially financed health care system and generally higher Chinese 
incomes has meant a strong decrease in the share of patients who 
discharge themselves from hospital treatment because they cannot 
afford it. This figure has dropped from 64% to 28% of all patients, 
and the decline has been particularly noticeable in rural China.  
On the other hand, it is not difficult to detect some stains in this shiny 
new health care system. Importantly, a very significant minority of 
Chinese households still experience ‘catastrophic’ health expenses, 
where the more serious and chronic ailments completely ruins the 
financial health of the household. This usually results in both 
considerable financial hardship and a lack of adequate treatment. New 
schemes such as the NCMS do reduce the incidence of catastrophic 
health expenses to a small degree if compared to a situation where 
enrollees had not been covered (Wang et. al. 2014c). Table 26, 
however, also reveals that 13% of households still found themselves 
in this situation in 2011. The rate of incidence is a little higher in rural 
CHAPTER 9. HEALTH INSURANCE: FROM CLUBS FOR THE RICH TO SHELTERS FOR THE POOR 
229 
China, and that situation has not improved in the timespan covered 
here. We can lay the blame for this on at least two elements of the 
programmatic design of the insurance schemes. The first are the 
reimbursement ceilings, pegged at six times local disposable per 
capita income (URBMI and NCMS) or six times local average wage 
(BMIUW) (see also 25). This of course strongly limits the 
reimbursement rate for the most serious and chronic diseases. Clearly, 
the aforementioned ‘medical financial assistance’-scheme cannot by 
itself remedy this. From 2011, some pilot programmes were 
undertaken whereby some serious health conditions such as leukemia 
or heart diseases are reimbursed with 20% for costs beyond the 
ceiling (Yip et. al. 2012). Therefore, private health insurances, which 
unsurprisingly cater mostly to urban labor market insiders, are often 
attuned to serious diseases and medical expenses (Huang 2013). 
Coverage of private health insurance is low at an estimated 7% of the 
population and accounts only for 2% of total health expenditure, 
however (Nundy 2014).  
The second problem in terms of serious illnesses is that health 
expenses are usually paid upfront by the individual insurance holder, 
who then gets reimbursed from his or her insurance scheme. This 
means that generous reimbursements matter very little if you cannot 
pay upfront. This is of course a problem for the poorest and those 
who have very little savings. Urban households typically save an 
estimated 30% of disposable income because of such potential risks, 
and this savings rate can easily be imagined to be even higher in rural 
China (Meng et. al. 2012)  
We also notice in table 26 that household expenditures on health has 
actually increased slightly despite the fact that the government has 
increased its share of total health expenditure. Between 2005 and 
2011, total inflation-adjusted health expenditures rose by 16.4% 
annually, much faster than GDP (Zhang & Navarro 2014). Total 
health expenditure has simply grown so fast that it is now laying 
claim on a higher share of household expenditures even if 
government financing plays a larger relative role than before. If we 
focus solely on out-of-pocket health expenditure, this has remained 
stable at 6% of household income in urban China, while it has risen 
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three percentage points to 8% in rural China (Zhang & Navarro 2014; 
Long et. al. 2012). Again, this rapidly increasing demand mirrors an 
increasing ability to pay for healthcare for most Chinese incomes, but 
it also reminds us that we should be careful to draw a general 
conclusion of a more ‘public’ health care system. We should also 
remind ourselves that even if the relative role of private financing has 
declined sharply it still plays a very significant role and average 
reimbursement rates still stood at less than 50% in 2011.  
In addition to this, the reforms of the delivery system so far seem less 
impressive than the reforms of health insurance. The total number of 
medical professionals increased by more than 20% in 2005-2011, but 
the pace was quicker in urban China, which means that the urban-
rural divide in this respect has increased. In 2011, there were 7.9 
doctors per 1000 people in urban China, while the rural figure was 
3.19 doctors per 1000 people (Zhang & Navarro 2014). The 
impressive construction of thousands of new hospitals has put the 
number of hospital beds at 2.9 per 1.000 citizens, which is below the 
average of 4.8 for the OECD countries, although this average is also 
subject to wide variations (Herd 2013; OECD 2013a). The level of 
training and education of medical staff is also very low. The density 
of doctors with five years of training is only 0.3 per 1000 citizens 
compared with 3.1 in the OECD (Herd 2013). There is a problem 
with the education level of medical staff at primary level facilities, 
particularly in rural China. The density of doctors with college-level 
education doctors is 9 times higher in urban China, and overall, 
almost half of all doctors in China have no education beyond 
secondary high level. New requirements for the education-level of 
staff were introduced in both urban and rural China around the turn of 
the millennium, yet enforcement is not effective.  
Partly because of this public trust in particularly lower level facilities 
is low. This in turn makes it difficult to ensure an effective referral 
system where lower levels act as gatekeepers for higher level-care. 
Patients often seek care at the hospital-level even for simple health 
problems in both urban and rural China (Yip et. al. 2012). Hospitals 
are as mentioned not subject to the new ‘National Essential Medicines 
Catalog’, but they are subject to price controls for certain basic 
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services, which are consistently set below costs. The hospitals in turn 
react by widely overpricing the unregulated services and treatments 
and by overprescribing these more expensive solutions (Herd 2013).  
In addition, hospitals also widely exceed the markups they are 
allowed to take on pharmaceuticals (15-30%, which is often exceeded 
by several times). Commonly, doctors are incentivized by sales 
targets with bonuses for exceeding the targets.    
In conclusion of health insurance as it has been assessed here, it 
should not be forgotten that this is the policy field where the turn 
towards a new welfare state has been the most prominent. Coverage is 
by now nearly universal, financing is much more dominated by both 
government financing and insurance contributions than before, and 
health care access, availability and utilization has increased. The new 
insurance schemes have reduced inequalities across the hukou and 
income divides. Yet, the increase in total health expenditure has 
outpaced the reforms, and households still spend a significant and 
increasing share of their income on health. People with serious 
conditions still face extreme financial hardship due to the 
programmatic design of the new schemes. The health care delivery 
system has been given a more cursory treatment in this account, but 
reforms have also been significant here, particularly since 2009. Here, 
the challenges are even more noticeable, and it is evident how 
difficult it is to change the behavior of actors conditioned to a few 
decades of near total marketization of health services. Therefore, the 
challenges to the creation of a more coherent and public health care 
system are still very pronounced.   
Finally, it is interesting to note local experiments in terms of the 
hukou-divide. In 2012, 41 prefectural cities and five provinces had 
abolished the rural-urban divide in health insurance according to 
Huang (2013), or more specifically attempted to merge the NCMS 
and the URBMI. If realized, such reforms represent very real steps 
towards health access based on social citizenship. Ngok & Huang 
(2014) offer as examples Dongguan city in Guangdong province and 
Shenmu County in Shaanxi. Dongguan offer the same health 
insurance for civil servants and farmers alike, and Shenmu even 
offers some free medical care regardless of personal contributions. 
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Another example is improving fund sustainability and risk pooling by 
implementing provincial-level funds (as in the case of the city 
provinces of Beijing and Shanghai) (Huang 2013) However, formal 
unification of schemes do not always have real impacts. The formal, 
provincial-level unification of health insurance in Guangdong 
province, for example, has retained the differentiated reimbursement 
rates and risk-pooling still takes place at the county-level (Ngok & 
Huang 2014). 
Just as in the previous two chapters, the impressive steps towards 
‘universalization’ of coverage are less impressive when we take the 
dimension of generosity into account. We will return to this in the 
final chapter.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 10. SINO-NORDIC PATHS OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
233 
CHAPTER 10. SINO-NORDIC PATHS 
OF SOCIAL RIGHTS  
This chapter will turn to the Sino-Nordic comparison of changes in 
social rights in unemployment, pensions and health. The end goal is 
to uncover institutional mechanisms or pathways of making public 
welfare provision more or less rights-based (or, keeping the 
conceptualization in section 3.4 in mind, institutional mechanisms of 
universalization and de-universalization). This is the third and final of 
the questions posed in section 1.2.  
In view of the official Chinese goals of achieving ‘moderate 
universalism’, the Nordic experience of how social policies can 
become relatively universal from a very non-universal starting point 
can offer some interesting insights into mechanisms of 
universalization. Completely ideal-typical universalism was only 
achieved in a few cases in the Nordic countries (see section 3.4 again 
for the definition of universalism).  
At the same time, the ‘Nordic model’ has certainly changed. It can be 
discussed whether the reforms of recent decades have entailed de-
universalization or just the adaption of relatively universal policies to 
modern, mixed economies of welfare (especially in pensions), but this 
only emphasizes how it is important to include recent changes as well 
and not only historical mechanisms of universalization. As noted in 
the introduction, much recent literature has discussed the issue of the 
changing Nordic model and whether and how it is still distinct.  Yet, 
basic, in-depth accounts of policy-level changes across several policy 
fields and several Nordic countries at the same time are missing in 
this literature.    
As argued in chapter 2 (and as I have done in chapter 7, 8 and 9 on 
China) the main focus will be on the rights-dimensions of coverage 
and generosity (as elaborated in section 3.4). However, since these 
two most important dimensions of social rights are partly derivative 
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of other dimensions such as financing and eligibility, these will be 
included where they are relevant.  
This chapter will attempt to limit our investigation to include the 
general Nordic policy changes that are relevant for a Sino-Nordic 
comparison with the aim mentioned above. More specific details than 
what will be provided here would be relevant for a more complete 
picture of Nordic policy changes and intra-Nordic diversities across 
these three policy fields. This can be found in The Nordic Model? 
Intra-Nordic diversities and policy changes in pensions, 
unemployment and health care (Kongshøj 2014b), which is free for 
download as a CCWS Working Paper
12
. This chapter will present a 
condensed version of that working paper on those aspects that are 
comparable to the Chinese experience outlined in previous chapters. 
Generally, each policy field will be structured with separate sections 
for policy expansion and policy restructuring/adaption (as further 
discussed below).  
10.1 EXPANSION AND RESTRUCTURING OF WELFARE 
STATES AND THE COMPRESSED CHINESE TIMESCALE  
In general, the history of the emerging Nordic welfare states began in 
the 1890s when all the Nordic countries introduced their first social 
insurance laws. Sequencing, time spans and the level of economic 
development were very different across the countries. Denmark was 
the early mover, adopting national insurance schemes in all these 
areas from 1891 to 1907. In, Sweden and Norway, the process lasted 
until the mid-1930s. Finland was much less industrialized than the 
three Scandinavian countries, and the late emergence of national old-
age and sickness benefits in Finland are some of the main examples 
of how Finland has often been described as a Nordic ‘laggard’ or 
latecomer (Kangas & Saloniemi 2013; Alestalo 2000).    
 
 
                                                          
12 http://www.dps.aau.dk/forskningsenheder/ccws/publications/workingpapers/ 
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Table 27: The first Nordic social insurance laws  
 1
st
 social 
insurance law 
2
nd
 social 
insurance law 
3
rd
 social 
insurance law 
4
th
 social 
insurance law 
Count
ry 
La
w
1 
Year SD
2 
La
w 
Year SD La
w 
Year SD La
w 
Year SD 
DK PI 1891 50 SI 1892 50 W
A 
1898 52 UI 1907 55 
FI W
A 
1895 22 UI 1917 27 PI 1937 37 SI 1963 62 
NO W
A 
1894 40 UI 1906 45 SI 1909 46 PI 1936 50 
SE SI 1891 47 W
A 
1901 50 PI 1913 55 UI 1934 61 
Sources: Kangas & Palme (2005); Esping-Andersen & Korpi (1986).  
1) Law: SI = Sickness insurance; PI = Pensions; UI = Unemployment insurance; 
WA = Workers accident. 
2) SD = Based on the index of “socio-economic development” in Kangas & Palme 
(2005). The index is noted as based on “industrialization and laborization” but it is 
not explained any further.  
 
However, like China nowadays, this does not mean that individuals 
were entirely left to fend for themselves just because there were no 
national-level public schemes. For example, some municipalities 
introduced the first public pension schemes for municipal workers, 
and various insurance schemes had emerged long before national 
legislation as voluntary, non-public schemes arranged by guilds, trade 
unions or employers. Generous public social insurance for civil 
servants also has a much longer history. We will return to this in the 
various policy-specific sections below.  
It should be noted that prior to these first national social insurance 
schemes, various ‘poor laws’, wich could be seen as embryonic 
public welfare, were introduced much earlier in all the Nordic 
countries. Yet, like elsewhere in Europe, the ‘poor laws’ belong to the 
pre-welfare state era and did not constitute new social rights since 
they included penalization, stigmatization and loss of civil rights 
(Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1986). Denmark introduced its first ‘poor 
law’ in 1803 while the other three Nordic countries adopted their 
counterparts in 1845-1852. In terms of social assistance-laws, 
Denmark was once again the early mover in 1933, while the rest of 
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the Nordics enacted their first laws in 1956-1965. Denmark was also 
a European latecomer, however, not dismantling the last element of 
loss of civil rights related to public support until 1961 (punitive loss 
of voting rights in some special cases).  
As mentioned in chapter 6, China adopted its first insurance schemes 
within health, maternity, work accident and pensions already in 1951, 
yet these were of course entirely different schemes since they were 
based on work units within the planned economy of the new People’s 
Republic. The policy changes of the last 20 years tracked in the 
preceding chapters more accurately reflect the enactment of social 
insurance and social protection in a market economy.  
The implication of the above is that the Chinese timescale in terms of 
social reform is relatively ‘compressed’ as briefly mentioned in 
chapter 1.  
 
In the Western research literature, there is general agreement about a 
phase of welfare expansion during which modern welfare regimes 
emerged up until around the 1970s, followed by a phase of welfare 
state restructuring since then (Vis & Van Kersbergen 2014; Hay & 
Wincott 2012; Bonoli & Natali 2012; Glennerster 2010; Pierson 
2001; Kuhnle & Alestalo 2000; Esping-Andersen 1999). The sections 
below will roughly follow this path of expansion and restructuring 
within each policy field. How exactly to label and characterize this 
‘restructuring’, or whether it should be further divided into several 
distinct phases, has been the subject of much debate. Concepts and 
labels abound. It is difficult to draw clear boundaries between the 
many different dynamics, directions, levels or causes of change 
suggested in the literature13. This has fed the extensive debate around 
                                                          
13 Just a few offhand examples: Different dynamics of change (such as ‘path-
breaking’, ‘path dependent’, ‘institutional’, ‘incremental’) have moved welfare 
states in different directions (suggestions include ‘recalibration’, 
‘recommodification’, ‘cost containment’, ‘retrenchment’, ‘social investment’, 
‘activation’ or ‘dualization’) for different reasons (explanations include new 
paradigms, discourses or ideas; ‘new social risks’; ‘new politics’; 
deindustrlialization, demographic change; globalization; austerity; new ways of 
managing the public sector) (Bonoli & Natali 2012; Morel et. al. 2012; 
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welfare regime convergence or divergence (as noted in chapter 1). 
The point in this context is that unlike the Nordic countries, China is 
grappling with welfare state expansion and restructuring at the same 
time.   
 
If we adopt a slightly functionalistic approach that emphasizes similar 
challenges across country contexts, this compressed timescale is 
easily observable in the case of the Chinese pension system (chapter 
8). Here we saw how China is trying to extend basic public pensions 
at the same time as the challenge of developing a mature system of 
different pension tiers and pillars is being undertaken.  This is 
necessitated by the simple fact that China will experience 
demographic ageing very rapidly. China will relatively quickly 
experience a transition from a relatively low old age dependency ratio 
(just below 0.15 in 2010) to having a dependency ratio similar to (or 
even higher than) many European countries already by the 2030s (0.4 
in 2013 and above 0.5 by 2040) (Hu & Yang 2012). Similar adaptions 
of the Nordic pension systems have been on-going for several 
decades and taken place after the expansion of public pension systems 
(as we will see below).  
 
This combination of expansion and restructuring at the same time is 
less evident in the health care system, except perhaps for the general 
aim of balancing private and public health care financing and 
provision. As we will go on to see, the Nordic (or at least 
Scandinavian) health care systems are still overwhelmingly public, 
but there are also moves towards more mixed welfare provision here.  
 
In terms of unemployment protection, we will later in this chapter 
find it difficult to talk of significantly similar policy adaptions in 
China and the Nordic countries. We will find benefit retrenchment (in 
terms of replacement levels) a shared Sino-Nordic experience, but by 
very different degrees and probably also for different reasons. In the 
Chinese case, it is largely a result of rapidly increasing working 
incomes. The paradigmatic influence of supply-side economics has 
                                                                                                                                       
Emmenegger et. al. 2012; Goul Andersen 2007; Streeck & Thelen 2005; Pierson 
2001). 
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
238
 
arguably been more important in the Nordic countries, although some 
measure of institutional ‘drift’ (in terms of insufficient benefit 
indexation) is also evident.         
 
From this discussion, we will quickly turn to a more substantial 
comparison of coverage and generosity (and important policy changes 
that affect coverage and generosity) within the three selected social 
policy fields.  
 
10.2.1 PENSIONS: PATHS TO UNIVERSALISM 
Before reading the next two sections, it may be useful to go back and 
refresh the pension terms or concepts outlined in the very beginning 
of chapter 8. 
We have previously seen how China has been extending coverage of 
pensions, yet attempted to do so within a multipillar framework from 
the beginning with the public pillar including both basic pensions and 
income replacement.  This story is decidedly longer in the Nordic 
countries. The Nordic countries all arrived at clear cut and fully 
fledged universalism after World War II, but the way there was not 
entirely straight, and the Nordic countries also arrived there from 
different starting points. Similarly, the transition to multipillar 
systems has not happened in a uniform manner.    
With their early old-age support schemes from 1889 and 1891, 
respectively, Germany and Denmark are commonly seen as the 
founding fathers of two very fundamental and different branches of 
both pension and welfare models (Ebbinghaus & Gronwald 2011; 
Palme 1990). Germany set off on the so-called ‘Bismarckian path’, 
and adopted a mandatory and contributory system based on the 
principle of status maintenance or income replacement, divided 
according to different status groups, while Denmark took the 
‘Beveridge path’ (as it later came to be known) based on citizenship 
(Ebbinghaus & Gronwald 2011). The Danish 1891-scheme was not at 
all universal but residual in the way that it was strictly means-tested 
and partly was an attempt to remove the elderly from the existing 
poor law and extend proper old-age support.  
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The former Chinese pension systems for the urban minority, nested 
within a planned economy and enacted in the 1950s, do not easily fit 
into the Bismarck-Beveridge distinction, but are closer to the former 
since they were income-related (based on defined benefit), marked by 
insider-outsider divides and financed through employment ties.  
Perhaps not entirely unlike the Chinese pension for rural and urban 
residents from 2009 and 2011, Sweden in 1913 adopted a pension 
reform, which was mainly insurance-based but also included a basic 
pension for all regardless of contributions. The difference is that the 
Swedish basic pension, while also being very low initially, was 
means-tested but available for all citizens and not just those (whose 
children are) enrolled in the insurance scheme as in China. It has been 
argued that this was actually the first piece of social legislation based 
on universalism (Anttonen & Sipilä 2012; Esping-Andersen & Korpi 
1986). Norway in 1936 adopted its first national old-age support 
scheme, which was tax-financed and means-tested like in Denmark, 
while Finland in 1937 set out on an initially more Bismarckian path 
with a fully-fledged compulsory and defined-contribution based 
pension scheme for all workers (Kangas & Luna 2012; Kuhnle 1987). 
The Finnish scheme, however, also included a means-tested 
supplement in line with the Swedish system (Kautto 2012).  
After World War II, the various Nordic schemes all evolved into 
universal old-age pensions of the kind which are currently only be 
found as local experiments in some cities in China.  Sweden turned its 
basic pension into a PAYG-system without any means test in 1948, 
with the same flat-rate benefit for all pensioners (Lindquist 2011). 
Denmark and Norway adopted universal basic pension reforms in 
195614 and 1957 (Goul Andersen 2011b; Kuhnle 1987). Finland also 
made a switch from its more Bismarckian path to a completely 
universal and flat-rate benefit in 1956 (Kangas & Luna 2011).  
The switch towards ‘universalization’ did not happen as abruptly as 
the impression might be from the above. There were some 
                                                          
14 In the Danish case, means tests were not fully abolished until a 1964-reform (fully 
implemented in 1970). 
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incremental steps before then. Some of the incremental steps we have 
identified in China, such as expanding the group of eligible workers 
or unifying locally fragmented benefit systems are also echoed in 
Nordic pension history before World War II (Lindquist 2011; Kautto 
2012; Petersen 2006). Particularly in Norway a very fragmented 
system of municipal-level pension systems evolved in the early 
1900s, some quite Bismarckian, others resembling the Danish system. 
These local solutions sprang up because it took decades of 
deliberation before the adaption of the first national pension system in 
1936 (Petersen & Åmark 2006).  
10.2.2 TOWARDS MULTITIERED PENSION SYSTEMS 
The next step and critical juncture in pension evolution in the Nordic 
countries was whether an adequate earnings-related tier was added to 
the pension system to maintain incomes within the context of the 
economic development of the post-World War II period (Ebbinghaus 
& Gronwald 2011). The Nordic countries diverged somewhat on this 
issue, particularly in the case of Denmark, where policymakers did 
not introduce an adequate earnings-related tier, which partly led to the 
crowding-in of non-public pension solutions (Kangas et. al. 2010).  
As we saw in chapter 8, in China this earnings-related tier is part and 
parcel of the the new pension schemes with their combination of 
social pooling and personal accounts, beginning with the urban 
workers scheme from the mid-1990s. The idea of the multipillar 
framework was by then enshrined in international policy discourse as 
the pension system of the future, but the way there in both Nordic and 
non-Nordic Europe was longer and windier.  
In Sweden, discussions began already in the 1940s about 
complementing the public basic pension with a more adequate 
solution for wage earners. In 1960, Sweden adopted a defined benefit 
or earnings-related PAYG-based supplementary pension named ATP 
(Lindquist 2011). Norway adopted a scheme similar to the Swedish in 
1967 of the same name (Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1986). The 
Finnish and Danish paths were somewhat different.  
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In Finland, existing employment-related pensions in the private sector 
became statutory and compulsory in 1961 (Kangas & Luna 2011). In 
this way, the Finnish ATP-equivalent became one marked by sectoral 
divides. This made the Bismarckian legacy in Finland clear once 
again, as did arguably the fact that the earnings-related pensions had 
no formal ceiling (unlike the Swedish and Norwegian ATP-schemes) 
(Kangas et. al. 2010). The Finnish public pension system without any 
benefit ceiling has arguably hampered the development of private or 
collectively negotiated solutions (Kangas & Luna 2011).  
In Denmark, a new and fully funded pension benefit which bore the 
name ATP (as in Sweden) was added to the pension system in 1964, 
but bore little resemblance with the Swedish ATP.  The benefit was 
not based on previous income, but on the number of contribution 
years with contributions being fixed. (Petersen & Petersen 2012). For 
various reasons, no agreement could be reached on an earnings-
related tier (Larsen & Goul Andersen 2004). Because the universal 
basic pension was relatively generous in Denmark, this meant that the 
Danish public pension system was more generous for low work 
incomes relative to the other Nordic counterparts who included 
earnings-related tiers, but somewhat less generous for average work 
incomes and markedly so for high incomes (Ploug & Kvist 1994). 
The fact that the Danish ATP was so limited contributed to the later 
crowd-in of occupational labor market pensions, but another 
precondition was that strong coalitions of actors supported this 
trend15.  
In this regard, the Chinese case is a good example of how inadequate 
public pensions by themselves do not automatically lead to the 
crowd-in of private solutions (benefit adequacy has even been 
declining in China). Coverage of private pensions are far from 
widespread and still limited to only some of the urban labor market 
insiders as noted previously. In the Chinese case, the situation is 
                                                          
15 In 1989, government and municipalities together expanded labor market pensions 
to all municipal workers who did not already have one. This was an important push 
for the subsequent expansion in the private sector through collective agreements 
from 1991 (Goul Andersen 2011b).  
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perhaps more comparable to the historical Nordic experience of 
unilateral occupational solutions by single employers (before the 
enactment of national pension systems), since the Chinese labor 
market is not characterized by highly organized labor market partners, 
representing employees or employers, with strong fora for common 
decision-making.  
Non-public labor market pensions through collective agreements did 
certainly also emerge as significant pension pillars in Sweden. 
Collectively agreed labor markets pensions also have near universal 
coverage, but contributions are low
16
. In Norway, the system was 
until recently overwhelmingly based on the public, PAYG pension 
system. For this reason, pension savings were also quite low (7% of 
GDP in 2011 according to OECD-figures) compared to the other 
countries. In 2011, pension savings were equivalent to 64% and 84% 
of GDP in Sweden and Finland, while it was an extreme 187% in 
Denmark (Goul Andersen & Hatland 2014).  
Because the Swedish and Norwegian pension systems incorporated 
earnings-related tiers into public pensions, recent reforms have also 
had to adapt these public pension systems towards funded and DC-
based pension systems.  
In Sweden, a sweeping pension reform was adopted in 1998 and fully 
enacted from 2003 (Berglund & Esser 2013; Lindquist 2011). The 
public earnings-related tier, now dubbed ‘income pension’ was 
changed to a predominantly notional defined contribution (NDC) 
pension scheme. The NDC system is predominantly PAYG-based, 
but mimics a funded DC-system in the sense that contributions are 
                                                          
16 The contribution rates for the four major collectively negotiated pension funds 
(two for public and two for private employees) are all of them at 4.5% of the wage 
(Lindquist 2011). An exception is found in the two private sector schemes, where 
wage amounts above a level of 7.5 times the so-called base amount has a 
contribution rate of 30% (the base amount was 51.100 SEK in 2010), a level which 
corresponds roughly to the average Swedish wage according to Eurostat (2013).  
Nevertheless, this still makes for a very low total contribution rate for most 
workers. In Denmark, by contrast, contributions vary between 12 and 18% of wages 
(Goul Andersen 2011b). 
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linked to ‘notional” accounts’17. Effective from 2011, Norway 
reformed its pension system along some of the same lines as Sweden 
(Goul-Andersen & Hatland 2014; Hippe & Berge 2013; OECD 
2011). An important difference, however, is that the benefit level of 
the earnings-related Norwegian income pension is not NDC-based18  
In short, this means that the Nordic pension systems have all adapted 
to become multitiered pension systems, although the degree to which 
the equals evolved multipillar systems varies.  
This has happened alongside very significant reforms of the basic and 
(previously) universal public pensions. Universalism as a policy 
principle in its most strict sense can no longer be found in Finland, 
Norway or Sweden. Here, the basic pensions are now completely 
negative-selective, while Denmark has formally maintained 
universalism, but also increased the degree of positive selectivism (or 
increased ‘targeting within universalism’)19 (see section 3.4 on 
                                                          
17 On top of this is the compulsory and state-run “premium pension”, which is 
funded and DC-based. The contribution rates are 16% for the NDC-scheme and 
2.5% for the premium pension. Retirement is flexible between 61-67 years, with 
income from the NDC-system spread out over the remaining (expected - by gender 
and age cohort) lifetime to induce late retirement. 
18 Instead, each individual will increase their pension income entitlements by 18.1% 
of annual income below a certain ceiling, which is adjusted each year by wage 
growth to secure real adequacy As in Sweden, retirement is flexible, but in the 
Norwegian case it is between 62-75 years (retirement before age 67 is only possible 
for retirement incomes above the full amount of the basic pension, however). There 
is no public “premium pension” as in Sweden either. On the other hand, it has since 
2006 been mandatory for employers to adopt occupational, defined contribution 
plans with a minimum contribution of at least 2%, which is quite similar to the 
Swedish premium pension.  
19 Finland abolished the universal basic amount of the national pension, whereby the 
pension became income-tested (but only against income frome other legislated 
pensions) already in 1995 (Kautto 2012). Sweden and Norway adopted their 
negative-selective ‘guarantee pensions’ with the 1998- and 2011-reforms. In 2011, 
Finland also added a “guarantee pension” to ensure a higher minimum at the lower 
end of the income scale, since the benefit level of the national pension had drifted 
quite significantly. While Denmark has not seen a complete removal of pension 
universalism as a policy principle, the national pension has certainly shifted towards 
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universalism). The shift away from universalism as a policy principle 
in the basic national pensions in Finland, Norway and Sweden is not 
as radical when seen through the perspective of benefit generosity. 
The various Nordic national minimum pensions achieve replacement 
rates which are in the end not that different20.   
In China, we do not yet find any exact institutional counterpart at the 
national level to these public basic pensions since these are linked to 
insurance participation. The flate-rate, guaranteed minimum for 
everyone in the new pension schemes for urban and rural residents 
from 2009 and 2011 are the closest Chinese counterparts. The benefit 
is still extremely low and based on insurance-participation rather than 
citizenship, but this is where we may perhaps see some institutional 
potential for a future, universal pension much like we already see it at 
the local level in some Chinese cities.  
In conclusion, there has certainly been a shift towards multitiered and 
multipillar pension systems in all the Nordic countries, but by 
different degrees and different paths. In terms of pension pillars, 
occupational, non-public pensions in Denmark (and Finland, if we 
consider the privately managed but compulsory occupational 
pensions) dominate the pension system much more than in Sweden 
and particularly Norway. These new and generally more DC-based 
schemes are by nature better adjusted towards changes in life 
expectancy (and then various political decisions such as life 
expectancy coefficients or increasing pension accrual rates by age 
                                                                                                                                       
being more income-tested than before. From 1994, the amount of the universal 
benefit became roughly equal to the mean-tested supplements, and in 2003 another 
means-tested supplement was added. Furthermore, even the basic pension has since 
1984 been means-tested against income from possible employment (Goul Andersen 
2011b). 
20 In 2009, replacement rates for basic pensions with other supplements were 56% 
in Denmark, 52% in Norway, and 46% in Sweden, but also a significantly lower 
38% in Finland (Nososco 2009). However, we should bear in mind that these 
numbers are from 2007 and before the introduction of the new guarantee pensions 
in Norway and Finland (in Finland it is significantly higher than the old minimum 
as explained above).   
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also help in that regard21).  More inequality among future pensioners 
would logically be expected since earnings-related pensions will 
matter much more for future pensioners. On the other hand, it is not 
necessarily a given fact since statutory (or quasi-statutory in 
Denmark) earnings-related pensions and more selective basic 
pensions with high minima might complement each other well22. The 
shift towards multipillar pensions has happened in quite different 
ways in the Nordic countries. However, whether it has happened 
within or without legislation or the degree to which the income-
replacement tier is public or private does not always make an equally 
big difference in the end. All the Nordic countries have broadly 
shifted in various ways to much more DC-based pension systems. 
Coverage is universal for employees because of their compulsory 
nature, except for Denmark, where the institutionalization of labor 
market funds through collective agreements excludes a small minority 
of workers23.  
In comparison with China, we are struck by some very fundamental 
differences in terms of policy pathways. The Nordic history of 
pension systems is a long-winded story of different departures along 
the Bismarck-Beveridge continuum to pension universalism and then 
on to multitiered systems in different ways in terms of the 
public/private mix as described above. This Nordic ‘restructuring’ 
towards adapting pension systems to demographic change has taken 
place in different ways. Norway and Sweden make up the Nordic 
mainstream, while Denmark and Finland have relied more on the 
                                                          
21 Finland in 2014 adopted a reform which will further increase pension ages for 
cohorts born after 1995 and similar reform deliberations are taking place in Sweden 
(Finnish Centre for Pensions 2014; Valkonen & Vihriälä 2014).  
22 In Denmark, for example, inequality is expected to decrease among pensioners 
and to be lower than among the population in general (Goul Andersen 2011b). 
23 In the Danish case, Goul-Andersen (2011b) argues that the Danish private labor 
market pensions constitute a quasi-universal solution because of the way private 
labor market pensions, now institutionalized in collective labor market agreements 
and covering nearly 80% of the labor force in 2008, interact with the public pension 
system, which ensures very high minimum benefits for those with little or no labor 
market pension.   
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occupational pillar outside the public system. Always, existing 
institutions have had a very clear impact on these trajectories, for 
example in the case of the compulsory occupational insurance in 
Finland or the degree to which the income-replacement tier became 
public or private in Scandinavia. This is less evident in China which 
has been marked both by major societal disruptions and a 
compression of the timescale in terms of economic development. The 
pension system of the planned economy broke down and was 
disbanded, and after a short vacuum new pension schemes have been 
hauled in. This happened at a time where the idea of the ‘multipillar’ 
system was firmly embedded in international discourse.  
On the other hand, some traits have been constant in China, namely 
that both the old and the new pension systems were clearly dominated 
by a strongly ‘Bismarckian’ principle of status maintenance and 
strong insider-outsider divides, which are further exacerbated by the 
hukou system.  
There are a few significant Sino-Nordic similarities in terms of broad 
changes. The Chinese reforms have incorporated the income-
replacement tier into the public pension system (like Sweden and 
Norway, for example, and unlike Denmark), while the occupational 
and individual pension pillars appear much less developed and have 
achieved very limited coverage despite some governmental support 
mechanisms. Another experience is fragmented public pension 
systems that vary locally in terms of pooling and benefits. However, 
in the Nordic countries this belongs to the annals of history before the 
introduction of national-level policies. Contemporary China, on the 
other hand, has had to embrace this diversity within the national 
schemes out of sheer necessity because of the size of the country and 
enormous local disparities, even as there is a continuous effort to push 
for institutional homogenization.      
10.3.1 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: THE CONFLICT-
RIDDEN ADAPTION OF THE GHENT SYSTEM 
A major institutional difference between China and the Nordic 
countries is that unlike Norway and the rest of Europe, Denmark, 
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Finland and Sweden have all retained their old systems of state-
subsidized insurance in voluntary unemployment funds connected to 
independent labor unions (also known as the ‘Ghent model’24). In 
China, unemployment insurance is formally mandatory as it has been 
in Norway since 1938, even if coverage is far from universal as we 
saw in chapter 7. Paradoxically, these Nordic Ghent models later 
became some of the most universal and social citizenship-based 
unemployment insurance systems, although recent decades have also 
seen some notable steps towards ‘de-universalization’, particularly in 
Sweden.  
As we can see in table 27, Norway and Denmark were the first Nordic 
countries to adopt national legislation on unemployment insurance in 
1906 and 1907, respectively. Finland followed in 1917, and this time 
Sweden was the laggard until it also adopted such a scheme in 193425. 
Initially, all the Nordic countries adopted the Ghent model.  
The initial adaption of these Ghent models was connected with much 
political turmoil and often resistance from the unions themselves 
(Edling 2006; Caroll 2005). Union funds often resisted on the 
grounds that the gain from state subsidies did not match the loss of 
autonomy when they became subject to political regulation (such as 
the requirement to open up for unorganized workers or separating 
strike funds from benefit funds).  
Such continuous conflicts coupled with the worsened economic 
situation in the 1920s after World War I contributed to the demise of 
the Ghent model in Norway in 1938. Coverage was too low, and the 
funds struggled with finances for those that were covered. The new, 
compulsory scheme increased insurance coverage tenfold and was 
articulated as a triumph for the labor movement. Finland experienced 
                                                          
24 The ‘Ghent model’ is named after the Belgian city of Ghent in which it was first 
implemented in 1901 (Vandaele 2006). In 1905, France was the first country to 
adopt this system nationally. Belgium has retained a form of quasi-Ghent model, 
where the government also plays an important part in distributing benefits 
25 Only a small minority of funds became state-subsidized after 1934 (because the 
loss of autonomy was seen as to problematic). Only after World War II did 
coverage of state-subsidies pick up (Berglund & Esser 2013; Edling 2006). 
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many of the same problems26, but retained its commitment to the 
Ghent model. The process was much smoother in Denmark where 
enrollment picked up at a much quicker pace (and state subsidies 
were also more generous in the beginning) 
The later ‘universalization’ of the Nordic Ghent models after World 
War II has for very obvious reasons limitied applicability to the 
Chinese case. Unemployment insurance is not managed by unions, 
and the so-called All-China Federation of Trade Unions is not 
politically independent (althought it in some instances has begun to 
act more as an interest organization for workers rather than a 
government body) (Hong & Ip 2007). As in the case of the formally 
mandatory system in China, Norway gradually ‘universalized’ the 
occupational groups eligible for insurance, the difference of course 
being that the corresponding process took place much later in China 
(1986-1999). Norway incorporated agricultural workers and a few 
other leftover occupational groups into unemployment insurance in 
1949, thereby making it universal (Kuhnle 1987). As emphasized 
previously, the big ‘black box’ in terms of unemployment in China is 
the exclusion of rural Chinese from unemployment due to the 
historical circumstance of collective landownership. In addition to 
this comes the exclusion of large groups of de facto urban 
unemployed from registered uemployment (chapter 7).   
Still, the experience of the Nordic Ghent model includes many 
dynamics that are typical to the gradual ‘universalization’ of 
insurance schemes. One important step towards universalization of 
coverage is the universalization of financing, which made the 
government assume the lion’s share of benefit expenses. For members 
of funds this means both lower contributions overall and equalization 
                                                          
26 Only about 10% of workers were unionized by 1935, even lower than the 21% in 
Norway at the time, and as in Norway fund members were a clear minority (Edling 
2006). On top of this came domestic political turmoil between left and right 
inherited from the civil war in 1918. In 1931 and 1934, laws were enacted to protect 
the ‘industrial peace’, which led to the suspension of eight out of the ten funds at 
the time (Edling 2006; Carroll 2005).  
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of contribution levels between funds. This happened in the decades 
after World War II in the Nordic countries, while the scheme in China 
is still mainly financed by employers and employees. In China, the 
tendency has even gone towards increasing contributions as the 
existing scheme was set up as can be seen in table 21 (section 7.3). 
However, before transformative reforms of financing, the old Nordic 
Ghent systems could experience declining government financing as 
well27 
The transformative reform happened in 1967-1970 in Denmark. The 
state fully overtook the ‘marginal risk of unemployment’ and the link 
between unemployment levels and member contributions was 
severed. This made contributions uniform and fixed. Despite 
generally declining government financing, 1958 was also a significant 
for the ‘universalization’ of financing because state contributions 
became timed to expenses rather than income. This meant that 
contribution levels were greatly equalized across funds. The reforms 
in 1967-1970 laid the institutional foundations for the modern setup 
of the benefit. The corresponding overhaul of unemployment 
insurance in Sweden happened in 1973 (SO 2006). In Finland, the 
foundations for the current unemployment insurance were laid with a 
reform in 1985 (Lilja & Savaja 1999).  
In terms of generosity of the Nordic unemployment insurance 
schemes, a distinction can be made between the Finnish scheme on 
the one hand, which does not have a benefit ceiling, and the three 
Scandinavian benefit schemes on the other, where benefit ceilings are 
in place (AK Samvirke 2012; Torp 1999). While the schemes are 
formally earnings-related in contrast to the Chinese flat-rate benefit, 
low benefit ceilings in the Scandinavian countries means that the 
Scandinavian schemes are de facto flat-rate for much of the 
workforce (Clasen et. al. 2001). This means that the Finnish scheme 
is much more earnings-related. It is earnings-related from a lower 
                                                          
27 In Denmark, for example, the government share of financing fluctuated between 
less than 10% and nearly 60% in 1907-1967 (Jørgensen 2007). After 1950, there 
was a general trend towards declining government financing.  Due to a reform of 
financing in 1967, it quickly jumped from 10% to 70%. 
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baseline, however, which means that only for working incomes above 
150% of the average wage is the Finnish scheme significantly more 
generous (OECD 2014a)28. 
Once again, Sino-Nordic similarities are more pronounced if we take 
a historical look at the Nordic countries. For Denmark, for example, 
the current Chinese net replacement rate just below 25% (of an 
average wage) is closer to benefit levels before the 1967-reform. In 
1947-1967, for example, maximum benefits hovered around 35-40% 
of an average wage before they doubled in 1967 (Jørgensen 2007). 
The rock bottom was 20% in 1919. Flat-rate unemployment 
assistance (for people outside the unemployment funds  – see also the 
section below on social assistance) can be found in Finland and 
Sweden (Edling 2006).       
Coverage of the Nordic unemployment insurance schemes became 
relatively high, except for Finland. In the 1980s and 1990s, 70%-75% 
of the unemployed were covered in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
while it hovered around 50% in Finland (Torp 1999; Lilja & Savaja 
1999). The reason why coverage of the compulsory Norwegian 
scheme is not 100% is that duration is of course not unlimited just as 
a work qualification criterion has to be fulfilled as elsewhere
29
.  
In China, the problem of non-compliance from employers has kept 
coverage hovering at an even more modest 50-60% of the registered 
unemployed, with precise figures hard to come by. Furthermore, as 
noted previously, the real coverage rate is much lower because of 
serious issues with including out-of-work people looking for a job in 
                                                          
28 At these high income levels, the Nordic schemes vary a 42-49% replacement rate, 
except for Sweden at 34% (in 2012). At the lower rungs of the income scale with a 
working income at 67% of the average wage, Denmark is significantly more 
generous with a replacement rate of 84%, while the other Nordics schemes have 
replacement rates of 59-68%. The relative Danish generosity for low incomes is the 
result of a high formal replacement rate of 90% of previous income below the 
ceiling, while it is 80% in Sweden and 62.4% in Norway. 
29 Duration is two years (one year for very low incomes). Qualification criterion is 1 year of 
wage income within the last year (or within the last three years for high incomes). Sick or 
maternity leave also count as wage income.  
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registered unemployment (due to the hukou system and the economic 
transition of the 1990s). With coverage divided sharply between 
workers in public employment or state-owned enterprises and 
workers in private employment or self-employment (CDRF 2012), 
the Chinese unemployment benefits are subject to marked insider-
outsider divides.   
10.3.2 THE RETRENCHMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE 
The Nordic benefit levels have been subject to some retrenchment, 
most significantly in Sweden. Firstly, Sweden like Denmark used to 
have a formal replacement rate of 90% below the ceiling, but this was 
lowered to 80% in 1993 and further down in 2007 to 70% and 65% 
for the unemployed after 200 and 300 days of unemployment, 
respectively (Goul Andersen 2012; Sjöberg 2011).  
However, most of the decline in benefit generosity is explained by 
insufficient benefit indexation (relative to the wage development) as 
in the Chinese case. The difference is course that the Chinese wage 
development is much quicker and replacement levels are much higher 
in the Nordic cases. The trend is most strongly pronounced in 
Sweden. Automatic adjustment of the benefit ceiling was removed in 
1993 and it has not been adjusted upwards since 200230 This 
development has gradually turned the Swedish benefit into a flat-rate 
scheme for more than 80% of the insured unemployed (Berglund & 
Esser 2013; Sjöberg 2011).  
The same thing happened in Finland, where benefit indexation was 
frozen from 1994-2002 due to a big economic crisis in the early 
1990’s (Ervasti 2002; Heikkinen & Kuusterä 2001; Alestalo 2000; 
Lilja & Savaja 1999). Unlike the other two Nordic Ghent countries, 
however, benefit levels have also been raised significantly in the new 
millennium (Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2012; 
Uusitalo & Verho 2010). This included raising the earnings-related 
                                                          
30 By late 2014, the new Social Democratic-led government has proposed to raise 
the ceiling significantly, however. 
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element of the benefit during initial unemployment (for people with 
long work histories), raising benefits for unemployed in activation 
measures and raising the base level of the benefit.  
Denmark did not to the same extent experience very noticeable 
cutbacks in benefit levels, yet the benefit ceiling has declined 
somewhat over time relative to wages because the indexation 
mechanism adopted in 1990 entails that benefits are not raised at 
quite the same rate as wages during times of high economic growth 
(Goul Andersen 2011c).  
In Norway, the single most important change to the benefit ceiling 
happened in 1989 when the ceiling above which any additional 
income is disregarded for benefit calculations was halved from twelve 
to six times the ‘base amount’ (Clasen et. al. 2001).  
In terms of coverage, there have been some trends towards declining 
coverage. Sweden is also the frontrunner in this regard. Here, a steep 
decline from 2005 and onwards has placed coverage below 30% of 
the unemployed (Berglund & Esser 2013). We will return to the 
explanation below. The trend is so far less evident in Denmark and 
Finland. In Denmark, the long-term effect of a halved duration period 
(from four to two years) and a doubled requalification criterion (from 
26 to 52 weeks of work)  is yet to be seen (the reform was adopted in 
2010 and effective from 2012, but a long string of ‘temporary’ 
measures have eased the effect)31. For Finland it should be noted that 
coverage was already lower to begin with. In Norway, the tightening 
of unemployment benefits was not as marked as in the other Nordic 
countries (Halvorsen & Jensen 2004; Halvorsen 2002; Eitrheim & 
Kuhnle 2000)32.  
                                                          
31 In Denmark, the foundations for less generous coverage were laid by the middle 
of the 1990s, partly due to shortening of the benefit duration period in successive 
reforms (benefit duration capped at seven years in 1993; down to two years in 2010, 
effective from 2012) (Goul Andersen 2012, 2011c). However, up until 2010, this 
did not decrease coverage significantly, as (long-term) unemployment had declined.  
32 Duration was actually extended in 1984, differentiated according to previous 
wage income in 1997 (which actually meant an extension for most work incomes) 
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Just like China, Sweden and Finland have not witnessed the 
Norwegian fluctuations or the Danish cuts in benefit duration, but 
duration was already considerably lower than in Denmark. Sweden 
has retained its benefit duration of 60 weeks (but as explained below 
the unemployed continue on lower benefits), Finland its own of 100 
weeks and China has stayed with is contribution-dependent maximum 
of 24 months. 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland have all either abolished or shortened 
special duration extensions for the elderly unemployed, just as 
participation in various active labor market measures no longer count 
as ‘work’ when fulfilling the work requirements33 (it still counts in 
Finland, but hours participated are divided by two). The work 
requirements themselves have also been intensified in all the 
countries34.  
Norway is a bit special in this regard, since the work criterion is 
defined as a minimum income level. In 1989, this was raised from an 
income of 0.75 to 1.25 times the ‘basic amount’ within the last year 
(Clasen et. al. 2001). This barred very low incomes such as students 
or elderly women in seasonal work from the benefit.  
Perhaps the Chinese failure to increase coverage significantly even as 
the eligible group of workers was expanded gradually in 1986-1999 
partly owes to the increase in contributions that was also embedded in 
the adaption the new ‘universally mandatory’ scheme from 1999. At 
                                                                                                                                       
and later cut down to the present duration of 104 weeks and 52 weeks (for wages 
above or below two times the so-called ‘base amount’). 
33 However, when Sweden removed activation participation from hours of fulfilled 
work in 2001, it at the same time installed an “activity guarantee”, renamed “job 
and development guarantee” in 2007, during which one receives a lower gross 
replacement rate of 65% after the ordinary unemployment benefit has been 
exhausted. (Berglund & Esser 2013; Sjöberg 2011). 
34 Presently: Denmark: 52 weeks at 37 hours = 1924 hours (within three years). 
Finland: 34 weeks at 18 hours = 612 hours (within 48 weeks). Sweden = 26 weeks 
at 80 hours (within 12 months) or 480 hours in 26 consecutive weeks (within 6 
months): 480 hours. 
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least we have seen in other policy fields (health and pensions) how 
contributions may be a reason for both employers and employees to 
opt out of a scheme.  
In the field of unemployment insurance, Sweden is a prime example 
of this. In 2007, a reform sharply increased and differentiated member 
contributions (and further increased in 2008)
35
, causing members to 
opt out of funds (Berglund & Esser 2013; Goul Andersen 2012). The 
Swedish government announced its decision to abolish the 
differentiated membership fees from 2014, but the damage had been 
done in terms of fund membership. In just two years, from 2006 to 
2008, fund membership in Sweden decreased from 83% to 70% of the 
workforce (AK Samvirke 2012). The fund membership rate is a few 
percentage points higher in the other Nordic Ghent systems (Denmark 
and Finland) at around 75%.  
In conclusion, it is not surprising that the institutional foundations of 
unemployment insurance are very different in China and the Nordic 
countries, particularly in the case of the three Nordic Ghent countrie.  
The only characteristic, which not too common among 
unemployment insurance systems but shared between China and the 
Nordic countries (apart from Finland) is flat-rate benefits, although in 
Scandinavia it is a result of low benefit ceilings.  
Once again, the historical perspective on the Nordic benefit systems 
revealed some similar experiences. Low benefit levels were also a 
Nordic experience before transformative benefit reforms from 1967 
and onwards. The ‘universalization’ of coverage in the mandatory 
system in Norway ended with the inclusion of agricultural workers in 
1949. In China, the group of eligible workers was expanded in 1986-
1999, but the inclusion of rural citizens is a huge step still difficult to 
imagine because of the hukou system.   
                                                          
35 The differentiation between funds had increased from 4 EUR/month to 41 EUR/month in 
2012 (IAF 2013). Overall, member contributions soared to constitute 59% of benefits in 
2008, up from 12% in 2007 (ibid). The government tried to offset this with a small decrease 
in contributions in 2009, which brought the figure down to just below 40%. 
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10.3.3 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: BETWEEN PARTICULARISTIC 
AND RIGHTS-BASED RESIDUALISM 
In terms of social rights for the unemployed, social assistance or 
minimum income protection for those not member of an 
unemployment fund is of course important. It has become 
increasingly important in the Nordic countries as coverage of 
insurance has declined. Social assistance has also become 
increasingly important in China, not so much because of changes to 
unemployment insurance, but because of the expansion of the new 
MSLS-scheme in urban China since 1999 and since 2006 in rural 
China. While all the schemes in question are residual, the Chinese 
MSLS exhibits a very particularistic form of residualism (see sextion 
2.4 on social rights and particularism) where eligibility and benefits 
are determined by street level bureaucracy despite formal goals of 
including everyone below the local poverty thresholds. This perhaps 
bears some resemblance to the old ‘poor laws’ that were the first 
pieces of social legislation in Nordic and non-Nordic Europe alike, 
but also the later social assistance-schemes before they became 
governed by legislation.  
In the Nordic countries, national social assistance laws were first 
enacted in Denmark in 1933. Finland, Norway and Sweden followed 
suit later with national legislation after World War II in 1956-1965. 
To cut short the historical account, the Nordic social assistance 
schemes all evolved from schemes with very high discretion for local 
municipal governments in terms defining eligibility and benefit 
levels, a trait which continued even as they became inscribed in 
national legislation (Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012; Bahle et. al. 2011). 
Nordic social assistance was often characterized as more residual 
relative to other countries, which perhaps should be seen as a 
reflection of the very limited needs that needed to be covered 
(Lødemel 1997). As poverty was low and the coverage of 
unemployment benefits high, there was a smaller clientele for these 
benefits in the Nordic countries.  
As the universal welfare states had matured, social assistance was 
perhaps the last scheme to see steps towards a more rights-based 
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approach. Finland was seen as a Nordic forerunner when it set 
national standards for benefit levels from 1989, while Denmark 
followed soon after and Sweden set a national standard in 1998 
(Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012). Norway introduced national guidelines 
in 2001, but substantial local discretion remains (Gubrium & 
Lødemel 2014; Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012)36. In that sense, with its 
strong features of ‘particularistic residualism’, the Norwegian social 
assistance is the Nordic scheme most alike the Chinese counterpart. 
Denmark arguably has the most universal or rights-based social 
assistance scheme since benefit levels are completely fixed nationally 
(Bahle et. al. 2011)37.  
While coverage of Nordic social assistance schemes traditionally used 
to be quite low, mostly due to the well-developed ensemble of income 
protection in the Nordic countries, Nordic social assistance-benefits 
have usually been described as relatively generous in terms of benefit 
levels (Gough 2001). Today, that notion does not seem to find clear-
cut support when compared with benefit levels in other European 
countries (Figari et. al. 2013; Mechelen & Marchal 2013; Bahle et. al. 
2011). Benefit levels are difficult to compare, particularly as regards 
social assistance because a range of supplementary and discretionary 
elements often play an important role for the general benefit package, 
but there is no doubt that social assistance has become less generous 
over time in the Nordic countries38.  
                                                          
36 Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, declining generosity has to some extent been 
tied directly to the introduction of more rights-based national benefit standards 
(Kuvivalainen & Nelson 2012).  
37 In this regard, it should be noted that Finland and Sweden have an extra benefit 
tier besides social assistance, where those who fulfill the work criteria for 
unemployment insurance, but are not fund members can receive a flat-rate benefit 
which is not means-tested. Sweden introduced this benefit tier in 1974 and Finland 
did the same in 1994 (Sjöberg 2011; Lilja & Savaja 2001)
37
. It is often 
supplemented by social assistance as a top-up. 
38 Kuivalainen & Nelson (2012) estimate that the equivalized disposaple income of 
recipients on social assistance compared the average wage earner dropped from 
57% to 48% in Denmark, from 62% to 50% in Finland, and from 65% to 44% in 
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The declining relative value of the Chinese MSLS reflected 
inadequate indexation of local MSLS thresholds in a context of 
rapidly rising incomes  (local benefit thresholds certainly increased 
significantly in absolute terms), particularly in the beginning of the 
millennium. This has also been the main explanation behind the 
declining generosity of Nordic social assistance, only at a much 
slower pace. The national benefit levels in Sweden and Finland are 
regulated only according to the price development, while the Danish 
indexation method is (nearly) tied to the wage development 
(Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012)39.  
In other words, insufficient indexation, while being more pronounced 
in China, is also visible in the Nordic countries. Admittedly, the 
Chinese MSLS is very difficult to compare with Nordic social 
assistance. As mentioned in the introduction, the Chinese MSLS is 
somewhere between a classic, European ‘poor law’ and proper social 
assistance. If it should be likened to social assistance, it is a very 
stigmatizing and particularistic form of social assistance (Kongshøj 
2014a). Another big difference is that the Chinese MSLS is 
embedded in a general safety net with much bigger holes than its 
Nordic counterparts. Chinese welfare provision is still so very 
dependent on private or out-of-pocket payments (as in the case of 
health care, for example), that the Chinese MSLS as noted in chapter 
7 (depending on the local variations) comes with a range of additional 
welfares subsidies that would be alien to a Nordic social assistance 
recipient. For many Chinese recipients, these supplements are much 
more important than the cash benefit itself.       
                                                                                                                                       
Sweden, while Norwegian benefit levels have been stable around 45% in 1990-
2008. In comparison with China, the decline to 15% of urban average disposable 
income in the urban MSLS (figure 7), or the 25% for the rural MSLS, would be 
lower still if calculated as a wage-based replacement rate. 
39 While the Danish indexation is more generous, it does have a small, hidden 
under-compensation (except in times of low economic growth) as explained before 
on unemployment insurance. The method of indexation is the same for the two 
benefits in Denmark. 
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10.4.1 HEALTH CARE: UNIVERSALISM DECENTRALIZED 
In comparison with China, the Nordic countries are all characterized 
by universalism in health care. Financing, provision and regulation of 
health care is a public responsibility (Böhm et. al. 2013; Wendt et. al. 
2009). In terms of spending, the Nordic countries are among the 
countries with the highest levels of public spending and the highest 
share of public spending relative to total health expenditure in the 
OECD (this has not applied to Finland since the 1990s, however) 
(OECD 2014b)40. The very low level of public spending in China 
reflects that the Chinese system represents an emerging insurance-
based system.   
Universal and relatively generous health care is not at all exclusive to 
the Nordic countries, however. As an example, the British National 
Health Service (NHS) has long been known as a quintessential 
example of universal health care. Other examples could also be 
named. What has been distinctly Nordic, however, is the degree to 
which local government (municipalities and counties) has been 
responsible for health care with some degree of state financing 
(Magnussen et. al. 2009; Häkkinen 2005; Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004).  
Taking a historical look on the pathways to universalism in the 
Nordic countries, they do not necessarily examplify very well the 
mechanisms of universalization in a previously insurance-based 
system. Unlike most non-Nordic countries with universal health care 
such as Britain, the Nordic countries did not arrive at universalism 
after switching from a primarily social insurance-based model (Haave 
2006). Social insurance played only a minor role for specialized or 
inpatient treatment, except for Norway. Norway introduced 
compulsory sickness insurance in 1909 (coverage was not universal 
                                                          
40 In most recent years, 81-85% of Scandinavian health expenditures have been 
public (Finland 75%, EU-27 average 73%), and public spending amounted to 8-9% 
of GDP (Finland 6.6%, EU-27 average 6.5%). By contrast, the earlier figures for 
China placed public spending at 1.4% of GDP in 2011, or 29% of total health 
expenditure.  
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or population-wide until 1957), which provided both medical and 
cash benefits. The other early Nordic schemes primarily aimed at 
providing income support and a few medical benefits in kind. 
Inpatient treatment at hospitals was primarily financed through public 
budgets, and social insurance only played a minor role.  
Denmark and Sweden introduced voluntary, state-supported sickness 
insurance-acts in the 1890s, however. While insurance had played 
only a minor role in hospital care (except for Norway), it did, 
however, play a large role in terms of primary care before 
universalization, especially in Denmark (Martinussen & Magnussen 
2009). Besides Norway, the Danish development is closest to 
resembling a switch from a social insurance-model to universal, 
national health care. However, since healthcare provision was heavily 
hospital-centered in both Denmark and the other Nordic countries, 
financing and provision has been primarily public since the late 19
th
 
century (Wendt et. al. 2009). Still, as an example, the Danish 
experience from 1892-1973 offers some basic similarities to the 
current Chinese, namely the ‘universalization’ of insurance coverage 
achieved via larger governmental responsibility in financing of 
insurance. This has been most evident in the expansion of the NCMS 
and the URBMI for rural and urban Chinese in the new millennium. 
Denmark began subsidizing sickness funds in 1892 and a reform in 
1933 also made membership compulsory (in order to be eligible for 
old-age support) for people below a certain income level (Vallgårda 
& Krasnik 2010). In Denmark, Coverage of sickness insurance was 
extended to all wage earners in 1960, and the system which had 
hitherto aimed at ‘excluding the rich’ from primary care (initially 
from 1892 with locally differentiated income limits), was abolished 
(Petersen 2012).  From 1973, the sickness funds were abolished, and 
the counties assumed responsibility for financing, regulation and 
providing both primary and secondary health care41.  
                                                          
41 The sickness fund Danmark survived, however, and continues to insure members 
against medical expenses not covered (or not fully covered) by public health care 
such as pharmaceuticals or dental care (membership stood at more than 2.2. million 
in 2012)   
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In Sweden, the most important final step beyond compulsory sickness 
insurance in 1955 was the so-called Seven Crown Reform of 1970. 
Not only did it firmly place all kinds of specialized care (it had only 
been hospitals up to that point) at the county level, but it made health 
care much more accessible to low-income groups with the state 
reimbursing the expenses of counties (Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004). 
Norway as noted earlier made its compulsory insurance fully 
universal in 1957, but the final step towards the modern, universal 
health system came in 1967 when the country set up its National 
Insurance Scheme (Johnsen 2006; Kuhnle 1987). From 1971, health 
insurance was also integrated within the scheme, and sickness 
insurance was included in general taxation, where it became visible as 
a ‘health tax’ (Haave 2006). Finland was the last European country to 
legislate compulsory sickness insurance in 1963. In health care, the 
current system of free health care with (with municipal responsibility) 
was enacted in 1972 with an implementation period of 10 years 
(Kangas & Saloniemi 2013; Vuorenkoski 2008).  
Beyond some classic dynamics of ‘universalization’ of insurance 
schemes, the historical evolution of the Nordic health care systems is 
very different from the Chinese since the Nordic systems had a very 
strong impetus towards public and universal health care from the very 
beginning. As mentioned above, the Nordic systems were very 
centered on their publicy financed hospitals. The present Chinese 
system is also much attuned towards public hospitals, but 
nevertheless public hospitals have been very reliant on private 
financing since the onset of market-oriented reforms.  
10.4.2 PRIVATE HEALTH CARE AND MARKET MECHANISMS 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. 
The most central issue from the perspective of social citizenship in 
the modern, Nordic health care systems is the role of private health 
care. In China, the privatization of health provision is very strong 
both within and without the public health care system, even if 
insurance reforms have eased some of this.    
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While Nordic health care has not witnessed the same degree of 
‘privatization’ as in the field of pensions, the supplementary role of 
the private health care sector has been strengthened slightly (more so 
in Finland). However, just as the pension systems may exhibit various 
degrees of quasi-universalism, the private sector has to a large extent 
been embedded within systems of universal acces and financing 
(except perhaps for Finland, where the growth of the private sector 
has been a result of health care ‘dualization’ between labor market 
insiders and outsiders). The growth of private health insurance in the 
Nordic countries may also point to a strong potential in the future for 
institutional ‘layering’ of private health care outside the universal 
health care systems, even if it has not happened so far.  
In primary care, general practitioners (GPs) as gatekeepers to 
specialized treatment are often self-employed, but publicly financed. 
In Denmark, a legacy from the private sickness funds and their well-
developed network of primary care has been that GPs remain outside 
formal public ownership, even after the 1973-reform. In China, we 
almost see a reverse-mirror situation, with public insurance schemes 
and public providers that nevertheless are very dependent on private 
financing.  
In Sweden, the role of private GPs has been much politicized and has 
billowed back and forth42. A new ‘freedom of choice’-act entered into 
force in 2010, which obliged counties to allow citizens to choose 
primary care-providers with reimbursements following the citizen 
regardless of public or private ownership (Anell et. al. 2012; 
Nordgren & Ahgren 2011; Häkkinen & Jonsson 2009). By 2011, 
about 40% of all doctor visits were provided by private GPs.  
Norway was inspired by the Danish organization of GPs when it 
passed a reform of primary health care in 2001 (Hagen & Vrangbæk 
2009; Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). The reform meant that every 
                                                          
42 From 1994, the counties’ regulations on the number of private practitioners were 
revoked and citizens got the freedom to freely choose their own GP’s (Martinussen 
& Magnussen 2009). Even though the reforms were quickly withdrawn when the 
Social Democrats re-entered government office, many counties had already 
implemented them. 
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
262
 
citizen became listed with a specific GP as in Denmark and about 
90% of GPs in the following years chose to become self-employed.  
Finland generally retained its system of publicly owned health centers 
in primary care at the municipal level, but some municipalities have 
contracted out the management of health centres to private providers 
(Saltman & Vrangbæk 2009). While contracting out has not been 
prevalent, the non-public sector has grown much faster than the 
public since the 1990s. This has applied both to private as well as 
statutory occupational health care (we will return to this below).  
In terms of hospital care, the role of private providers remains very 
modest. In all the Nordic countries, around 90% or more of patients 
receive care at public hospitals (Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). 
The role of private providers has grown very moderately by varying 
degrees between the countries, much of it is a result of increasing 
patients rights’ legislation coupled with free choice between public 
and private providers (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2013; 
Anell et. al. 2012; Tynkkynen 2010; Winblad & Ringaard 2009).  
In chapter 9, we briefly noted how private health insurance in China 
so far has very limited coverage (7% of the population and 2% of 
total health expenditure). Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, 
supplementary private health insurance is much more widespread in 
all the Nordic countries, despite the fact that public health care is also 
much more adequate. The may reflect a different level of demand in 
the developed Nordic economies, but also in the resources and 
organization of labor market parties as speculated before on private 
pensions. Whatever the explanation, private health insurance has 
come to play a larger role in all the Nordic countries, but can so far be 
regarded as a rather modest and supplementary layer on top of the 
universal health systems.  
The expansion of private health insurance coverage has been most 
prominent by far in Denmark (Berge & Hyggen 2010; Martinussen & 
Magnussen 2009). One important push for this happened in 2002 
when tax subsidies for private health insurance provided by 
employers was introduced under the condition that coverage included 
all employees in the firm (Beland et. al. 2014; Kjellberg et. al. 2010). 
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The new centre-left government abandoned tax subsidies again in 
2011, but coverage of private insurance has continued to expand. By 
2012, just below 2 million Danes were covered by private health 
insurance (Forsikring & Pension 2014).  
While this presents an extreme development in terms of coverage, it 
does not mean that one-third of the population (almost exclusively 
people in employment) has quit public health care. The revenue of the 
small private sector is still overwhelmingly coming from publicly 
financed patients referred because of waiting list guarantees, free 
choice, etc., and insurance-covered or self-paying patients constitute a 
small minority (Kjellberg et. al. 2010). No doubt, an important factor 
behind the Danish development is the way in which supplementary 
insurance has become a normal part of the employment package for 
job holders just as supplementary unemployment insurance now is in 
Sweden. The difference is that the Swedish private unemployment 
insurance has become a part of collective agreements, while it has 
taken place at the firm-level in Denmark.   
In the other Scandinavian countries, the development is far less 
pronounced. In Norway, 333.000 Norwegians, or a little less than 7% 
of the population, had some form of private insurance in 2012, while 
the figures for Sweden were 464.000 or just below 5% of the 
population in 2011 (SKL 2012; Manifest Analyse 2012). In Norway, 
insurance drawn up by employers was tax deductible from 2003, but 
this was repealed again in 2006 (Berge & Hyggen 2010).  
Finland constitutes a Nordic peculiarity with occupational health 
insurance being statutory (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
2013; Wahlbeck et. al. 2008).  Employers in Finland are required to 
offer free occupational healthcare for their employees. Coverage is 
around 85-90% of employees since not all small enterprises are 
enrolled while participation is voluntary for farmers and self-
employed. In terms of provision, employers can choose between 
either setting up their own, buying from other employers, purchasing 
from municipal health centres or from private providers. Only a small 
minority of occupational insurance is provided by municipal health 
centres, and the increasing utilization of occupational health 
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insurance in primary care has fuelled the growth in non-public health 
care delivery (Wahlbeck et. al. 2008). In addition, private health 
insurance has also bloomed in Finland. In 2012, around 1 million 
Finns (or 20% of the population) had private insurance, with about 
half of them drawn up by parents who wish to cover their children 
(Kangas & Saloniemi 2013).  
All told, the private sector accounted for 25% of expenditure and 20% 
of personnel in health care provision in 2009 (Arajärvi & Väyrynen 
2011). This substantiates how health care provision in Finland is 
significantly less ‘public’ than in the other Nordic countries as 
mentioned in the very beginning. In 2000, Finland was found to be 
among the OECD-countries with the greatest socio-economic 
inequality in utilization of health care along with Portugal and the 
United States (Kangas & Saloniemi 2013; Wahlbeck et. al. 2008). 
Finally, we should note that the Nordic core trait of decentralized 
provision of health care has been challenged somewhat, particularly 
in Norway and Denmark (Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004). A 2002-reform 
in Norway transferred hospital and other forms of specialist care from 
19 counties to the state, with health care provision being organized by 
five (later four) regional health enterprises under the Ministry of 
Health (Hippe & Berge 2013; Martinussen & Magnussen 2009; 
Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004). Hospitals were restructured into semi-
independent public firms, the main idea being that hospitals should 
act more like private enterprises. The enterprize organization entailed 
a break between managerial provision and the superior political body. 
Similarly, Denmark from 2007 implemented a structural reform 
which reduced the number of local authorities from 14 counties to 5 
regions and from 275 municipalities to 98 (Martinussen & 
Magnussen 2009). The new and larger regions retained their 
responsibility for health care, but the most important change in the 
reform was that the authority to set independent tax rates was 
removed from the new regions. Instead, financing has largely become 
a matter for the central government43.   
                                                          
43 Fiscal centralization also characterized the Norwegian reform, but while counties 
already were very limited in setting tax rates before the 2002-reform, the 
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Similar attempts at centralization have been attempted in both 
Sweden and Finland, however. In these two countries, it was until 
recently more of a coordinated bottom-up process rather than the big-
bang, top-down reforms of Denmark and Norway. Sweden tried to 
initiate a process of voluntary mergers over several years after a 
structural reform commission handed in its report in 2007 
(Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). The process collapsed in 2012, 
however, as no counties managed to present any final mergers to the 
government (Karlsson & Bretzer 2012). A similar process of mergers 
has been more successful in Finland, but here it has until recently 
taken place at the municipal level44 (Blöchliger & Vammalle 2012; 
Häkkinen & Jonsson 2009).  
In conclusion, we have identified some similar mechanisms of 
‘universalization’ in China and the Nordic countries when we 
consider the Nordic systems before transformative health reforms of 
the 1960s and 1970s. This applies especially to health insurance 
outside specialized or hospital care, since the Nordic hospital system 
was publicly financed even before the ‘golden age’ of welfare state 
expansion.  
When we consider the modern health systems, private health 
insurance somewhat paradoxically seems to have higher coverage in 
the Nordic countries than in China, at least in Denmark and Finland. 
As noted before, there are good explanatations for this, however. 
While the degree of ‘dualization’ has increased in Finland, it has 
mainly been the result of retaining compulsory occupational 
                                                                                                                                       
Norwegian reform further replaced unconditional block grants from the government 
with conditional and activity-based financing (Rehnberg et. al. 2009; Häkkinen 
2005).  
44 Financial incentives for mergers ended in 2013, but the process is on-going. 
Between 2001 and 2014, the number of municipalities was reduced from 452 to 320 
(Population Register Center of Finland 2014; Blöchliger & Vammalle 2012). 
Furthermore, by late 2014 a new health care reform was agreed upon by the 
government coalition, which when implemented will place responsibility for all 
forms of health care provision in regional administrative units (‘SOTE-reform’) 
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insurance, and the the extent of private insurance in Denmark has so 
far not had very significant consequences (even if the potential for 
quick institutional layering is certainly in place). Finally, there is no 
doubt that the actual privatization of health risks is much bigger in 
China because ‘public’ providers have been forced to operate on 
market terms.  
The more recent Nordic changes have been reforms of public, 
universal health care that we have not been able to directly relate to 
the Chinese experience. This includes centralizing the previously 
decentralized public health care, introducing some market 
mechanisms into universal health care (not to be confused with 
increasing private financing) or increasing patients’ rights.     
The final conclusion across all three policy fields will be included in 
the next and final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 11. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN 
CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
It is time to weave together the threads of the previous 10 chapters 
into a coherent image of social citizenship in China and the Nordic 
countries. The dimensions of social citizenship covered in this 
dissertation include first and foremost the welfare state itself but also 
normative orientations.  
This dissertation has elaborated how ‘Confucianism’ can be 
compared with any normative-theoretical school of citizenship. In 
terms of empirical welfare attitudes, we have seen how China and the 
Nordic countries are placed in a larger country-level context and what 
empirical typologies of citizens emerge within the five countries. We 
have discussed the welfare regime context in East and West. Social 
reforms in China across three select policy fields have been analyzed 
in terms of social rights and universalism. Finally, we have discussed 
broad Sino-Nordic reform trajectories across the same three policy 
fields.      
Our findings will be summarized and discussed here across the three 
main research questions raised in section 1.2. The first section of this 
chapter will discuss the normative foundations of social citizenship 
(chapter 4 and 5). The second section will focus on progress and 
challenges in China in relation to the goal of achieving more 
universal welfare provision (chapters 6-9). The third section will 
focus on comparative reform paths in China and the Nordic countries 
(chapter 10).  
Our main conclusions will not only be summarized, however. The 
policy-oriented enquiry (the second and third research questions 
above) will also be discussed from a global perspective. Of course, 
we cannot conduct a truly global, in-depth analysis in a few short 
sections, but some of our findings naturally raise raise the question of 
whether the Sino-Nordic policy trends are necessarily that unique to 
our very different country cases. As will be discussed, some of the 
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main findings are not wholly unique when we anchor China in the 
context of developing or emerging economies and the Nordic 
countries correspondingly in their Western context.  
In the conclusion, we will return to China and the Nordic countries 
and briefly point to the importance of the political underpinnings of 
social citizenship as we look to the future.  
11.1 THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL RIGHTS: 
MARSHALL VS. CONFUCIUS?  
In chapter 1, I framed the first question in terms of “…the normative 
foundations of citizenship in China and the Nordic countries, both 
from a normative-theoretical perspective and in terms of welfare 
attitudes among the citizenry”.  
While Confucianism is in essence a diverse amalgam of ethical 
thinking with a very long history, I have argued that it can in fact be 
compared with any traditional ‘Western’ school of citizenship. 
Confucianism encompasses normative prescriptions for relations 
between citizens (or citizenship practices) as well as for the 
relationship between state and citizen.  
When presented in its most traditional and narrow conception, 
‘Confucianism’ becomes a vision of an almost organic and 
meritocratic society in which differential social roles leave little space 
for equal ‘citizens’. Furthermore, public welfare should take the 
backseat vis-à-vis the family in particular, since this is the arena from 
which proper Confucian citizenship practices emerge. This to some 
extent resonates with communitarianism and conservatism as they 
have been known in the West. There is a strong resonance with social 
conservatism in the Confucian obligation for political leaders to be 
benevolent and develop the citizen potential of everyone, including 
the poor or the marginalized.   
However, as I have also argued, once we begin discussing inherent 
ambiguities in core concepts such as the ‘family’ and the mutual 
obligations in Confucian relations, a vision of a more progressive role 
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for social policy can be envisaged. Still, we would have to stretch 
Confucian citizenship thinking quite far in order for it to have any 
significant overlaps with egalitarian liberalism as described by T.H. 
Marshall (and as it has commonly been ascribed to the ‘Nordic 
model’ or welfare regime).  
Our empirical investigation to some extent resonated with a stylized 
notion of the differences between Chinese Confucianism and Nordic 
egalitarian liberalism. With the method of latent class analysis we 
have seen how different types of citizens emerge within countries. 
Egalitarian citizens were more strongly represented in the Nordic 
countries, while more ‘meritocratic’ citizens, who favor basic public 
welfare for all, but also tolerate inequalities in welfare provision, 
were more prevalent in China.  
However, we should be mindful of drawing conclusions which 
emphasize distinct or relatively stable ‘welfare cultures’. A wealth of 
possible explanatations, which we have not pursued at great length in 
this dissertation, could be offered. We have discussed the influence of 
policy institutions and context-dependent perceptions of reality and 
also noted the potential issue of a Chinese ‘agreement bias’ (which 
we have investigated as a potential problem for the reliability of our 
results, but no significant impact could be found).  
One result from our analysis of individual-level social divides 
supports that we should be wary of simplistic conclusions regarding 
‘Confucian’ citizenship. Generally, high incomes and the highly 
educated had a smaller chance of being ‘inegalitarian’ in China. We 
saw the reverse dynamic in the Nordic countries. This suggests that 
those benefiting from economic development in China also increase 
their expectations towards public welfare provision.   
Coincidentally, this is very much how welfare reform has actually 
unfolded in China. Welfare schemes for urban workers have been 
enacted first while also being much more generous. This observation 
supports the notion that the welfare reforms of the past 10-15 years 
represent efforts to put out the most urgent fires of market reform. 
CCP efforts to increase social legitimacy and decrease the potential 
for social unrest have (when related to social protection) first and 
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firemost tried to deal with the demands of the new middle class, 
whereas the remaining Chinese citizenry have had to be more patient. 
If we revert to a more simple view of reality, however, such a 
dynamic of welfare reform might also just be said to represent a 
‘Confucian’ social order.  
11.2 UNIVERSALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: 
TOWARDS MORE CITIZENSHIP-BASED SOCIAL RIGHTS? 
In Chapter 1, I asked “….to what degree has the goal of achieving 
more universal welfare in China been achieved regarding health, 
unemployment and pensions, and what are the challenges in this 
regard? 
Social policy in China has in some respects become more rights-
based. Similarly, Ngok & Huang (2014:156) argue that “….a 
conception of social citizenship has begun to emerge…” and that 
“….the implementation of various welfare programmes, in a sense, 
are a kind of reaffirmation of social citizenship”. The traditional 
perception of social citizenship in China has been that individual, 
rights-based citizenship is both very new and relatively weak 
compared to citizenship as the exercise of collective power (Wong 
2013a). In the arena of public welfare, the state-individual 
relationship has perhaps become a little less state and a little more 
individual in tandem with welfare state expansion. This is somewhat 
speculative, however, and perhaps Wong (2013a:419) is right to say 
that “There is a long way to go before the wholesale acceptance of 
citizenship as embodying individual rights in China”. From a rights-
oriented perspective there are still big challenges. 
Considering the official Chinese goals of achieving ‘moderate’ or 
‘appropriate’ universalism in the near future, there is no denying that 
some big steaps ahead have been taken in the past decade or two. This 
includes increasing coverage significantly of health insurance, 
pensions and minimum income assistance. It has not only been a 
matter of extending coverage of existing schemes, but in later years 
also adapting new schemes for urban and rural residents outside the 
urban labor market. This means that the divides across the hukou-gap 
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and between insiders and outsiders on the urban labor market are not 
such big chasms as they used to be.   
In some areas, experiments are being undertaken with unifying rural 
and urban schemes or implementing provincial-level insurance funds 
as mentioned in previous chapters. Noteworthy examples were 
universal basic pensions or the unification of health insurance 
schemes. Several provincial-level governments have even undertaken 
formal steps towards unification of hukou-based divides, although the 
real impact in terms of social rights has not necessarily been very 
significant (Ngok & Huang 2014; Li et. al. 2013). In the province of 
Guangdong, for example, the formal integration of health insurance 
has not abolished the divides in reimbursements, and risk pooling still 
takes place at the county level (Ngok & Huang 2014). In 2013 and 
2014, the Central Committee of CPC and the State Council called for 
integrating rural and urban insurance schemes, perhaps inspired by 
local efforts with this goal in mind. As seen so often in the history of 
China, local policy experiments can offer a glimpse into the future of 
national-level policies in China.  Even if we ignore the myriad of 
local experiments, however, welfare provision in many policy fields 
has become more citizenship-based than it used to be. Furthermore, 
tax financing also plays a larger role in health insurance, minimum 
income assistance and to a more limited extent, pensions.  
However, this positive assessment cannot stand alone. The previous 
chapters have also explained a series of issues which are problematic 
from the perspective of universalism and social citizenship. Increased 
coverage of insurance in pensions and health has been achieved with 
new schemes that are very ‘cheap’ for the government and therefore 
result in very low replacement rates or reimbursement levels. Benefits 
are not adequate in pensions, unemployment insurance or minimum 
income assistance, and replacement rates have been declining 
significantly in relation to the rapidly increasing Chinese incomes. In 
health insurance, generosity, defined as the adequacy of 
reimbursement rates, has increased, but are still far from ensuring 
adequate protection, particularly in case of serious illness. In terms of 
unemployment protection, there is still a need for recognition of 
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unemployment as a social problem in rural China (and subsequent 
extension of unemployment insurance).  
At the same time, however, coverage of schemes has been expanded 
and the government foots a larger share of the bill. It is up for 
discussion whether this should be interpreted as just maturing 
productivism or perhaps a more principal change from particularist or 
selectivist productivism towards inclusive or universalistic 
productivism as the literature has discussed for other East Asian 
countries. Alternatively, this more ‘inclusive’ productivism may be 
interpreted as an emerging conservative welfare state if we revert to 
the labels of classic comparative research. Already in 2002, Liu et. al. 
(2002) from the Asian Development Bank characterized the Chinese 
welfare state as resembling most closely this classic ideal-type in their 
review of Chinese health provision.    
The most important steps towards citizenship are the adaption of new 
schemes across all three policy areas, even if they often reinforce old 
divides. In addition, all of the schemes in question, except the MSLS, 
are insurance-based and not fundamentally based on citizenship. 
Finally, we should remember the around 260 million migrants living 
outside their area of hukou, who now in various ways can enroll in 
either rural, urban or separate schemes for migrants, but as discussed 
in previous chapters, many are still caught in a no-mans land outside 
the social insurance system (Wang & Wan 2014; Wong 2013a). 
Therefore, in terms of social citizenship, it so far seems more 
appropriate to talk of the extension of very basic social rights, but 
these social rights are nested within a social insurance-model facing a 
series of big challenges in terms of guaranteeing adequate social 
protection. China is best understood as a maturing developmental or 
productivist welfare regime in the typical East Asian fashion. Social 
spending is low, social rights are minimal and to a large extent linked 
to productive activity. In terms of care, the welfare state still plays a 
minimal role. Still, this is only true with significant variations in East 
Asia.  
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11.3 CHANGING SOCIAL RIGHTS AND MECHANISMS OF 
UNIVERSALIZATION IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC 
COUNTRIES 
The third and final question I posed in chapter 1 concerned “…the 
comparative policy reform paths in China and the Nordic countries 
vis-à-vis universalism and social rights in the same three policy 
fields” 
While the contemporary welfare states in China and the Nordic 
countries are extremely different, we identified some similar policy 
trajectories in chapter 11, just as some of the historical mechanisms of 
‘universalization’ in the Nordic countries are echoed the current 
Chinese experience. We also discussed how the Chinese timescale is 
very ‘compressed’ relative to the Nordic (and Western) welfare state 
development. The simplest way to describe this is to characterize the 
Chinese policy changes as a combination of welfare expansion and 
restructuring at the same time, while the Nordic countries have trod 
the long path of separate phases of welfare state expansion and 
restructuring. This is most evident in the field of pensions, but also to 
some extent in health care and unemployment protection.  
In pensions, both China and the Nordic countries have arrived at 
multitiered pension systems, although the degree to which this 
equates evolved multipillar systems differs somewhat. The basic 
public-private mix is one example, where Denmark has gradually 
evolved a dominant layer of private, occupational labor market 
pensions, whereas the earnings-related tiers in Norway, Sweden and 
both rural and urban China are partly incorporated into the public 
pillar. China is still trying to develop its (urban) occupational pillar, 
whereas it has long been dominant in Finland.  
In the Nordic countries, we can observe three reform paths (with 
Norway and Sweden sharing a common path with many similarities). 
The reforms may all appear to have entailed radical ‘de-
universalization’ of public pensions from the perspective of social 
rights, but when the institutional interplay between basic pensions and 
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the universal (or near-universal in Denmark) coverage of earnings-
related pensions (whether public or private) is considered, changes 
are less radical (Goul Andersen 2011b; Kangas et. al. 2010). The 
formal departure from universalism in basic, public pensions has been 
less marked in Denmark. On the other hand, earnings-related 
pensions are arguably least universal in Denmark.  
In the Chinese case, it seems difficult to speak of a particular pension 
reform path. The old pension system drifted to its death due to market 
reform, and after some time the present system began to take shape in 
the middle of the 1990s at a time where multipillar pension systems 
were perceived be the key to sustainable pension systems in 
international discourse. On the other hand, the main traits of status 
maintenance and strong insider-outsider divides, enforced by the still 
existing hukou system, have been strong throughout. Despite the 
formal multipillar set-up of the Chinese pension system, it is largely 
limited to the urban workers’ system, and even here the non-public 
pillars appear underdeveloped. Furthermore, financing issues have 
rendered the formally funded, DC-based tier of public pensions de 
facto PAYG-based. Coverage remains inadequate and increasingly 
income replacement levels are also inadequate45. Finally, it is 
interesting to note the aforementioned local experiments in many 
Chinese cities with properly universal and public basic pensions.  
As regards the field of unemployment protection, urban China has 
since the turn of the millennium had the common institutional set-up 
of unemployment insurance complemented by social assistance. In 
China, coverage of the formally mandatory unemployment insurance 
remains low and has seemingly even been declining. The MSLS, 
which is now extended to both rural and urban China, still excludes 
many of the formally eligible poor and able-bodied unemployed in 
implementation. For both benefits, it is also the case that benefit 
                                                          
45 When we compare China with the Nordic countries, we should note that the Nordic 
countries are also unique in the way they have to a relatively high degree achieved 
demographic sustainability of their pension systems (Goul Andersen & Hatland 2014). 
Pension systems with big PAYG-based sustainability gaps and declining replacement rates 
can be found in other developed economies. For example, the US Social Security fund will 
run empty by 2033 at present pension regulations (Ellis et. al. 2014).  
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levels are inadequate and replacement rates declining in a context of 
rapidly increasing Chinese wage incomes.  
Even if the starting points are very different from the Chinese, we 
have also identified some steps towards declining coverage of 
unemployment insurance and declining generosity of both 
unemployment insurance and social assistance in the Nordic 
countries. This has been most significant in Sweden, but some of the 
same tendencies can be observed in Denmark. In Finland, the 
tendency has once again been one of mostly retaining a system which 
was already the least universal among the Nordic countries. Finally, 
in Norway, where insurance is mandatory like China, the policy field 
has been much less tumultuous, and it is difficult to talk of clear-cut 
retrenchment despite a few important changes.   
It is difficult to talk of Sino-Nordic similarities in this policy field 
beyond the extension of schemes. In rural China, the MSLS was not 
adopted nationally until around 2007, and formal recognition of 
unemployment as a social risk along with access to unemployment 
insurance is still absent. However, some similarities were noted with 
a historical perspective on the Nordic unemployment protection 
systems. A big difference is that the Chinese state has so far not 
assumed larger financial responsibility in unemployment insurance, 
which was an important mechanism of ‘universalization’ in the 
Nordic countries.     
Health care, however, is the field where we have seen the most 
similar dynamics of ‘universalization’, even if the Nordic countries 
unlike other universal healthcare systems did not primarily evolve 
from insurance-based systems. At the same time, this is also where 
the welfare reform impetus has been strongest in China. The 
historical mechanisms of ‘universalization’ were most similar to the 
Danish sickness insurance in primary care or the mandatory 
Norwegian sickness insurance from the first half of the 1900s, again 
via extension of coverage and increasing state financing. That does 
not at all mean that China will eventually evolve anything resembling 
universal healthcare. Public financing is still inadequate, particularly 
in health delivery in hospitals. The Chinese reforms are so far more 
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accurately understood as an attempt to put out the fires and filling the 
gaps in a broken, insurance-based system.  
In the Nordic countries, the health care systems remain universal even 
though the supplementary role of private provision has been 
strengthened. However, this has mainly taken place within the 
universal, tax-financed health care system, for example in the way 
that general practitioners in Norway have become predominantly 
private as they have long been in Denmark. The rise of private health 
insurance, which is most significant in Denmark, has not had a 
significant impact so far on the Scandinavian health care systems. 
However, there is a strong potential for quick institutional ‘layering’ 
(Streeck & Thelen 2005) in the future should perceptions of public 
health care change for the worse. Finland is a Nordic outlier with 
mandatory occupational insurance, which has increasingly been 
utilized for private provision (in tandem with growth of private 
insurance).   
In other words, China and the Nordic countries do not always 
constitute a choice of unlikely apples and oranges. Some current 
reform tendencies and historical pathways do exhibit similarities 
across the Sino-Nordic divide. However, as we shall see below, the 
Sino-Nordic binoculars can blind us to the wider landscape of welfare 
state reform.    
11.4 EXPANDING THE HORIZON.  PARALLEL TRENDS AT 
THE GLOBAL LEVEL?  
Even if it is both interesting and relevant to spend a dissertation 
immersing ourselves in Sino-Nordic welfare architecture, at some 
point we may ask ourselves whether what we have uncovered here is 
really that unique to our country cases.  
It should be no secret that some of the broadest policy trends are not 
necessarily that unique to our comparative framework.    
Developments in the Nordic countries are to some extent general to 
developments in developed, Western welfare states across welfare 
regimes. The Chinese reforms in many ways resemble general trends 
CHAPTER 11. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
277 
among developing economies and East Asian neighbours. From a 
historical perspective, historical dynamics of policy ‘universalization’ 
in the Nordic countries are not exclusively Nordic, even if the process 
went further in these countries. In this section, we will not go further 
into the historical dynamics, but focus on contemporary changes in 
developed and developing welfare states.  
Welfare state research at the global level naturally involves a 
relatively high level of abstraction, yet global welfare state research 
has pointed to common developments, some of which we will include 
here when relevant for our country cases. New theories and 
approaches such as ‘global social policy’ ‘world society theory’ or 
‘the world polity approach’ have recently been invoked (Yeates 2014; 
Deacon & Stubbs 2013; Meyer 2010). These theoretical approaches 
emphasize the spread of norms and ideas about specific social policy-
solutions among pivotal actors as well as the influence of global 
institutions on national-level policy making. We will not engage the 
theoretical discussion here, but researchers applying these theories 
have pointed to developments that also apply to the Chinese case, 
particularly the spread of new social assistance-schemes, increasing 
health coverage and attempts to adopt multipillar pensions.   
First we will consider the Nordic corner of the Western world. Here, 
we may oftentimes speak of ‘parallel trends, persistent diversity’ 
(Kautto & Kvist 2002). While differences between welfare regimes 
may persist across the many different regime indicators that have 
been used in the literature (Vis & Van Kersbergen 2014; Hay & 
Wincott 2012; Arts & Gelissen 2010), they have in some respects 
been subject to similar changes. A prime example is pension reforms 
with the purpose of ‘privatizing’ the financing of pensions and easing 
this responsibility off the shoulders of government combined with 
incentives to stay longer in the labor market. Of course, beyond this 
broad trend there are certainly are significant differences regarding 
coverage, financing or the ways in which pension systems are 
governed in the public-private mix (Ebbinghaus 2011).   
Making unemployment benefits less generous or decreasing coverage 
of unemployment insurance is also a very general trend in Western 
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welfare regimes (Ferragina et. al. 2013; Van Vliet & Camanida 2012; 
Clasen & Clegg 2011). Clasen & Clegg (2011) argue for a trend 
towards what they name ‘triple integration’; Firstly, ‘benefit 
homogenization’ or reducing differences between benefit tiers or 
reducing the number of tiers, secondly, ‘risk-categorization’ or 
diminishing differences between unemployment benefits and other 
schemes regarding conditioniality and eligibility, and thirdly, 
‘activation’ such as increasing job-search or activation requirements 
for working-age benefit claimants. This fits well with what we have 
uncovered in chapter 10, once again with notable differences between 
the Nordic countries.  
As regards the still (nearly) ideal-typically universal and social 
citizenship-based Nordic health care systems, a wide range of non-
Nordic countries have near-universal health care. This applies to at 
least Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, although countries 
such as Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand also come very 
close if we also include private provision within a system otherwise 
publicly regulated and financed (Böhm et. al. 2013). Beyond that, we 
have seen how the role of private financing or supplementary private 
provision has been strengthened somewhat in the Nordic countries 
within a context of increasing demand. This, too, is not a distinctly 
Nordic experience, and neither is the introduction of some market 
mechanisms within the public sector (OECD 2014b; Freeman & 
Rothgang 2010; Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). The degree to 
which this has happened is of course very different, and it has so far 
not been very pronounced in Scandinavia.  
The Nordic countries have arguably been much more distinct within 
welfare services and especially care policies (Ferragina et. al. 2013; 
Jensen 2011; Scruggs & Allen 2006). This remains the case, but there 
has perhaps been some general convergence towards to Nordic 
countries here, at least in Europe. Continental Europe has increased 
spending on care policies, and especially family policies (child care, 
maternity/parental leave and child allowances) have become more 
generous in non-Nordic Europe (Ferragina et. al. 2013; Jensen 2011). 
This does not necessarily entail a welfare regime convergence in 
family and care policy, however, since the policy expansion in 
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Continental Europe often has taken place in ways that emphasize 
existing regime differences, for example via the extension of 
comprehensive cash-for-care schemes in Continental Europe (Stoy 
2014).   
As regards the Chinese case, some of the main developments that  we 
uncovered in chapter 7, 8 and 9 do follow trends common to the 
developing countries. There are also similarities to neighbouring East 
Asian countries as hinted in the discussion in chapter 6.  
On the level of discourse, the much-discussed turn at the beginning of 
the millennium under the Hu-Wen leadership is not isolated to China. 
In the international rights-discourse that takes place in the framework 
of the UN, many countries, developing as well as developed, were 
previosuly reluctant to embrace the idea of social rights. China, like 
some other Asian and Arab states did endorse the idea of social rights 
championed strongly by Latin American countries after World War 
II, but also seemed to be much more preoccupied with the more 
vague right to social and economic development (Davy 2013). The 
latter ‘right’ was more of a general policy prescription for 
governments than a right for individuals. Sometime after the mid-
1990s, the idea of individual, social rights gained stronger 
international consensus. For example, individual country reports 
submitted under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights (ICESCR) began to be generally much more 
concerned with socio-economic inequalities, and “Welfare statism 
soon became the preferred framework for social policies reported 
under articles 9 and 11 ICESCR” (Davy 2013:26).  
Simultaneously, there has also been a change of discourse in 
important epistemic communities on policymaking such as the 
OECD, IMF and the World Bank (Vetterlein 2013; Deacon 2005). 
Others, such as the ILO, have long pushed for more extensive social 
policies. The influence of these organizations often went beyond the 
lose dissemination of ideas, since they also had important direct 
policy influence through structural adjustment programs and the like. 
Until the turn of the millennium, the emphasis was overwhelmingly 
on market solutions from a more neoclassical perspective. To the 
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extent that countries should maintain any welfare state, it should be 
targeted at the poorest. That changed in the new millennium and some 
consensus also seemed to emerge among these international 
organizations for more comprehensive welfare policies in the 
developing countries.  
One recent example is the idea of the so-called “Social Protection 
Floor”, developed by the ILO (2012) and endorsed by the UN, the 
World Bank, ILO and G20 from 2012. The name itself indicates a 
close connection with classic Beveridge-universalism or social 
policies which guarantee everyone a basic level of social protection. 
It is stressed that the aim is to ensure ”…universal coverage of the 
population with at least minimum levels of protection (horizontal 
dimension) and progressively ensuring higher levels of protection 
according to ILO standards (vertical dimension)” (ILO 2012:11), and 
“the specific universal right of everyone to social security and to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
themselves and their families” (ILO 2012:24)”.  
The new-found (or more accurately, re-discovered) concern with 
more active social policy in Bretton-Woods institutions like the IMF 
and the World Bank should not be overemphasized. In these 
institutions, sconomic growth is arguably still perceived as the 
primary goal for the social development of the developing countries 
(Vetterlein 2013). Still, there seems to be a move towards a new 
balance somewhere between more residual ‘pro-poor’ policies on the 
one hand and more universal protection on the other. At the same 
time, the increasing attention towards positive associations between 
growth and economic equality may increase the impetus of this new 
turn. Recent prime examples of this are analyses by IMF- and OECD-
economists such as Cingano (2014) and Ostry et. al. (2014)  
In tandem with these international changes in discourse, comparative 
welfare state research on a global have identified broad policy trends 
that echo some aspects of the Chinese case. One such is the spread of 
social assistance schemes. This has been described as a ‘quiet 
revolution’ in developing countries (Bender et. al. 2013; Leisering & 
Barrientos 2013), although the label of ‘social assistance’ also covers 
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a wide range of schemes with very different programmatic features in 
the developing world. Until recently, patchy social insurance, which 
was regressive and covered only insiders (the group of workers in 
formal employment) was not a distinct Chinese experience. The first 
decade of the new millennium saw the enactment of social assistance 
in a range of developing economies, including big economies such as 
India, Brazil, Mexico, and, as explained here, China with the MSLS. 
While general social expenditures are still very low in most 
developing economies, spending on social assistance has become 
very high. Among many African and Middle Eastern countries, 
spending on social assistance is above 3% of GDP (compared with 
2.5% in the OECD) (Walker 2013). Social assistance makes up a very 
large share of social spending in these countries, but this also reflects 
that coverage of other forms of social protection is still very low and 
marked by strong insider-outsider divides.   
Pension and health care reforms are good examples as well. When 
reviewing social policy and drivers of change in developing countries, 
Mares & Carnes (2009:105) identify “….pension privatization as the 
wave that has swept the world” and as one of two general trends that 
received much attention, the other being the expansion of social 
policy in East Asia (as discussed in chapter 6). As the prime example 
of more universal welfare in East Asia, both Surender (2013) and 
Mares & Carnes (2009) point to the extension of health insurance in 
Taiwan and South Korea in the mid-1990s. Considering 
developments since then, it would certainly not be wrong to include 
the extension of health insurance in China (chapter 9).  
As regards pension privatization and multipillar pensions, attempts at 
developing a functioning multipillar pension system in China has 
been linked to the influence of World Bank recommendations on 
reform-minded Chinese officials in the early 1990s. The World Bank 
became prominent in promoting multipillar systems in the 1990s and 
also published a report with similar recommendations for China in 
1995 which was discussed by Chinese policymakers before the major 
reform of 1997 (see chapter 8) (Orenstein & Deacon 2014; Frazier 
2010; Salditt et. al. 2007). Several other countries adopted some form 
of multipillar systems where defined contribution-benefits dominated, 
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most of them in central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
Examples outside these regions (besides China) are Brazil, Nigeria, 
South Africa and Taiwan. At the same time, this reform trend does 
not unilaterally entail retrenchment of public pensions across 
countries. South Africa, Brazil and Mexico, for example, have 
introduced new selective public pensions within a multipillar 
framework. The selectivity of the two latter countries is not the 
traditional income-based means-test however, but targeting towards 
poorer, geographical regions (Mexico) or agricultural workers 
(Brazil). Several developing economies have even introduced 
universal social pensions, including some countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa as well as Chile, Ecuador and Brazil (Walker 2013). This 
‘sweeping’ trend of pension privatization has nuances and exceptions, 
in other words. In addition, the trend has arguably ground to a halt 
since 2005 (Orenstein & Deacon 2014).  
The examples mentioned here are not attempts at making any 
comprehensive review of social policy in developing countries (see 
for example Surender 2013; Bender et. al. 2013; Mares & Carnes 
2009), but they illustrate how the most significant Chinese reforms of 
the new millennium (health, pensions and social assistance) are not 
necessarily distinctly Chinese experiences.  
While one should be mindful of the many issues and challenges 
facing social policy in the developing world as well as the very 
different points of origin compared to the world of OECD welfare 
states, it certainly is possibly to speak of a general move towards 
more comprehensive social protection. The United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) devotes an entire chapter 
in its 2006-2010 flagship report Combating Poverty and Inequality to 
outlining the move “Towards Universal Social Protection” (with 
Korea and Taiwan as prominent showcase examples) (UNRISD 
2010). The UNRISD (2014) also undertook a new project from 2012, 
Towards Universal Social Security in Emerging Economies: Process, 
Institutions and Actors, focusing on 12 country cases and spanning 
several reports and papers, one of which is a brief review of China by 
Ringen & Ngok (2013) discussing “What Kind of Welfare State is 
Emerging in China?”  
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11.5 GLOBAL WELFARE STATE EXPANSION? 
This section will demonstrate that the above tendencies towards 
welfare state expansion in many developing economies can be 
observed with expenditure data.  
The biggest obstacle facing comparative welfare research at the 
global level is the very limited availability of comparable indicators. 
Western welfare typologizing has come to rely on an ever more 
diverse supply of indicators on welfare policies down to details on the 
programmatic level (replacement rates is one of the oldest and most 
familiar examples, for instance) as well as a broad range of welfare 
outcomes. Chapter 2 dealt with some of the most widely used datasets 
on developed welfare states as the various dimensions of social rights 
were outlined.  
The possibilities are still very limited, however, if one wishes to 
expand the scope beyond the West or developed economies. On a 
truly global level, choices are so limited that it becomes difficult to 
anchor analyses narrowly in welfare regimes. The state of global 
social policy research is therefore still very reliant on the basic and 
perhaps most important foundation of comparative research, namely 
contextual and qualitatively oriented in-depth enquiries into the 
individual country cases (which is also true of this thesis).    
Nevertheless, in recent years some internationally comparative 
datasets and information databases have become available. For 
example, Park & Jung (2013) review a range of global databases or 
datasets while focusing on East Asia, but the dataset of Mares (2005) 
also deserves mention
46
. The East Asian Social Policy Research 
                                                          
46 Park & Jung (2013) reviews the qualitative database on programmatic policy set-ups in 
Social Security Programs Throughout the World (maintained by the International Social 
Security Association and the US Social Security Administration), the Social Security 
Database (ILO), the Social Security Expenditure Database (ILO), Government Finance 
Statistics (IMF), the Social Expenditure Database (OECD) the World Income Inequality 
Database (United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research) 
and the Key Indicators (Asian Development Bank). Isabela Mares’ (2005) Social Policy 
Coverage Index spans 130 countries, but it is not publicly available. While the index is said 
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Network (EASP) has now established a project aiming to facilitate 
comparative data for the region (Hudson et. al. 2014). Available data 
including both China and several Nordic countries in a wider 
comparative context are limited, however.  
The ILO’s Social Security Enquiry covers both China and the Nordic 
countries on some indicators, specifically coverage of pensions and 
coverage of unemployment benefits, but is based on information from 
relevant country experts, usually from government ministries. It is 
evident that the data do not seem to be very reliable or comparable 
(not shown here), for example in the way that coverage rates fluctuate 
wildly between years in some countries or in the way that some 
countries report extremely high coverage of benefits. 
The qualitative Social Security Programs throughout the World 
(SSPTW) database does contain in-depth descriptions of social policy 
legislation that also covers our country cases, but the information is 
unwieldy and difficult to present in a simple, comparative format as 
we seek to do here.  Furthermore, while there may always be 
somewhat of a gap between formal legislation and actual 
implementation, it is especially true of welfare states in developing 
countries. This is due to a plethora of issues affecting the countries to 
varying degrees, for example the informal economy, lack of financial 
resources, administrative capacity, corruption or demographics 
(Walker 2013). Nevertheless, it is possible to glean some interesting 
country variations just by looking at the spectrum of schemes 
formally enacted through databases such as the SSPTW. ILO (2010), 
for example, shows how high-income countries usually have schemes 
in place that cater to nearly all social risks, while that is not at all the 
case in low-income countries. Only various forms of old-age pensions 
or work injury protection have been universally enacted in nearly all 
countries. In this section, however, we will try go a little beyond these 
very general observations and also a little further into the general 
trajectories of welfare efforts.   
                                                                                                                                       
to cover both coverage and redistribution of four types of insurance (old-age, sickness, 
disability and) it is based on formal legislation on both aspects, however.   
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In the end, what we are left with in this case is the classic object of 
first-generation comparative welfare research, namely data on social 
expenditure. The critique against this indicator as a valid measure of 
differences between welfare states is well-known. The most important 
critique is that it does not say anything about qualitative differences 
in terms of the principles underlying social rights and that social 
spending is heavily affected by fluctuations in needs (such as levels 
of unemployment or old-age dependency ratios). As Esping-Andersen 
(1990:21) noted: “It is difficult to imagine that anyone struggled for 
spending per se”. In addition, just as it is affected by changing needs, 
it does not tell us whether demands are actually being met. 
Furthermore, gross social spending may distort differences in fiscal 
welfare effort as shown by the analysis of Adema et. al. (2011) in the 
OECD countries. Nordic welfare states are not in general among the 
most expensive when we compare net social expenditures rather than 
gross social expenditures
47
.   
In this case, however, some interesting and relevant observations can 
be made with the ILO’s Social Security Expenditure Database on the 
global level, and we can also narrow our focus to the OECD and 
China and distinguish between broad categories of social spending in 
each country case.   
In figure 16 we find China alongside the range of countries available 
in OECD (2014c) data on disaggregated social spending. China is  
compared with 16 selected OECD countries, sorted into three groups 
corresponding somewhat to the classic Western worlds of welfare 
plus a fourth group which includes Chile, Japan, South Korea and 
Mexico (see also appendix C for the full range of OECD countries). 
For all OECD countries, data on three forms of protective spending is 
from 2009, while public education expenditure is from 2008 or latest 
available year. For China, expenditure data is provided for 2011. 
                                                          
47 Social spending in 2007 in Denmark, for example, drops from 30.8%  to 23.9% on this 
measure of net publicly mandated spending. Among the 27 OECD countries, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden drop from ranking, as the 3rd, 8th, 11th and 2nd highest on 
gross social expenditure, respectively, to being 7th, 9th, 13th and 3rd on net publicly mandated 
spending. 
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
286
 
Figure 16: Disaggrated public social expenditure in 16 OECD 
countries (2009/2008) and China (2011), % of GDP * 
 
 
Sources: OECD (2014c); OECD (2014d); OECD (2013a); Mok & Wong (2011) 
* For all countries but China, expenditure on 1) simply includes spending on ‘old-
age’ and ‘unemployment’ in (2014c). For China, 1) refers to ‘social security’ in 
OECD (2013a:129). The concept of ‘social security’ can be ambiguous, but for 
example the World Bank (2014) refers to a distinction between ‘social security’ and 
‘social safety net’ in its discussion on expenditure data, with the former comprising 
pensions and unemployment insurance. Still, there is a issue of comparability with 
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1). Therefore, we will refrain from drawing specific OECD-China conclusions on 
this dimension of expenditure.    
** ‘Other’ protective expenditures refers to the following categories in OECD 
(2014c): Survivors, incapacity, family, active labor market policies, housing, other. 
For China, the category represents ‘social safety net’ plus ‘housing’.  
 
In figure 16, we see how Chile, Mexico and South Korea resemble 
China to a much larger extent with very low public expenditures on 
all dimensions of welfare compared to the other, Western OECD 
countries. This is perhaps not so surprising given the limited role of 
public financing of welfare outlined in chapter 6 on East Asia. In that 
chapter, we also noted how this does not fully apply to Japan, which 
resembles the rest of the OECD more. Here we can see how this is 
particularly the case in terms of spending on health, old-age and 
unemployment, but not the remaining safety net. The figure 
substantiates the argument that East Asian countries resemble 
Western welfare states more when we include ‘productive’ welfare 
such as education and not just protective welfare.  
In figure 16, we should also note that some substantial differences can 
actually be identified across the four worlds of public welfare 
expenditure constructed here. This echoes the finding that 
disaggregated OECD social expenditure data actually does 
correspond largely to the familiar three (four if 
Southern/Mediterranean Europe is included) worlds of welfare when 
analyzed with hierarchical cluster analysis (Obinger & Wagschal 
2010). In this case, we see how Nordic and Continental Europe are 
the biggest spenders, the main difference being that the Nordic 
countries spend less on old-age and unemployment and rather more 
on the remaining social safety net. As evident from appendix C, this 
is primarily an issue of the Continental European countries having 
old-age security systems which are relatively expensive for public 
budgets. The Anglo-Saxon countries do as expected feature more 
light-weight welfare states, particularly in the case of the United 
States. Across all countries, differences are generally small regarding 
health and education expenditure, while the regime-pattern is better 
reflected on the other dimensions of spending. The Nordic countries 
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also spend more on education than the other countries in general, 
however.  
While there has been a substantial increase in public social 
expenditure in most recent years in China, it does perhaps not look 
like much when compared against the backdrop of Nordic or 
Continental Europe. It is easier to properly appreciate the significance 
of the Chinese development when seen from a more global 
perspective, although here it is not possible to disaggregate 
expenditure into different branches of welfare.  
On a global level, both the IMF and the ILO provide data for a large 
number of countries, although they do not always cover the same 
countries. In figure 17, we find data for 42 countries covered by the 
estimates of both the IMF and the ILO. Both of them are available 
from the ILO’s Social Security Expenditure Database. The most 
recent IMF data are from 2007, but we also use data from 2006 in 
those cases where data from 2007 are not available from the IMF or 
ILO. Figure 17 tells us that the data from the IMF and the ILO as 
expected correlate highly. Social expenditures are generally a little 
lower in the ILO estimates compared to those from the IMF, usually 
by less than two percentage points. Very few countries deviate from 
this, and the most notable cases are Luxembourg, Canada and Spain.  
When we include the level of social spending in China in 2000, which 
is around the time when welfare expenditure hit the rock bottom in 
China (Wang & Long 2013), we can see how China has since then 
climbed upwards. The China of 2007-2006 is comparable to South 
Korea at the same point in time, whereas the China of 2000 is 
comparable to the Hong Kong of 2007-2006, for example. Social 
expenditure in China was significantly higher than India. 
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Figure 17: Social expenditures in 42 countries according to IMF 
and ILO, 2006-2007, % of GDP
*
  
Sorce: ILO(2014) Social Expenditure Database 
* For each country, information from the last available year in 2006-2007 is used 
from the ILO and IMF. 
 
If we had included the China of 2011 with the aforementioned 
OECD-estimates (see also chapter 6), it would be closer to the small 
cluster of 2007-countries consisting of Bolivia, Albania and Chile. 
Once again, it is apparent that the Sino-Nordic comparative 
framework of this thesis (all five countries in bold) is very much one 
of opposites, since the Nordic countries are among the countries with 
highest levels of social expenditure.  
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Turning back to the more global perspective, if we use data only from 
the ILO, data up until 2012 become available (see appendix D). The 
level of social expenditure in China is comparable to other East Asian 
countries such as Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan, and 
significantly higher than Singapore and Hong-Kong. This affirms the 
divide noted in the literature on East Asia between the more 
archetypal developmental or productivist welfare in the small city 
states and the gradually more inclusive welfare in Taiwan and South 
Korea (and China, taking this dissertation into account). It also 
highlights the limitations of the functionalist account of welfare 
centered around economic development.  
We should also note that the contemporary Chinese level of 
expenditure is comparable to a number of countries outside East Asia 
as well. 16 of the 56 non-Western countries had levels of social 
expenditure between 7-10% of GDP in 2010-2012. However, when 
the available non-Western countries are sorted according to the 
changes in social expenditure since 2000, we see that only 9 countries 
among the 46 countries available in this time period has had higher 
increases in social expenditure than China (where it has increased by 
3.7% of GDP). Among the countries that spent less than 10% of GDP 
in 2000, there are only six countries which have had higher increases.  
If we look at the levels of social expenditure for all 56 non-Western 
countries since 1990, social spending has on average climbed from 
4% to 7.2% in this time period. This emphasizes the general welfare 
expansion in developing countries which has been heavily 
emphasized in the literature. This is perhaps one of the explanations 
why income inequality actually declined from the 1990s until around 
2008-2010 in many developing economies, particularly in Africa and 
South America (Kongshøj 2014c; UNDP 2013).  
11.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Our aim of investigating social citizenship in China and the Nordic 
countries has been answered across three main research questions. 
One is concerned with the normative foundations of welfare, while 
the two others concern the policy-level of the welfare state itself.  
CHAPTER 11. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
291 
Firstly, while ‘Confucianism’ and ‘egalitarian liberalism’ do constitue 
nearly ideal opposites in the world of normative citizenship thinking, 
they are not as entirely different when nuances and inherent 
ambiguities are discussed. Empirically, Chinese and Nordic citizens 
do have very different perceptions and normative orientations towards 
public welfare, but this mostly reflects how China is a strong outlier 
in some respects (in the ISSP 2009 survey). We have also seen how 
qualitatively different citizen types emerge within coutries. Among 
the four basic types within each country, one corresponds roughly to 
‘egalitarian’ liberalism while the other is more ‘Confucian’. The latter 
is more dominant in China. This could be interpreted as support for a 
Confucian social order, in which the public provides a very basic 
level of welfare, with space left for meritocratic outcomes to unfold 
and for the family to play an important role in the welfare mix. 
However, at least one individual level-dynamic questions such an 
interpretation. In contrast to the Nordic cases, higher incomes and the 
highly educated generally favor public welfare provision more than 
others in China. This matches welfare reform as it has actually taken 
place in China, and it could indicate that the demand for better public 
welfare will increase in the future (although we should of course be 
careful with using cross-sectional findings to conclude on attitude 
change over time). Other possible explanations for our findings have 
also been discussed.  
Secondly, China has taken big steps towards a ‘moderate’ universal 
welfare state. First and firemost, this has included increasing 
coverage of existing shemes and enacting new schemes in pensions, 
health care and social assistance. The hukou divide in terms of both 
coverage and generosity is less pronounced than before. On the other 
hand, inadequate or declining generosity continues to be a big 
problem in terms of social rights, as do issues with financing and 
fragmentation. The issue of fragmentation, however, appears to be the 
next politically prioritized challenge, and local experiments and 
recent national goals are promising in this regard.  
Thirdly, some historical mechanisms of ‘universalization’ and recent 
contemporary reform trends are shared between China and the Nordic 
countries. There are important intra-Nordic differences across all 
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policy fields at any point in time, but they will not be repeated here. 
The points of departure are very different, but the Nordic pension 
systems have also been adapted to become mixed multipillar or 
multitier systems, just as some retrenchment has taken place in 
unemployment protection. The Nordic pension systems, however, do 
not share the fundamental inadequacies, funding and financing issues 
or sustainability problems of the Chinese counterpart, just as Nordic 
unemployment protection is of course much more ‘universal’ than in 
China. The field of health care is where contemporary Sino-Nordic 
differences are most pronounced. However, historical similarities in 
mechanisms of ‘universalization’ can be found across all three policy 
fields if we compare China with the Nordic cases when the 
foundations for the modern, Nordic welfare states were laid. Where 
we can find some similarities, the comparable timescale is often 
relatively ‘compressed’ in China, and China is arguably battling 
welfare state expansion and restructuring at the same time. It has also 
been stressed, however, that some of the most general trends, whether 
historical or contemporary, are not exclusive to our five countries.  
It may be surprising to some that there are any similarities at all 
between China and the Nordic countries. Due to the questions posed 
initially, this dissertation has looked at broad historical trends and 
focused on policy changes while noting the differences and 
discussing the similarities more extensively. This makes it easy to 
adopt a latent functionalist view (as discussed in chapter 1) which 
undoubtedly has a lot of merit when including such diverse country 
contexts. However, as we also discussed early on when I delimited 
the dissertation from thorough explanatory analyses, it is of course 
not the whole story.  
This note is especially important as we look to the future. Most 
important are the political underpinnings of social citizenship, 
whether in terms of the welfare state or broader citizenship practices. 
We cannot discuss the future (or explain the past) without taking this 
into account.  
In the Nordic countries, the most popular explanations pertaining to 
the emergence of universal welfare regimes are class-coalitions or the 
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strength of the political left and labor unions (the latter also known as 
the ‘power resources theory’) (Manow 2009; Korpi 2006; Esping-
Andersen 1990). In chapter 10, I deliberately sorted out many 
examples (some are included in Kongshøj (2014b), however) of how 
the most important social reforms in the Nordic countries were made 
possible through broad political coalitions rooted in the industrial 
class structure, while others perhaps reflected the sheer strength of 
‘power resources’. These political dynamics were simply not part of 
our research questions.  
Still, the politics of social citizenship is important to consider if we 
want to discuss the future and assess exactly how far China will go in 
its pursuit of ‘moderate’ universalism or a more ‘harmonious’ society. 
In the Chinese case, it is difficult to see how class-coalitions and 
especially ‘power resources’ could be either significant or, if in place, 
actually push Chinese social policy to a more progressive future. The 
party-state and the internal deliberations of the CCP are of course 
most important. 
Recent research has elaborated how elite interests have driven 
increased economic inequality in the West, particularly in the United 
States (Giles & Page 2014; Hacker & Pierson 2010). In the Chinese 
case, the China-based Hurun Global Rich-list estimated in 2013 that 
about 31 dollar billionaires are represented in the National People’s 
Congress, while the American Congress (Senate and House of 
Representatives) cannot produce a single billionaire (Financial Times 
2013). The 83 wealthiest CPCC and NPC delegates have an estimated 
fortune of on average 3.35 billion USD, compared with an average of 
56.4 million USD for the 83 wealthiest American Congress members. 
The NPC and the American Congress cannot be compared in terms of 
decision-making power, but it illustrates the relative position of 
Chinese policymakers. This applies to the very top of the CCP, the 
Politburo, as well. Furthermore, revolving-door job changes between 
top positions in both politics and business (in strategic SOEs) are 
formalized in the ‘nomenklatura’ system of the CCP (Brødsgaard 
2012).  
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Any ‘Chinese Dream’ of a more progressive welfare state looks bleak 
and distant with this outlook. Yet, the very important reform impetus 
of the past 10-15 years has taken place within this context. From a 
more functionalist perspective, we might say that the political 
contestations that have been so visible and manifest in Western 
welfare history are to some extent just taking place within the Party 
since it harbors several ideological divides (Christensen 2010).  
Sinologists have emphasized the relative ‘resilience’ of the CCP in 
terms of adapting and staying in power, but the political strength of 
the central state should certainly not be overplayed either (Pei 2014; 
Li 2012). We might say that those who expected the CCP to head 
straight off into the abyss have been proven wrong, but also that the 
CCP has never been on entirely safe and firm ground either. Rather, it 
has been a long balancing act.   
Exactly in which direction the CCP will be pushed depends not only 
on the internal deliberations of the CCP, but also on the efforts to 
increase social legitimacy as described in chapter 1. If these efforts 
manage to meet some of the attitudes and expectations uncovered in 
chapter 5, the policy path of increasing ‘moderate’ universalism 
(chapters 7-10) is locked in for a while yet. It is up for discussion 
whether it in the long run will amount to more than just a slightly 
more inclusive policy ensemble where the ethic of Confucian 
benevolence (chapter 4) is a little more pronounced than before. On 
the other hand, welfare history has seen before how quite 
encompassing social policies can develop from the initially limited 
ambitions among policymakers.  
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 Sino-Nordic percetions and Appendix B.
normative orientations (index score) 
 
Variable  Country Country 
averag.
1 
CN DK FI NO SE DE JP KR 
Index measure 0-100
2 
Survey: ISSP 2009 
Inequality 
too high
 
 82  65  72  63  73  84 78  83  80 
Ineq. govt. 
responsib.  
76 57 73 58 64 67 64 73 71 
Unemp. 
govt. res.
 
78 82 76 71 75 65 72 77 72 
Poor less 
benefits
 
56 20 25 26 28 27 26 23 31 
Progress.  
Taxes
3 
73 69 78 68 72 78 80 85 75 
High taxes 
on rich
4 
40 50 35 46 43 38 36 28 41 
Just: Rich 
buy heal.
5 
65 32 36 33 27 28 42 37 36 
Just: Rich 
buy edu.
5 
68 26 31 31 26 26 46 46 38 
Conflict 
poor/rich
6 
60 31 46 37 46 56 42 74 48 
Conflict 
work/mid
6 
46 22 33 28 34 37 - 57 35 
Ideal 
society
7 
74 80 76 77 78 67 70 75 74 
Perceived 
society
7 
30 63 50 64 51 39 42 38 34 
Survey: WVS 2005-2009 
Benefits 
humiliate 
68 - 53 59 47 54 59 66 64 
No work 
lazy
 
74 - 64 59 49 58 72 84 72 
Demo. tax 
rich
8 
73 - 66 62 60 69 63 72 62 
Demo. 
unemp.
8
 
82 - 74 69 68 79 66 66 70 
APPENDIX B. SINO-NORDIC PERCETIONS AND NORMATIVE ORIENTATIONS (INDEX SCORE) 
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1 
Country-level average of all countries in the survey (ISSP = 37-38 countries, WVS 
= 48-53 countries) 
2 
This index score is based on the values assigned to individual responses and then 
transformed to a score ranging from 0 to 100. For example, if a variable has four 
response categories (1-4) and the mean of the responses from the sample population 
of a country is 2.5, then the index score will be 50 (as a mean of 3 on a 1-5 item 
would also be). 
3 “Much larger” and “larger” share reported 
4 “Much too high” and “Too high” reported 
5
  “Very just, definitely right” and “Somewhat just, right” reported 
6   “Very strong conflicts” and “strong conflicts” reported 
7  “
Type D: A society with most people in the middle” and “Type E: Many people 
near the top, and only a few near the bottom” reported 
8 “responses 6-10 on a 0-10 scale reported 
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 Disaggregated social Appendix C.
expenditures in 33 OECD countries, 
2008-2009 
          
Country Old 
age 
Survi
vors 
Inca
paci
ty 
Heal
th  
Fa
mil
y  
Activa 
labor 
marke
t 
Unem
ploy
ment  
Hou
sing 
Oth
er  
Tot
al 
Australia 4.9 0.2 2.3 6.2 2.8 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 17.
8 
Austria 12 2 2.5 7.3 2.9 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.3 29.1 
Belgium 8.1 2.1 2.5 8.1 2.8 1.4 3.7 0.2 0.8 29.7 
Canada 4.1 0.4 0.9 8 1.1 0.3 1 0.4 2.9 19.2 
Chile 2.8 0.8 0.9 3.7 1.5 0.2 0.1 1 0.3 11.3 
Czech 7.8 0.7 2.2 6.7 1.8 0.2 1 0.1 0.1 20.7 
Denmark 8.2 0 4.9 7.7 3.9 1.6 2.3 0.7 0.9 30.2 
Estonia 7.9 0.1 2.7 5.2 2.6 0.2 1.1 0 0.1 20 
Finland 10.2 0.9 4.1 6.8 3.3 0.9 2 0.5 0.7 29.4 
France 12.3 1.8 2 9 3.2 1 1.5 0.8 0.4 32.1 
Germany 9.1 2.2 2.3 8.6 2.1 1 1.7 0.6 0.2 27.8 
Greece 10.9 2.2 1 6.5 1.4 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 23.9 
Hungry 9.1 1.4 2.7 5.1 3.6 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.1 23.9 
Iceland 2.2 0 2.7 6.2 4 0 1.7 1 0.7 18.5 
Ireland 4.5 1.1 2.4 7.1 4.1 0.9 2.6 0.3 0.6 23.6 
Italy 13 2.6 1.9 7.4 1.6 0.4 0.8 0 0 27.8 
Japan 10.4 1.4 1 7.2 1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 22.2 
Korea 2.1 0.3 0.6 4 0.8 0.6 0.4  0.8 9.6 
Luxembo
urg 
5.8 1.9 2.7 6.6 4 0.5 1.2 0.3 0.5 23.6 
Mexico 1.4 0.3 0.1 3.1 1.1 0 .. 1.3 0.9 8.2 
Netherla
nds 
5.8 0.2 3.1 7.9 1.7 1.2 1.4 0.4 1.4 23.2 
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New 
Zeland 
4.5 0.2 2.8 8.3 3.5 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.2 21.2 
Norway 7.1 0.3 4.7 6.2 3.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.7 23.3 
Poland 9.8 2 2.3 5.2 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 21.5 
Portugal 10.6 1.8 2.1 7.2 1.5 0.8 1.2 0 0.3 25.6 
Slovakia 6.4 0.9 2 6 2 0.2 0.7 0 0.4 18.7 
Slovenia 9.2 1.7 2.2 6.8 1.3 0.3 0.5 0 0.5 22.6 
Spain 7.7 2.2 2.7 7 1.5 0.9 3.5 0.2 0.3 26 
Sweden 10.2 0.5 5 7.3 3.7 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.7 29.8 
Switzerla
nd 
6.2 0.3 2.9 6 1.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.6 18.5 
Turkey 5.8 1.1 0.4 5.4 0 0 0.1 .. .. 12.8 
United 
Kingdom 
6.7 0.1 2.9 8.1 3.8 0.3 0.5 1.5 0.2 24.1 
USA 6.1 0.8 1.5 8.3 0.7 0.2 0.9 .. 0.7 19.2 
OECD 
total 
7.3 1 2.4 6.6 2.3 0.5 1.1 0.7 0.8 22.1 
           Source: OECD (2014d) 
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 Social expenditure in 56 Appendix D.
non-Western countries, 1990-2012 
 
Country 1990 2000 2010-2012 
(latest year) 
Change, 
2000 – 
2010-
2012  
Russia 12.0 10.1 17.8 7.7 
Japan 11.1 16.3 23.6 7.3 
Kyrgyzstan 8.6 3.7 9.6 5.9 
Armenia 4.3 3.1 8.8 5.8 
Rwanda 1.9 2.2 7.3 5.2 
Brazil 13.7 16.3 21.3 5.0 
Egypt 4.4 8.6 13.2 4.6 
Korea 2.8 4.8 9.1 4.3 
Jordan 7.1 8.4 12.1 3.7 
China 5.2 4.7 8.4 3.7 
Ecuador 1.4 1.1 4.4 3.3 
Georgia 5.0 5.1 8.2 3.1 
South Africa 6.0 6.9 9.8 2.9 
Burkina Faso   3.5 6.3 
2.8 
Ghana 2.2 3.1 5.4 2.3 
Viet Nam 2.5 4.1 6.3 2.2 
Senegal 4.3 3.4 5.3 1.9 
Argentina 15.1 16.5 18.1 1.7 
Burundi 1.7 3.7 5.3 1.6 
Bangladesh 0.7 1.1 2.7 1.6 
Kiribati   8.5 10.1 1.6 
Zambia 2.3 3.9 5.5 1.6 
Panama 3.4 5.1 6.6 1.5 
Saint Lucia   4.5 6.0 1.5 
Pakistan 1.5 0.3 1.7 1.4 
APPENDIX D. SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN 56 NON-WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1990-2012 
 
APP 333 
 
Paraguay 1.6 5.0 6.4 1.3 
Honduras 2.9 3.1 4.4 1.3 
Singapore 1.4 1.6 2.8 
1.2 
Peru 2.3 5.7 6.9 1.1 
Kenya 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.1 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
5.8 7.2 8.2 
1.1 
India 1.7 1.6 2.6 0.9 
Venezuela 4.5 6.1 6.9 0.8 
Jamaica 4.5 3.6 4.4 0.8 
Hong Kong 2.4 4.5 5.2 0.6 
Guatemala 2.0 3.8 4.4 0.6 
Philippines 1.1 1.1 1.5 0.5 
Nepal 2.0 1.7 2.2 0.5 
Zimbabwe 3.3 5.6 5.6 0.0 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 5.0 5.6 5.6 0.0 
Guyana 4.6 8.2 8.2 -0.1 
Grenada   4.7 4.3 -0.4 
Papua New Guinea 3.3 3.8 3.2 -0.6 
Sri Lanka 5.3 4.4 3.0 -1.4 
Chile 9.9 12.8 11.3 -1.6 
Kazakhstan 7.5 8.7 6.4 -2.3 
Iran 4.7   12.5  
Thailand 1.5   7.2  
Tanzania 1.9   6.8  
Mexico 3.3   7.5  
Taiwan 8.0   9.7  
Ethiopia 1.5   3.2  
Sudan 1.1   2.3  
Madagascar 1.4   2.4  
Algeria 7.6   8.5  
Malaysia 2.7   3.0  
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Average 4.0 5.4 7.2 1.8 
Source: ILO (2014) 
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In tandem with official goals of building a ‘moderate’ universal welfare state, 
social policy in China has witnessed a transformative turn in the new millen-
nium. In Northern Europe, the Nordic countries have long been perceived to 
be the hallmark of relatively universal welfare states. However, the ‘Nordic 
model’ is also subject to restructuring and significant intra-Nordic diversi-
ty. Considering both contemporary and historical policy reform trajectories, 
some similarities emerge between China and the Nordic countries, even if 
China is closest to other East Asian welfare systems. We also see how China 
is still facing big challenges in terms of securing adequate and sustainable 
social protection within the multitude of new policy schemes. As we leap 
back and forth between these two very different corners of the world, it be-
comes apparent that the normative foundations of welfare certainly are dif-
ferent, both from the normative-theoretical and the empirical perspective. 
However, a shared trait is the belief in active social policymaking as condu-
cive to social cohesion. 
